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ABSTRACT
This is a study of Japan and Taiwan's different responses to the expansion of the global
drug industry. The thesis focuses on the problematic of "voicing," of how a state can make its
interests heard in the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). The ICH is a unique project that
facilitates the formation of a single global market by creating universal standards for clinical
trials and drug approvals. Tracing, through "slow motion" ethnography, step by step, why
Japan claims a racial difference requires additional local clinical trials with "Asian bodies,"
this thesis rejects conventional interpretations of protectionism for Japan's resistance to
globalization. It argues that more than protectionism is involved, and that a rich ethnographic
understanding of Japan's medical infrastructure is required to understand the claim of
biological, cultural, and national differences, as well as biostatistical arguments about the
ambiguities of "extrapolation" of clinical data from one place to another.
The inherent ambiguities of efforts to create "bridging" studies as a temporary solution
to these problematics created a deadlock in the ICH, and provided an opening for Taiwan,
another Asian state, which does not enjoy formal recognition from the world, to speak for
itself to this conference, and to create the fragile, but politically critical, possibility of
becoming a clinical trial center for Asian populations. The language of genomics and
biostatistics become in the more recent period the vehicles for both Japanese and Taiwanese
efforts at "voicing" their concerns. Both genomics and biostatistics look different in these
contexts than they do from the United States or European Union.
In sum, (1) Japan's and Taiwan's response, as well as "global ethnographic objects" such
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as the ICH, provide important tools to rethink the comparative method as well as
universalizing claims of harmonization. (2) Race, culture, and the nation-state are transformed
as categories through the contemporary reworkings of genomics and biostatistics. (3) The
thesis demonstrates that abstract accounts of the spread of clinical trials and resistance in
various parts of the world are not to be trusted unless they include detailed probings of local
understandings, identity issues, and problems of voicing.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael M. J. Fischer
Title: Professor of Anthropology and Social Study of Science and Technology (STS)
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2001
MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan (reorganized as the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2001).
MOSS U.S.-Japan Market-oriented, Sector-selected Discussion
NDMC National Defense Medical Center (Taiwan)
NHRI National Health Research Institute (Taiwan)
NTE Annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (USA)
NTU National Taiwan University
OPSR Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and Research (kiko, reorganized as
part of PMDEC in 2004)
PANDRH Pan American Network on Drug Regulatory Harmonization
PBS Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (Australia)
PhRMA Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (renamed from PMA
in 1994)
PMA Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (renamed as PhRMA in 1994)
PMDEC Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Evaluation Center
PWPA Professors World Peace Academy (Japan)
ROC Republic of China (Taiwan)
SDAC Southern African Development Community
SRB Strategic Review Board, Executive Yuan (Taiwan)
STR Special Trade Representative (renamed as USTR in 1979)
TGA Therapeutic Goods Administration (Australia)
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UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USTR United States Trade Representative
WHA World Health Assembly
WHO World Health Organization
YMU National Yang-Ming University (Taiwan)
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Acronyms
ACTD ASEAN common technical document
ADME absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion
ADR adverse drug reaction
AUC area under concentration (of a drug in the body)
CCDP complete clinical data package (ICH)
c-GMP current good manufacturing practice
Cmax maximum effective concentration (of a drug in the body)
Cmin minimal effective concentration
CRO contracted research organization
DTC direct to consumer
E5 fifth guideline on efficacy (of the ICH)
EWG expert working group (ICH)
FTA free trade area
GCP good clinical practice
GDP gross domestic production
GMP good manufacturing practices
HLA human leukocyte antigens
IND investigational new drug application
IP intellectual property
IRB institutional review board (for clinical trials)
JIRB joint institutional review board (for clinical trials)
MRSD maximum recommended starting dose
NDA new drug application
NIEs newly industrializing economics




R&D research and development
T1 therapeutic index (Cmax/Cmin)
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Chapter 1
Prologue: An STS Inquiry into the Nation-State as It Encounters Bio-Globalization
A collectivity united in a belief is a culture. That is what the term means. More
particularly, a collectivity united in a false belief is a culture. Truths,
especially demonstrable truths, are available to all and sundry. But errors,
dramatic errors, are culture-specific. They do tend to be the badges of
community and loyalty.
Ernest Gellner'
Who has seen the wind? Neither I nor you;




"Ridiculous Race" and "Nationalist Mania"
You may be puzzled by the juxtaposition of a quotation from the political scientist
Ernest Gellner and two lines by the poet Christina Georgina Rossetti. Their connection is
not apparent. I shall try to explain by introducing two scenes I happened to encounter
during my fieldwork on the pharmaceutical industry.
The first scene took place at midnight. After a long day of writing, I sat before my
computer, idly clicking through some e-mail. One was from an American (a Caucasian)
anthropologist I am acquainted with. He had been browsing through a website devoted to
the pharmaceutical business and had come upon a PowerPoint presentation that illustrated,
he said, the "irrational" insistence of many Japanese that they differed from all other
races. The tone of this e-mail message gave me the impression that I had been added to
the list or recipients in the middle of a long discussion between some anthropologists,
copied when the topic moved to Asia. The way the Japanese evaluated race fascinated the
message's author: he was bewildered by the extremely long list of so-called extrinsic and
intrinsic factors that appeared in the PowerPoint presentation. So Andrew, as I shall call
him, wrote:
"The Coming Fin de Millenaire," in Ernest Gellner. 1996 [1995]:244.
2 "Who Has Seen the Wind?," in Sing-song: A Nursery Rhyme Book (1893 [1872]).
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i [sic] find [it] an interesting complication of the meaning of ethnic/race
differences. They have approximately 20 slides full of factors that may account
for "ethnic difference" in clinical trials. With the following conclusion [Andrew
inserted here the original presentation slide, as shown in fig. 1.1]:
Fig. 1.1 Why Are E5 Guidelines Not Accepted? Japanese Are Different from
Others
Why are E-5 Guidelines
not Accepted?
, Japanese are different from others
/ Endpoints are not the same
/ Placebo controlled trials are culturally less
well accepted
/ Clinical trials are difficult to do in Japan
" Medical practice is different
/ Diet affects a drug's actions
/ Sunshine, air pollution and other similar
things are different in Japan O
QUINTLES
Source: Trygstad 2003.
Andrew was fascinated by the Japanese definition of race. But when we go back to
the original presentation, 3 which was made by the executive director of Japan Hawaii
Alliance, Quintiles Transnational Commercialization Group,4 we can better understand
Japan's racial discourse. It is real but absurd, absurd but real. From biological ethnicity
and medical practices to lifestyle and culture, including even sunshine, everything is
different in Japan. What strikes us as ridiculous and funny is the use of "different" (and
its synonyms) as the key concept in understanding the Japanese race, with race extended
to include everything found on the Japanese archipelago.5
Moreover, the form in which they appear makes these criteria look funny. This is
not idle gossip but a summary of how racial difference was manifested in clinical trails
performed by Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW). It participates in
a scientific discourse, or at least, it is written in scientific terms, which have immediate
3 The presentation was made at New York Pharmaceutical Forum on November 5 2003. See Trygstad
2003.
4 It is one of the biggest contract research organizations (CROs) in the world. Founded in the United
States in 1982, Quintiles has grown into a global giant in the area of clinical trials; it now has branch offices,
laboratories, and research sites in every continent except Oceania.
5 In fact, on Quintiles' world map, Japan and Korea are separated from other countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. I will return to this point later in this chapter.
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practical implications, namely, whether a drug should be granted official approval for sale
in Japan. Andrew's reaction casts doubt on the practicality of the Japanese definition of
such a sensitive concept, on the very assumption that race exists.
I assume that this is why the presentation was brought to my attention. Race, in the
American scene, is a troublesome term. Didn't the American Anthropological Association
urge census takers to stop collecting statistics based on race, saying that the concept of
race was based on pseudoscience? The group stated that if biological information were
not the objective, terms with a biological resonance added nothing to the precision, rigor,
or factual basis of information being collected. If biological terms are confusing, now the
Japanese have added to the confusion by bringing in non-biological terms. The message
Andrew read in the PowerPoint presentation was not how advanced our current
understanding of racial differences was; Andrew was just fascinated that, in a global era,
Japanese people might imagine that they were racially different from others and would
express this idea so naively.
But after replying to Andrew's e-mail message I asked myself whether there was
any way to make sense of Japan's approach by working from the assumption that it was
rational and not a strategic ploy in international trade. After all, when I interviewed
Tominaga Toshiyoshi, an officer of the MHLW who had translated the E5 guideline
mentioned in that slide from English to Japanese, he admitted that he did not see any
difference between race and nation. He recalled that he had originally translated the term
race asjinshu, which is more biological and closer to the original meaning of race, but
his supervisor had changed it to minzoku, a term referring broadly to both the state and
race.6 This change provides a key insight into the Japanese attitude, since they see no
significant difference between race and nation-state.7 And I recalled Gellner's
reflections on the long entanglement of anthropology and politics, which I quoted at the
beginning of this chapter. According to Gellner, a nation is a constructed artifact,
6 In Japanese there are two sets of terms roughly corresponding to the concept of race and ethnicity in
English: while minzoku and shudan refer to cultural and social factors, jinshu and shuzoku refer to
biological factors. But for our purposes I will use the term minzoku as a shorthand for that which is
considered the base of the Japanese nation.
7 Minzoku, like its Chinese equivalent minzhu and minjok in Korean, reflects a complicated process
of translating terms and concepts from one part of the world to another during modernization. Even so,
concerning the uses of minzoku in the making of modem Japan, Hiroshi Yasuda's historical study clarifies
the inseparable relationship of minzoku with the state (1992). According to Yasuda, minzoku is a cultural
device used as the foundation when Japan transformed into modern state. Within this process, the emphasis
on different aspect of its meaning varied in different periods, from a certain set of relation between the state
or the emperor and its people to a biological one that facilitates the imaginary construction of a
homogeneous Japanese race. At the end, as the author suggests, the tradition of minzoku has, on the one
hand, a clear racist meaning, but on the other hand, it can only considered with the state that legitimatize its
existence (72).
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inseparable from culture, itself another construction. In addition, he suggested that a
culture's collective specificity resided in what it considered false. If, instead of hastily
rejecting such preconceptions we consider them seriously as one aspect of the
nation-state, we might be able to explain Japan's attitude toward its race. The indexes
used by the Japanese to differentiate themselves from others may seem strange, but they
provide a starting point for thinking about the state that supports such ideas and the race,
according to the Japanese definition, that supports such a state.
The second scene had taken place some months earlier in a hotel shuttle on the way
to the University of California, Irvine, where an anthropological workshop on global
capital was being held. I was there to present a paper about the standardization of
pharmaceuticals and its impact on East Asia. Since there were no other passengers on the
shuttle, I had a relaxed, pleasant chat with the driver, an immigrant from Mexico, who
had just started this part-time job. "Mike" kindly described his experience as a foreigner
and a minority - exciting, yet definitely not easy. He talked and I listened. After a while,
Mike asked my nationality, possibly out of simple courtesy (I look distinctively East
Asian and speak English with a noticeable accent). Having run into many people who
confuse my homeland with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand
(Thailand certainly sounds like Taiwan), I decided not to test his knowledge of world
politics or my English. I replied, slowly, taking care with my accent, letter by letter:
"T-a-i-w-a-n."
To my surprise, Mike was familiar with Taiwan and immediately responded with a
sharp and straightforward question: "Huh. Do you believe that your country is
independent'?" Maybe he wanted to show that he was quite familiar with Taiwan. In any
case, I was intrigued. Let me say that my academic experience in the United States has
convinced me never to touch this topic on any public occasion. Of course, it is, in itself, a
difficult topic. Area studies specialists have their own way of connecting the island's
society and culture to the web of knowledge. Those in science studies, who prefer science
and technology's universal effects, do not accord Taiwan any special importance. For
them, an industry or a laboratory is a more valid research subject. But what really
prevented me from discussing Taiwan in academic circles was a fear of becoming
confused by a peculiar political grammar. In the question "Do you believe that your
country is independent?" nearly every word is troublesome. Who, for instance, is able to
determine Taiwan's political status? What is meant by believing in a state's political
status? The very expression your country assumes a great deal, possibly too much. When
can we say a state is independent? Independent from what?
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Somehow, without realizing how "wrong" and how complicated some might think
his question, the shuttle driver knew that asking it was the most direct way to enter into a
close relationship with a Taiwanese person. This was not the conventional greeting that
Americans who know something about Taiwan tend to offer on first meeting a Taiwanese
person here. To be greeted with a "Ni hao" or a "Xing hui" ("How are you?" and "Nice to
meet you" in Mandarin) does nothing for me, though no doubt these phrases are meant
kindly. It seems to me, a Taiwanese native, that the most moving greeting is not a
confirmatory sentence but a question.8 So I said to Mike, not at all answering his
question, "You must know about this from a Taiwanese." And he admitted that he had
discussed the subject with a Taiwanese immigrant who had helped him get his job. And
he told me the story of this Taiwanese immigrant, whom I will call Hu.9 Like many
immigrants, Hu moved to the United States for economic reasons - and for economic,
cultural, and social reasons was marginalized by American society. But what amazed me
was the topic he chatted about with his friends - apparently he talked nonstop about
building a Taiwanese nation; Mike must have ended up thinking that all Taiwanese have a
mania for politics and that all are devout nationalists. Hu had often spoken with him
about Taiwan's politics, Taiwan's relations with the PRC, Taiwan's failure to get a seat at
the United Nations, and so forth. Mike might not have felt a need to belong to a nation,
but he sympathized with Hu's desperation.
Mike's comment revived my own reflections on Taiwan's national problem, which I
had forgotten. I can understand his ignorance about the nation. In a world of nation-states,
the state is everywhere yet barely felt in our everyday lives. This is why Christina
Rossetti's image of wind is appropriate for understanding nation-states in the modern
world. Just so, political scientists are forever trying to give the nation and nationalism a
definition, but in vain: it is so abstract that it can be seen only in how people live and
react to it. No matter how artificial and contingent they are - or perhaps because they
are - the nation and the state have become an inseparable part of the constitution of the
modem world. Gellner has even said that it is obvious that now an individual must have a
nationality, just as she or he must have a nose and two ears (Gellner 1983: 6).
But what of those born without an internationally recognizable nationality? Gellner
failed to take into account this tricky situation, which is the starting point for the present
8 This question can be interpreted in another way, namely, as in inquiry into the gap between a
generally recognized political status and the aspirations of the mass of the people. Later in this thesis I will
return to this alternative.
9 This fictitious name is inspired by the main character in Jonathan D. Spence's historical investigation,
The Question of Hu (Vintage, 1989), a tragic tale of a sixteenth-century Chinese man, John Hu, thought to
have lost his mind after being brought to Europe by Jesuit missionaries.
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study. Hu's manic longing for a nation (or, for him, a clear nationality) should be
reassessed. Is every Taiwanese a nationalist? Why don't the Taiwanese take their
nationality for granted, as others do? If the state is remote from most Taiwanese, as it is
from most of the Earth's inhabitants, why is Taiwan's nationhood a part of their everyday
conversation? Whether or not the cry for a nation is a valid inquiry in global politics or
international relations, it seems to me that it is already an anthropological phenomenon
deserving of serious study.
After sending Andrew my reply, I sat in my room and started thinking about
whether questions about the state should carry more weight in my study of the
pharmaceutical industry and globalization. I could not help recalling the moment when I
got off that shuttle in Irvine. I thanked Mike and asked him to send my regards to his
friend Hu. But he told me he couldn't: a month after learning that his wife had an ovarian
tumor, Hu had returned with her to Taiwan, where his wife, otherwise uninsured, had
health insurance. For Hu, the nation is not the purely imaginary artifact described by
academics. I asked myself: How is Taiwan's statehood presented and, given this peculiar
statehood, what does Taiwan fail to give its people as ordinary citizens in the world?
An Interdisciplinary Inquiry into STS: Bringing the State Back into the
Technoscientific Worldl °
Perhaps my readers are having trouble seeing the relationship between the two
vignettes and the present thesis. As I hinted above, my study began long before I met
Mike and got a note from Andrew. My topic had been decided in 1999, when I learned
about Viagra (sildenafil citrate), then just approved for use in Taiwan and Japan after
having been developed in the United States. From 2001 to 2002 did archival research at
the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology in Tokyo. I was hoping to
trace the social and cultural influences of Viagra, from the global level to the level of
individual users. During my stay in Japan I noticed abnormalities in the reviewing
process for the drug and interviewed a handful of people who provided useful comments.
I also heard about other Western-developed products that had run into problems when
10 This abbreviation refers to the academic field devoted to "science, technology, and society" and to
"science and technology studies" and even to a certain research agenda devoted to "social studies of science
and technology." Examples of the last would be the program devoted to the sociology of scientific
knowledge at Edinburgh University and the actor-network theory proposed by Bruno Latour at the Centre
de Sociologie de l'Innovation, tcole Nationale Sup6rieure des Mines in Paris. Rather than cling to any one
of these schools of thought, the present thesis is my attempt to include every approach and discipline that
might be useful in dealing with the issues.
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their manufacturers tried to export them to Japan. However, this material could not be
accommodated by my original plan.
Let me explain the above situation through an example from the history of science.
My previous conception of the world of pharmaceuticals can be described as an
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model of the universe, in which the state functions as the lunar
sphere that demarcates the "empirical" and "abstract" worlds (fig. 1.2). Below the state
level, the world of pharmaceuticals is observable and experience-based. In contrast,
beyond the state lies a purely abstract world that nothing except theories can enter." So
far, this is fine. Relating abstract theories about the world to local experiences can be a
challenge, but certainly there has been excellent research on how science and technology
have affected American people's lives. This does not mean that I could not simply apply
this to what I observed in East Asia, but over time I came to see this approach as
unconvincing.
Fig. 1.2. Model of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic Universe, in Which the
Lunar Sphere (indicated by red arrow) Is the Boundary Separating the
Empirical World from the Abstract One
Source: Galileo Project website at http://galileo.rice.edu/sci/
theories/ptolemaic_system.html.
The problem was that everything depended on the position from which observations
were made. In my original plan, the United States was regarded as the center of the world.
Like the Earth in the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model, the United States not only has
geographical importance but also ontologically preempts all other claims; from this
position researchers can only elaborate the universe as they conceive of it. 12 In studies of
11 An anthropological version of this situation can be found in the "crisis of representation" described
in Marcus and Fischer 1999, Chapter 1, esp. 11-12.
12 This criticism was accepted among some Western scholars after the appearance of Edward Said's
II_ ; I_ _ _~~ ~_I~ ~_I^ ~IC ~~ _;~~
the United States, the state itself, like the Moon in the Earth-centered cosmological model,
does not play a crucial role in practice. The material sphere, according in medieval
theories, was "gradual," starting in the lunar area and ending in the starry dome. The
lunar sphere is attenuated and imperceptible, existing only in theories.
To return to my situation. When I tried to use this model to describe individuals
living outside of the United States, such as those in Japan and Taiwan, I found
inconsistencies among local concerns and outsiders' concerns. The Asian states do not
present a neutral interface through which our ideas about the world can be easily
projected. It could be said that what I learned in the United States was an "Americentric"
view of the world; I have since switched to a "local-centric" one (an anthropologist on
Mars). Traveling back and forth between these states and the "center of the world" has
enabled me to "see the wind" by watching the "trembling leaves." For me, the state is a
lens that refracts the anthropologist's view.
My exchanges with Andrew and Mike did not change the field I had been working
in - I still work on East Asia and the pharmaceutical industry - but they did change my
subject and my viewpoint. I began to wonder whether the state, which has long been
considered merely an intermediate between the global and the individual, really matters
in a technoscientific world empowered by science and technology and unified by shared
ways of living and thinking.13 I decided to expand my field to make it international and I
took as my topic the interactions between the state and the world.
This provoked a range of conceptual problems. The first is related to the meaning of
global in this study. In conventional anthropological discourse, the world, if mentioned,
functions largely as the background for local activities. As a result, the world tends to be
portrayed in an abstract manner. There may be sound questions about whether the whole
image of world can be obtained from selective observations, but if one shifts the scale of
research from the individual to the state, this criticism can be dodged. Then one can pose
questions about the world itself, such as, how can we find a world we are able to describe?
Obviously, if I cast the world as one of my main characters and not merely as background
pioneering work on the Western view of the Islamic world, Orientalism (1979). Said evaluated and
criticized the long tradition of writings about the Middle East generated by Western travelers, scholars, and
colonizers who had created a set of fantastical images of their "Other." These fantasies assumed a palpable
form in the capital circulation of knowledge and material, becoming an integral part of European material
civilization and culture. Although my project deals with how Asia is misinterpreted by some American
scholars, I have refrained from adopting a Saidian perspective.
13 For a brief review of the term technoscience and its meaning in the context of science, technology
and society studies, see Fischer 2003: 416 n. 3. Later in the present chapter I will explain why biology
should be considered a new and challenging realm in my project.
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in this anthropological discourse, one solution might be to draw up a self-contained
theory about it that is convincing enough to its readers, but since I am interested in
something else I set myself the task of defining a world that is restricted yet can be
empirically described, only to wonder whether such a world exists.
Another problem is how to treat the state as a workable subject. Although the scenes
I observed over the course of my fieldwork have some shared characteristics, this does
not mean that the state is the appropriate level of analysis. Here Gellner's argument on
the formation of nations is useful. It is the attributes of nation-states that configure the
world: French cuisine, Japanese bonsai, Taiwanese tea. Using a computer metaphor, we
can say that the world is a hard disk that is conceptually "formatted" by nation-states.
Though political scientists offer formalistic definitions that clarify the difference between
nations and states, in practice one may speak of them in terms of the subjects they assume:
there is the entity that international organizations can deal with and there is the different
entity that allays the anxiety of an individual like Mr. Hu.
Even if the state can be a subject for study, we still have to figure out how it can be
represented. To put this question more precisely, how can we cast a state as a person? We
are often told that the world is a global village and states are residents. We read in the
international section of newspapers that "Germany and France finally signed the
agreement," "the United States attacked Iraq," "Russia is involved in a territorial dispute
with Japan," and so forth - the grammar implies that the state functions and behaves like
a person. Even so, we need to go beyond the explanations provided by studies of
international relations, which simply render the state synonymous with government. In
addition, the presumed predictability of governmental behavior, subject to universal rules
of rationality and describable through game theory, may make governments seem like
political scientists' understanding of people, but it only makes states seem less human by
anthropological standards. Gellner has shown us that sometimes the state is not
rational - he ascribes this to culture and thus to nationalism. My project, then, is to
explain why Japan looks "irrational" in a scientific field such as biomedicine, which
supposedly acts independently of politics. My tasks are as follows: first, to search out the
logic of nationalist discourses in the technoscientific world; second, to see how this logic
is presented through the state.
After these tasks have been accomplished, a third task, possibly the most
challenging, remains: writing a single and comprehensible narrative describing more than
one state and more than one worldview. In other words, I need a method. Certainly, this
would not be a problem if I believed that the world could be objectively conceived. Like
Copernicus, I could write a new book on the world by abandoning the
28
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic model and putting the sun in the middle of things, filling my
literature review with complaints about how stupid my predecessors were to believe in
any other model. I could even add a meta-analysis about this switch of worldviews, as
Thomas Kuhn did in his pioneering Copernican Revolution (1957). Unfortunately, recent
science, technology, and society (STS) thinking frowns on such a progressive narrative.
The argument offered by anthropologist Michael Fischer in "Modules for a Science,
Technology, and Society Curriculum: STS@the-turn_[]000.mit.edu" suggests some of the
complexity that is being sought in the contemporary discourse on science (2003: 334-39).
Over the course of explaining why he begins his history of science with the scientific
revolution, Fischer notes that the main reason is not "its temporal priority or presumptive
content, but because the seventeenth century had become within the world of STS a
central arena for social theory and mutual borrowing between historians and
anthropologists" (334). Indeed, the scientific revolution is a period that is much studied,
especially by those with an interdisciplinary disposition. However, this pedagogical
statement also reminds us that there is more than one way to understand a period like this.
Fischer then uses a series of examples to show how the scientific revolution should be
considered not as a universally agreed upon historical fact but rather an event
ontologically located, for historians, in the context of periodization, and for
anthropologists, in cultural encounters. According to Fischer, the scientific revolution
deserves an interdisciplinary narrative, which is possible since "the presumptive division
between the work of historians and anthropologists ha[s] already broken down" (339). If I
want to develop a thesis describing not one state but many, featuring not one viewpoint
but many, my main challenge would be that of describing a world where many
"local-centered" schemes coexist and, on the level of narrative, synthesizing these
conflicting views into an understandable narrative.14
Fischer has suggested a practical way to initiate such an interdisciplinary discussion.
He asks, quite simply and straightforwardly, "What is at stake" (339)?'5 As for the
interaction between states within the context of globalization, two interrelated questions
should be kept in mind. First, part of my subjective analysis concerns how the voice of
the state comes to be heard through research. This question is crucial because it
determines the characteristics of my narrative. International studies are not new to the
14 I do not admit the existence of a "standard" worldview acknowledged by all other worldviews. I
prefer to think in terms of a "pre-paradigmatic" period in which no model dominates.
15 In writing the present STS study, I have tried to avoid the debates within cultural anthropology on
writing and the representation of culture, though they are related to my project. Those who are interested in
this topic and recent related work in the STS field, see Late Edition Series edited by George Marcus and
Michael Fischer (University of Chicago Press) and Fischer 2003.
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field of the social sciences, where comparative studies are common. Though comparisons
can be powerful, they imply a non-historical, non-ethnographic approach that removes
the subjects in question from their contexts, setting them in an artificially determined grid
and collecting everything the grid demands, in order to compare them. The current
practice in STS will not tolerate this sort of decontextualization. This thesis has to
consider how the voice of the state can be heard and I have to be selective in a study of
globalization - although it is equally important, in light of anthropology, to notice what
is missing from what the state tells us.
The second question is about the structure of narrative. In response to globalization,
cultural anthropology has developed a "multisited" approach. Though attractive and
useful for capturing synchronic changes, only a small number of multisite studies have
been successful. In other words, though such an approach has much to recommend it,
everything depends on how the sites are related to one another. On the other hand, grand
theories remain taboo. Thus, in order to make the juxtaposition of voices (worldviews)
possible, it is necessary to identify a locus outside of national boundaries where the
voices of states can speak, converse, quarrel, debate, and achieve consensus.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will introduce the requirements imposed by
globalization, the Asian states I have chosen to study, and a range of methodological
issues. For each, I will review the related literature, assessing achievements, identifying
what remains to be done and explaining what I hope this study will achieve.
PART II
AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN STATES AND BIO- GLOBALIZATION
Bio-Globalization: Why "Global" and Why "Bio"?
In the literature review that follows, I discuss the two principal themes addressed in
the present thesis -the state under globalization and the place of race in the state and in
nationalism. Narrative technology and methodological problems I will discuss in Part III.
Globalization is a burgeoning field in social studies. Although the term lacks a
precise definition, the dynamic notion of globalization help us to depart from a static,
descriptive one of the "global," thinking a process in which we conceive the formation of
this world or how it operates. Political scientists David Held and Anthony McGrew (2001)
point out the following four types of activity it features. The first is the increase in social,
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political, and economic activities across frontiers, regions, and continents. Second is the
growing interconnectedness of the various increasing flows of trade, investment, finance,
migration, culture, and so forth. Third is the acceleration of the processes through which
ideas, goods, information, capital, and people freely diffuse. Fourth is the increasingly
fluid boundary between domestic matters and global affairs. Distant events can have
significant consequences close to home and specific local developments can come to
have global consequences.
The origins of globalization can be traced back to the so-called age of discovery
when the "modern world-system" was formed (Wallerstein 1974, 1989). But not until the
mid-twentieth century did globalization became a tangible political reality for social
science researchers. This was when the gap between the developing and the
developed -- both economical and political - first appeared in the landscape of global
political economy. In response to this trend, some cultural anthropologists integrated
Marxist cultural perspectives into their ethnographic works (e.g., Taussig 1983). As
Marcus and Fischer (1999) commented, such works suggest that "ethnography is an
effective medium for representing the range of moral and cultural responses to capitalist
penetrations. [.. .] [W]hat is new about these works is the demonstration of the
sophistication of these responses" (90).
Globalization gave birth to bio-globalization in the context of a cultural critique that
rose up to reconsider the value of life science. As thinkers struggled with the trajectory
that led from Voltaire, Diderot, and Hegel to the horrors of the first half of the twentieth
century, the relations among life, the body, power, and control provided a new matrix for
understanding the past, as Michel Foucault (1970, 1973, 1979) brilliantly demonstrated in
his critique of the European Enlightenment through studies of insanity, structures of
knowledge, sexuality, and self-discipline. In addition, quite a few works critically
reexamined the rise of science in the context of the manipulation of modernity and power
(e.g., Kay 1993), considering how it has governed our conception of life (Doyle 1997;
Keller 1996, 2000). This line can be extended even to the cultural criticism of other forms
of life, such as the birth and development of cybernetics and artificial life (Helmreich
1998; Keller 2000; Mindell 2002).
The most influential works that emerged were those that treated the operation of the
world as technoscientific. The impact of modern biology went far beyond the realm of
science proper: the new metaphors of life became mighty enough to shape our perception
of the world. A classic is Evelyn Fox Keller's study (1992) of the language scientists used
in the development of nuclear weapons, and Donna Haraway has done much to show how
life and the world are conceived in light of technoscience. Formerly a biologist, Haraway
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has shown how the world has come to be understood in terms of the metaphors and
insights of biology. Two of her most frequently cited books, Simians, Cyborgs, and
Women and Modest Witness@SecondMillennium. FemaleMan()Meets OncomouseTM
provide us with a new way to conceptualize globalization. Emphasizing globalization's
fluidity, she obliges us to dwell on our new subjectivity in this world, arguing that new
relations between humans and machines, men and women, human beings and mice
should be redefined: technoscience is rewriting biology as biology rewrites our world.
Echoing the critical approach of Foucault, Keller, and Haraway, more and more
anthropologists include science among the subjects they study, considering how it
changes our lives and bodies. As Michael Fischer (Marcus and Fischer 1999) noted,
science is one of the strategic terrains being explored by ethnography. He later expanded
these musings into a rich review article, describing scientific practice, the subjects of this
practice, and the philosophical underpinnings of the practice as "emergent forms of life"
(Fischer 2003). Thanks to Fischer's broad grasp of anthropology, he is able to show how
the contemporary life sciences and biotechnologies have engaged with the
technoscientific world, serving as the intermediary between the individual and the global
(45-48). Medical practices have become a favorite subject for anthropologists, with a
rash of studies have been devoted to medicine in American society as well as in
democratic societies around the world (Davis-Floyd and Dumit 1998, Lock et al. 2000).
These works, in my opinion, reveal a crucial aspect of bio-globalization depicting how
our understanding of life and personhood was shaped in the light of bio-power and the
mechanisms it introduces.
In addition to the philosophical perspective, Fischer reminds us of how the life
sciences have become enmeshed in the changing relations of state, academia, and the
market, just as physics and engineering did long ago (2003: 45). This is the social aspect
of bio-globalization that links to the production of knowledge and capitalism Science is
now a powerful culture that, as Emily Martin (1997) suggested, it is as if it were
dispersed and entangled like rhizomes. This is my intention for the present study. The
field is pharmaceuticals, a business that has thrived at the intersection of science and
globalization. For millennia human beings have traveled considerable distances to trade
in drugs. The word "drug" can refer to either a healing medicine or a poison. As a cure,
the history of drugs is closely bound up with the development of scientific medicine
(Weatherall 1990). But as a dangerous material that can intoxicate or kill, drugs have a
different history, connected to crime and political power (Inciardi 1986, 1992, 2001). A
lucrative commodity and balm for the ill, pharmaceuticals promise an interesting story.
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Even so, the literature on drugs varies a great deal, depending on whether the focus
is on the local or global level. Ethnographic studies of chemotherapy, AIDS, and
psychiatric agents have all dwelt at length on drugs (Dumit 1998, Lock et al. 2000).
Scholars have examined the intimate interactions between the medicine and the patient,
or the conflicts between patients' perceptions of the medication they are taking and the
more official interpretation offered by modern medicine. Some research that deals with
public health may extend this concern to take in national policy or social movements (for
example, studies of responses to oral contraceptive pills). But few anthropological studies
have taken on the globalized pharmaceutical industry.
Among the handful of studies of globalization and the pharmaceutical industry, 6
the dissertations of Andrew Lakoff (2000) and Kaushik Sunder Rajan (2002) demand
attention. Lakoff looked at how Argentinian psychiatry changed upon the introduction of
new drugs from France, while Sunder Rajan traced genomic research from laboratory to
industry in the United States and India. Although Lakoff and Sunder Rajan worked on
different parts of the pharmaceutical assembly line and did their fieldwork in difference
places, the two studies share three traits. First, both scholars were aware of the colossal
scale of the pharmaceutical industry and of the importance of understanding its operating
logic, which is complex and multilayered because of the need to combine scientific
realities and marketing strategies. Second, like Marx 150 years earlier, both were critical
throughout their studies, particularly as they examined the fight against the co-production
of capitalism and modernity. Although their dissertations were developed at top American
universities, both authors also displayed a rare level of self-reflexivity in conducting their
investigations. Their studies devote nearly as much space to discussing themselves as
ethnographers as they do to the subjects that they work with. Third, and most important,
Lakoff and Sunder Rajan tried to describe a global ethnography or an ethnography about
globalization. Unlike those who study people in a developed society, such as the United
States, or in a remote, well-defined site, they attempted to capture a critical moment when
no single site can escape from globalization and ethnographers cannot isolate themselves
from their fields. Theirs are not just studies of modernity, the peripheries of modernity, or
alternative modernities: these are ethnographic studies of that which is specifically
global.
Though these pioneering ethnographies exhibit remarkable sophistication, the
16 Though the number of publications remains small, more anthropologists have recently shown an
interest in the pharmaceutical industry and its global impact. Ongoing projects include: Adriana Petyma's
study of the CROs in the United States (some of her findings appeared in Petyrna 2005), Joao Biehl's study
of Brazil's pharmaceutical industry, and Nancy Chan's study of China's.
relationship between the sites they chose to compare provokes real methodological
problems. As Marcus and Fischer pointed out (1990: 90-92), a knowable community, the
traditional unit of ethnographic study, may not be suitable for understanding a system of
political economy. So they suggested two strategies, seeking relations between the
subjects and providing an interpretive frame for the phenomena observed; as it happened,
these strategies were, entirely coincidentally, used by Lakoff and Sunder Rajan. The
subjects Lakoff decided to present in his story - bipolar patients, Argentinean
psychiatrists, and young reformers at Buenos Aires's Hospital Pinero - were linked to
one another by the intended and unintended consequences of specific activities:
"pharmaceutical reason" is the thread that unites his narrative. 7 For Sunder Rajan, a site
is nothing but genomic research and its use in the research and development of drugs. In
other words, it can be anywhere in the world. The main concern of his study is not some
entity, such as a patent advocacy group in India or a genetic laboratory in the United
States, but a set of concepts, including speed, ownership (intellectual property), vision
(the potential of a commodity), and subjectivity (of a patient or a nation).
Though they are fascinating, these narrative strategies are not without problems, as
Marcus and Fischer pointed out. While they claim to take local culture into account, these
works are not interested in the problems of interpretive anthropology. But this is
reasonable because when globalization is a theme rather than a vague background, the
scale of the writing has to grow to match its subject. (After all, no atlas of the Australian
continent includes a street map of every small town.)
To create a meaningful global ethnography of the pharmaceutical industry while
maintaining the possibility of a detailed representation of the local, I propose a third
narrative strategy: choosing a truly global site as one's field. This is definitely not a return
to descriptive realism or a backlash against the abstract approaches that have recently
appeared in cultural anthropology. Instead, it is an honest search for new sites and
subjects in an age of diversity and global connectivity (Fischer 2003).18 According to
Fischer, creating big interpretative frames is not the only way out when anthropologists
have lost their energy (and motivation) by exhausting every distinct, geographical field in
the world. Indeed, new fields and subjects are emerging through several mechanisms,
'7 This approach is explored further by Marcus (1998), whose multi-sited methodology interrogates the
distinction between life-world and system. He believes in exploring not only the life-world of his subjects
but also some aspects of the world system, by tracing the paths of connections and associations that the
anthropologist delineates among sites.
'8 This is related to Marcus's multisited ethnography. In his view, the world system can be
ethnographically portrayed by connections and paths decided by the anthropologist. Accordingly, it
becomes "integral to and embedded in discontinuous, multisited objects of study" (1998: 81).
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such as the new technologies of cyberspace, new medical practices involving surrogate
mothers and organ donors, new social relationships among AIDS activists, new media for
film and art, and new ways for institutions to communicate and negotiate. Obviously, the
pharmaceutical industry benefits from the last. As Marcus and Fischer point out,
"Markets and capitalist modes of production, distribution, and consumption are the most
obvious views of systems as objects for experimentations with multilocale
ethnographies" (1999: 93).
Since drugs are a global phenomenon, we do not have any excuse to reject an
emerging site that belongs to our traditional taxonomy of local, regional, and global. The
global locus this dissertation will deal with is the International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use (ICH), a unique project that brings together the regulatory authorities of Europe,
Japan, and the United States and experts from the pharmaceutical industry in the three
regions to discuss scientific and technical aspects of product registration. Since I will
introduce the ICH in some detail in Chapter 2, here I will simply make some points about
the conference that are related to the issues already discussed.
The first issue is about the meaning of this conference in globalization. Despite its
global characteristic, the ICH distinguishes itself from two kinds of meetings that deal
with the consequences of globalization-one involves the commercial negotiations to
decide the price of certain pharmaceuticals or the amount of their production, and the
other concerns scientific explorations of new drugs and their uses. The ICH is a
conference that attempts to set up universal standards upon which these advanced
pharmaceuticals are made and accepted as such. In other words, it presents the origin or
the "backbone" of globalization where a standard or set of rules has to be set in order to
make the flow of knowledge and capital possible.
The second issue concerns the form of this gathering. Although people from around
the world attend this conference, the ICH is not a permanent organization such as the
United Nations. It has a clear mission to standardize all requirements for drug approvals
and has a clear goal of minimizing the number of clinical trials. In short, the ICH is a
locus by globalization, of globalization, and for globalization. When all of its missions
have been accomplished, it will cease to exist. It is not located in a place; it is everywhere.
Even so, the ICH is not a market, an exhibition, or a trading zone where people gather by
chance and talk. This is a locus with a concrete structure. It has rules for negotiation,
agendas, and formal guidelines. It has its own official scientific language, and only those
who are selected and invited may join. As I will discuss later in the present chapter, this
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conference faithfully reflects the power structure of the capitalist world, thus makes it an
excellent site for this project.
The third issue raised by treating the ICH as a global site is its ability to act. The
ICH is a discursive site with the ability to turn discussions into reality. These are not
loose gatherings, but a model of globalization in general, with participants representing
selected organizations or states. Every word said in conference is transcribed and the
individuality of participants is somewhat regulated by the state or organizations that send
them. The acts of the ICH are guidelines, rules for corporations as well as commandments
for participating states and their people. Given the function of the ICH, it is important to
distinguish among the voices of participants, who include experts, regulatory officials,
industry representatives, and the many observers.
Two problems remain. The bigger one, which I will address in the next chapter, is
whether the ICH is in any way typical of global institutions. Since it is no simple matter
to distinguish the ICH from the world as a whole, I feel obliged to clarify what in the
world this conference refers to. The other problem, which is more immediate, is how to
interpret the statements made at the ICH. This is the subject I will address over the
remainder of this section.
State Transformation in Global Context
There have been so many studies of the nation-state that it is virtually impossible to
review them one by one. I will focus on studies that relate to examining the state in the
context of globalization.
I want to clarify first why the state is the subject, at least in this study of
globalization. I have several reasons. First, as with many international meetings, the state
or regional political entity is the basic unit of the ICH. The European Union, Japan, and
the United States each reserves the right to send delegates to any given committee
meeting; at the same time, attendance makes it that much more likely that the results
achieved at the conference will be fully obeyed by all entities. Thus, the regulatory
authorities that attend the ICH are accredited by central governments: the United States
sends the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the European Union (EU) sends the
European Medicines Agency (EMEA), and Japan sends the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (MHW).
The second reason why I've taken the state as my subject is that the ICH's interest
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is state-oriented. The three interest groups selected to attend this conference - the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the Japanese
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA), and the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries Associations (EFPIA) - represent the interests of their home
states. They are indubitably business groups, entities infamous for ignoring national
identity, but at the conference they must act in the interests of their states: they must
defend domestic markets from foreign competitors. The universal desire among
pharmaceutical companies to sell more drugs encounters resistance at state borders: the
aim of the ICH is to subsume the state to the world. Because the ICH needs a juridical
body to execute its guidelines and because the only such body that qualifies is the state,
the ICH must draw its legitimacy from the states that participate, and their interest has to
be part of the system. The third reason for foregrounding the state is related to the scale of
my project. I am not intent on studying a small area of the cosmos by adjusting the focus
of a telescope. Instead, in order to establish a basic understanding of the sky, I propose a
star map in which galaxies indicate the structure of the universe. I am not questioning the
significance of microsystems, the operation of trade, negotiations, and exchanges within
each state, but mine is a study of macrosystems.
The existence of the state is complicated by the puzzles created by social science
researchers. To begin to understand the main trajectories followed by previous studies of
the state, I propose a simple two-by-two matrix. One axis is defined by how the state is
viewed, reducing the choices to the international and the domestic perspective. The
former, as classically declared in the Montevideo Convention in 1933, defines the legal
attributes of the state as an entity possessing the following attributes: (1) a permanent
population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter into
relations with other states. The domestic view of the state focuses on the relationship
between the state and its people; according to this view, the state can be defined as an
organization with a monopoly on legitimate violence in a particular geographic area.
The other axis is defined by the source of the state's authority, which is either
popular or tyrannical. In the popular model, a social contract affirms the role of the state
as serving the people and their interests. The tyrannical model recognizes the dominant
role that the state plays in people's lives. Some assail this dominant state for using force
to defend the existing system of class domination and exploitation, while some praise it
for preserving traditions and hierarchies that benefit society as a whole.
This simple analytical matrix can be used to classify all studies of the state. Unlike
political scientists, anthropologists assign the state an important yet remote position. The
distinctive quality of the state, as anthropologist Elman Service says, "is the presence of
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that special form of control, the consistent threat of force by a body of persons
legitimately constituted to use it" (1975: 163). Thus, state control over the people is
addressed in works of cultural anthropology or of the anthropology of science and
technology, many of which I have cited in the previous section - they emphasize the
centrality of the state. To get at how the modem state functions, anthropologists look at
how it is constituted, subjecting to critical examination educational and policing systems,
medical facilities, bureaucracies, systems used to keep track of individuals, social
statistics, culture and ideology, and so on. Such works fall into the category of
people-centric studies approached from the domestic viewpoint. The state is cast as the
sum of hegemonic apparatuses - apparatuses, it is implied or declared, against which a
social movement can struggle. Some researchers extend their critical arguments across
national borders, seeking the ultimate origin of systems of coercion in the ideology of
colonization and post-colonization (Anderson 1998), dependence and modernization
theory, or a diffused yet powerful global government (Gupta 1998; Lakoff 2000).
But the image of the state as a social actor is vague. Even political anthropologists,
who study the origin and evolution of early states, present the state as a point of reference,
a fixed entity rather than an object of inquiry. As Ted C. Lewellen (2003) has shown,
many political anthropologists choose a primitive society for their fieldwork, trying to
identify factors, such as food production or population pressure, that foster the earliest
steps taken toward a centralized political system. On the other hand, those who study
civilization and modem states shift their focus from the state itself to its impacts on its
people. As Lewellen pointed out, the concept of the political field was applied with an
awareness that "political structures overlap but do not coincide with other social
structures and [... ] they tend to wax and wane over time. [... A] political field is nothing
less, or more, than the wider area of political activity defined by a particular researcher"
(87-88). In anthropology in the modem world, the state seems to be a reference, a fixed
grid rather than an object of inquiry.19
From the 1960s to the end of the 1980s, political anthropologists were able to create
their own terminology, systems of classification, and theories without referring much to
what was going on outside of their field. However, by the 1990s it was clear that these
tools were no longer sufficient to explain an increasingly complex world, a world "in
some ways more integrated and in other ways more fragmented than could be accounted
19 An exception to this generalization is Michael Fischer's Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution.
Thanks to the intensive fieldwork he carried out before the revolution, we not only appreciate the religious
tensions created by the Shiites' denial of the legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime, we also see that these
tensions were located in a complicated context of dualistic dynamics involving global politics/state politics,
Capitalism/Islam, and modernity/traditionalism.
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in either paradigm" (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 203). This opened up a gap between
anthropologists and political scientists. While many anthropologists still see globalization
as precipitating the decline of the state-centric system, political scientists have
rediscovered the state (Keyman 1997, Chapter 3; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol
1985; Weiss 2003, Part 3). Although recently some anthropologists have shown
increasing interest in cultural diasporas, immigration, the international labor market, and
global business (Lewellen 2003: 221-22), these works tend to isolate an individual
agency, treating the state as part of a global collectivity rather than an object of analysis
(an example is Aihwa Ong's interpretation of "flexible citizenship" in Ong 2002).20
This dissertation is dedicated to filling this gap by trying to make sense of the
state's behavior from an international viewpoint. In what remains of the present section 
will discuss the three kinds of studies on which I have drawn. The first kind of studies
presents an interest of policy that can be seen in James Scott's Seeing Like a State (1998).
Scott looked at the tension between state authorities and various "unstable" individuals
throughout history. Numerous scholars have interpreted individual responses to a
particular political system is not new (see, for example, Roful 1999); Scott casts the state
itself as his object of study, analyzing the failure of some authoritarian states to take into
account "the indispensable role of practical knowledge, informal processes, and
improvisation in the face of unpredictability" (Scott 1997). The evolution of modern
states into flexible organisms capable of responding to requests - Emily Martin (1998)
creatively relates this organism to the human body and its immune system - has made it
necessary to treat the state as a subject. In the present study, the request made by various
constituencies is the provision of high-quality health care.
The second kind of studies concerns the responsiveness of the state, which has
already been considered by Marc Swartz, Victor Turner, and Arthur Tuden (1966), all
anthropologists determined to go beyond both structuralist and functionalist approaches.
The political system gets its "life" when researchers notice the interactions taking place
beyond social or ethnic boundaries, allowing this system to change with time. As these
authors wrote in their introduction to Political Anthropology, the study of politics "is the
study of the processes involved in determining public goals and in the differential
achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with these goals"
(7). The importance of Turner in cultural anthropology, as we all recognize, resides in his
20 A few historians of science have begun to look at global scientific enterprises. An excellent example
is Sharon Traweek's work (1996) on Japanese high-energy physicists and their relations with the
international community.
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emphasis on process and his studies of social drama and liminality (1969, 1974). The
subject of my thesis is not a static state but a dynamic one that changes over time. My
method involves showing practices as though seen in slow-motion, trying to grasp the
moments when the ICH first came to an agreement over universal standards for drug
approval. At the interface between the national and the global, we can expect that this
encounter will yield more than a simple acceptance or rejection.
Finally, as will deal with two East Asian states, this study is drawn into a substantial
literature on Japan and Taiwan, the third kind of studies I would mention here. It is not
my intention to introduce them here. I call attention to the characteristics of these two
countries to echo policy researcher Sheila Jasanoff's recent comparative study of
biotechnology in Europe and the United States (2005). In her study three main arguments
are advanced concerning different states' attitudes toward biotechnology. First, current
democratic theory cannot satisfactorily explain certain political behaviors if it fails to
examine the details of the politics of science and technology. In addition, the policies
concerning life sciences have become a more or less self-conscious project of
nation-building at a critical juncture in world history. Lastly, political culture does matter
to contemporary politics. Following that trajectory, the present dissertation supplements
this theme with cases from East Asia, where Japan is suspected for the resurge of military
nationalism and Taiwan is anxious for its political visibility.
Table 1.1. Considering the Nation-State: An Analytical Frame
Source: Wang 1999: 51.
In order to study the problem of the nation-state in the global scene, political
sociologist Horng-luen Wang has proposed an interdisciplinary approach (1999, 2000,
40
Civic-territorial Ethno-cultural
(Political/territorial map) (Cultural/cognitive map)
Global level Interstate system International cultural grammar of
International organization nationhood
International law International epistemic
Transnational arbitration system communities
National level State sovereignty, territoriality, and "National culture"
citizenship Language
Signifying symbols (flag, national Cultural patrimonies
anthem, etc.) "Nation-view" and knowledge
Diplomacy systems (history, literature, etc.)
Military
Border control
2001). He suggests first that the nation-state be understood in relation to the world. In a
context broader than straight politics, Wang defines a nation-state as a political and
cultural product derived by demarcating a territory within the networks of the global. The
related fields can be variously categorized as civic-territorial and ethno-cultural (table
1.1). According to Wang, no clear line can be drawn between culture and politics, or
between nationalist reality and pure nationalism, when dealing with a modem nation-state.
Instead, "it is an institutionalized form [of life] whose existence relies on the operation
and context of a given institution" (Wang 2001: 197). From this institutional perspective,
traditional attributes of the "imagined community" might not be enough for global
institutions; furthermore, a nation-state can be recognized in fields not limited to politics.
Wang has argued that tourism, fashion, popular culture, and sports are all part of everyday
life and are places where nationalism can arise (224-25); I would like to add medicine to
this list.
A study of pharmaceuticals seems to fit perfectly into the above matrix. In the left
column of civic-territorial, which is state-related, we have the ICH as the international
field and a regulatory authority for drug approval as the domestic counterpart. Taiwan's
national problem becomes a crisis of representation, fulfilling all that is expected of a
state at the national level (lower left cell), yet failing to show its proper existence at the
global level (upper left cell). However, shifting to ethno-cultural concerns, it is not clear
that race will help us understand state in globalization (right hand cells). I shall discuss
this in the next section.
Reading Race into the State: Toward Nationalism and Globalization
Questions about race have recently given rise to heated discussion in the social
sciences and the life sciences. As the anthropologist Ashley Montagu (1942) sets the title
of his study of race (1942), race is human beings' "most dangerous myth." Indeed, race is
a socially conceived category rather than a scientifically measurable phenomenon. In his
well-documented Race: The History of an Idea in the West, Ivan Hannaford traced the
conceptual roots of modern race theory to natural philosophy, early anthropology, and the
search for national characters, continuing the historical narrative with the late nineteenth
century's systematic pursuit of the biological and historical origins of the racially pure
state (Hannaford 1996: Part 2). Race was all and the state was the political tool to
regulate it. Montagu published his plea during the heyday of Nazism in hopes of
delegitimizing the Third Reich's racist political doctrine.
Even so, neither Montagu nor Hannaford rejected research on ethnic variations;
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they were opposed to the perpetuation of myths and ideologies based on race. As
Montagu reasoned, "There are numerous differences between ethnic groups, and even
regional segments of such groups, in many bodily and genetic traits. These differences
are real enough, and they are of the greatest interest to the student of variation. [...]
Differences are not denied where they exist. What is denied is that they are biologically
either great or significant enough to justify men in making them the pretext for social
discrimination of any kind" (1942: x-xi).
But progress in medical research and social changes - if not polarization or
stratification - complicate the landscape. The distinction between the medical and the
social has already become blurred. Bodily differences have become bio-information that
predetermines people's lives, while social distinctions have evolved into delicate controls
deep in the disciplines of body and mind. In modern societies, the nation-state is no
longer at the top of the guilty list for exercising racist ideology. Scholars devote
considerable effort to recognizing and negotiating the cultural and political tensions
among ethnic groups whose geography defies national boundaries. As Hannaford pointed
out, "Ethnicity is essentially an idea introduced in modem times, and it has prospered in
proportion to the decline in political ideas concerning the disposition of civil affairs"
(1996: 398). As researchers try to comprehend a complicated society, ethnicity becomes
an analytical variable, along with other items such as gender, age, and class.
As this happens, the biologically oriented concept of race is gradually replaced by a
broader, socially constructed concept of ethnicity. Today anthropologists study the social
assumptions that construct the image of "the other," and the study of anatomical variation
has halted. I want to say this more clearly: while differences in cultural heritage, religious
beliefs, and linguistic characteristics are noted, biological differences are largely ignored.
This is especially so in the field of STS, which has been deeply affected by social
constructivism. As they try to counterbalance the prevailing biological determinism found
in medical research, social constructivists tend to argue against the suggestion that
biology affects complex social behavior.
Let me cite two recent examples. In June 2003 Technology Review published an
article describing a debate over race that accompanied the emergence of genetic medicine.
The HapMap project, an international project aimed at building a huge genetic database
that would help scientists make comparisons among different ethnic groups, is one of the
latest targets of critics' concern. 2' They worry that these data will be manipulated to give
credence to ethnic stereotypes or to revive discredited racial classifications. Scientists
21 For a detailed introduction to the HapMap project and its role in the ICH, see Chapter 8, Part 2.
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have fought back by simply calling the critics "nihilists" because they did not come up
with alternative methods for carrying out this genetic research.
My second example is drawn from the clinical side. Observant physicians are
reminded frequently of the ethnic differences among their patient pools: as Sally Satel
admitted in the title of her New York Times article (2002), "I am a racially profiling
doctor"; she went on to say, "Certain diseases and the approval of treatment responses
cluster by ethnicity." Drug companies are also aware that special treatments for different
ethnic groups constitute an emerging market. But they know that caution is necessary, as
has been shown in a furious debate over the clinical trials targeting African-American
heart failure described in the May 2001 issue of the New England Journal of Medicine
(for a more detailed report on this controversial case, see April 2005 Technology Review).
Robert S. Schwartz, one of the journal's deputy editors, wrote that taking race into
account when prescribing medication was both morally and scientifically wrong: "Race is
not only imprecise but also of no proven value in treating an individual patient"
(Schwartz 2001). As serious discussions take place, the agenda is silently and steadily
moving toward individual, gene-based medication guided by racial categories.
Most anthropologists prefer to leave these problems to physical anthropology, the
anthropological counterpart of evolutionary biology. They know that there has never been
such a thing as a pure race; they know that there is no causal linkage between physical
and behavioral traits (AAPA 1996). However, no alternative has exactly replaced the
category of race, no matter how crude it may be, in the production and circulation of
anthropological knowledge. It may be possible to achieve a lot by criticizing the approach
scientists are taking from outside, as the American Anthropological Association did in the
statement cited earlier, but in my opinion, such arguments amount to hollow warnings
rather than constructive suggestions, calls for an ethical line that medical experts and
clinicians must not cross. Such arguments usually conclude by asserting that medical
practices are part of a range of modern institutions that aim to control people, as if these
critics are living in a paranoid universe.
The problems are many and the present thesis will not answer them all. I will not try
to criticize the idea of race outside the medical arena, but I will try to show how it cannot
work inside. The ICH is a perfect locus for such a project. The issue of racial difference
appeared early in the history of this conference, in the context of whether the data from
clinical trials conducted in foreign countries or regions should be accepted as universally
valid. Some scientists from Japan and Europe insisted that racial differences should be
taken into account, because the distribution of reactions to certain drugs among Japanese
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patients differs from that among Caucasians. A scientific understanding of race was
required and an expert working group was assigned to work it out. Although from 1993 to
1997 these experts met many times and drew up over twenty drafts of a guideline on
racial differences, no consensus was reached. The Japanese delegates thought that the
racial differences between Japanese and Caucasians were fundamental and that thorough
studies would need to be carried out before any guidelines were completed. But the
delegates from the United States and the EU - which are the site of over 80% of the
world's clinical trials - did not think that there was much variety among the peoples of
the world. They accepted the existence of some differences between Asians and
Caucasians, but they firmly believed that, in the end, all human beings should be
considered the same, rendering a universal standard possible, so long as it included some
local modifications. This disagreement was never resolved, and though a vague guideline
was implemented in 1998 the situation was still a nightmare for drug companies: almost
every drug had to undergo long and expensive clinical trials wherever it was going to be
marketed.
This is a problem both familiar and strange to anthropologists. Familiar, because it
concerns racial difference in medical research and clinical trials, and because it has clear
social implications, such as people's access to the latest drugs. Even so, it is also strange
because, uncharacteristically the Western medical mainstream acted as if all racial
differences were bridgeable. What can be prescribed to Caucasians should also be
prescribed to Asians. The opposing group, arguing for "race-based medicine," is Japan,
an Asian power infamous for its racist nationalism during World War II. That old
purveyor of racism, the nation-state, seems to have returned, but anthropologists have
forgotten how to deal with it. I would like to remind readers of the scene I mentioned at
the beginning of this chapter, when that anthropologist spotted something interesting in
the Japanese conception of race but did not know how to make sense of it. Indeed, in the
global era, when interactions among races and huge waves of immigration shake the
traditional definition of race, the relationship between the state and race has become a
very tricky research topic, but it certainly should not be skipped. To pursue this topic, old
models of race and nation have to be discarded.
Hannaford (1996: Chapter 5) has reviewed how race played a part in the creation of
nation-states (or race-states) in the nineteenth century. However, if we review the idea of
race in the context of nationalism, we find that remarkably few biological characteristics
belonged to the academic discourse. Although nationalism can be historically defined as
the combination of several factors, including lineage ties, shared language, religion,
cultural heritage, and life and historical experiences (Hobsbawm 1990), much as we
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expect a discussion of race it just isn't there. It may have played a part in building a
nation, but it soon lost its position to political institutions, which became the arbiters of
difference (Giddens 1985).22 Although nationalism tends to be ethnic in character, this is
not necessarily the case.
But East Asian states are virtually unique in terms of the relations between race and
state. Eric Hobsbawm has connected the racial homogeneity of Japan, Korea, and China
to their citizens' sense of national identity and political loyalty (1990: 66).23 This topic
has been much discussed among Asia scholars. They all note the distinctive discourse
built on the idea of a single origin for the Japanese race, identifying that race with the
surrounding polity. The discourse was crystallized when developed ideas about the
modern state were introduced to Meiji Japan (1868-1912). As the state pursued the goal
of"a rich nation, a strong army" (fukoku kyohei), a naive set of ideas about common
descent and shared biological traits evolved into the complex nihonjinron (theories about
the Japanese). These theories described relationships among the Japanese (developed out
of the dyad self/others) and with foreigners (insider/outsider), while also erecting a
collective goal for the entire "race" based on social Darwinism (Weiner 1995). The
Japanese minzoku emerged as an ontologically unique existence that defines itself
through itself. It can be seen in the individual pursuit of pure self, but the collective
enterprise of building a wealthy nation is just as significant. Race and the state are in
Japan two sides of the same coin.
The above belief does not disperse when Japan has more contacts with outside
world. In fact, the notion of kokusaika, which can be roughly translated as
"internationalization," closely linked to ideas about nationalism. Kokusaika and minzoku
occur in close proximity to such terms as kokumin-shugi (civil nationalism), kokusui
(national essence) andjunketsu-shugi (pure-bloodism). Let us return to Japan's
"ridiculous" insistence on its racial uniqueness. In her study of how people think about
death and organ transplants in Canada and Japan, anthropologist Margaret Lock (2002)
has reminded us that the point of such an investigation is not to adjudicate whether Japan
22 Benedict Anderson (1983) assigns virtually no weight to biological factors in the construction of an
"imagined political community." Racism and myths based on race are, according to Anderson, rather a
consequence of the formation of a community and an internal affair among the dominant race and minority
groups.
23 The idea of"one race, one nation" has influenced political relations between the PRC and Taiwan.
When the former denies the political sovereignty of the latter, the reason is often that both are of the "same
language, same race" (tong wen tong zhong) and so must act as a single nation. This idea has affected
Taiwan's domestic politics: some political parties cite the same argument when they insist that Taiwan
should be a part of China. On the invention of Han "race" and the Han nation, see Kai-wing Chow 1997.
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should accept the definition of brain death in its medial practice, but to gain an
appreciation of both Japan and North America through continuous reflections on the
debate over this issue. Adorned with culturally and socially specific attributes, death,
according to Lock, "will not be pinned down once and for all" (377).
As Lock's thesis implies, anthropologists cannot make sense of Japan's ideas about
race without considering its ideas about the state. Moreover, because these ideas are
manifested most clearly in Japan's relations with other countries, any assessment ought to
be made in a global framework instead of a national one. The key to understanding
Japan's resistance to Western standards is a reassessment of race and an abandonment of
the idea that all nations subscribe to the same universal beliefs. Nancy Stepan's historical
study has successfully demonstrated that the idea of Latinity is different from the
Anglo-Saxon view of race: while the latter is monolithic and excessively biological, the
former is multiple, reflecting the divided nature of politics in Latin America (1991:
190).24 In fact, Stepan showed that even science is not universal in her story. As she
asserted: "The adoption of a specific scientific theory within scientific circles and
elsewhere is not a purely empirical, logical, or evidential matter but a historical and
political one. [. . .] Science that get taken up by particular groups or attached to specific
institutions cannot be explained solely by reference to their purely factual character or
truth states" (197). Echoing this idea, this thesis will not address whether Japan has
"misunderstood" the meaning of race. Instead I examine the similar concept of minzoku,
showing how advanced sciences, such as genomics and biostatistics, are incorporated into
Japan's agenda on racial difference at the ICH.
Consider Horng-luen Wang's analytical frame, introduced in the previous section
and illustrated in table 1.1. Let us call minzoku the sum of all national ethno-cultural
institutions (lower right cell); politically these correspond to the Japanese state (lower left
cell). However, this mingled identity is challenged by the ICH through two global
institutions: one is the civic-territorial institution of the conference (upper left cell) and
the other is the ethno-cultural institution of universal standards where the operational
definition of race is determined (upper right cell). Thus, we find that Japan's attitude
toward its race and its state is always hard to capture. I will state, as my own "uncertainty
principle," that Japanese race and state cannot be simultaneously measured with any
degree of precision. Rather, these have to be monitored as elements of a diachronic
process viewed from a global perspective - this is exactly what I try to do in the
24 Of course, race and nation building in Latin America are parts of a complicated process. The creation
of a hybrid race, known as mestizo, implied a racial politics that rejected the Anglo-Saxon race on the one
hand and excluded "undesirable" groups of Chinese, African, Syrians, Jews, and Gypsies on the other.
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following chapters.
Before ending this section, let me comment on two statements frequently made
about Japanese race and nationalism, which I jointly refer to as state determinism. One is
in the field of international trade. Since race is considered a fictitious category, it is often
said that Japan's insistence on the uniqueness of the Japanese race is a hypocritical
defense of protectionism, a means of protecting a share of its national market against
global partners. Though this is interesting, it fails to explain why even the world's top
scientists cannot solve this problem by just giving a workable definition of racial
difference. The other statement is political and more widely known: in response to recent
nationalist claims by the Japanese Right, many foreign observers have spoken of the
coming revival of nationalism and militarism. At times statements from the Right seem
one short step away from calls for a pure race. But I think such a conclusion is too hasty.
Although the concept of race does figure in contemporary Japanese political thinking, it
is not always connected to nationalism. I agree that race is an important parameter when
considering the state in the modem world; however, the old model of the nation-state may
not be able to accommodate the complicated relationships that have arisen during the
global era. Although anthropologists no longer participate in discussions of the biological
construction of race, I will try to show here that in the context of state and global politics,
particularly in East Asia, ethnography is still the best critical tool for getting at state
policies on race from inside its practices.
PART III
WRITING ON THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF STATES: AGENCIES, SITES, AND
VOICES
States as Anthropological Agencies
In my discussion of methods I will address three related issues: (1) whether the state
can be an agency for anthropological inquiry; (2) what characteristics a site must have for
states to be recognized as active and responsive; and (3) how to identify a state's
institutional voice. The intrinsic relations between these topics will be shown in the order
of their appearance.
The thorniest of these questions is perhaps how to treat a state as a workable agency
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(character) in an ethnography.2 5 States are everywhere personified. This is especially true
when talking about the state within an international context, where one never even thinks
about the implications of such passages as "In the global village, Japan is uncooperative,
always carefully protecting herself' or "Because of its long isolation, Taiwan is an orphan
in the global community." But what do such statements mean? Are they merely analogies,
or are they something more? Political scientists tend to think of the state as a person and
they construct knowledge based on this analogy; an extreme case is the scholars
committed to "bringing the state back in," who are fond of terms like "state actor,"
"state's behavior," and so forth (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). Certainly we
live in metaphors; still, it is different to talk about the role metaphors play in the
construction of a systematic body of knowledge. For instance, Evelyn Fox Keller has
shown (2002) that molecular biology - a specific way of explaining life - was created
by the metaphors and models borrowed by biology from cybernetics and mechanics.
While I am opposed to the view that the state possess a personality that scholars can study,
what is at stake is not whether one can accurately speak of the agency of the state, but
rather whether this metaphor can generate (guide, shape, evolve) a systematic
knowledge. 2 6
This perspective leads us to look at this question from another angle, namely,
whether the state is represented as a person in anthropological texts - the answer is of
course positive. Clifford Geertz reminded us that the core of anthropology is a cultural
institution. He wrote that anthropologists are constantly trying "to convince us what they
say is a result of their having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated by)
another form of life, or having, one way or another, truly 'been there.' And that,
persuading us that this offstage miracle has occurred, is where the writing comes in"
(1988: 4-5). Two questions about the author and the text immediately arise: "The first
question, call it that of signature, is a matter of the construction of a writerly identity. The
second, call it that of discourse, is a matter of developing a way of putting things - a
vocabulary, a rhetoric, a pattern of argument - that is connected to that identity in such a
way that it seems to come from it as a remark from a mind" (9). Writing and written must
be considered together; anthropological agency is defined as that which generates a
25 For example, Michael Fischer is evidently uncomfortable when referring to an anthropological or
ethnic unit higher than the individual. See Fischer 2003: 11-12.
26 Lily Kay explains this standpoint clearly in her understanding of the genetic sequence, or the
"book of life" (2000). Differentiating her approach from the objectivist, constructivist, and deconstructivist
vantage points, Kay situates her post-structural understanding of genomics as "the presentation itself that
guides the imagination and reasoning, as was the case with the idioms of 'information' and 'knowledge."'
From this viewpoint, "it is the writing itself that writes" (xviii).
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strategic text addressing the relationship between this writerly identity and others. If we
extend this argument to all of the identities appearing in an anthropological text, our
question becomes: can the state be a writerly agency in a given ethnographic text, able to
write and to be written about?
Though clearer, this question is still difficult to tackle. Perhaps it should be asked as
a negative: why cannot the state be a writerly agency? Two immediate answers, or the
same one doubly claimed, occur to me. One, which is a quite intuitive and true, is that the
state is not an ontologically existing individual that the ethnographer can interrogate; the
collectivity of the state makes it a conceptual term rather than a concrete object for
anthropological inquiry. The other answer relates the state to its artificiality: it is a subject
conceivable only through the actual agencies that stand in for it: the people concerned.
These prevent a state from taking an active part in an ethnographic text. I will try to
respond these assertions, focusing more on the issue of artificiality, since the problem of
collectivity has haunted ethnography from its earliest days and I have little to contribute
there.
Even after identifying a manageable unit for study, ethnographers run into problems.
The difficulty of examining all of the components of a subject is often disguised by
narratological devices. The question is not whether the ethnographer has successfully
solved this problem, but whether the text generated is conventional enough to convince
the audience. A typical example is Marjorie Shostak's acclaimed Nisa: The Life and
Words of a !Kung Woman (1983). The book takes the form of a series of conversations
between the ethnographer and an exceptional and outspoken !Kung woman named Nisa.
In order to convince her readers of the reliability of the description, Shostak wrote an
extensive introduction to !Kung culture before presenting her informant's narrative.
Shostak also opened each chapter with a description of a specific stage in the lives
of !Kung women, based on other sources. At a dramatic moment in the book, Nisa's peers
warned the author that her informant was a liar; only when Nisa told an impressive story
about herself was the truth revealed.
Shostak's story is so compelling that readers generally find themselves deeply
moved. But the problem of the relation between the whole and its parts remains. I am not
concerned with the question of Nisa's veracity; rather, I am troubled by how this work of
ethnography was made. More exactly, I wonder about the conceptual gap between the
word "a" in the title (a !Kung woman) and the presumed "the," the entirety of the !Kung
tribe. Whether Nisa told the truth has no bearing on whether all !Kung women can be
presented by this single person. In fact, in reading Nisa's narrative, we are not
considering only her; instead, we are imagining a whole group of people, with a writerly
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identity, speaking though her.
Though this thesis steers clear of this epistemological problem, I am aware of it and
to bridge this potential gap I have used the most conventional narrative styles, such as
plain descriptions supported by statistical data and examples. Still, in studies of an
ontologically conceivable group (tribe, community, society, etc.) we tend to accept the
slippage between individual informants and an imaginary writerly identity without any
good reason. If this problem occurs in all attempts to relate the parts to the whole, it is
certainly true of an ethnographic consideration of the state.
Anthropology is about human beings. Certainly the state is anthropogenic, an
apparatus that fits into no category in traditional anthropology.27 But this does not mean
that this thesis cannot find allies among recent cultural ethnographies, especially studies
of science and technology. The works I would like to discuss here are Joseph Dumit's
Picturing Personhood (2003) and Stefan Helmreich's Silicon Second Nature (1998). In
my opinion, these very different works not only extend the interpretative power of
ethnography to the technoscientific world, they radicalize - silently and perhaps
unwittingly - the discipline of anthropology by reminding us of its original aims, which
so many of its practitioners have forgotten. They both ask what on earth human beings,
life, and personhood are and how they are to be represented.
Dumit studied positron emission tomography (PET), an imaging technology now
widely used in psychological research on the brain. His method involved tracing the
"social life of things" surrounding PET: how the experiments were designed, how human
categories were defined, how the results were created and interpreted, and how these
results became part of the circulation of knowledge and social relations. The object of
analysis is not just a machine or a technology applied to it but a lived relation among
cultural actors: "To the extent that things such as images and technologies are attributed
agencies [.. .] they, too, participate in cultural exchanges" (10-11). Let us look more
closely at the idea of "attributed agencies." If we consider the difference between an
ontological existence and an identity exhibited in the narrative, inconsistencies start
popping out of this ethnographic text. While the ontological existence of PET is always
that of a nonhuman actor, the focus the author writes about shifts from PET to the
inventors who developed the idea of this technology, to the images that can be interpreted
in a particular way, and, in the end, to a biomedical personhood able to replace our true
personhood. The more of Picturing Personhood we read, the further we depart from the
27 As mentioned previously, political anthropologists tend to base their insights on an awareness that
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argument that PET is a merely a nonhuman actor of no importance. This change always
depends on the context involved; in the end, it gives readers a feeling that it is the
writerly identity called PET that initiates various relationships and discourses in this
narrative.
Perhaps this shift began at very beginning of this book, when the author spoke of
multiple interpretations of the history of PET (Chapter 2). When the editors of a science
encyclopedia invited Dumit to produce "an objective, historical narrative [about PET], in
the third person, past tense," his research unearthed a variety of deterministic historical
narratives, written from different perspectives, having different focuses, which even
contradicted each other. He abandoned the original plan to write a simple historical
explanation of PET and instead composed an analytical text in which readers came to
understand the social relationships among inventors through PET. Fine. But what I am
interested in is the creation of a writerly identity as his project changed. I agree that
scientific history is a genre where clarity of subject is achieved by sacrificing the messy,
intercontextual trajectories that propel the subject's development. But when PET is
shifted from the subject to a factor entangled in social relationships, a writerly identity is
formed and, for readers, a new narrative network is created.28
This writerly identity keeps changing and growing as readers move to the so-called
biomedical personhood introduced in Chapter 5 and 6. Assuming that readers would see
PET images as reflecting personhood, Dumit describes the most striking situation where
this problematic personhood produced by this writerly identity usurps the position
originally occupied by intuitive personhood in our cognitive web. The differences
between the two personhoods illustrate the effect scientific research has had on our
conception of our minds. Meanwhile, at the representational level, this full-grown
writerly identity completes the narrative of this change. Dumit even projects this
personhood back to the real world by showing a "scientist" and an "anthropologist" on
his book's cover, both appropriately labeled. Perhaps this provides the key to Dumit's
larger project: in the modern world, where only biological signals can be recognized and
justified, biomedical personhood should be the fundamental agency we deal with, not the
personhood anthropologists take for granted. On the narrative level, biomedical
personhood should be considered an active writerly identity able to generate meanings by
exploiting human supporting actors.
behind the political system in question is a group of human beings.
28 One example of the change in writerly identity can be found by comparing two quotations: "the
history of PET is still under construction" (49) and "one kind of ideal PET machine would have a resolution
small enough to show each neuron" (78). The distinction between the subject and the actor is clearer in
some languages than others: in Japanese the former is used with an auxiliary wa while the latter takes a ga.
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Silicon Second Nature exhibits a set of concerns that overlap with Dumit's, but
Helmreich headed in the opposite direction. Unlike Dumit, who started his inquiries with
a machine said to produce faithful images of personhood, Helmreich started with a
computer that created artificial life, an existence by definition totally different from that
of human beings. Like Dumit, Helmreich looked for answers in the social, thus his first
task was to bridge the difference between the artificial creatures and their creators.
Referring to Hegel's notion of first and second nature, Helmreich identified artificial life
as second natures: "They are rule-ordered human constructions, but they are meant to
mirror first nature. And they are second natures in still another way: they not only ape
first nature but also offer to replace it, to succeed it as a resource for scientific
knowledge." When researchers "embrace the logics of synthetic vitality, they come to
possess a new sort of subjectivity, a silicon nature that may be increasingly common
among humans inhabiting a world in which computers are haunted by 'life"' (Helmreich
1998: 11-12).
Though inclined to set it in quotation marks, Helmreich made artificial life a
writerly identity all the way through his book. He approached this in-between position
from a different direction than did Dumit. While the latter detached the socially
constructed personhoods he created from real ones, Helmreich tried to show how close
artificial forms of life were to real ones. As a writerly identity, artificial life is humanly
alive; more accurately, artificial life functions as a miniature of the human species. From
this viewpoint, Helmreigh's book is a record of the evolution and civilization of artificial
life: it has primitivity; it has competitions and slaughters; it has problems of heredity; it
has tensions surrounding gender and sexuality; it connects to the spiritual. It pursues an
anti-Durkheimian agenda of forming a society by religion; it cries out for salvation; it
even thinks of the meaning of life, as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer did in the nineteenth
century, and the meaning of self, as Sartre did in the mid-twentieth century.
But this narrative project was not complete without the coda Helmreich added at the
end of his book. There he described his interaction, as a narrator and an author, with a
quite childish artificial life form made in Japan called Tamagotchi. He treats this dialogue
as a sign that human beings are about to be swallowed up by the world of artificial life
both without and within (the scene of the meeting with Tamagotchi is a thoroughly
cyberneticized New York City). Citing one of the scientists he interviewed, Helmreich
commented that the future of artificial life is not simulation-as-we-know-it but
simulation-as-it-could-be (1998: 256). Concerning this observation, I would say that what
is most frightening is not the competitiveness of this form of life, but rather the absence
of a notion of "we" in its future. Possibly at stake is the disappearance of the
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ethnographer: a biomedicalized personhood could produce its own ethnography.
I think I have answered why the state, even recognized as a collective and artificial
entity, can function as a writerly agency in ethnography. In the present dissertation, I treat
Japan and Taiwan as writerly agencies. As the optimistic discourse of globalization
dominates the globe, Japan worries that the racial characteristics believed to be the
foundation of the state may disappear, while Taiwan views globalization as an
opportunity to gain international recognition.
Two works in the field of science and technology provide insights into the narrative
context in which such writerly identity is located and functions. The first is Donna
Haraway's masterpiece, "A Cyborg Manifesto," which catalyzed countless debates on the
concept of the cyborg and its possible implications in the social studies of science (for
example, Downey and Dumit 1997). But in the original text the cyborg was not an
isolated entity in the real world, nor was it a fictional illusion: it was a writerly identity.
To be exact, the cyborg must always be thought of as a cyborg in context. Haraway was
fully aware of the power of a text and of reading, so she intentionally seduced her readers
into seeing themselves as reacting to the real world as ifthey were cyborgs. This goal
cannot be achieved without constructing a textual world that playfully mimics the real
one while reorganizing it according to science and technology studies, socialism, and
feminism. Only through the continuously intertransforming processes, which switch back
and forth between the two worlds, can these cyborgs (or readers) come to understand (or
be misled about) why they are not allowed to march in the ranks of Marxism as well as
feminism, realizing finally where they should go. The tools she uses are "stories, retold
stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of naturalized
identities" (Haraway 1991: 175). As Dumit and Helmreich did with their writerly
identities, at the end of this text Haraway presented herself as a cyborg author devoted to
subverting Western culture, a "central myth" that had long dominated our intellectual
lives. All textual identities, which have shown the way for new connections and relations
in the text, have to project themselves into the real world. The link between the real and
the fictional is the act of reading. Writerly identity determines its own appearance in a
text; genre and context determine how it will be linked to reality. Fully aware of this,
Haraway identified her text as both provocative and constructive, a blasphemy that
"protects one from the moral majority within, while still insisting on the need for
community" (149).
The final methodological requirement for making such an ethnographic text is that
we liberate ourselves from the idea that such a text may treat only human beings as actors.
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Anthropologist Bruno Latour (1993) provided an alternative approach in his acclaimed
study of Aramis, an effort to design an automatic transit system that ultimately failed. In
response to the criticisms raised by social constructivists, and others who attacked him
for his alleged relativism, Latour carefully developed his ethnographic text around social
networks rather than any objective entity.29 Calling this approach both "distributed
monism" and the "anthropology of objectivity," Latour warned scholars against trying to
explain a stable object whose voice was socially constructed; the alternative he proposed
was following the social network (in other words, the context) in which all humans and
nonhumans interact. Applying Durkheim to science and technology, Latour claims that
there is no basic difference between ontological entities and socially recognized entities:
both have to be unified in a comprehensive text that he proclaims as ethnography. Any
action away from this locus of inquiry, according to him, is a waste of time (395). This
powerful argument obliges me to identify the context for my own writerly agencies.
Conferences as an Experimental Field for Ethnography
The second methodological issue here is the way the global and the national present
themselves. Until now I have mentioned my field of inquiry only fleetingly. I have
mentioned several institutions and organizations, but I have told my readers nothing
about the context in which these entities interact. I hereby propose an experimental field
for ethnography: conferences.
I call this site experimental because, although the conference is not an institution
that first arose within modernity, almost no anthropological attention has been paid to it.30
This does not mean that people think that the conference is nothing but a formal gathering.
All who attend them, especially Homines academici, intuit immediately which role they
are assigned to play.31 However, here it requires an analytical scrutiny. For those
involved, conferences are all about social relations and the accumulation of capital
(cultural/social/economic) in a given milieu. The organizer of a conference would like to
optimize its value by lining up the most impressive list of participants. These key figures
work sessions into their schedules, which are full and tight. Special events, such as
29 The debate between Latour and scholars from the Edinburgh school over the ontology of science
studies was played out in volumes 30 and 31 of Studies of History and Philosophy of Science.
30 Among few ethnographies using international conferences as a working site, see Riles 2000.
31 In Homo Academicus, Pierre Bourdieu notes that participation at scientific conferences is an
important indicator of academic capital (1988: 46). He points out that conferences may be used to analyze
the power structure of an academic system (241).
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keynote speeches, special lectures, or round-table discussions, are scheduled. Those who
are not featured speakers largely function as spectators, and while they are not the main
characters in this social drama, by attending they are able to collect the latest useful
information, which for them is certainly a form of capital. Sometimes they add to their
academic capital by asking an impressive question or by meeting one of the big names. In
addition to cultivating such relationships, for outsiders conferences are a "ritual of
institution" that bestows value and authority upon the words spoken (Bourdieu 1991:
117-26).
I see three principal dynamics functioning at conferences. First of all, the
conference is the site of a conversation, a formal discourse. If we acknowledge Jacques
Derrida's differentiation of writing and speaking as central to the development of our
logocentric civilization (1976: Part 2), the conference resists progress. Unlike the bazaar
in anthropology and the trading zone in the history of science (Galison 1997: Chapter 9),
the conference is a locus for discursive performances with a clear procedural structure.
Just as important, at its conclusion the results of the conference are written up, and while
the framework of the conference suggests that ideas can be worked through on the spot,
improvised, reformulated, the playful aspect is always subordinated to the need for a
stable final result. This makes the conference an interesting site. A modem version of the
panorama or the universal exhibition, the conference visualizes and verbalizes the desires
and the relations of dominance and submission among their participants (in the case of
this thesis, the states). Words and actions are directed toward agreement, yet most of them
are unstable, lacking any regulations and yielding no publications. I believe that
conferences can be understood as a collective, dramatized action that turns speech
(thoughts) into writing (representation carries symbolic power): they constitute a space
that deserves an interpretative ethnography.
The conference brings people together for an exchange of opinions, which is its
second dynamic. But there are two ways to think about this. On the one hand, people
gather and work together toward a goal by exchanging opinions. On the other hand,
different opinions are recognized by consultation and comparison. In short, the
conference is an arena where both controversies and consensus are expected; tensions and
conflicts provide punctuation marks on which a cultural interpretation can be built.
Consider the debate over racial difference at the ICH as an instance of controversy within
a context devoted to finding consensus. The social drama of racial difference and its
resolution at the ICH provides two scenarios illustrating the paradoxical dynamics of the
conference. The ICH is devoted to creating a universal standard for drugs and among its
guiding principles is the importance of neglecting racial differences as much as possible.
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However, this issue assumes differences among races. The tension thus comes about
because the ICH has to recognize all the differences on one hand - that is the reason for
having this conference - yet its goal is to unify them by means of scientific tools. In
order to achieve this goal, the ICH allows a range of possible interpretations of racial
difference, but these interpretations would be melted into a consensus, no matter how
limited it may be, as a result of communicative skills and political manipulation. The ICH
is a promising site for observing the merging of a range of opinions into a single standard.
The third dynamic can be observed over a series of conferences. Although the goal
of conferences is to achieve consensus - or, at worst, conclusions - this is rarely
achieved in a single meeting. When issues are complicated, opinions tend to be at odds,
and no number of sessions will suffice to resolve differences: resolving the disagreements
must be postponed until the next conference. Often such postponements arise out of a
practical need: more can be done through informal exchanges of ideas after a recess has
eased tensions. To ensure the next conference can pick up where the last one halted,
records are needed, either formal documents (memorandums, minutes, announcements,
proceedings) or informal notes (participation reports, memoirs, presentation slides, news
releases).
These materials create a living archive - living because of the two ways one
conference can link to another ethnographically. Until a formal conclusion can be reached,
the archive cannot stop expanding. Conferences have long adopted a rule governing the
use of this archive: it calls for reading the minutes from the previous meeting when a new
round starts. Additionally, through various written and visual technologies, even informal
materials can be indefinitely preserved and disseminated. The second way to consider
these materials as living is the use the participants make of them. Although oral
interviews can be of great utility in anthropological studies, my field experience
convinces me that recorded materials themselves are more reliable. Burdened by
everyday routines, many experts rely heavily on this kind of material as an aide-mdmoire:
these memories represent the nature of the conferences, both fragmentary and periodic.
Participants base important decisions on these materials, and these decisions will be
presented at the next conference. Observers find that these materials are the only record
of actions inside a conference: they can be traced and counted, both serially and
sectionally.
My concern is the debate on racial difference at the ICH, and several series of
meetings on the subject have built up a rich deposit of materials. In addition to regular
meetings of the Steering Committee and the Expert Working Group, many conferences
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and symposiums not organized by the ICH have addressed this topic. For example, the
CMR International Institute for Regulatory Science organized some technical workshops
and conferences on ethnic factors, which collected early opinions from the European
Union and Japan. Conferences and panels continued to be held even after a guideline was
established; the annual meetings of the American Drug Information Association (DIA),
for instance, are attended by experts in regulatory science and industry. Other meetings,
such as the most recent International Organizations of Medical Sciences meeting on
pharmacogenetics, addressed related topics and are reviewed here. The Quintiles
presentation I cited at beginning of this chapter is just one other example.
Many conferences and meetings were held in East Asia and neighboring areas
concerning the ICH and racial difference. In 1996 the DIA held its Asian meeting in
Tokyo and since then meetings have been held in Taipei (1998), Seoul (2000), and
Singapore (2005). The International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Associations (IFPMA) held a series of conferences, the first in Hong Kong in 1997 and
subsequent ones in Singapore (1999), Thailand (2001), and Beijing (2004). Regional
meetings are also relevant. The most important is perhaps the APEC pharmaceutical
network on bridging studies, which originated in 2000 and is held annually in either
Japan (Tokyo in 2002), Taiwan (Taipei in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2005), or Korea (Seoul
in 2004). Also worth mentioning is the Kitasato-Harvard symposium organized jointly by
Harvard's School of Public Health and Kitasato University's Division of Biostatistics,
and held annually in Tokyo since 2000. Despite their academic orientation, these annual
symposiums are closely watched by government and industry groups, especially since
genomics will certainly dominate future pharmaceutical research. The latest series of
meetings to be announced is the Life Science Innovation Forum (LSIF) initiated by the
United States and the ASEAN member states in 2003 under the APEC scheme. The
backing of the Bush administration, which clearly wants to extend its influence in Asia
through this channel, has put the spotlight on this newly launched conference.
While the ICH will be at the center of my discussion, I have adopted a multisited
approach that includes material from the other conferences I have just listed. George
Marcus has declared the multisited approach a new mode of ethnographic research
predicated on the idea that mobility and circulation are embedded in a world system and
are therefore constitutive of cultural formations. This approach permits us to "examine
the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space"
(Marcus 1998: 79). My method is basically the same as Marcus's. Given the
spatial/temporal/cultural separation of sites from each other, Marcus suggested some
subjects on which a comprehensive ethnography can be constructed, such as following
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one group of people, a thing or a metaphor, stories and myths, or issue-oriented conflicts.
My focus is on the last.
The conferences I examine are not conventional single sites: they are single sites
with multisited characteristics. Let me reiterate: these are not sites naturally formed by
culture, race, or society that can be taken for granted. They are artificial constructions that
cross every temporal and spatial boundary that anthropologists can imagine. They are not
located anyplace but can be found anywhere; they take place in a specific moment but
their effects can be eternal. Although their artificiality can be partially explained through
the anthropologist's use of deployment, I need to try to explain why this site is important
for ethnographers and why we should recognize and describe it.
In conceptualizing sites of anthropological inquiry, Fischer has offered the concept
of "ethical plateaus," which he defines as "the strategic terrains on which multiple
technologies interact, creating a complex topology for perception and decision making"
(2003: 30). Such a terrain might be that described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as
a new form of sovereignty that effectively regulates global exchanges. The empire they
describe is a pyramid of global constitutions structured by international companies and
nation-states and energized by the global economy (2000: 310-16). As a part of this
larger phenomenon, the conferences surrounding the ICH are not merely of academic
interest: they are ethical plateaus where the nation-state and its governmentality, the life
sciences, capitalism, and the politics of representation are mashed together. By studying
them we can trace the formation of the pyramid, with the United States and Asian
nation-states interacting on the first level, and the international pharmaceutical companies
negotiating with both on the second. The tensions between the world and the states can
also be also understood as part of this empire, and the ethnographer may well hear a
moral call to document them.
Bourdieu posed an important question that is relevant here: "Could rites of
institution, whatever they may be, exercise their power [. . .] if they were not capable of
giving at least the appearance of a meaning, a purpose, to those beings without a purpose
who constitute humanity, or giving them the feeling of having a role or, quite simply,
some importance, and thus tearing them from the clutches of insignificance?" (1992: 126).
This above question suggests that a certain Danish prince might find succor at the ICH.
However, it also suggests that we might question the conference's ability to present all of
the voices ethnographers want to hear. Possibly those who fail to be heard in conferences
are either insignificant or unimportant: they need not be incorporated into the story.
However, as critical ethnographers, we have to concern ourselves with those who speak
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but are not heard. That is the last methodological issue we should deal with.
Anatomy of the Institution's Anthropological Voice
The human voice is a metaphor often used in anthropology. It refers to both what
anthropologists listen to and what they deliver to their audience. Anthropologist James W.
Fernandez indicated the role voice plays in anthropological works: "An important part of
our vocation is 'listening to voices,' and our methods are the procedures that best enable
us to hear voices, to represent voices, to translate voices. [...] Anthropology is paying
attention to the voices of those among whom we live and study" (1987). Although
recognizing voices seems to be just as important as synthesizing them into a single,
comprehensive voice, more attention is now being paid to the formation of the
anthropological account than to "listening to voices."
There are two reasons to give careful thought to the voices I have studied. First,
while I have already made my case for calling a state a writerly agency, such an agency
can make more anthropological sense if one explains how a state can have a voice and
how the ethnographer is able to hear it. Second, and more important, in the previous
section I mentioned that a conference is not a given, well-defined territory but an ongoing
global field that constantly refreshes itself. Not every voice is able to be present and not
all voices get the hearing they want. For such a site, ethnographers must to be very
careful to define the field they are looking at, paying attention to who is unable to express
themselves in such a field.
Regarding the anthropological voice of an institution, I will provide a three-fold
analysis based on Fischer's reading of autobiographies as ethnographic material (2003:
Chapter 6). Fischer classified autographical voices, calling the self-contained process of
finding an identity finding voice one, the dialogic process of"mirroring" and
"cross-cultural critique" voice two, and the process of making networks by triangulating
subjective voices and voices of rationality voice three. This classification (with minor
modifications) is useful when applied to institutions such as the states I discuss in the
chapters that follow.3 2 I shall call voice one "instrumentality of voicing" and in my
investigation of this voice I will focus on the set of mechanisms by which one institution
expresses its opinions (this is the primary source ethnographers use to recognize that
32 Fischer creatively probed the anthropological voice by looking at three kinds of text. For voice one,
the identity process, he considered autobiographies; he found that when they were read along with
biographies a new voice appeared. However, scientists are not wont to distinguish these voices, thinking
instead of a universal voice of science, ruled by the career path that more or less controls the way the other
voices are represented.
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institution's identity). Voice two of an institution I call "functionality of voicing" because
the voices are themselves dependent on the context for their interactions. Voice three of
an institution, in the field of science and technology, is where scientific rationality
dominates, defining the ability to generate a scientific discourse by, for instance, hosting
conferences.
It is not difficult to imagine the state as an instrument than is able to voice its
opinions. The government is the instrumental representative of the state, its formal voice
on policies, laws, announcements, and so forth. And in democratic polities one can trace
the mechanisms for generating such voices. Of course, political scientists have shown
how complicated these mechanisms are as a result of the conflicts among interest groups
and the interests of the government itself. In the realm of science, however, these
mechanisms address relatively technical issues, which tend to be less politically driven.33
In the case of the ICH, the voice of the United States is perhaps the simplest to analyze.
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which handles the approval of
new drugs at the FDA, is the mouthpiece for United States policy at the ICH. Meanwhile,
the PhRMA is a typical lobbying group for global capitalism based in the United States.
Every year the headquarters of American pharmaceutical companies collect complaints
from local subsidiaries around the world and submit them to the PhRMA. It then writes
its annual report, which is used to pressure Congress as well as trade representatives.
The situation in Japan is a bit more complicated but still understandable. Within the
MHLW are departments corresponding to the FDA. However, unlike the FDA, which
also deals with scientific issues, the MHLW deals exclusively with administrative issues.
On pharmaceutical matters, Japan has a consultative committee of senior scientists,
whose opinions are usually taken as that of the government; the committee funds studies
and routinely issues official statements. The delegates sent to this committee's meetings
by the Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA) do not play a leading
role in discussions. Meetings are highly technical and the scientists are not that interested
in business. Before each ICH meeting, industry representatives are provided with
opportunities to consult with the MHLW. Disagreements are not rare, but traditional
Japanese negotiation techniques generally resolve differences and produce consensus.
Taiwan's relations with the ICH are ambiguous, for the simple reason that it is not
invited to the party. Although it formed an ad hoc committee to monitor ICH conference
33 I am not saying that science is of no political interest. Many cases studies by members of the
Edinburgh school have revealed that science cannot be separated from policy decisions. Furthermore, in
modern science, scientists are even "normally" involved as a crucial part in the process of policy making.
See Jasanoff 1990.
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results and later a technical organization for new drug reviews, their functions are limited.
Similarly, Taiwan's drug industry plays almost no part in the ICH. Unlike the United
States and Japan, Taiwan has virtually no domestic pharmaceutical production of any size;
most local businesses are subsidiaries already represented by the PhRMA. Even so, the
voices of Taiwanese scientists and officials do crop up in ICH records. In order to tell in
what contexts these voices are counted, we have to take a look at the interactions of these
voices inside and outside of the ICH; they are related to what I call voice two, the
functionality of vocing.
As I have already mentioned, researchers tend to reproduce conventional images of
the states they study. Since Japan is commonly described as "conservative" and
"protectionist," there is a tendency to expect that representatives of that country will
resist globalization. Though it is almost invisible internationally, Taiwan is thought of as
an economic leader - one of the "four dragons" - and a political troublemaker due to
its relations with the PRC and the Unites States. In international forums, many fear that
Taiwanese delegates will upset the proceedings with political declarations. The tendency
to cast nations in certain cliched parts contributes to capturing a voice in a context, but it
does not entirely account for it. Such factors play almost no role in science, where
ethnography enters the frame.
The functionality of voicing, I insist, should be defined in a particular form of
narrartive; let us consider how it would work in opera. Opera buffa is full of formulaic
characters: cunning servants, parsimonious fathers, passionate lovers, wayward daughters,
and arrogant soldiers - these provide the backbone of the comedy. But what brings the
audience to the theater is the music, the exquisite melodies, the transcendent voices. Each
voice performs two functions: its statements contribute to the progress of the story; its
purely musical qualities can be recognized and appreciated separately. Not every actor on
the stage gets to sing a solo at the front of the stage. Depending on the dramatic effect he
hopes to achieve, the composer may assign a character only spoken lines or some offstage
singing. Different people may react differently to these devices. While opera lovers are
fully aware of the crucial functions these characters have in the story, for the uninitiated
the failure to sing or to appear turns these players into vague memories.
Let us continue to rely on the analogy of opera as we consider the range of
institutional voices debating racial difference at the ICH. With developing countries serve
as the audience and occasional walk-on roles, only a handful of actors enjoy the glory of
standing at the center of the global stage and belting out an aria. The FDA plays a judge
and the PhRMA a czar; the former seeks the universal virtue of public health while the
latter, accompanying the former, promotes the most advanced drugs to achieve this goal.
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A special role is written for Japan in this opera, a non-Western role in this Western opera:
certainly the dark baritone is talented enough to sing an aria or two. Stubborn and
conservative, always protecting her traditional values, Japan's determination to cling to
antiquated notions of racial identity will, like the plans of Amonasro in Aida, fail. Taiwan
is only a voice, singing from offstage. Though this soprano has a promising idea about
how to recognize racial difference even while ignoring it via a carefully designed
scientific agenda, this does not finally prove sufficient to win her a role on stage. Few can
identify her contribution, her role in the global text - this will be voice three in my
analysis.
Voice three is concerned with creating a scientifically justifiable, globally
recognizable voice. This voice can be a scientific argument or a policy, but it must be
considered together with a discursive vehicle or channel by which this voice can be
conveyed to listeners. For the case of ICH, this would amount to satisfying a simple yet
challenging set of criteria: becoming a presence in a globally recognized conference,
hosting such a conference, and recording these events in an archive so that they can be
revisited over and over. The first criterion is more closely related to the voice in context,
or voice two, but the other two pertain to voice three, which I shall explain here. It is not
difficult to host a scientific conference and have a say in it; the difficulty lies in winning
global recognition of such a conference. To host a conference modeled on the ICH means
proving oneself an adept in both science and political economy. Bourdieu reminded us
that conferences tend to concentrate certain types of capital, but this is not an effortless
process. Many concerns have to be taken into account, depending on the types of capital
available to the organizer: the selection of topics (issues of concern), consumptive power
(market), political influence (superpower), and qualified science (curiosity and politics of
knowledge).
Let us briefly evaluate both Japan's and Taiwan's voices. In terms of hosting well
attended and generally respected conferences and forums, Japan and Taiwan are utterly
asymmetric. While its huge domestic pharmaceutical market is sufficient justification for
Japan to host such conferences, it suffers a broad perception of being protectionist. This is
an impediment to talks with its main economic rival and political partner, the United
States. Taiwan, on the other hand, stands at a distinct disadvantage in several areas. While
Taiwan's medical research is superb, its reputation as a troublemaker excludes it from
almost all governmental gatherings, and hosting its own events is out of the question.3 4
34 According to the Thomas ISI data of scientific index Taiwan's performance in producing medical
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In order to create a forum where its voice can be fairly heard and documented, these
Asian states have to modify the rhetorical strategies they use in their communications
with the Western mainstream. One can look to studies of gender in science to get some
idea of why. The history of discussion of women's role in science has been divided into
two stages (Harding 1991). The first stage was "equality feminism": activists asked for
fair treatment and wanted outstanding woman scientists to be judged by the same norms
applied to men. The second stage was "difference feminism," developed once some
women had succeeded according to the standards of equality feminism. The new
demands were radical: not only did proponents demand that their voices be heard, they
criticized the norms by which these voices were selected.
A similar type of development can be seen in the case of Japan and Taiwan's
relationships with the ICH. Although the ICH was determined to have Asian participation
from the outset, Japan had to deal with the established Western norms from the outset.
Taiwan lagged far behind, cruelly rejected by almost every international organization. In
other words, while Japan is now at the second stage, questioning the universal standard,
Taiwan is still at the first stage, hoping to be incorporated by being outstanding according
to existing standards. As we will see in the following chapters, Japan used every
opportunity to negotiate with the United States over what it considered its unique values.
The more tightly Japan becomes enmeshed in globalization, the more desperately it clings
to these conferences as forums for its unique voice. While the voice of the Japanese state
is repressed, Taiwan's state voice remains inchoate. Like the women's movement, Taiwan
can point to a few "successful individuals" but it is determined to see the entryway to
legitimacy opened wider, so that these individuals cease to be the exception. For this
reason, Taiwanese politicians view the creation of conferences as crucial. Like the women
of the feminist movement, Taiwan keeps hoping that someone will hear its voice, its
cadences distinctive and unlike any other.
The present study is dedicated to presenting the complexity of the interactions
among voices in the era of globalization. As Donna Haraway did for feminist socialist
cyborgs, I would like to propose an ethnographic interpretation of and for the
non-Western world, not only to create a fairly representational identity, but to ensure that
in international settings non-Western opinions enjoy parity. Echoing Geertz's reading of
Levi-Strauss's Tristes Tropiques, where the foundation of these "strange-looking lives"
can only be appreciated by "subjecting the cultural productions, the things that give these
lives their immediate look of strangeness, to a universalizing analysis that, in dissolving
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papers is ranked the twentieth in the world over the past fourteen years; this is roughly the same as its
the immediacy, dissolves the strangeness" (Geertz 1988: 48). This interpretation is not a
manifesto for strange Japan or outrageous Taiwan; it is, rather, an appeal for a fair
multicultural world.
To bring out the state voices analyzed in my study I have relied on the institutional
ethnography developed by feminist and sociologist Dorothy E. Smith (1987: Chapter 4).
An important part of Smith's project was reworking theories in light of what they failed
to explain, creating a "sociology for people" rather than submitting to the power of the
theory to shape perceptions. In order to collect the experiences that would make possible
a critique, she insisted on the performance of several tasks, which can be summarized as
follows: (1) choosing a standpoint from which the institutional subject was studied; (2)
achieving an understanding of how the institution functioned, especially how every
individual worked with the others; (3) gaining an understanding of the institutional power
structure by analyzing the institution's documentation; and (4) exploring the ideology
behind this structure (167-78). Looking to discover the voice of states, I insist on a
critical awareness of the incommensurability that becomes apparent when Japan and
Western states discuss racial difference, and of the "off-stage" role Taiwan plays in this
debate. I have interviewed the key representatives of Japan and the unofficial
representatives of Taiwan at the ICH. In addition, I have collected local material, most of
which is published in Japanese and Chinese, to gain a clearer understanding of the
representatives' view of the ICH conference (voice one). In the pages that follow I show
how the ICH functions by examining its documents and structures. I pay special attention
to the tensions and conflicts surrounding racial difference, tracing there the interactions
among the different states (voice two). Finally, in order to situate local experiences in a
comprehensive context, I draw attention to the ideological structure that mutes the voices
of the states (voice three).
The second methodology I have relied on is drawn from Latour's ethnographic
studies of scientific knowledge. It is used to supplement institutional ethnography by
extending its two assumptions: first, to extend its research object from a sociological
category of collective individuals to a single representational agency of the state; and,
second, to extend the analysis from a synchronic, cross-sectional examination of power
relations to a dynamic examination that captures the changes in globalization. In Latour's
Science in Action (1987), he showed how a laboratory orchestrated scientific facts (its
voice) by various technologies. Here I will try to do the same (especially in Chapters 6
international rank in the consumption of pharmaceuticals.
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and 7) by tracing how Japan and Taiwan produce their own scientific voices in the debate
over racial difference. Echoing Latour's observation that scientific knowledge is a
co-product of social engineering, I describe how a state can form its own autonomous
voice (voice one), or use such a voice to confirm its agency (voice two). As for the
second element, the formation of a diachronic research frame, I refer to The Pasturization
of France (1988), where Latour brings up the idea of "translation" as a way to understand
the social dynamic in which actors organize and modulate density and texture. As I will
argue in Chapter 5, this methodology helps me to trace a Machiavellian act of social
engineering, braiding the voices of individuals into an institutional voice of the state
(voice three). The book also provides a model for understanding how the FDA and the
PhRMA act in East Asia, and how Japan should respond. As Latour indicates, no
encounter between actors is simple; instead, it presents a social zone where clashing
styles weave new connections and synapses (voice two), and various agencies trade
information and visions.
I have explained the agency this dissertation will examine, the sites it will work on,
and the voices it will listen to. The present chapter is designed not to convince readers but
to suggest how they might approach this thick thesis - a "long argument," to use the
phrase Charles Darwin modestly applied to his theory of natural selection. But one
question remains unanswered. To borrow a locution from Latour, "How should we talk
about all these things that hold together?" (1988: 203). In what follows I explain why and
how this text is composed, and what its style looks like.
AN END NOTE: READERSHIP AND SYNOPSIS OF THE THESIS
Readership and Narrative Style
In the article "Sticking with Ethnography through Thick and Thin," George Marcus
discussed the anxieties provoked in anthropologists by a multisited methodology and an
interdisciplinary approach (1998: 238-49). Developed at a famous university, conceived
as a hybrid of history and anthropology, this thesis shakes continuously as a result of
multiple anxieties of representation. I have deviated from traditional ethnography by
choosing my subject from the global politics of science; I have deviated from history and
regional studies by borrowing the methods of ethnography. This puts me in danger of
engaging no readership at all. Even as I consider the textual representation of science and
politics, I have to ask myself, who will read this thesis? What can it offer to the lay reader,
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to the academy, and to the people with whom it is concerned? In this section, I will try to
answer these questions.
My narrative here is a hybrid of ethnography and history. The incubator that gave
birth to it is the half-anthropology-half-history-of-American-technology academic cyborg.
I expect to attract three kinds of readers, cultural anthropologists who want to understand
globalization and new ways to deal with it, historians of contemporary East Asia and of
pharmaceuticals, and those members of the general public interested in knowing how
state and race interact in the field of medical science during globalization.
Readers with a background in science, technology, and society will easily identify
the STS blood that runs through this dissertation. This is a story of scientific controversy
about racial difference and about trade between East and West. Race is broken into pieces
at the ICH; its operational meaning has to be found in the reconstruction performed in the
conference sessions by different actors, namely government, industry, and scientists.
Their interactions turn race into something that goes far beyond skin color, as the United
States, Japan, and Taiwan each treat the subject with a distinctive social and cultural
approach (see Chapters 4 and 5). As the sciences are called upon to serve each state's
specific need (see Chapters 6 and 7), we see how science and technology function in
social settings. Those who specialize in pharmaceutical policies will find in this thesis not
only a description of some segments of this business on the global level (Chapter 2) and a
guide to regional practices (Chapter 3), but a description of the dynamic between
government and industry that produces new policies (Chapters 6 and 7).
Cultural anthropologists will have found by now that many familiar ideas provide
the theoretical foundation of this thesis; the strong affiliation with ethnography is also
evident. My goal has been to produce an ethnography of modernity and globalization. As
a whole, this work can be considered a modem problem comedy, where conflicts take
place in the domain of scientific theories and diplomatic rhetoric. Longstanding tensions
and cultural misunderstandings are taken into account, as the ritual of globalization
proceeds unceasingly: its progress is marked by quarrels, temporary compromises, and
settlements (see Chapters 4 and 6). I have also tried to produce an ethnography of the
politics of the eccentric and marginal, describing Japan's voice on racial difference with
criteria of symmetry (Shapin and Shaffer 1985). Similarly, I have approached the efforts
to lend Taiwan a voice through Dorothy Smith's suggestions for listening to the voiceless
(see Chapters 5 and 7). Finally, this thesis is a methodological experiment in creating an
ethnography of science and technology. Some of its chapters (Four, Five, Six, and Seven)
may remind readers of Michael Fischer's comments on the collaboration of ethnographer
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and scientist-subject in the pursuit of an ethnographic/authorial voice (2003: 149). And in
some chapters (Five and Eight), I have addressed the problem of the ethnographer
becoming an actor: the ethnographer must always be self-reflexive when trespassing in a
foreign field.
Although this thesis is not a revival of that early ethnographic tradition of
romanticizing the situation of the researcher in the field, I have found that in the era of
globalization the boundaries between the observer and the observed have been almost
completely eroded. As a scholarly work concerning East Asia, the present dissertation
offers an interpretation of pharmaceutical business in Japan and Taiwan (Chapter 3) and
one chapter has been wholly devoted to the view science takes of race and the state
(Chapter 8). 1 have used local accounts throughout the dissertation; I feel strongly that the
local should not be viewed merely as material to interpret.
It is hard to manage complicated arguments while maintaining narrative clarity.
Moreover, I have run into problems of representation and authorship. Throughout the
writing, my model has been Debating Muslims. Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and
Tradition (Fischer and Abedi 1990). This book is a rich, creative narrative on Islamic
culture in Iran and its uneasy situation in the modem world, specifically in dialogue with
the United States. While the differences between that study and mine include subject
matter, material, and approach, our agendas are quite close, as are our thinking about how
our results can be used.
Both works address tensions between cultural tradition and modernity, and tensions
between the non-Western and the Western (principally represented by the United States).
On the question of tradition versus modernity, both reject the assumption that culture is a
fixed, permanent heritage. And on the question of representing cultural encounters, both
reject stereotyped interpretations, such as the fundamentalists' account of Islam or
Japan's stubborn attitude toward racial difference. In addition, both basically share the
assumption of social construction. Fischer and Abedi show that in the praxis of the state
and nationalism, even the most fundamental idea about the hajj can vary through social
manipulation (1990: Chapter 3). In the same manner, I argue that Japan's anxiety about
globalization and Taiwan's embrace of it are interactive, if not cybernetic, social process
that deserves "slow motion" ethnography, tracing it step by step.
In terms of narrative techniques, I have relied heavily on the narrative repertory of
storytellers, turning this text into a story. Each chapter has a story to tell. In addition, this
thesis contains multiple viewpoints created by juxtaposing stories from different
informants. This is an attempt to approximate the multifaceted nature of the world that we
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live in. Like Fischer and Abedi, I have made use of the structures found in folktales
because of this genre's remarkable capacity for absorbing data with various
characteristics; I believe that this genre also encourages more voices and interpretations
to join in.
Collaborations between natives and ethnographers can produce remarkably rich
results. Unlike Marjorie Shostak's relationship with her informant (in Nisa: The Life and
Words of a !Kung Woman there is much talk of sisterhood between interviewer and
subject), an American anthropologist and an Iranian Muslim coauthored Debating
Muslims as a "cultural dialogue." I have followed this trajectory of intercultural dialogue,
juxtaposing these different views, setting arguments one against another (a rational
construction of the debate over racial difference), assessing the political in an
international environment (Taiwan's political status and its exclusion from international
settings). This approach is especially suitable here because the author is both an
ethnographer and a Taiwanese native.
Finally, I have tried to write something that a wide audience can read without
specialist knowledge. Readers will find comprehensive introductions to the industry of
proprietary drugs (Chapter 2), to the drug business in Japan and Taiwan (Chapter 3).
Fischer and Abedi said of Debating Muslims that it was not an attempt to show the
mysterious Orient; instead, it was written in the hope that readers might "gain from it a
feel for the sociological as well as cultural texture of a world" (1990: xxi). This task also
implies a careful reconstruction of an understanding of non-Western culture, because, as
Fischer and Abedi remind us, it is hard to appreciate Islam if it is approached only
backward through the more instrumental policy categories of modernization. I have tried
to provide a similar understanding of Japan and Taiwan, devoid of essentializing tags.
Synopsis
The present dissertation is divided into four basic parts; each part is made up of two
chapters except for Part IV, which only has one chapter.
Part I, composed of Chapters 2 and 3, describes the creation of the ICH against a
background of the world of proprietary drugs and, specifically, the drug business in Japan
and Taiwan. Chapter 2 examines the logic of the production and consumption of
innovative drugs. Adopting Ulrich Beck's notion of a risk society (1992), I argue that
what the industry calls a high-risk, high-profit business is half-reality and half-illusion.
The dangers that the body faces justify an expanding healthcare business. But the creation
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of new drugs should not be considered financial risks since successful drugs have
redeemed the investment in failed attempts. It has been said that the pharmaceutical
business has an extremely low success rate. To better understand the ecology of this
productive mode, this chapter addresses the role of regulatory science in the development
of the modem pharmaceutical industry. Rising standards for new drug approval and a
shrinking of the marketing period have driven big companies to expand from the
domestic market to the international, creating a pressing need for a regulator-industry
forum.
In contrast to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 is about local conditions. The first part covers
the business outlook of Japan's and Taiwan's pharmaceutical markets. It offers an
estimate of their size, an introduction to their domestic environments (ecologies), and
considers how the United States has pressured the states to open up these markets. In the
second and third part I try to make sense of Japanese and Taiwanese drug manufactures.
Using Francis Fukuyama's ideas about trust (1995), I contend that drugs cannot be
considered pure commodities in the Western capitalistic sense; they are implicated in the
social relations between physicians and patients, as well as between physicians and
business. Japan, a country that Fukuyama considers high trust, represents a self-contained
model of health care that is not based on restrictive scientific standards and free
competition but on systematic trust and collective authority; both stem from trust in the
state bureaucracy and the abstract nation. Taiwan, on the other hand, is an imperfect copy
of Japan, which once colonized the island and implanted various medical institutions.
Despite these influences, Taiwan never developed a strong drug industry. The key to
understanding this situation is, again, the concept of trust. Most Taiwanese consider drugs
nothing more than neutral instruments that cure diseases, and through a combination of
cultural estrangement, lack of trust, and unusually high regard for expensive foreign
goods, Taiwanese society has attracted a strong foreign pharmaceutical presence while
nurturing no local companies. More importantly, protracted political isolation has
undermined the government's power in dealing with pharmaceuticals. The Taiwanese
government is compelled to resist the intensive pressure of the PhRMA to reduce barriers
to foreign pharmaceutical sales while endeavoring to maintain its global visibility in
health care.
Part II, Chapters 4 and 5, describes how Japan and Taiwan separately encountered
the ICH. As I explain in Chapter 4, Japan's experience was not smooth. Portraying this
encounter as a quarrel between the Western and non-Western, this "slow-motion"
ethnography describes two modes of negotiation used by Japan in the debate over racial
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difference. The theme is the politics of standards: which standard can be accepted as
universal? Answering this question proved a long and exhausting process lasting from
1986, when a bilateral agreement was reached between Japan and the United States on
the acceptance of foreign data, to 1998, when a guideline was finally implemented.
Instead of repeating the banal scenario about the victory of globalization, in this chapter I
contest this discourse and advocate a dialogic context where there is a symmetry between
the two states' interpretations. Although the meeting moved from bilateral United
States-Japan negotiations to the multinational ICH roundtable discussion, and the content
of the discussions shifted from trade to science, the essence of the quarrel remained an
interpretative and ideological disagreement about race and the state, which could never be
reduced completely to either business or science. At the end, a political compromise was
reached and a single definition of race was agreed upon, but the contradictory voices
were not silenced: they are quite audible in the guidelines that were drawn up.
Chapter 5 concerns Taiwan's efforts to catch up with globalization. Unlike the
previous chapter, in which I depicted a defensive and combative Japan at odds with the
West, here I look at how a state goes about making its voice heard in an international
context. Taiwan's dealings with the ICH involve two difficulties, one commercial and
specific, the other political and general. The commercial problem is simple: Taiwan was
not invited to be a member of the ICH. Like many other countries, Taiwan has never had
any allies that might help it resist the pressure brought to bear by the PhRMA and United
States trade representatives. In addition, since Taiwan does not enjoy wide recognition as
an autonomous state, it almost never participates in international negotiations, including
the ICH. This results in a hopeless dependence on the United States, which further
complicates the problem. Even so, this chapter is neither a lament for Taiwan's political
status nor a critique of global capitalism. Taiwan's strategic embrace of globalization has
permitted it to escape from the grip of the United States by sneaking into a forum where it
can hope to be treated as an equal. When Taiwan's representatives began to take an active
role in discussions at the ICH, it began to look very much like a state. This chapter
describes the making of this institutional voice.
Part III, made up of Chapters 6 and 7, traces the second round of discussions among
Japan, Taiwan, and Western countries at the ICH, after the release of a controversial
guideline that attempts to cope with the intractable issue of racial difference. Chapter 6
shows how Japan tried to escape from a political deadlock while insisting on a picture of
biological homogeneity. I explore the strategies that Japan has employed to unlock this
impasse. Japan knows that it cannot always refer all domestic and foreign pressures to
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open up its market to the ICH, and racial difference is an issue that has been tentatively
"settled." It also knows that cultural values have little value in such a forum unless they
are backed up by globally acceptable science. As it resists attacks from international
corporations, Japan is developing a new voice to rewrite the definition of race. For the
Japanese government, the way to treat globalization is not to resist but to make new
standards to replace the old ones.
Continuing Chapter 5's portrait of Taiwan's institutional voice, Chapter 7 is an
ethnography about voicing (fasheng). Though it remains formally outside of the ICH,
Taiwan carefully monitors Japan's interventions on racial difference. It knows the
guideline is controversial and impractical, and is aware of the cultural gap that yields
these contradictions. Here is a chance for Taiwan to prove that what cannot work in Japan
can work in Taiwan. Revising guidelines - which Japan is always trying to do on the
racial issue - may be beyond Taiwan's reach, but Taiwan might be able to get what it
needs by expanding the applicability of guidelines to other non-Western countries.
Taiwan's voicing project can be divided into two strategies. To facilitate the bridging of
racial differences, Taiwan started talking to other Asian countries that have not yet
adopted ICH guidelines, calling for an Asia-Pacific regional network of regulatory
science whose members would share clinical data. This is part of a plan to situate
Taiwan's voice in regional networks to consolidate claims about legitimacy. Furthermore,
in order to make the regional network a workable scientific agenda, Taiwan has drawn
upon its abundant pool of statisticians to develop relevant biostatistical models. For an
ignored, ambiguous political entity like Taiwan, the only way to survive globalization is
neither to resist it nor to revise its operating rules; the solution is to exploit globalization
to further its own interests.
Part IV is an attempt to generalize my previous findings in a broader discussion of
state transformation. I rely there on the concepts of"normal" and "pathological" to
contribute to the ongoing debate over race and the state. In the first half of Chapter 8 1
argue that in Japan race is not a biological entity but a cultural reflection of the state.
Race and the state are in fact two sides of a coin periodically flipped by globalization.
Taiwan, despite the outbreak of terrific debates over ethnicity and autonomy during local
and national elections, has not experienced these kinds of conflicts in its relations with
globalization. Long isolation from global politics and terrible intimidation by the PRC
have given Taiwan a clear national goal. What the Taiwanese really want, I conclude, is
internationally recognized statehood. Though nearly all of its appeals end in humiliation,
Taiwan exists as a state in those moments when it seizes center stage at the ICH. An
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ethnographic study of the contemporary scene, this chapter considers what Japan's views
on race and Taiwanese views on statehood are, not what they should be. The emergence
of new branches of science (e.g., genomics) and new political situations (e.g., China's
recent military threats against Taiwan) will continuously complicate the landscape of
globalization. I want to offer a snapshot so that readers can imagine where the next move
will be.
In my conclusion I offer a wrap-up of theoretical issues related to the present thesis.
I review my contributions, which are: recognizing the state as an anthropological agent,
showing how the non-Western functions in the technoscientific world, and
conceptualizing institutional voices at the global level. I also reconstruct the story of
racial difference at the ICH from three separate perspectives: those of the predominantly
Western pharmaceutical industry, of Japan, and of Taiwan. These reconstructions do not
constitute an ontological understanding of globalization, but they remind us that the
different agents at the interface between individual lives and the world help us to imagine
the effects of globalization on individuals and they give us some idea of how the state, as
one of these agents, can voice.
All right. I have provided as much instruction as I can on how to read my thesis.
Like Tonio's famous aria in I Pagliacci, which connects drama and reality, this chapter is
a prologue that invites readers to the social drama concerning drugs, race, and standards
that follows. I have told you my plan and how it unfolds. Without any further ado,
Andiam. Incominciate! (Come. Let's begin!)
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PART ONE
Reading the Bio-Global, Looking into the Local
It was an odd invitation for me, I have to admit, to the real world of proprietary
drugs.
On a sunny winter morning, I sat in a cafe, enjoying my breakfast and the Los
Angeles Times. While browsing the newspaper page by page, a column attracted me. It is
about the more rigorous measures the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
intended to use to monitor drugs in response to two recent safety debacles, including the
national withdrawal of Vioxx (rofecoxib), a COX-2 (cyclo-oxygenase II) inhibitor
manufactured by Merck, in September 2004. The withdrawal followed Merck's
acknowledgment that Vioxx was linked to heart attacks and strokes. The article quoted a
comment by Steven Galson, the acting director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research: "We don't always understand the full magnitude of drugs risks prior to
approval" (November 6, 2004, All). At that time I had been doing archival studies on the
profiles of some proprietary drugs, which are often opaque to the public. I know that
these medications seriously affect millions of lives in the U.S. and around the world;
however, they were only names to me until this news was released. It was so vivid and
visible a case that it prompted me to think of two things that lie outside the conventional
discourses of "consumers' rights" and "public safety."
First, as one of the most effective painkillers available, Vioxx has been sold for five
years since its approval; an estimated twenty million American people have taken this
drug and its annual sales exceeded $2.5 billion, making it the thirteenth best seller in the
world. Its high profitability had led to several followers, such as Celebrex (celecoxib) and
Bextra (valdecoxib), both developed by Pfizer. If Vioxx was suspended, these might be
too, leaving no COX-2 inhibitors on the market. The Public Citizen's Health Research
Group, cited in the Los Angeles Times article, claimed that the balance of power in the
FDA "is in favor of approving a drug or keeping it on the market without warning." What
I thought of was the fact that patients will suffer. Putting aside the loss of profits to these
companies, which showed up in their stock prices (a loss of $27 billion within few hours
of Merck's announcement), I was concerned about the millions of Americans who had
benefited from these drugs. Pulling drugs from the market precludes them from being
able to make risk-versus-benefit decisions. What else could they choose if they
considered the risk of Vioxx is bearable? It is easy to pull a drug from market, whether
voluntarily or not; however, it may result in unpredicted losses for people who have no
better choices for their treatment.
Secondly, I was concerned about the level of safety we expect in pharmaceutical
products. Although the article at least indicated that the risks were evident four years ago
from the data that were not properly analyzed, the manufacturer claimed that its decision
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was based on a three-year post-marketing study on the prevention of the recurrence of
colorectal polyps in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas. In this study, there
was an increased risk for confirmed cardiovascular events beginning after eighteen
months of treatment for the patients taking Vioxx compared to those taking a placebo. In
other words, if this drug is risky, it is risky for long-term users. According to the article,
the FDA was asking the Institute of Medicine to study the drug safety system;
nonetheless, what is most crucial may not be whether this system can discover drugs'
safety problems before they are sold to customers. The problem, in my opinion, is a
cultural one, a question of how long the public can stand to wait for care that is totally
"risk-free." We drive cars; we hope they are safe all the time. We also know that there is
slight possibility that they have problems that may endanger us. However, we have
extremely high standards for pharmaceuticals. We take drugs, and we expect them to be
"absolutely safe" before and after they are approved. Once a drug is thought of as risky,
its sale is immediately suspended.
Even so, I agree that this event has flagged the problems that arise in this small yet
important area, the ambiguous, rapport-based relationship between scientists and
pharmaceutical companies. I started off being interested in the logic of how innovative
drugs are produced and regulated. What is the relationship between the regulators and the
regulated, and when and how was it established?
The issue remains heated and unsettled in the United States. Science warned in
November 2004 that there could be a "class effect," meaning that all brands of COX-2
inhibitors could increase the risk of heart disease. Pfizer checked its Celebrex, which, like
Vioxx, showed possible risks of heart attacks and stroke. It also announced that two
recent studies showed that its drug Bextra increased cardiovascular events in people who
had undergone a coronary artery bypass graft. A Merck plan to seek for approval for
Acroxia, claimed to be the "second-generation" of COX-2, did not go forward. In the
meant time, public hearings, debates and discussions were held. An advisory issued by
the FDA in February 2005 suggested that Celebrex and Bextra should be kept on the
market and allowed Vioxx to return to the market, but the public criticized some of the
committee members for their links to the drug industry. The latest news I know of is that
Bextra was yanked from the market on April 7, 2005, and the government ordered that
nineteen other popular prescription competitors, from celebrex to mobic to high-dose
naproxen, carry tough new warnings that the drugs may increase the risk of heart attacks
and strokes.
In East Asia, Vioxx is another story. Although it was approved in the United States
in 1999, Vioxx was still waiting for approval for the Japanese market, the second largest
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in the world, when Merck pull it from the U.S. market. Banyu Co., Ltd., a first-rank
Japanese pharmaceutical company that was completely acquired by Merck in 2001, had
taken charge of the clinical trials that were conducted in Japan on Japanese subjects (trial
code MK-966). After acknowledging its mother company Merck's decision, Banyu
immediately stopped this clinical trial, which had reached the most costly and
time-consuming third phase. A medical reporter commented that among the unfortunate
delays due to Japan's slow system of drug approval, Vioxx presented an example of the
necessity of this pickiness. In addition, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
started to investigate other COX-2 drugs that were already on the Japanese market in case
they posed the same risk.
Closely following the FDA, Taiwan approved Vioxx in February 2001 after
conducting a clinical trial with forty local subjects (import number 023111), and the drug
soon won popularity among patients with arthritis. However, when Merck announced the
voluntary withdrawal in the U.S., Taiwan's Department of Health ordered the
cancellation of the import permit for Vioxx the same day (October 1, 2004). In the
meantime, Taiwan's Center for Drug Evaluation had been kept informed by the FDA
about the monitoring of other drugs to see whether they should be pulled from the market.
For various different reasons, Vioxx did not arouse public discussions in these two
countries.
That is the starting point from which I want to investigate the intersection of the
bio-global and the local.
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Chapter 2
Harmonizing the World in the Name of Health: The Spread of Bio-Capitalism and
the Need for Standardization
Merck has always believed that prospective, randomized, controlled clinical
trials are the best way to evaluate the safety of medicines. APPROVe is
precisely this type of study-and it has provided us with new data on the
cardiovascular profile of Vioxx.
Peter S. Kim'
These (innovations) should give patients waiting for new medicines
confidence in the ongoing research commitment and continued discoveries
emerging from American pharmaceutical research companies.
Alan Holmer2
PART I
READING THE WORLD OF PROPRIETARY DRUGS
"New Medicines, New Hope": PhRMA's Voice on Drug Innovation
If some readers are puzzled about preceding description of the Vioxx incident,
especially the complicated responses regarding the way a drug's safety should be
properly evaluated, this chapter will demonstrate that the rhetoric the pharmaceutical
industry uses is not obscure. The logic is simple, as shown in the quotes above:
pharmaceutical companies are willing to develop new drugs because innovations give
patients hope and confidence. Drug companies have extremely high standards for the
clinical trials they use to evaluate their products. As the PhRMA claims in its motto
"New Medicines, New Hope," everything is in the name of people's health. Without
jumping too quickly to criticism, this chapter will try to understand what these people
want to say to us.
Indeed, listening to the pharmaceutical industry's voice is a joy. With its
optimistic tone, it sounds as if drugs are one of the world's most innovative,
research-based mines of discovery and invention. The industry is characterized by
Director of Merck Research Laboratories in Merck 2004, "Merck Announces Voluntary Worldwide
Withdrawal of VIOXX®."
2 Chariman of PhRMA in PhRMA 2003, "A Monumental Decade for Combating Illness and
Disease."
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ever-growing investment in research and development. As the public is aware,
incredible progress based largely on advances in life sciences including genomics and
proteomics is being made. Indeed, new techniques for synthesizing chemicals using
robotics, computer science and information systems are continuously being developed.
It is what many refer to as "the golden age of science."
However, the joy comes with mixed feelings about this business, both globally
and individually, because it is both beneficial and profit-driven. Let us take a closer
look at the pharmaceutical business by reviewing a report prepared by the PhRMA for
the United States' leading research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.
Entitled "A Decade of Innovation," this twenty-page narrative begins with summary of
achievements over the last decade: over three hundred new drugs, biologics and
vaccines have been approved to prevent and treat over one hundred and fifty conditions.
These pharmaceutical innovations, most of which were made by the PhRMA member
companies, advanced the treatment of many major diseases of modern times: high
blood pressure, schizophrenia, Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease, high
cholesterol, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis and HIV/AIDS (PhRMA 2003).
As announced by Alan Holmer at The Economist's Third Annual Pharmaceutical
Roundtable in November 2003, "The advances achieved over the last decade have
dramatically changed medical care for many serious conditions, including those
highlighted in this report. As a result, many patients can now be treated effectively with
medicines, instead of facing invasive surgery, a lengthy hospital stay, or a debilitating
chronic condition." In this report, each disease has a separate profile that includes the
treatments for it in development. Examples cited include the four new classes of oral
medicines (sulfonylureas, biguanides, a -glucosidase inhibitors, and D-phenylalanine
derivatives) that have allowed diabetic patients better control of their blood sugar levels
and help prevent the devastating complications of diabetes, and three new classes of
medicines (two drugs and one biologic) that improve the treatment of rheumatoid
arthritis (including Vioxx). Medicines that did not exist in 1993 are now the standard of
care among neurologists for patients in the mild to moderate stages of Alzheimer's
disease.
Alongside this progress, what is also notable in the report are the various ways in
which these diseases are presented. Except for traditional scenarios showing how new
medicines powerfully treat a certain disease, the report takes an educational tone
highlighting the dreadfulness of diseases such as diabetes and rheumatoid arthritis. For
example, the latter is portrayed as leading to bone loss that causes osteoporosis, as well
as the development of anemia, neck pain, dry eyes and mouth, bumps under the skin,
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and very rarely, inflammation of the blood vessels. For some diseases the cost-
effectiveness of drugs is emphasized by comparing them with hospital care: the report
cites a New England Journal of Medicine study about AIDS treatment that states that
drugs "are almost a perfect substitute for hospital care. We can afford them because, in
fact, we are already spending the money on HIV care in the form of hospitalization."
Sometimes cost-effectiveness is re-framed in order to compare the treatment and the
restored functions, such as control of high blood cholesterol resulting in extension of
life expectancy and better overall patient functioning. The report may in some cases
call awareness to a certain disease that affects a particular group, such as Alzheimer's
disease for the elderly. In some instances, it warns of tendencies in health problems,
such as the increasing number of people who need to control their blood pressure, as
judged by the new clinical practice guidelines from the National Institutes of Health's
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute. While the report is written in a plain,
scientific writing style, a richness of multi-faceted meaning seems to be embedded in
these subtle expressions.
This report is not an exception-there are many publications and public lectures
made by the PhRMA like it. What can we learn from reading a report like this? On the
basis of our understanding of the narrative style described here, what messages can we
expect to receive about the pharmaceutical industry? In the rest of this section I will
discuss four issues that help construct the image of this business in the United States.
They are: 1) changing concerns about illness and treatment; 2) the correspondence
between diseases and the people they affect; 3) the rationale of cost-effectiveness in
drug development; and 4) the increasingly important role of research and development
in general.
Miles Weatherall presents a good review of the first issue in his In Search of a
Cure (1990). Although human beings have used plants and minerals for medicinal
purposes for thousands of years, he writes, no synthetic drugs existed prior to 1800.
Despite the modem medical institutions that were established in the early and
mid-nineteenth century, hospitals for teaching and research, the practice of laboratory
medicine, and the origin of the germ theory for disease transmission, pharmacology
was still primitive and alien to the emerging field of scientific medicine (Chapter 2).
Modem pharmacology did not develop until the last decade of the nineteenth century,
when it emerged in the form of vaccines. The research-based pharmaceutical industry
and agents for chemotherapy only emerged in the 1920s. Through the use of antibiotics
and vaccines, the battle against infectious disease reached an historical climax: in 1928
penicillin, the "magic bullet" against bacteria, was discovered by Alexander Fleming,
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and in 1942 its medical use was identified.3
When Americans' memory of infectious disease faded with the eradication of
diphtheria, whooping cough, measles, and polio, the targets and consumers of
pharmaceutical industry gradually changed. Although chronic infectious diseases and
viral diseases could still be found in some populations and in the developing countries
of the world, in industrialized societies there was an increasing awareness of chronic
diseases and the maintenance of a healthy status. Led by cancer research conducted by
the U.S. government, more studies were made by the drug industry to discover the
unknown causes or mechanisms of such illnesses, including degenerative and
psychiatric diseases. Unlike infectious diseases, these other types of disease present a
great gray for matters like the identification of an illness, ways to change it, and proof
that the treatment is responsible for improvement.4 In the contemporary context, the
pharmaceutical industry is one of the main players in framing our conceptions of illness
and ways of dealing with it. Guidelines shift; the demography of the unhealthy is
changed.
The second issue refers to establishing a correspondence between an illness and a
certain group of people. Michel Foucault (1978) has pointed out that in the nineteenth
century, special measures were taken to discipline the sexualities of certain groups or
people in order to construct a modem society.5 The same kind of tendency can be
found in recent discourses on drugs and diseases, but the expressions are different.
Based on existing medical institutions, this discourse focuses not on the development
process but on the degeneration of human beings. In addition, the call to take care of
these degenerating bodies comes not from outside but from within. Pharmaceutical
companies know clearly which people are aware of their bodily changes and would like
to pay for treatment. Unlike the marginal people at the dawn of modernity, the targets
for today's most advanced medicine occupy the center of health care. In order to
3 Although influential, this account is problematic. For example, sulphonamides, not penicillin, were
the first antibacterial agent put on the market. They are not usually called antibiotics because they are not
produced by a living system. In addition, penicillin was not available for general use until the end of
World War 11. I am grateful to Professor Ralph Kirby at National Yang-Ming University for providing the
above information. For more detail about the discovery of penicillin, see Brandt 1987.
4 This ambiguity is well illustrated by historian Charles Rosenberg's notion of"framing diseases"
(1992). Rosenberg asserts that disease should be considered "both a fundamental substantive problem
and an analytical tool, not only in the history of medicine but in the social sciences generally" (xxii).
5 These "abnormal" people, including children, women, criminals, the mentally ill, and homosexuals,
needed to be subjected to a process of modernization and became objects of study. Making these people
"normal" required mechanisms that operated through previous and emerging power relationships, such as
those between children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and
experts. New sciences were created to serve this need, and all these elements were built into the fabric of
power/knowledge and have become invisible under the disguise of modernity.
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maintain their health, these baby boomers are willing to be subjected to the system in
the name of public health or social welfare. The latest example of this tendency is the
Medicare Prescription Drug Reform Act signed by President George W. Bush in
December 2003, which claims to cover most prescription medicines used by its forty
million elderly and disabled beneficiaries.6
The third issue expressed in PhRMA's message is cost-effectiveness reasoning. It
is no wonder that the United States has the highest per capita spending on healthcare, as
well as the highest percentage of gross national product dedicated to this sector.
Between the years 1970 and 1994, the percentage of GNP devoted to healthcare jumped
from 7 to 15 percent. The systems of healthcare financing in the United States, from the
early forms of private insurance in the 1930s to the Medicare and Medicaid systems
established in the 1960s, inevitably resulted in escalating healthcare costs. Although the
private sector's various schemes, such as health maintenance organizations, preferred
provider organizations, and fee-for-service plans, were developed in the emerging
industry of managed care, the problem still remains that the basic level of
reimbursement is directly related to services provided. The incentives are very clear:
the more services that a practitioner or institution provides, the greater the
reimbursement.
Thus it is clear that the pharmaceutical industry has to face scrutiny from critics
claiming that it reaps excessive profits at the expense of the health of the general public.
It also faces constant threats from government price controls and measures that
diminish patent rights. Since the Kefauver Congressional hearings of the 1950s, the
industry has defended itself with the argument that high profit margins are necessary to
support the massive capital outlay required to develop new treatments. Not only do
people deserve better quality treatment-advanced drugs are also alternatives to other
courses of treatment and therefore save money by avoiding unnecessary hospitalization
and medication while achieving better outcomes. In other words, spending on
medicines goes up, but total treatment costs go down. A recent Health Affairs study
supports this persuasive argument (Thorpe et al. 2004). According to this paper, 56
percent of the increase in health care spending between 1987 and 2000 was due to
fifteen diseases. Although many of these conditions have new treatments that are more
costly, they are also more effective. Therefore, the authors contend that "some of the
concern about the growth in spending may be misplaced," and that for many diseases,
the increased use of new treatments is "likely to represent an appropriate if costly
6 For a critical comment on health care reform in the United States, see Rothman 1997.
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expenditure by society" (W4-443).
The fourth and last issue that PhRMA reminds us of is the increasingly important
role the pharmaceutical industry plays in the research and development of health care.
Although we observe that the role of government in health research has increased in
past decades, 7 it is said that industry takes a crucial role in the cutting-edge fields. For
instance, from fiscal year 1989 to 1993, NIH expenditures on human use clinical trials
grew from $495.5 million to $869 million, an increase of 70 percent. However, by
comparison, the members of the PhRMA reported spending $1.55 billion on clinical
trials in 1989. Moreover, in contrast to the government's role in basic and public
interest research, PhRMA focuses more on the drugs used by the majority of the
population, whose health behavior is guided by the customer-pays system. As a result,
the government is left to fund all drugs that cannot be sold to huge number of people.
As PhRMA noted in Rx Minute (Issue 5, October 5 2004), the NIH has rights in only
four of forty-seven top selling drugs. In the same issue of Rx Minute, PhRMA cited the
NIH's recent report to Congress (NIH 2004), which says that the industry is the
dominant, if not the only, research resource that people can rely on. According to that
report, the NIH typically contributes to the understanding of basic and clinical biology
that help guide translational research toward producing a cure or therapy. However this
does not mean that the NIH is responsible for developing new medicines, because the
technologies it invents are rarely part of a final product, and when they are, they are
only one of many components. Thus the responsibility for protecting "normal" citizens'
health has shifted from the government to industry. Citing a study conducted by the
Center for the Study of Drug Development and the Department of Pharmacology and
Experimental Therapeutics at Tufts University in 1993, PhRMA claims that during
1981-1990, the pharmaceutical industry was the source for 181 of the 196 new drugs
approved by the FDA, academia was the source of seven, and the government was the
source of two.
The above four routes of persuasion provide reason to appreciate the value of
prescriptive medicines, as can be read in the quotes at the beginning of this chapter. As
health economist J.D. Kleinke claimed at the release of the PhRMA report, "People
often forget how different medical care was just ten or fifteen years ago because we did
not have the medicines that are available to us today" (PhRMA 2002: 12). In turn,
7 Health care research and development (R&D) is the second largest element of federally funded
R&D-only defense ranks higher. In 1993, the federal budget included more than $12 billion for health
care R&D. About 70 percent of all federal health care R&D expenditure is funded through the National
Institutes of Health. The remaining expenditure is funded through other agencies in the Department of
Health and Human Services, as well as other federal agencies.
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PhRMA would like to take responsibility for the future health care and the vast
investment in research and development that is its promise. The report concludes that
PhRMA will "continue to work intensely to discover and develop new treatments for
these debilitating conditions, investing an estimated $32 billion in 2002 alone and more
than $200 billion in the past decade in researching and developing new medicines." Yet,
on the other side of the "New Medicines, New Hope," R&D is also a "scare card"
against criticism. Any attempt to threaten the profits of PhRMA will be blamed for any
reduction in its R&D productivity.
A Look at the R&D-Based Pharmaceutical Club
Following the preceding examination of global pharmaceutical companies' claims,
this section will step back and give an overview on the world of proprietary drugs and
the "club" that dominates it. Despite its early origins, the modem pharmaceutical
industry only began to assume importance after World War II. Its growth over the past
few decades has been remarkable. World production has increased more than twofold
since 1975 and in 1990 stood at $150 billion. Roughly sixty countries each produce at
least $100 million worth of pharmaceuticals each year. The markets for drugs have
generally grown almost as rapidly.
Even so, looking into this business, we find it has four distinct realms, or
"sectors" in industrial terms: proprietary, generic, over-the-counter (OTC), and
biopharmaceutical. Each is run by different logics and requires a different range of
technologies. The proprietary pharmaceuticals are the most advanced, and include those
drugs in which the effective substances are protected by patent and trademark.
Proprietary drugs are named by the companies that invent them. When the patent on
one expires, other producers are able to make copies of this product that claim to be
identical or bioequivalent to the brand name drug in dosage form, safety, efficacy, route
of administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use. Because they
are copies utilizing the same effective substance, these products are labeled with the
generic name of that substance rather than the brand name, which is why such drugs are
called generic. In contrast to these first two realms, which are usually described
together as prescriptive drugs, meaning medicines that are regulated by legislation to
require a prescription before they can be obtained, OTC drugs may be sold without a
prescription and without a visit to a medical professional. The oldest and most well
known OTC drug is perhaps aspirin, which used to be a Bayer product exclusively and
first appeared in the world in 1899. Unlike the above chemically synthesized
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small-molecule drugs, biopharmaceuticals are complex macromolecules created
through the genetic manipulation of living organisms, so they merit a category distinct
from the above three.8
The importance of these realms is reflected in the size of their territories in the
drug industry. According to a study by the IMS Health Inc. shown in table 2.1, the
pharmaceutical industry is the pharmaceutical industry is continuously expanding, and
is currently doing so at a rate of 8.7 percent annually. Among this industry's four
sectors the proprietary sector is the biggest, accounting for 74% of the total world
pharmaceutical market. This sector is growing at double-digit rates but is under
increasing pressure owing to strong competition from the generic realm, which is
currently valued at $30.5 billion and holds 6 percent of the total market. Owing to their
efficacy and ability to act on hard-to-treat conditions, biopharmaceuticals constitute a
small but increasingly popular mode of treatment. Overall, however, it is safe to say
that this industry is dominated by the production of proprietary drugs.
Table 2.1 Worldwide Pharmaceutical Market Watch by Realms,
2000-2003, and the Estimation Through 2008 (in billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2008 Average growth
rate, 2003-2008
Proprietary 317.1 363.4 401.0 437.6 677.8 9.1
(73.1) (74.1) (74.1) (73.8) (75.2)
Generics 24.0 27.0 30.5 37.0 64.0 11.6
(5.5) (5.5) (5.6) (6.2) (7.1)
Over the Counter 70.5 73.8 78.5 82.0 101.0 4.3
(16.3) (15.0) (14.5) (13.8) (11.2)
Biopharmaceuticals 22.1 26.3 31.0 36.5 58.6 9.9
(5.1) (5.4) (5.7) (6.2) (6.5)
Total world market 433.7 490.5 541.0 593.1 901.4 8.7
* In parentheses are percentages of total world market
Source: Adopted from BCC, Inc. Data based on IMS Health Inc. 2003.
8 Some biopharmaceutical milestones include the first recombinant protein (human insulin),
launched in 1982, the first recombinant vaccine (against hepatitis B) in 1986, the first therapeutic
monoclonal antibody (against kidney transplant rejection) also in 1986, and the first and only
oligonucleotide to date in 1998 (against cytomegalovirus retinitis in AIDS patients). And although it is a
hot topic for the future, no gene therapy product has yet been approved.
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Even so, only few companies have the qualifications to enjoy this market. In
global terms, a small number of about fifty pharmaceutical multinationals accounts for
two thirds of the world's production and exports each year. It is documented that a high
degree of concentration prevails in international markets. The top 25 companies
reported sales of $67.7 billion in 1988, or 44 percent of the world market (Ballance et al.
1992: 108-109). This concentration is emphasized in a 1995 report that indicates that
the ten largest companies hold 34.3 percent of total market share (Schweitzer 1997:116).
These companies, according to Liebenau (1987), have existed in one form or another
since the nineteenth century. In addition, among the largest ten firms, six have chosen
to locate their headquarters in the United States, two in United Kingdom, one in
Germany, and one in Switzerland (Schweitzer 1997, Table 5.2.).
Table 2.2 Typology of the World's Pharmaceutical Industries
*
Number of countries
Stage of Development Industrial Developing Total
A. Sophisticated pharmaceutical 10 Nil 10
industry with a significant
research base
B. Innovative capabilities* 12 5 17
C. Reproductive capabilities
i) those producing both 6 8 14
therapeutic ingredients and
finished products
ii) those producing finished 2 87 89
products only
D. No pharmaceutical industry 1 59 60
Total 31 159 190
Each country in this group discovered and marketed at least one NCE
between 1961 and 1990.
Source: Adopted from Ballance et al. 1992:8-9, Table 1.1.
A more detailed typology made by a study sponsored by the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO; Ballance et al. 1992) is outlined in table
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2.2. In order to give a picture of this industry's configuration, states are classified
according to the development of their pharmaceutical production capacities. Putting
aside the countries in the C and D categories, which include most countries in the world,
only ten countries are recognized in category A: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. This category is a club in which membership is restricted and limited. The states
in this category are not only responsible for 60 percent of world pharmaceutical
production in 1975 and 69 percent in 1990, 78 percent of world exports in 1975 and 68
percent in 1990; they also consume over three quarters of all medicines produced.
Therefore, unlike textiles, food processing, or clothing, the pharmaceutical industry has
an international character but is a closed system. Only in a handful of countries have
companies benefited from drug production and people from the latest medicines. Of
course, the United States is the leading figure in this club. Among the top 25 companies
reported in 1988, 14 are based in the United States and have combined sales of more
than $30 billion, equal to one fifth of the world sales in that year. All this is what
PhRMA's claim in the previous section is based on.
According to Ballance et al., the prominence of the countries in Category A rests
on two cornerstones (Chapter 1). First, although all types of firms exist in each of these
countries, it is the large, vertically integrated, sophisticated corporations which have
taken absolute domination in this sector. Their abundant market power provides the
necessary impetus to lead, and this leadership is the main reason for their
overwhelming contributions to world production. Most of the integrated producers are
multinationals with large foreign sales and investments in other countries which are
also club members. Through these connections these companies have formed a
transnational class in which the flow of capital is vast yet hard to trace. The recent trend
of mergers between these companies strengthens their power. As the Guardian
observed about these "pharmaceutical giants," "There were times not long ago that drug
companies were merely the size of nations. Now, after a frenzied two-year period of
pharmaceutical mega-mergers, they are behemoths which outweigh entire continents.
The combined worth of the world's top five drug companies is twice the combined
GNP of all sub-Saharan Africa and their influence on the rules of world trade is many
times stronger because they can bring their wealth to bear directly on the levers of
Western power" (June 6, 2001).
The second factor, related to the first, explains the industry's heavy concentration
in these countries. Their own drug markets have grown exceptionally fast. Levels of per
capita consumption increased dramatically between 1975 and 1990, from $65.80 to
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$150.50 (in 1980 dollars), many times greater than those in other parts of the world.
Two obvious facts about this growth, as pointed out in the PhRMA report discussed in
the previous section, are worthwhile noting. One is that the populations of these
countries are aging rapidly and their disease patterns have changed to chronic ailments.
Medical demand has shifted toward more expensive types of medicines and the
frequency of drug consumption has risen. The second is that the governments of these
countries have established very generous systems of public health care at times when
national incomes were rising and the proportion of elderly was comparatively small.
The public sector now accounts for more than half of all drug expenditure in all the
countries in category A (the United States was the last country to make this promise).
'Table 2.3 Distribution of consensus New Chemical Entities
(NCEs)* by nationality of originating firms, 1970-1983
Country Number Percentage
United States 71 41.7
Switzerland 22 12.9
Germany 17 10.0







* Consensus NCEs are defined as new drugs
introduced in at least 6 of 11 major markets over the
period.
Source: Grabowski (1989), cited from Ballance et al. 1992:88,
Table 4.3.
The above observation goes to the center of the logic that operates the realm of
proprietary drugs. Since health is invaluable and the last thing to the sacrificed, the
main battlefield for these companies, as Joseph Schumpeter's insights on the role of
new technology in industrial competition suggest, is the ability to keep innovating. If
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there is an "innovation system" in this industry, it is the search for new chemical
entities (NCEs) that must be the most essential element of it. Only through continuous
R&D and the creation of new markets can capital be accumulated. From 1961 to 1990,
about two thousand NCEs were produced by the United States, Japan, and Europe, at a
rate of hundreds per decade. If we take into the consideration the fact that some NCEs
are much more significant than others, we find that the United States was the most
productive. From 1970 to 1983, about 41.7 percent of the "consensus NCEs" were
produced in that country (table 2.3).
Moreover, these innovations were secured by patents. This was an issue when the
therapeutic revolution began in the mid-1940s: some countries in Western Europe and
Japan had not introduced the concept of a product patent. Until amendment of their
patent laws, only manufacturing processes could be subjected to a patent, and thus it
was argued that these countries provide the most convincing argument that a patent-free
environment is essential for the technological development of the pharmaceutical
industry. This environment started changing when France introduced product patents in
1960. It was followed by Germany in 1968, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1977, and
Italy and Sweden in 1978. Under this scheme, governments can regulate local copyists
in the countries these drugs are aimed to be marketed in.
As a result, big pharmaceutical companies' profits can be even higher due to the
limited competition resulting from strict patent laws. When a company owns a patent
for a key drug, profits can mount up since the company faces no competition.
Furthermore, high barriers are set for small firms to enter the industry. This logic also
drives production for the future. As PhRMA notes, at the end of 2002, 28 percent more
medicines were being investigated by pharmaceutical companies for approval by the
FDA than a decade ago, with more than one thousand medicines now in the
development pipeline. As Alan Holmer adds, "The story of pharmaceutical discovery
and its importance to people living healthier and longer lives is also a story of renewed
hope and restored futures." The drug giants cannot track all new developments
themselves, but they keep their pipelines full.
"Why Do Prescription Drugs Cost So Much?" The Construction of High-Risk,
High-Profit Discourse
The pharmaceutical industry is tremendously successful by almost any measure.
Industry operating margins typically exceed 30 percent, net margins averaged above 17
percent from 1995 to 2000, and return on equity averages over 25 percent. In this
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section, let us return to the starting point of this chapter and ask a simple yet important
question: why do prescription drugs cost so much? In the following section, I will
discuss this from the viewpoint of industrial innovation; in part II of this chapter, I will
deal with the same question, but from the perspective of regulatory science.
Unlike other commodities, prices of proprietary drugs are not determined through
a free-market mechanism. If a drug is affordable, a patient will not adjust the demand
for a product in response to a small change in price, particularly when there are no close
or available substitutes. Thus, the domination of handful "behemoths" enables large
companies to dictate drug prices. In past two decades, pharmaceutical prices have risen
faster than the rate of inflation. Since the actual manufacturing costs of medicines are
relatively low, the fact that there is very little price elasticity associated with price
increases is a major factor contributing to the high profitability of the pharmaceutical
industry. Gross profit margins of some of the leading pharmaceutical companies in
recent years have been around 70 to 80 percent.
However, as discussed above, PhRMA knows how to persuade customers that
they deserve the most advanced medicines. Industry presents a scientific discourse on
the high-risk nature of innovation by which its high-profit agenda is justified. In Why
Do Prescription Drugs Cost So Much? ... and Other Questions About Your Medicines,
for example. a PhRMA report explaining the cost of research and development, three
contributing factors are listed: first, of every five thousand chemicals tested, on average
only five are tested in clinical trials and only one of those is approved for patient use.
Second, it is expensive to develop an innovative drug-the average cost of bringing one
new medicine to market is hundreds of millions of dollars. Third, it takes an average of
twelve to fifteen years to discover and develop a new medicine. Most of that time is
spent testing the drug to make sure it is safe. These carefully chosen facts illustrate the
core of drug company R&D activities: they must be scientific and tough enough to
reconcile all doubts about the high price that is charged. As illustrated in the PhRMA
medicine bottle graphic below, a single medicine contains "years of scientific education,
state-of-the-art research tools, and 12-15 years worth of research and development."
Let me briefly review the origin and early development of this process. According
to Weatherall (1990, Chapter 6), one of the most important industrial roots of modem
pharmacology back in the nineteen century was the German chemical industry, which
at the time was far ahead of any others. Germany's academic environment of
universities, research institutes, and clinics was also significant. However, theories on
how drugs interacted with the body were primitive. Throughout the nineteenth century
there was a slowly developed understanding that drugs react with specific bodily
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components. In the twentieth century progress was made towards understanding the
properties of these components and differentiating the effective outcomes resulting
from chemicals with slightly different structures. Even so, most pharmacologists in
early twentieth century were investigating familiar medicines and sometime seeking to
improve on them. On the other hand, there was lack of understanding between scientists
and clinical doctors. Sometimes the former happened to find substances that were
effective in some cases, yet such knowledge played little part in physiological
discoveries.
Since this was the case, the inefficient "synthesize and screen" approach to drug
discovery-that is, searching through variations of a substance for some useful
medicinal property-was created and has been widely followed ever since. Without
much knowledge on how a drug acts on the body, this process does require an extensive
knowledge of the chemical makeup of compounds. The makers know well that the
responses of living tissues are very selective; some changes that seem to be of no
significance can radically alter the properties of drugs. Thus scientists had to master
this field before they could begin to perfect systematic methods of synthesizing drugs.
In the process of drug discovery, much work, particularly in industrial laboratories,
consists of operating suitable test systems, or screens, which are used to select the most
active of a range of novel compounds created by chemical scientists. The painstaking
nature of this process is illustrated by the search for a drug to guard against malaria. It
is reported that more than 230,000 chemicals were screened for anti-malarial activity
between 1964 and 1974, whereas only about thirty were selected for clinical study in
human subjects (Ballance et al. 1992:92). It is indeed a tedious, inefficient and wasteful
method, some might say, yet it has led to many modest and some very remarkably
beneficial new agents. A multitude of new and miraculous drugs began to flood the
market soon after the end of World War II, including antibiotics, medicines to treat
asthma, arthritis, cancer and heart diseases, along with contraceptives and vaccines.
Parallel to the progress of drug discovery is the process of manufacturing, which
supports and refines the discovered chemicals. In The Economics of Industrial
Innovation (1982), Christopher Freeman points out how process innovation, rather than
product innovation, played a decisive role in the high rate of productivity that the
chemistry industry has enjoyed for over a century (Chapter 2 and 3). As he noted, the
most important general change in the techniques of the industry has been the move
from batch to flow processes of production; several improvements were made to save
cost, increase efficiency, and even create new procedures that may lead to new
discoveries. Freeman's observation can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry. For
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instance, based on the 1905 revision of the United States Pharmacopoeia, German
companies took out U.S. patents on any new final or intermediary product developed in
their laboratories. It was a strategy that discouraged competition because there was little
incentive to work through a development phase when patents are already held on every
conceivable related product.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that after the introduction of a new process
or the construction of a new plant, many minor technical improvements would be made.
These changes were equally important, but they were not recorded in patent statistics
for reasons of secrecy and of patentability. Major U.S. drug makers, such as Merck,
Squibb, Abbott, and Parke-Davis, made daring reforms during the first two decades of
the twentieth century, and Eli Lilly and Company is also exemplary in this regard
(Madison 1989). Eli Lilly, the grandson of the company's founder, brought
revolutionary changes to this Indiana-based firm, and improvements in manufacturing
resulted. For instance, Lilly initiated a plan determining which drugs were low in
material costs and less burdensome to the inventory. Meanwhile, he attacked the
problem of determining the most economical lot sizes for each product. High inventory
costs necessitated small lot sizes, while lower unit costs resulted from the manufacture
of large lots. Based on the substantial investment spent, by 1930, Eli Lilly had become
a modem industrial corporation through these improved methods of production and was
encouraging the development of new products.
However, starting around the same time, more "stockades" were set up
between the discovery of potentially effective chemicals and their production that
made it much more difficult to bring an NCE into the market. Among such
regulations, the ones in force in the United States are the most difficult. As shown
in fig. 2. 1, it is said that the involved sequence of steps is the main reason for the
high costs and risks of drug development. The sequence includes pre-clinical testing
and clinical trials, each of which consists of several steps, which I will introduce
one by one. The pre-clinical stage of drug development consists of several complex
empirical analyses of the biological activity of candidates for products. They are
conducted to identify potential uses for the chemical tested and to assess toxicity. It
is a long process that usually takes and average of six-and-a-half years, and during
which most of the possible candidates are tested and dropped before going to
human trials. A rejection rate of 999 out of 1000 test compounds is not unusual.
Even so, there is regrettably no way to predict the potential applications that each
new compound may have.
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Fig. 2.1. Process of Drug Development
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Source: PhRMA 2002, based on data from center for drug
development, Tufts University (1995)
Promising products go on to the clinical stage, where the first step is to conduct
tests on healthy humans. The profile of each candidate's activity in humans is built up
based on the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamic data obtained from twenty to
eighty healthy volunteers. Potential side effects are identified, and a dosage range is
determined. If the drug is tolerated and produces the desired effects, it enters phase II of
clinical trials, in which approximately 100 to 300 volunteers with the targeted disease
are tested with several dosages suggested in the range determined in the previous phase
to determine the drug's effectiveness. Again, it is time-consuming work with a high
failure rate. Four years on average is spent here and only five out of 250 tested drugs
get a chance at large-scale trials after tough evaluation. The phase III clinical trial is the
most expensive and time-consuming step in the process of drug development. It is so
expensive that only handful successful drugs can be selected. Usually one thousand to
five thousand patients are involved at this stage. The aim of this trial is to determine the
ideal dosage that will produce the best performance from the drug. At the same time,
studies on the use of the compound as a drug are performed. All these concerns make
this phase difficult to pass. During the four years spent on average at this phase, about
eight out of ten drugs fail for various reasons, such as the compound's instability, lack
of efficacy, undesirable side effects or toxicity problems.
Only when the compound tested overcomes these barriers does it have
scientifically guaranteed access to the market. However, aside from regulatory
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requirements for approval, there are two additional obstacles that may make the
previous efforts all in vain. The first is post-marketing surveillance. After a medicine is
approved, the manufacturer and health care professionals monitor the safety and
efficacy of the product when it is used by a larger number of patients than participated
in the clinical trials. This is done to detect adverse reactions that occur infrequently in
patient populations or cannot be found in the relatively short trial period. The second
obstacle is the clinical trials requested by the markets where a product is intended to be
sold. For most of the cases these are just a repeat of the initial trials, yet they still take
times and money, and the drug maker has to risk the possibility that the product may
fail to show the same efficacy as in original studies.
According to this explanation, we can understand why the PhRMA apologists
describe drug development as a long, massively expensive, high-risk activity. The time
and money spent during this process are estimated is table 2.4. In total, development
times have been increasing steadily over the past twenty years, from eight years to an
average of ten years, at an average cost of $230.8 million each. As an illustrative
measure of investment commitment, in 2003 alone U.S. industry researchers, together
with some of their European and Japanese allies, will have invested well over $33
billion in the name of research and development.
Table 2.4 Stages of Pharmaceutical Research and Development
Stages Mean time Cost per successfully marketed
(months) drug (in millions of 1987 dollars)
Direct cost Capitalized cost
Preclinical studies 42.6 65.5 155.6
Clinical phase 1 15.5 9.3 17.8




Clinical phase III 36.0 20.2 27.1
Total 119.4 113.6 230.8
Source: Adopted from Schweitzer 1997:29, Fig. 1.3, from DiMasi et
al. 1991.
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For this reason the high profits of the pharmaceutical industry are said to be
justified. The logic was clearly reasoned in an oft-cited study led by health economist
Joseph DiMasi (DiMasi et al. 1991). According to this study, high cost does not
necessarily represent a problem for pharmaceutical innovative activity. The article
states,
[I]f the higher costs are reflective of higher probabilities of commercial
success and/or higher average sales per new drug introduction, then strong
incentives to undertake pharmaceutical R&D can be maintained even in the
face of rising R&D cost. (134)
This is exactly what these giant companies claim to do. Currently, they have in
excess of one thousand new drugs, biologics and vaccines in active development. To
take PhRMA as an example, annual investment represents over 17 percent of its
domestic pharmaceutical sales, a higher R&D-to-sales ratio than any other U.S. industry.
It is what they have done in order to survive in a high-risk and high-profit business.
However, while reading the above discourse, we should not take for granted that it
truly reflects the reality of this business. The "high-risk" persuasion gives the necessary
justification for the pursuit of extravagant profits. It is the discourse drug companies
construct for the public; but they construct it for themselves, too. In fact, in addition to
fitting the public's image about medical care, this "formal" discourse has also set the
terms by which these companies create new rules. In the next section, I will argue that it
may not be necessary to follow this discourse by questioning whether research and
development is really that risky, and instead the low product success rate implied in this
discourse has driven these companies into an endless race of toughening standards.
Again, they may not reflect the reality of their practice; however, they set up the route
whereby their development depends.
PART II
SURVIVAL LOGIC: THE CONSTITUTION OF REGULATIONS
Behind the "$500 million" Myth
The preceding section discussed the unusual nature of the innovation of
proprietary drugs; this section tries to make sense of it from the perspective of
regulation. Let us begin again with the cost of developing a drug. Although it is
substantial, according to the study by DiMasi et al., the cost PhRMA tells the public is
much higher based on its own calculations. This "$500 million" claim was ubiquitous
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in the 1990s and widely accepted as the base for the debate over the price of innovative
drugs. Along with the increasing costs estimated by academic studies, such as $259
million in 1990 and $302 million in 1995, the estimated costs that PhRMA released
rose as well. In the latest update in 2001, based on a study done by the Tufts Center for
the Study of Drug Development, the figure had reached $802 million.
Of course, there are criticisms of the bases of these numbers, such as the report
released by Public Citizen in 2001. This report calls the $500 million figure misleading
because it includes tax-deductible expenses. It also points out that costs are often
significantly reduced by public funding, which has helped to launch most medically
important drugs in recent years. Furthermore, many so-called NCEs are not that
innovative and therefore do not cost that much.9 No matter what the details of its
reasoning are, the question is straightforward: since the drug business is so profitable, it
should not be considered high-risk. As the report asserts in its conclusion:
It [the drug industry] claims to be a high-risk industry, yet for almost two
decades it has topped the profit charts by factor of two and more recently
three.... In 2000, the 11 largest drug companies netted $28 billion in profits, a
15 percent increase in their return on revenue over 1999....
Public Citizen believes that it is essential that America maintain a strong and
vibrant prescription drug industry.... However ... the industry has massively
overstated the amount it spends inventing new drugs. (21-22)
Thus, the report suggests more action from government, such as drug price cost
containment, transparency on the costs of R&D, and restriction on patent extensions, to
put these "over-grown dinosaurs" back in their original position on the path of
"evolutional equilibrium" of thirty years ago.
Although Public Citizen's criticism is insightful, one thing that always troubles
me when reading this document is the notion of"risk." What do they mean by that? In
order to achieve a better understanding, we have to see how risk is considered in a
modern society, for which sociologist Ulrich Beck's innovative analysis of risk is useful
(Beck 1992). Beck successfully calls attention to the way the changing idea of risk
demarcates industrial society from the society in which we live. Unlike the naturally
occurring hazards considered as risks in pre-industrial society, or the socially
accountable hazards of industrial society, in "risk society" risks are not limited in time
or space; for some, the global is the proper scale for estimating the effect, and even
9 They are also the criticisms mentioned in Marcia Angell's recent book (2004, Chapter 3 and 4).
Angell points out that in fact, big companies hide the real cost of R&D in several ways while
exaggerating the innovativeness of their activities.
95
future generations can be affected (e.g., by global warming). The rules of accountability
become diffused, since everyone in the group can be held responsible (183). In this
sense, the pursuit of healthy bodies is the original route of risk management, and
medicine is the means called to this effort. As a rational pursuit, modem medicine is
expected to deal with the risks to vulnerable bodies that may be individually
encountered; however, its practices generate additional risks because it is so privileged,
with the help of scientism, as to "monopolize" the way the problems of risks and
possible answers to them are interpreted. The public perception is of the "risk-free"
drug, designed as an absolutely safe, technologically neutral instrument that will target
only the problems our bodies have encountered in the past, are experiencing in the
present, and will meet in the future.
From this perspective we see more clearly the problem in the debate over the risk
in the process of drug development. As written previously, drug companies favor the
"high-risk" discourse because it justifies the high price they demand. On the other hand,
admitting that health is the last thing to be sacrificed, health activists in fact accept this
discourse by only debating the way it is calculated. I do not mean that Public Citizen's
attempt is wrong, but it is an extremely difficult argument for the very simple reason
that, as I have written, the information by which "risk" can be assessed is held by drug
companies; from my perspective, this may not be the best way to confront this giant if
the information is terribly unbalanced. Thus instead of directly questioning the
"unrealistic scenarios of risks" in drug development, my strategy is a two-step analysis
of the practice of risk analysis in drug development. First, I will try to differentiate the
claim of "risk" from that of "low success rate" (or high failure rate). In my opinion,
what both PhRMA and Public Citizen mean by "high-risk" is the fact that very few
candidates can go through the process and become profitable products; even so, this
does not necessarily equate to calculations of risk. Second, if extremely high standards
are the basic rule set for drug development, then how have these regulations or "risk
management process" evolved and become the way drug companies set the course of
future development? Instead of making a direct judgment on whether these practices
are right or wrong, this strategy is an effort to see how drug companies reached the
place they are now and what problems this course has entailed.
From a technical point of view, it is not difficult to separate "low success rate"
from "risk." In fact, when DiMasi et al. calculated the cost of developing an approved
NCE, they used "success rate" instead of"risk." They set preferred parameters: a
five-year lag, a discount rate of 9 percent, and a clinical success rate of 23 percent.
According to them, given plausible ranges for these parameters, the corresponding
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range in R&D cost is as wide as between $105million and $425 million. And PhRMA
has turned this uncertainty into parameters that they incorporated into their own
calculations. It is not "risk," we can see, because "the revenues from successful
medicines must cover the costs of the 'dry holes."'
Even so, we should recognize that the drug success rate is extremely low, and that
this is the immediate result of the extremely strict reviewing and approval process
carried out in the name of safety. According to PhRMA, producer commitment to high
safety standards is required by the regulatory agencies. As seen in its 2002 profile,
PhRMA interprets the research and development of drugs as a "careful scientific
procedure" in order to ensure patient safety (PhRMA 2002:24-26). This includes four
distinct stages of pre-clinical safety assessment, pre-approval safety assessment in
humans, safety assessment during the FDA regulatory review, and post-marketing
safety surveillance. According to this interpretation, the vast investment in drug R&D is
spent to fulfill these rigorous regulations, which are all necessary in order to ensure the
absolute safety of the products. This process starts back at the very beginning when a
company determine whether a new chemical is worth developing. "The development of
a drug is terminated when tests suggest that it poses a significant risk for
humans-especially organ damage, genetic defects, birth defects, or cancer" (24).
Even after passing animal tests on toxicity, these candidates must also pass
evaluations for safety in each clinical trial conducted on human beings. All subjects
involved (healthy volunteers and patients) are observed for adverse effects and all
detectable harmful reactions are reported to the regulatory agency. In a phase I study, an
initial dose is tested, followed by "real testing," which consists of various dosage levels
used in the target population. Doses that fail when applied are dropped. The true
challenge comes in the large-scale phase III trial, in which the elderly, patients with
multiple diseases, patients who take other drugs, and patients whose organs are
impaired are all included.
These studies are overseen at the sites where the trials are conducted, and the data
collected is carefully reviewed by the regulatory agency. 0° The central regulatory
agency for clinical trials in the United States is the FDA. In the four-stage process of
safety assessment, the FDA first controls the possible safety problems by a review of
the Investigational New Drug (IND) application set up prior to any human testing. If
the FDA does not approve the IND within a thirty-day period, no clinical trial can be
conducted. The FDA continues to be updated during the trials. According to federal
0 In addition, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the on-site regulatory body for the participating
physicians and scientists, is also involved.
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requirements, a sponsor must report an adverse event that is unexpected, serious, and
perhaps drug-related to the FDA within fifteen days (and adverse events that are fatal or
life-threatening within seven days).
Even so, the most important measure the FDA exercises on drug safety is in the
review of the new drug application (NDA), which contains an integrated summary of
all available information received from any source concerning the safety of the drug.
The main sub-agency that deals with this task is the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER). l' The CDER has sixty days from the date of an NDA submission to
decide if it contains sufficient information for review. The Review Division carries out
the process of review. Once the decision is made, it sends a letter to the company
explaining the decision. The company has ten days to respond to the FDA decision
before the agency automatically withdraws the NDA. As for the review results, a recent
analysis by CDER revealed that for the sixty-eight NDAs in 1984 and 1985, the
sponsoring companies filed a total of 1,141 amendments (Schweitzer 1997:158). As a
condition of approval, the FDA may require a company to conduct post-approval
research (a "phase IV" study) to gather more safety data.' 2 Further, federal regulations
require manufacturers selling drugs in the United States to notify the FDA periodically
about the performance of their products, and safety monitoring continues throughout
the life of a medicine.' 3
The above description reveals how risks to the body are addressed by the
supposedly "risk-free" instrument of medicine, the drugs. It is not a "risk scenario" as
Public Citizen portrays, nor does the industry reject this same idea; but these high
standards do facilitate the image the industry desires to present to the public, as
concluded in its literature:
Pharmaceutical companies and the FDA take as a primary responsibility the
duty to ensure the safe use of all approved medicines in the United States.
Throughout the long and careful process...the principal concern of both the
agency and the industry is that patients receive medicines that have been
The other agency that deals specifically with biological products is the Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (CBER).
12 These studies may consist of new clinical trials or may be evaluations of existing databases and are
designed to detect uncommon but serious adverse reactions typically not revealed during pre-marketing
testing (i.e., long-term effects).
13 While reading these regulations it is important to keep in mind that they do not faithfully reflect
the real practice of these companies after their drugs are marketed. The strict regulations, as I will
explore later in this section, can be understood as a political strategy of"structuring the world so you can
win." For a complete criticism on the devices the drug industry applies to squeeze more profit from their
products, see Angell 2004.
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demonstrated in every reasonable medical, scientific, and practicable way to
provide more benefits than risks when used appropriately in accordance with
label instruction. (PhRMA 2002:25)
In order to benefit the bodily condition with almost no risk under the guidance of
modem medicine, only a very few drugs are chosen, and the cost of finding them
covers all the others that failed to complete the process.
However, safety concerns offer only a partial answer to the logic behind the "$500
million" myth. They do not exhaust the reasons for the extremely low rate of success.
Beck's notion of modernity tells us that while engaging in the management of risk, it is
equally important to assess how much benefit an action would bring. Thus the role
regulation plays in drug approval is to make every new body-changing drug visible and
quantifiable, and to put all these factors in an assessment equation in which one factor
can be exchanged for another.
Let us take a closer look at the benefit side in the consideration of the
development of a new drug, which is emphasized in the United States. Under the 1962
FDA amendments, substantial evidence of efficacy in the intended use of the drug is
required before marketing approval can be granted. Thus the logic of a drug's benefit,
simply stated, is maximum efficacy. In practice, the efficacy of a drug is measured in
phase II and III trials (in the case of cancer drugs, phase I is also involved), but the
consideration of efficacy can come as early as at the beginning of chemical screening.
Another goal of the phase I study is to estimate the maximum recommended starting
dose (MRSD). MRSD, defined as the largest dosage possible with no observed adverse
effect, is then recommended for use in the first human clinical trial. The way this dose
is found can be as simple as administering different doses and seeing how much the
body can tolerate, or it can be a complicate decision tree determining the dose and the
way to administer it. Nonetheless, both approaches share the same logic: the larger the
dose, the greater the efficacy that can be expected.
The major work of testing a drug's efficacy starts in the phase II study, in which
patients whom the drug is intended to benefit are used as test subjects. Although the
FDA does not specify trial design, efficacy is most likely to be shown by an absolute
measure instead of a comparison with existing drugs on the market.'4 The absolute
value of a drug's efficacy is calculated by comparing it to an artificial, inert
substance-a placebo. Therefore, every drug can be considered independent and
self-contained in the equation of adverse effects (risks) and efficacy (benefit). It is
14 In some cases, such as psychiatric, anti-cancer, AIDS drugs, the comparative study is allowed.
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compared to itself in the phase II study by using several dosages. The way their medical
values are judged is by comparing their efficacy with the "baseline" established by
placebos. The phase III study, following the same concept, tries to identify as much as
possible the effectiveness of the chosen dose by using large sample sizes. The goal of
the trial, therefore, is to maximize the efficacy of this "ideal" dose while limiting
possible adverse effects.
As expected, tough mechanisms of selection exist at every step on the way to
finding the most effective agent and dosage. From pre-clinical study to trials on human
beings, from dose-finding studies to large-scale trials on targeted patients, thousands of
chemicals and doses are abandoned because they do not show enough effectiveness.
Because of the way "absolute" effectiveness is calculated, each product presents a
closed-system in which body and drug interact with each other. The purpose of this
system is simply to claim a new chemical entity that can address the following
requirements: a bodily condition that needs to be changed or cured, an indication that it
could treat, a particular usage of the agent, proof of no or tolerable side effects with use,
and evidence of its absolute therapeutic effectiveness in treating a condition. The high
standards of regulation result in a very low success rate in the development of new
products, and in what I call the logic behind the "$500 million" myth. To reiterate: the
process should not be portrayed "risky," but as tough, expensive and time-consuming.
More importantly, regulation plays a crucial role in establishing this system.
Innovations in regulatory science, as discussed in the next section, may facilitate and/or
hamper prospects for product innovation.
"Faster! Faster!" The Red Queen Race between Regulator and Regulated
The above discussion of the current regulations for drug approval helps us to
understand the low success rate in making marketable drugs. Again, readers should
notice that I am not talking about the reality of this business, but the regulatory system
by which the world of proprietary drug operates.' 5 In this section I will further explain
how this system has evolved. Despite of its complexity-as briefly introduced in
previous sections-it is interesting to know how it developed, as it is only a few
decades old. Or, one could say, the environment of drug use and its conception now is
15 Similarly, we cannot assume that the analysis of laws corresponds either to the ways they are used
or to the ways drug companies respond to them in practice. However, it is still important to do such
analysis in this thesis, because these formalities set the framework within which drug companies survive.
Along this line of argument, the achievement of a universal standard, as I will reveal in the third part of
this chapter, is what most concerns pharmaceutical companies
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very different from what it was one hundred years or even fifty years ago.
Let me briefly review three milestones in the history of drug regulation in the
United States.'6 The first is the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906. It has been said to be
the foundation of modern food and drug law, and it made it illegal to distribute
misbranded or adulterated foods, drinks and drugs across state lines. Under the
directorship of Harvey Washington Wiley, its founding father, the FDA began to
actively pursue this newly assigned task. The second milestone is the 1938 Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which began the regulation and approval of NDAs,
requiring that new drugs be shown to be safe before they were marketed and that
adequate instructions for safe use were provided. At the same time, the FDA extended
its control over cosmetics and therapeutic devices. The third and most important
milestone was the Kefauver-Harris Drug Control Act, which took effect in 1962. It
regulated the efficacy of drugs, requiring drug manufacturers to demonstrate the
efficacy of their products with "substantial evidence." It also attempted to unify
standards for drug approval, authorizing the FDA to review all drugs marketed between
1938 and 1962. As a result, the FDA grew into a huge, complex organization with over
9,000 staff members and 167 field offices working to regulate over $1 trillion worth of
products.
From a progressive perspective, drug regulations seem to demonstrate that the
more regulations were made to protect consumers' safety, the better public health
was-like the motto of the FDA states, "Protecting consumers, promoting public
health." However, as addressed in this section, the process marked by these milestones
should rather be considered a dynamic evolution of the drug environment, in which
conceptions of drugs and the government's role in dealing with them kept changing.
Briefly, in the first half of the twentieth century, drugs were regarded a commodity, like
food. They were mainly sold directly to customers, in drugstores, without prescriptions.
Therefore, the predominant aim of government intervention was to ensure fair value for
money spent. In the 1950s-the period of the "therapeutic revolution," as it has been
called by policy analyst Peter Temin-the perception of drugs changed. They became
an area that required a high standard of regulation. More and more drugs were removed
from consumers' reach and sold through doctors by prescription. The government
began to take a more authoritative role than before in dealing with the control of the
innovation, manufacture and distribution of drugs. Regulatory science was soon
developed to serve this need, and it formed the highly regulated world of proprietary
16 For a journalistic review on the history of the FDA and its relationship with the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States, see Hilts 2003.
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drugs in which the industry, rather than any professional group from the field of
medicine, was the party with which the FDA communicated directly. In the rest of this
section will summarize first the changes in the drug environment and then the
"scientific language" or rules of the game that have developed for the increasingly
sharp dialogue on clinical trials between the FDA-the regulator-and the drug
sponsors-the regulated.
Although the Drug Importation Act was enacted in 1848 to authorize the Customs
Service to stop the entry of adulterated drugs from overseas, the origin of the federal
efforts at drug regulation can really be traced back to the Biologics Control Act of 1902,
which resulted from concerns about public health after the St. Louis tetanus outbreak.
The act mandated that the Hygienic Laboratory of the Public Health Service (later the
National Institutes of Health) regulate interstate commerce in biological products such
as viruses, serums and toxins. The Hygienic Laboratory, under the act's authorization,
was able to annually license manufacturers, set standards and test the potency of
approved items, inspect manufacturers' facilities before and after licensing, and to a
limited extent evaluate manufacturers' claims about the therapeutic value of their
products (Marks 1997:73-74).
However, under the competition between groups of health care producers and
manufacturers, the 1906 Food and Drug Act in fact granted fewer powers to the
government while covering a greater range of products. The act gave the Bureau of
Chemistry, which became the FDA, no right to screen drugs before their commercial
introduction; its function was restricted to informing consumers about the composition
of drugs. The act stated that some ingredients, such as alcohol and opium, must be
listed on the label or package. Any design or device regarding the medicine or its
ingredients that was false or misleading in any particular was illegal. There were no
requirements for the manufacturer to prove the truth of statements or the efficacy of
ingredients. In essence, the burden was on the government to prove that a claim was
false or misleading after a product was already on the market and being sold.
At that time there was no clear distinction between what we call prescriptive
drugs and the over-the-counter drugs, but rather, as Temin reminds us, a distinction
between "ethical" drugs and "proprietary" drugs (Temin 1980:3-4). Consider as a kind
of commodity, ethical drugs were those advertised only to doctors, and proprietary
medicines were those advertised directly to the public, including so-called patent
drugs.17 During the Progressive period, because there were few effective drugs and
'7 Temin writes that the term "ethical" here refers to the original 1847 code of ethics of the American
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because most regulatory activity occurred in the context of food production rather than
of medical care, consumers got less than 5 percent of their drugs directly from doctors.
What is more, consumers could simply buy any non-narcotic drug (and some narcotic
drugs such as laudanum) they desired without a prescription.
Further reforms were not made until the Elixir Sulfanilamide, a sulfa drug that
contained the poisonous solvent diethylene glycol, was released in 1937 and killed 107
Americans, mostly children. In a response, a new law was drafted enacting the reforms
originally undertaken within the FDA. The resulting 1938 Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act differed from the 1906 law in being far longer and in organizing
regulations by commodity rather than by type of violation. A new drug could not be
delivered for interstate shipment unless an effective application had been filed with the
Secretary of Agriculture. The application had to describe the content, manufacture and
uses of the drug and demonstrate that it was safe for use under the recommended
conditions. It became effective sixty days after filing unless the Secretary objected.
Meanwhile, the government policy toward medical drugs has progressively
removed control over drug choices from the customers. In section 502 (f), the 1938 Act
states that drugs with certain kinds of labels, such as "Caution...," can only be sold by
prescription, thus allowing drug companies to create a class of drugs that cannot legally
be sold without prescriptions by putting appropriate labels on them. The change of
policy has been described by one of the authors of the act, Davis Cavers, using a
baseball analogy: "Lives are at stake and ...we are entitled to ask for something pretty
close to errorless ball" (as quoted in Temin 1980: 1). The consequences of this
regulation can be seen in the change in the way that drugs were sold. As seen in
table 2.5, more and more drugs came to be sold through physicians with prescriptions.
As a primary attempt to separate drug regulation from food regulation, the 1938
Act also shaped the way entirely new drug technology was introduced after World War
II. The number of drugs available, the range of diseases and conditions amenable to
drug therapy, and the power of drugs increased dramatically. The 1950s is the decade
of the "wonder drug," when antibiotics, steroids and other therapeutic novelties flowed
from manufacturers' laboratories and plants in a seemingly endless stream (Hilts 2003,
Chapter 6). A new drug industry thus emerged in the context of the FDA's
prescription-only regulation. Characterized by large firms selling new, patented drugs,
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Medical Association, which excluded advertising to the public as part of ethical medical practice. The
term "proprietary" in proprietary medicines signified that the ingredients of the medicines were secret,
not that they were patented.
the industry earned high profits and got extensive legislative attention.'8
Table 2.5 Consumer Expenditures for Prescription Drugs and All Medicines,
1929, 1949, and 1969 ($ million)
Year Prescription Drugs and other Prescription drugs as a
drugs medicines percentage of all medicines
1929 190 600 32
1949 940 1640 57
1969 5395 6480 83
Source: Temin 1980:4, Table 1.
Although, as mentioned above, the famous Kefauver hearings gave birth to the
1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Control Act, the initial goal of this hearing was in fact a
limited one: to examine the high prices of proprietary drugs. Nonetheless, when passed
in the Congress, the act was given a new face by public perceptions of threats to health,
and came to include stricter regulations on safety and efficacy. The thalidomide tragedy
was the trigger. In 1960, William Merrell Company applied to the FDA for approval of
Kevadon, a brand of thalidomide. Although Kevadon was not granted approval before it
was identified as a source of deformities in newborn children of women who took it,
over 2.5 million tablets had been distributed for the purpose of clinical testing. However,
the FDA did not have authority to supervise the clinical testing of drugs under the 1938
law, and this resulted in a small yet highly visible group of deformed children in the
United States.
Like the regulatory acts of 1906 and 1938, the Kefauver-Harris Amendment was
an immediate response to tragedy (Hilts 2003, Chapters 9, 10, and 11). Instead of
letting a firm's NDA take effect automatically if the FDA did not object, the new law
required affirmative FDA approval before marketing could begin. In addition, the
amendments gave the FDA jurisdiction over the testing of all new drugs before they
were approved for marketing. A drug firm had to apply to the FDA for approval of its
procedures for testing an investigational new drug before it could undertake the tests
needed to file an NDA. The testing of drug like thalidomide could no longer be
undertaken without prior notification of the FDA.
18 See also the case of Eli Lily in section 3, Part I of this chapter.
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However, the most important impact of this amendment on drug regulation
practices was regarding drug effectiveness. The FDA was empowered to withdraw
approval based on a "lack of substantial evidence" of effectiveness. Although the
discussion of drug effectiveness can be traced back to the Supreme Court in U.S. vs.
Johnson (1910) on the basis that therapeutic effectiveness was a matter of "opinion,"
this vague term was added into the Act that the claims of effectiveness in the NDA or
thereafter had to be supported by "substantial evidence." 19 It defined "substantial
evidence" as follows:
[T]he term "substantial evidence" means evidence consisting of adequate and
well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of
the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof. (Chapter 5, subchapter
A)
Apparently, drug makers needed to provide the FDA with full details of clinical
investigations, including drug distribution, and the clinical studies had to be based on
previous animal investigations to assure safety. For this purpose the drug industry
formed the first advisory committee, the Advisory Committee on Investigational New
Drugs, for assistance in complying with the new law. Nonetheless, what was at stake
here, and how could this evidence be generated?
This need was served by newly established medical research methodology that
relied heavily on statistics. According to Harry Marks's research (Marks 1997), before
the 1950s, clinical investigators sought to master uncertainties by accumulating
experience. Experience alone brought detailed knowledge of the vagaries of specific
diseases, knowledge that might then be applied in devising proper experimental
controls. The value of a study depended on the prior state of knowledge about diseases
and treatments. The more that was known, the better the experiment that could be
designed. However, the methodological breakthrough of statistics entered the scene of
therapeutic research, as it did in other fields, after World War II. Of course, the notion
of using statistical analysis in medicine is an old one, dating back virtually to the
'9 Judiciary Committee members considered two options: preponderant evidence and substantial
evidence. In fact, the latter was weaker, according to the committee, as it did not require agreement
among the majority of experts for the approval of a new drug. This agreement was not considered
necessary as long as there was "substantial evidence" of effectiveness.
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origins of modern probability theory. Even so, it was not until the early twentieth
century that some medical researchers introduced statistical methods and concepts into
physiological, biochemical and clinical research. It was the introduction of statistician
R.A. Fisher's ideas about experimental design with the U.S. Public Health Service and
British Medical Research Council's trials of streptomycin for tuberculosis in 1948 that
opened up a new approach to establishing therapeutic effect.
Statistics had an impact on how clinical trials-especially later, large-scale phase
III trials-are done and how the results are interpreted. For the former, randomized
sampling and blinding were the two most important, though controversial, concepts.
Assuming the similarity of the trial subjects involved, randomization is a method used
to prevent bias in research. Participants are assigned by chance to groups that are
comparable in terms of factors affecting prognosis and other participant characteristics.
This sounds as if it should be perfect. However, this methodology has a possible
clinical effect on professionals, who in practice might unconsciously assign participants
with a more hopeful prognosis to the experimental group, thus making the new therapy
seem more effective than it really is. Double-blinded trials, in which neither researchers
nor participants know who is in the investigational or control group, were introduced to
avoid such bias by detaching physicians from the assignment making. This ensures that
people assessing the outcome will not be influenced by knowing which intervention a
participant is receiving. Thus while information from clinical observations and
investigations is collected, the physicians in charge no longer control the study-the
scientific method does. It does this by creating a self-constructed system according to
which the investigation starts and finishes, data are generated and analyzed, and results
are interpreted.
Thus an "adequate and well-controlled investigation" is defined as follows:
participants should be selected by eligibility criteria, such as age, sex or prior treatment.
The change a new drug brings to the participants is quantified by comparing it to a
placebo.2 0 The study is stopped when it reaches the endpoint, which is defined as a
measurable outcome that indicates an intervention's effectiveness. The results achieved
should be interpreted in terms of probability. Effectiveness is basically judged by
whether the difference a new agent brings has any statistical significance, defined as
when the data comparison results in a p-value of 0.05 or smaller. The smaller the value
20 In order to high the main factors incorporated into a modem clinical trial, such as placebos, this
section does not intend to exhaust all considerations when they are considered in different situations. For
more discussions about the meaning of placebo and its use in the proposal of clinical trails, see
Harrington (ed.) 1999 and Moerman 2002.
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ofp is, the greater the likelihood that the results are not due to chance. The
effectiveness of a clinical study is also defined this way. Confidence intervals indicate
whether the results of small-sized trials that are not statistically significant are
nevertheless medically significant. On the other hand, in order to avoid testing more
people than are needed to obtain statistically significant results, the concept of
statistical power is used to distinguish statistically significant results from insignificant
ones. The combined use of all these techniques creates a proper clinical trial. If in 1910
the Supreme Court argued that therapeutic claims were opinions, now they are "facts"
justified by statistical equations. Statistics are the rule of the game agreed upon by the
regulator and the regulated. Accepting it means accepting it all.
Since the FDA's acceptance of"appropriate statistical methods" as the standard
for "well controlled" studies in 1970, the phenomenon of the clinical trial has become
so large and complex that nobody can really see it as a whole. At almost the precise
moment when the Kafauver-Harrison amendment was passed, the postwar rate of new
drug introductions fell off sharply, from an average of fifty per year in the 1950s to an
average of twenty per year in the 1960s. As a consequence, a number of economists
investigated the effect of the 1962 amendment on the availability of drugs. Among
these studies, economist Sam Peltzman's is perhaps the most famous. Peltzman
concluded that although the amendment attained its goal of reducing consumer waste
spending on ineffective drugs, "the costs in the process seem clearly to have
outweighed the benefits" because of the decline in drug innovation (1988[1973]:346). It
seems like the tough standard, as the new rule of the game, was not made for the sake
of the availability of drugs.
This also sparked what I call the "Red Queen's race" between regulators and
regulated. This term refers to a race in Alice in Wonderland in which Alice and the Red
Queen, running hand in hand, never actually go anywhere. Although Alice does not see
any change of place, the Queen keeps crying, "Faster! Faster!" and says to the puzzled
Alice, "If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"
This is exactly what happened for regulatory authorities and pharmaceutical companies
after these rules were implemented. The fear of putting health at risk is so real that
nobody would dare to lower the standard once it came into existence.
During this new round of the Red Queen's race, both the FDA and the industry,
both rapidly grew in size. In early 1970s the FDA increased its statistical staff and gave
them a significant role in the review of NDAs. An expansion of the Division of
Biometrics in 1979 led to the formation of three branches: the Statistical Evaluation
Branch, the Statistical Application Branch, and the Computation Branch. The Statistical
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Evaluation Branch was responsible for the statistical reviews of all the clinical trials
submitted as NDAs. There were fewer than twenty people in the division, and the
Statistical Evaluation Branch accounted for about half of them. This change led to a
similar increase in the hiring by industry of statisticians. Furthermore, the development
of statistical program facilitated sophisticated analyses and also created a barrier to
entry into this profession. By 1985, the pharmaceutical industry and its regulators were
probably the largest employers of statisticians in the United States (Segreti et al. 2001,
Section 3).21
Table 2.6 Illustrative Breakdown by Activities and Purpose of R&D Costs
of a Typical NCE (in percent)
Source: Ballance et al.: 97, Table 4.6, cited from UNIDO.
21 Another aspect of this increase can be seen in the number of the biopharmaceutical subsection
members in the American Statistical Association. According to the ASA Biopharmaceutical History
Committee (2005), from 1966 to 1979, the number grew from 100 to approximately 1,500 (11).
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Activities Estimated share in total Purpose
research cost (%)
Synthesis and 11-19 Search for lead
extraction from natural compounds
substances
Biological screening 8-12
Animal pharmacology 8-12 Verification of their
basic uses
Toxicology and safety 9-10 Effects; determination
Metabolism and 6-7 of specific
pharmacokinetics pharmacological
Analysis research 5-6 properties
Clinical trials 16-28 Efficacy; safety
Chemical process 10-12 Standard quality
Pharmaceutical 7-10 Optimum dosage form
technology
Documentation for 3-4 Registration
regulatory authorities
The complex procedures of clinical trials today represent what these two giants
achieved over the past three decades. They comprise the basic framework of the world
of proprietary drugs and exclude unqualified players. Many researchers have found that
the clinical trial has become the most costly step in drug development (table 2.6). In the
drug risk-benefit equation, the industry is trying to find an optimized dose with the
lowest possible incidence of side effects. The FDA, on the other side, adds more
considerations for review. The total development time was prolonged from 8.1 years in
the 1960s to 15.3 years in the early 1990s; most of the increase is due to the new
requirements for clinical trials. Furthermore, since the 1960s, the FDA has added 2.3
years on average for the review of each application.
A number of things contribute to this new "drug lag" (Schweitzer 1997: 160-165).
Unlike in developing countries, where advanced drugs are often delayed for economic
reasons, in developed countries this lag happens as a result of the long and complicated
regulatory process for drug approvals. However, I do not think it is the basis of the
problem. In fact, before the recent proposal of reforms restricting safety regulations in
response to the adverse effects in the Vioxx case, many legislative efforts had been
undertaken in the attempt to speed up drug approval, such as the 1993 Prescription
Drug User Fee Act and the 1997 FDA Modernization Act. The fundamental problem,
as I explained in this section, is the construction of rules that are supposed to generate
"risk-free" drugs. Here is the real risk. For the drug industry, it is whether it can keep
its promises to provide "risk free" cure as the legal bar continues rising. For the
regulators, it resides in the promise of safe drugs: how long can people stand the lag in
the introduction of advanced drugs due to this high bar?22 It is a Red Queen's race that
there is no way to end. No one actually wants to run but they continue to do so.
All in the Name of Health: The R&D-Based Pharmaceutical Industry Inside and
Outside of the United States
From last section we have an understanding of the evolution of the world of
proprietary drugs. I have discussed how the regulator and regulated pursue and keep up
22 As Philip Hilts (2003) concludes about this dilemma for the FDA in the last two decades of the
twentieth century, "Regulation has become one of the most contentious and even inflammatory issues in
politics and society. It was asserted that regulation, regardless of its type or apparent usefulness, cost
society money and freedom. But now after the fever has passed, in looking back over the whole history
of the agency, it is clear that regulation has become a vital part of society for both citizens and business"
(337). Although the current work does not pursue a philosophical study on the ethics of promise, it calls
attention to this problem and tries to elaborate how experts and regulators figure a way to solve it by
means of the global forum of the ICH.
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with each other. In this section, however, I would like to call attention to their
companionship within the rules that they have created. As I have pointed out, the rules
are both beneficial and risky. Through the Red Queen's race mechanism of statistical
methodology, the regulator and regulated excluded other players by controlling the
field; those excluded include individual physicians, life science-researchers, policy
makers, health care planners, and, most importantly, consumers. These others can play
minor roles and establish some relationships with each team; however, it is very clear
that the FDA and PhRMA are the main players and the ones capable of adjusting the
rules of the game.23 On the other hand, the rules have changed the behavior of
regulators and drug sponsors by posing moral questions-in the form of marketing
scandals and clinical trial malpractice-about how strictly they should be followed.
Let me make a brief sketch here. Peter Temin (1980) has pointed out the changes
on the regulatory side that followed the 1962 amendments. He argues that the medical
behavior of drug use was changing from customary behavior, with consumers' free
choices driving the market, to behavior based on command and institution (Chapter 8).
A hierarchical structure is presented in the name of health. Considering drugs not as
pure commodities but as instruments of health maintenance, the regulator chose to
control not only whether there should be risk to users' lives, but also whether drugs
provide any benefit to their health. On the other hand, the ecology of the
pharmaceutical industry changed. Although risks took time and effort to deal at the
beginning when the new rules were introduced, once they could be estimated and
turned into factors in the calculation of cost, risks were no longer "risks" at all. They
just required a high investment that only a few could afford. However, everything that
was spent had to be recovered by the sale prices set by the industry itself.
This change of landscape can be described as a double "Matthew effect," as
described by sociologist Robert K. Merton in his observations of the activity of
scientific research (Merton 1968). The Matthew effect refers to the words of the master
in Jesus' parable of talents in the Gospel according to Matthew: "for everyone who has
will be given more ... and everyone who has nothing will forfeit even what he has"
(25:28). The reward system in science favors scientists who are more senior and more
powerful over those who are more junior and less powerful. It is the same in the
pharmaceutical industry: the established companies are able to invest more in drug
discovery and thus can gain more market share than smaller companies. The other
23 The history of the biopharmaceutical section of the American Statistical Association (ASA
Biopharmaceutical History Committee 2005) in fact reveals how the regulator and the regulated had to
work together to make the standards for clinical trials.
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"Matthew effect" aspect of drug industry is the role of the institutional consensus of
scientific novelty, something that Merton does not mention in his paper. The big
companies define which products constitute unique or useful contributions and should
therefore be given rewards. Tough regulations, in this sense, create the monopolistic
character of drug production.24
The 1962 amendment applied not only to drugs to come-it was an effort to
regulate all existing products. The FDA instituted the Drug Efficacy Study
Implementation Program in which the National Academy of Sciences-National
Research Council was commissioned to review over four thousand drugs from 1966 to
1973. Although products innovated before 1938 were not included, these soon
disappeared from the prescriptive drug market anyway. The consequence, as table 2.7
shows, is that the pharmaceutical giants grew larger in the 1960s and the gap between
big and small companies became wider, as only the former had a large volume of
capital that they could use to leverage the creation of profits through investment.
Table 2.7 Market Share and Number of Drug Firms by Size of Assets,
1948-1973
Source: Sourcebook of Statistics of Income, cited in Temin 1980:76, Table 5.
Meanwhile, the behavior of big pharmaceutical companies changed. They now
24 Though it works in a different direction with a different framework, I would like to acknowledge
psychiatrist and author David Healy's notion of the "Luke effect" (Healy 1997, Chapter 6), which nicely
draws the ambiguous social ground on which science and commerce trade with one another in ideas
about drugs and views of disease to which these ideas are applied.
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Share of total market receipts by Number of firms by size of
Year size of assets (in percentage) assets
$1-10 $10-100 Over $100 $1-10 $10-100 Over $100
million Million million million million million
1948 22 56 7 82 22 1
1953 19 48 23 92 25 3
1958 17 45 28 101 29 5
1963 11 20 61 138 31 14
1968 6 9 83 147 26 21
1973 3 4 92 119 21 30
know that in the name of health improvement only two items are worth more
investment: marketing and R&D. The former serves to let consumers and physicians
know how many new choices they have; the latter overcomes the difficult standards
required to send a product to the market. The trend can be clearly seen in the changing
structure of company costs as shown in Ballance et al.'s study (1992:123, fig5.2).
Although manufacturing is still the largest component in the total cost, the percentage
has dropped significantly from 40 percent in 1973 to 25 percent in 1989. Meanwhile,
expenditures on both R&D and marketing have increased-especially marketing, which
accounted for 24 percent of total spending in 1989. This change coincides with the
steadily growing percentage of operating profits.
Let us put aside the regulatory strategies industry has used to reduce its R&D cost,
which deserve their own study, and focus on the immediate changes to big
pharmaceutical companies' marketing strategies. The first change is the "return" of
direct to consumer (DTC) advertising. According to Temin (1980, Chapter 5), doctors
were appointed the consumer's agent, responsible for choosing "dangerous" drugs,
shortly before World War II. The description "dangerous" in this context does not mean
toxic, but rather potent; doctors were to prevent the misuse of powerful drugs by
patients. A new relationship between doctors and drug manufacturers began to take
shape in the mid-1950s and lasted until the mid-1970s, when the increasing availability
of generic products began to threaten it. With new drugs came competition within the
drug industry wherein the more integrated, innovative drug producers, those who
advertised heavily to doctors, started to overcome the limitations of their market to
establish personal relations with potential customers.
The most notable example is perhaps that of Tagamet (cimetidine), the first
H2-antagonist. Introduced in 1977 by SmithKline Beecham, Tagamet was the pioneer
acid-blocker. However, it is seldom noted, according to Cynthia Crossen, as the first
product that drug companies advertised on television news.25 This was done even
before the drug became commercially available. Patients came to their doctors
demanding this revolutionary new drug. This response hinted to pharmaceutical giants
that they did not really need doctors or medical journals to filter their products. They
could get the same effect by using the mass media (Crossen 1994:173-175). And
Tagamet's marketing performance was amazing: worldwide it has earned the company
25 Some may not agree with this understanding. Wayne Pines, for example, points out that there is
not identifiable point where the information about prescriptive drugs began to open to the public (1999:
489). According to Wayne, one of its legal origins can be found in FDA's patient package insert
developed in 1968, and the first direct-to-consumer advertisement was a price advertising for a ibuprofen
product called Rufen in the late 1970s (491).
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a total of $14 billion. Meanwhile, other companies joined this battle. Three other
H2-antagonists, Zantac, Pepcid and Axid were launched between 1983 and 1988.
The anti-acid battlefield moved to the OTC drug market when the patent for
Tagamet was about to expire in 1994. As Leon Jarnoff portrays (1995), in 1993
SmithKline began conducting clinical trials and seeking FDA approval of an OTC
version of the drug, Tagamet HB. However, Johnson and Johnson/Merck, the producers
of Pepcid, beat out SmithKline by winning FDA approval of their OTC acid-blocker,
Pepcid AC, and began marketing it two months before Tagamet HB first appeared in
pharmacies. The companies stoked the fires of mass media attention by fighting with
each other.
The story of Tagamet does not stop here. In addition to DTC advertising,
"abusing" the indications of an existing drug is another way to prolong the life of its
patent. This is a short cut in which pharmaceutical companies create a convenient
"health need" in the population. Soon after the marketing of cimetidine in the late
1970s, industrial scientists started to search for new indications for this drug, first for
gastric cancer and then for colon cancer (Morrow 2002). Like the (eventually
withdrawn) attempt to indicate the use of Vioxx for patients at risk of developing
recurrent colon polyps, in 1988 scientists tried to validate cimetidine's utility as an
inhibitor of tumor cell propagation and metastasis, and a clinical study found that it
significantly increased the survival rate in patients with stage II and stage IV disease.
More indications were added. The latest indication for the drug, published in the British
Journal of C'ancer in 2002, showed a three-fold improvement in the ten-year survival of
Dukes C colon cancer patients who were given cimetidine after surgery.
It seems as if the indications for a drug can be unlimited: new indications are
derived from old ones; an indication as a cure for one disease can be transferred to the
prevention of another disease. Echoing Dumit's observation on the cooperation of
science and markets in the drug business (Dumit forthcoming), the increase in
indications seems to show how an additional market can be created by either defining
more people as at risk (modifying risk factors or lowering the thresholds of having a
diseases) or turning invisible pathogens into the subjects of treatment (creating markers
and tests to detect invisible pathogenic changes within the body). This market comes
from the most fundamental part of the world of proprietary drugs and expands by the
power of its own logic.
Indeed, all of these manipulations in the name of health seem to be
unquestionable. Dumit nicely analyzes the motivations of the drug industry in terms of
a twenty-first century version of Capital for life science (Dumit 2004). From this
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perspective Dumit calls attention to a paradigm shift in the perception of the body when
encountering disease. The notion of the body has shifted from one considered
"inherently healthy" to one considered "inherently ill." The older notion of diseases of
the body has not totally gone, but the new notion of illness is one that "is now promoted
to us in advertisements and in awareness campaigns throughout our daily life" (17). As
this mechanism continuously acts, it can drive the medical care system to absurdity. As
Dumit points out, health is not evaluated on the basis of how many people are already
going to see their doctors, but by imagining "a threshold diagnosis and then [calculating]
how many people would be part of that threshold and therefore should be consumers of
that drug" (25). The key consideration-to what extend can this market grow-is not a
purely scientific concern, but one of political economy. To take screening as an example,
Dumit argues that the number of people diagnosed as sick will theoretically reach its
maximum when all possible cases found can obtain the required treatment (22-24).
The political economy of the drug market is far more complicated than what
Dumit suggests. Although the United States is an enormous market in which there
seems to be no limit to people's pursuit of health, drug sales are limited by the duration
of patent protection. In the case of Tagamet, sales plummeted from $600 million in
1993 to only $400 million next year, mainly due to the sudden fall in price after the
drug lost its patent protection in May 1993. Drug makers often resort to legal tactics,
such as Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, to protect and extend their patent rights, yet the
marketing time for each patent drug is short because a large portion of the patent period
is taken up by research and development activities and FDA review. Effective
marketing time was shortened to less than ten years in the 1980s (Schweitzer 1997,
table 9.1). For marketing, the key consideration is not how many patients a patent drug
can catch, but how many can be caught in a given period of time. The tactics used in the
American scene are of limited use for this, and additional markets appear to be an
immediate solution to this problem. This logic in capitalism, as Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri call, is the "need for an outside" (222-225).26
This can be seen in the shift of exports and pharmaceutical sales abroad by U.S.
firms. According to Temin (1980:145, table 21 ), along with the expansion of the
domestic market, the foreign sale of pharmaceuticals rapidly increased in the 1960s and
1970s, and the trend continued. Among these sales, total exports accounted for no more
than 17 percent, and the share of intra-firm trades (from the home company to oversea
26 In his politico-economic analysis of U.S. research pharmaceutical firms, Christopher Harrison also
suggests that patents and intellectual property rights issues are the reasons that drive U.S. firms to
overseas markets. See Harrison 2004, Chapter 3.
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subsidiaries) in exports has increased in the 1980s and makes up the bulk of exports.
The extent to which companies trade within their own organization is clear evidence
that strong links exist between the parent company and its foreign subsidiaries.
Meanwhile, these subsidiaries are the entities that deal with local governments.
Overseas markets are not just marginal. There has been a widespread increase in the
amount firms allocate to distribution and promotion overseas. Traditionally,
R&D-based firms concentrated their marketing resources on a few national markets
when they launched a new product. In the 1990s, however, they launched new products
in all major markets ("first wave" countries), and sometimes even some developing
countries ("second wave" countries), to maximize revenue. This adjustment requires
larger marketing forces and heavy sales promotion. The sales staffs of the world's top
pharmaceutical firms grew by 50 percent in the period from 1983 to 1988. With such
resources at their disposal, large firms are able to accomplish a worldwide launch in
only three years where they once required eight to ten years.
Of course, companies claim that this change in marketing tactics holds some
benefit for consumers across the world. Consumers now have access to the latest drugs
with a minimum delay. Again, this claim is made in the name of health. However, from
the viewpoint of political economy, it can be interpreted in terms of the drug
companies' urgent need for drugs that can clear regulatory hurdles and earn back
development costs as soon as possible.27 In the process, global marketing places these
capitalists in a situation that they are not familiar with. In the markets of developing
countries, patent piracy is a major problem. The business rhetoric of intellectual
property protection, as we often hear, is that it gives R&D-based pharmaceutical
companies a period of market exclusivity that they require in order to recoup their huge
investments and take in capital necessary for developing the next generation of
medicines and vaccines.
For developed counties, the problem is different and more difficult. Those who
can afford to may simply not accept drugs the United States has approved. In fact, some
major national markets, such as Germany and France, have improved their own drug
approval and manufacturing regulatory systems since the 1950s. It may be hard to
judge whether their standards are higher or lower than the FDA's, but one thing is for
27 Marcia Angell points out the crisis the American pharmaceutical industry faced at the dawn of the
new millennium (2003, Chapterl2). First, the public pay more attention to the prices of the drugs they
use. Second, more and more Americans buy their drugs abroad, where they are much cheaper. Third and
last, the R&D "pipeline" is running dry-only handful of candidates meet the tough standards for
approval. All these factors contribute to the industry's increasing attention to markets outside of the
United States.
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sure: they cannot simply be replaced, because they have their own special requirements
and concerns. For industry, this poses the biggest problem: there is no point in fulfilling
the increasingly complicated standards one by one. Thus the standardization of
standards became important and urgent. It would both ease the movement of drugs from
one country to another and create a larger single market that will reduce costs.
PART III
THE NEED TO STANDARDAIZE STANDARDS
The Need for a Universal Standard
When they step outside the United States, the global companies have to face the
problem of fitting other local standards. Of course, we need not review here the history
of standardization, which is long and complex. As Hashimoto Takehiko writes (2000),
the modem origin of technology standardization can be found in Thomas Jefferson's
visit to France in 1785, during which he learned of the standardization of parts for
building muskets. The shop of Honor6 Blanc, a French mechanic, made these
handcrafted parts to such precision that they could be interchanged (Chapter 1). The
idea of "interchangeability" was soon introduced in the United States and became the
central theme of its industrial production.
This concept also triggered the second stage of standardization, the
standardization of process. As one of the keys to mass production, process
standardization was combined with the introduction of machines and later the creation
of assembly lines. The standardized machine tools constructed a world of their own
logic that economist Winfred Rothenberg called "American production," and human
beings became subordinated to it. They had to be trained to be compatible with the
machines they worked with. In this situation we cannot forget the conclusions Karl
Marx draws in the first volume of Capital (1976[1867]):
In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory,
the machine makes use of him. ... we have a lifeless mechanism which is
independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living
appendages. (548)
It is not surprising that the first standardized mass production and the standardization of
process were both originated in the United States. Their origin can be traced to the
control of production in Harpers Ferry Armory in the nineteenth century (Smith 1980);
however, it was Henry Ford's Model T car and Frederick W. Taylor's scientific
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management of human factors that made standardization a trademark of the United
States. These phenomena demonstrated how the most efficient production could be
achieved without special requirements in terms of laborers' skills; their goal was clearly
to provide consumers with a quality product at a minimum price.28
At first glance this is an optimistic "win-win" vision. Quality mass production
was the gospel of modernity and those things previously considered to be luxury items
were now accessible to the public. Mass production also created an institutionally based
trust that quality would never vary with the place or time of production, just like how
McDonald's or Kentucky Fried Chicken customers would not expect differences in the
burgers they order even in restaurants in remote places. It seems that in the progressive
context of the industrial revolution, mass production and standardization were proposed
by the producers in order to offer customers better goods at cheaper prices. The above
discourse raises at least two questions related to our story: first, by what process can
people decide the best standard for all customers, and second, which standard is best for
which customer? In the rest of this chapter I will try to answer the first question in the
case of pharmaceuticals. The second question, which is more crucial to this
anthropological investigation, will be dealt with in later chapters.
Concerning the mechanism by which a "perfect" standard is chosen and widely
spread, Paul David's historical study of the emergence and domination of the QWERTY
keyboard is worth noting (David 1986). The paradox of the QWERTY keyboard, the
widely used layout that appears on nearly all of the world's typewriters, is its relative
inefficiency. But using this example, David shows that there are very rational and
interrelated causes that explain the embedded dominance of some standards despite
apparent discrepancies in efficiency. He offers three socio-economic factors-technical
interrelatedness, the "first mover" effect, and quasi-irreversibility of investment in
labor29 -which together form what David calls "path dependency." As he explains it,
this is "a sequence of economic changes.. .in which important influences upon the
28 It might be a too short and too "America-centric" review of the development of standardization. I
only list key events that present conceptual changes in the United States and are related to the following
discussion. In fact, to my knowledge, there is still no good history available concerning this topic.
29 Technical interrelatedness is described as system compatibility between keyboard "hardware" and
the "software" represented of the touch typist's memory of the particular arrangement of keys. It suggests
that the present value of a typewriter as a capital good was dependent upon the availability of typists
trained on the keyboard arrangement. As the most important consequence of technical interrelatedness,
the "first-mover" effect is seen in "the process of intersystem competition to lead toward a de facto
standardization through the predominance of a single keyboard design." The first person who creates
standard will be likely to lead the whole group. What David calls a "quasi-irreversibility of investment in
labor" refers to the situation, in the case of QWERTY keyboard when one typists were taught QWERTY,
there was a very high cost to converting to another system.
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eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings
dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces" (30). The story of the
QWERTY keyboard is meant to demonstrate that the role of a technology doesn't
necessarily depend on the relative merits of that technology. Rather, technological
"innovation" is part of an essentially dynamic historical process and must be
understood as such.
Let us draw parallels in terms of standard making between the story of the
QWERTY keyboard and that of pharmaceuticals. The first is the high bar for latecomers.
In the past thirty years regulatory agencies and industry have constructed extremely
high standards that protected all stages of the monopoly, from innovation to production.
As described earlier in this chapter, costs have been raised in order to produce high
returns in a short time. Thus, in this chain of innovation, companies must allocate what
they have earned from their previous products into their quest for future profits. Like
typists having the social capital of being familiar with the QWERTY keyboard, once a
company overcomes the difficulties of this game and survives in it, the game itself
resists new market entrants.
The second parallel is found in the existence of the exclusive club of global
pharmaceutical companies. Although they compete with each other, these companies
have developed common standards as the rules for competition. These seemingly trivial
standards-such as the proper temperature for stability testing, the period when a drug
is effective, the standard dosage for each pill-create fundamental principles upon
which a tablet or a pill can be produced, tested, sold, and finally consumed. However,
this phenomenon is only of consequence because of the existence of the "first-mover"
effect, the third parallel. As discussed above, the FDA was the first governmental
agency involved in the story of pharmaceuticals. However, in the 1970s and early 1980s,
there were in fact no comparable regulations in many countries outside of the United
States. In those years, the FDA ran almost alone. Even though the thalidomide accident
badly harmed the credibility of the FDA, companies knew that once their products got
the marketing approvals from it, they could be registered all over the world without
demands for more trials.
However, the situation changed. Based on their own considerations, more and
more governments added their own requirements for new drug applications. European
counties were the first to follow, and then Japan, along with many others. Regulatory
authorities in these countries often requested the replication of all or most of the clinical
data. As for the manufacturers of the QWERTY keyboards, it was hard for drug
manufacturers to switch from one system to another between different markets. If it was
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not possible to waive all standards, the industry was not able to meet them standards
one by one either. Thus the call for a universal standard arose in the name of public
health. The standard had to be the high in order to protect users from unknown risks; it
also had to be unified, by definition. From an economic perspective, the extensive
duplication of clinical evaluations in new regions not only required valuable
development resources, but also delayed the availability of new pharmaceutical
products to local patients in need.
Along with these factors, others, such as regulatory agencies, scientists, and
characteristics of drug industry such as dosage choice, complicated the process of
standard making. However, the outcome needed to be a universal standard for drugs
and a universal body of consumers that interacts with the drugs produced according to
this standard. If Marx's Capital describes how workers and machines encounter one
another in a new mood of production, the attempt to create a universal standard for
drugs pushes this situation to another level, one where "bio-availability" is achieved by
the free flow and exchange of material and flesh.30 More importantly, this flow and
exchange are made possible under the logic of the circulation of commodities. For
ethnographers, it is a moment when a fundamental structural change in the field of
global politics occurs, and at this moment we witness the birth of the ICH.
The ICH as a One-Size-Fits-All Panacea
From the perspective of standardization, the ICH presents a global project that has
never previously existed. Founded by the United States, the European Union (EU; at
the time the European Commission, or EC), and Japan, this conference tried to create a
universal standard by standardizing all standards and thus creating a single global
market in which new drugs could be traded freely. Its origins, according to the official
documents, are as follows: the harmonization of regulatory requirements was pioneered
by the EC in the 1980s as it moved toward the development of a single market for
pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, bilateral negotiations between these countries/regions
went on. It was at the International Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities in 1989
that specific plans for action began to materialize. Soon afterwards, the authorities
approached the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association
30 In fact, there are various forms of exchanges between supply and demand sides over standards in
the medical realm, and that in the area of drugs is just one of them. For example, in order to ensure a
successful transplantation, organ procurement organizations have set standard procedures and criteria in
their search for available organs. See Hogle 1995.
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(IFPMA) to discuss a joint regulatory-industry initiative on international harmonization,
and the ICH was conceived.
The birth of the ICH took place at a meeting hosted by the European Federation
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) in Brussels in April 1990.
Representatives of the regulatory agencies and industry associations from Europe,
Japan and the United States joined together and planned an international conference. A
steering committee was organized that decided to have the first conference, titled
"International Conference on Harmonization," in Brussels in November 1991.31 From
its beginning, the ICH was a focus for everybody related to the pharmaceutical sector,
including industry, academia and government. Over 1,200 people attended the first
conference, and its popularity increased at following meetings (appendix 1). The ICH
became a phenomenal global festival in the world of proprietary drugs, but for the field
of STS, it has additional meanings that are worth noting.
The uniqueness of the ICH can be understood by situating it in two political
economy contexts. First, from the viewpoint of global politics, unlike other conferences
on technical standard making that are dominated mainly by governmental
representatives, such as the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),3 2 the
ICH allows industry to have a strong presence. Given the fact that over 95 percent of
pharmaceutical research and development is conducted in the industrial sector, the ICH
clearly knows that it cannot be a space for only diplomatic gestures and performances.
It is fully aware of the fact that any standard for new drugs cannot be isolated from its
applications to industry; without the industry's support there would be no initiative to
create innovative drugs to which standards could be applied.
Second, from the capitalist point of view, the impetus for the ICH and its principal
activities is economic, so it must gain sponsorship from industry. Among this type of
organization, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is well known for
its non-governmental membership. Although many of its member institutes are part of
the governmental structure of their countries or are mandated by their governments,
31 In this thesis, I use the abbreviated name for general meetings of the ICH, the International
Conferences on Harmonization, which consist of"ICH" followed by the meeting number. For example,
the First International Conference on Harmonisation is called "ICHI," and the second conference
"ICH2," etc.
32 The IEC is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising all national electrotechnical
regulatory agencies. Its object is to promote international cooperation concerning standardization in the
electrical and electronic fields. To this end and in addition to other activities, the IEC publishes
international standards. Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC national
committee interested in the subject at hand may participate in the preparatory work. International
governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this
preparation.
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most have their roots in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships
of industry associations. However, the ICH is different from the ISO. Unlike the ISO,
which occupies a special position between the public and private sectors, the ICH
emphasizes formal participation by government as well as industry. It consists not only
of purely commercial negotiations among major players and competitors on the
standards over their products; the ICH also asks for the involvement of the regulatory
bodies that have ultimate authority over these products. Global companies know well
that without the promise of governments, no product can be sold to the places under
their authority.
As we will see, the dynamics between regulators and industry and between
industry and science guide the direction this conference takes. This is one aspect of the
bio-global. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the global should not be considered as if it
is a coherent entity. Echoing John Law's analysis of the global as "small" and
"baroque" (2002), the ICH demonstrates how the small world of proprietary drugs
operates. It differs from other health organizations: the dynamics of the ICH reflect the
complicated nature of the encounter between public health and economic concerns, and
more importantly, they provide necessary momentum that other organizations lack.
Take the WHO's health project on developing countries as an example: as Fiona Godlee
points out (Godlee 1994), the WHO lost it global influence after its ambitious launch of
"Health for all by the year of 2000" in the Alma Mata declaration in 1977, and political
and economic concerns were the main obstacles that prevented it from accomplishing
its promised goal. The United States first opposed the WHO's code on breast milk
substitute on the grounds that it interfered in global trade. Then, under pressure from
industry, it opposed the WHO's essential drugs program, launched in 1977.
Thus, although the WHO attempted to develop an international standard for
pharmaceutical products to "protect public health by ensuring the regular availability of
good quality, safe and efficacious pharmaceuticals and by contributing to their rational
use" (WHO 2002: 7) back in the late 1960s, it did not achieve much until the ICH was
created. As a primary process to "format" the world of proprietary drugs, the ICH does
not put public health in the foreground, but rather business. Its mission is clearly one
that is both commercial and scientific. The statement of the ICH2 steering committee
indicated
their commitment to increased international harmonisation, aimed at ensuring
that good quality, safe and effective medicines are developed and registered in
the most efficient and cost-effective manner. These activities are pursued in the
interest of the consumer and public health, to prevent unnecessary duplication
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of clinical trials in humans and to minimise the use of animal testing without
compromising the regulatory obligations of safety and effectiveness. (D'Arcy
and Harron eds. 1992: xxv)
For industry, the ICH is an attempt to "smooth out" non-tariff barriers, but it is also an
attempt in the area of public health to eliminate unnecessary administrative regulations
so that the most advanced medicine can be delivered to patients in need. Thus it is
important to note its exclusive nature. Unlike other scientific meetings, which are open
to all, the ICH carefully selected Europe, United States and Japan, who control 80
percent of world pharmaceutical sales; their combined markets comprise over 90
percent of the world total. In other words, the participants of the ICH are both key
producers and the main consumers, and the conference thus avoids possible conflicts of
interest from outside.
To achieve this purpose and ensure the efficiency of discussions, six players were
chosen. The regulators from the three regions-the FDA, the Japanese Ministry of
Health and Welfare (MHW), and the European Community-and industry
representatives-PhRMA, the Japan Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing Association
(JPMA), and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
(EFPIA)-make up the main body of this conference. Some organizations were chosen
as non-voting observers, such as the WHO, Health Canada, and the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA); their presence was considered to be helpful and did not
create obstacles to the process of harmonization. The design of this conference was "a
stage in a developing process, at a high level, between regulators and industry" (Nutley
ed. 2000:2). The structure of the ICH represents this idea. It is administered by a
steering committee, which is supported by the ICH secretariat. Since the ICH was
established, each of the six co-sponsors has held two seats on the steering committee
that oversees the harmonization activities. IFPMA, which is also an observer, provides
the secretariat and participates as a non-voting member of the Steering Committee.
The major events of the ICH, as introduced previously, are international
conferences on harmonization, hence the name given to the initiative. However,
between each conference, the ICH Steering Committee meets at least twice a year
together with working groups that are assigned by the steering committee. Both these
parties construct the routine activities of the ICH together. Although its goal is a clear
and simple one-a universal standard for clinical trials to be implemented as soon as
possible-the ICH is fully aware of the process necessary to achieve harmonization. As
claimed repeatedly in its documents, it carries out its actions such that the conference,
its preparations and its follow-up activities are open and transparent to the public.
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The steps toward the harmonization of guidelines gradually developed. At the first
steering committee meeting of the ICH the Terms of Reference were agreed upon and it
was decided that the topics selected for harmonization would be divided into the
categories safety, quality and efficacy, to reflect the three criteria that are the basis of
approving and authorizing new medicinal products. It was also agreed, in order to make
sure the guidelines were made scientifically, that six-party Expert Working Groups
(EWGs) be set up to discuss the scientific and technical aspects of each harmonization
topic. These EWGs meet at the same time as the steering committee and report their
progress to the committee. Along with the establishment of eleven EWGs at ICH , the
so-called the "ICH process" was first drawn up at the steering committee meeting in
Washington, D.C., in March 1992 and amended in Tokyo in September 1992 (D'Arcy
and Harron eds. 1992: 558).
Table 2.8 Step-wise "ICH Process"
123
Step I Preliminary discussions of the topic are held by the relevant Expert Working
Group or group of experts, mandated by the ICH Steering Committee, which is
representative of the six co-sponsors of the Conference.
Preliminary data are prepared (guidelines, policy statements, recommendations,
points to consider). The draft is reviewed and revised by the experts until
consensus is reached and the draft is forwarded by the Expert Working Group to
the Steering Committee.
Step 2 On the recommendation of the Steering Committee, the draft is transmitted to
the three regional regulatory agencies for formal consultation in accordance with
their normal internal or external consultation procedures. This regulatory
consultation may include organizations and associations outside the ICH
process, as well as the IFPMA, EFPIA, JPMA, and PMA, and the observers,
EFTA, Canada and the WHO.
The comment period should normally be six months, except when there are
special circumstances to take into account.
Step 3 Comments are collected by the regulatory agencies and exchanged with the
other regulatory bodies.
The designed regulatory rapporteur, in consultation with experts in the other
regulatory bodies, analyses the comments and amends the draft.
The revised draft is referred to the ICH Expert Working Group and "signed off"
Source: IFPMA 1994, Annex 6: 13-14.
Considered one of the key factors that determined the success of the ICH, the
"ICH process" is a complicated working process to achieve consensus. It makes sure
that every guideline it creates is ready to be implemented. This five-step procedure goes
as follows (see table 2.12). Formal proposals for new harmonization have to be brought
up to the steering committee by one of the six parties in order to initiate an ICH action.
When accepted, a proposal is assigned to an EWG, which advises on the technical
aspects of harmonization topics (Step 1). When a primary guideline is drafted, it must
first be distributed to all the invited experts to form a consensus (Step 2). After the draft
is completed, it is brought back to each region for feedback on other related topics (Step
3). Every guideline has to be agreed on by all experts and the domestic industries
before submission back to the steering committee, where the guideline is confirmed and
released (Step 4). Two "decision points" are set in the defined process, at Step 2 and
Step 4, which have enabled the steering committee to monitor the progress of the topics
selected for harmonization. When consensus is reached, every party involved has to
"sign off' to confirm its commitment.
Even taking into account these steps, what makes the ICH unique is its final step.
A follow-up mechanism is applied to see whether the guidelines are adopted by local
regulatory agencies. This is the reason why they are invited. It is requested that this be
done within six months of release (Step 5). In the case of the European Union, the
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Product (CPMP) should be responsible for the
adoption. In Japan, the final draft should be implemented into MHW notifications, and
in the U.S., the FDA should publish it in the Federal Register. Information on
regulatory action taken and implementation dates are reported back to the steering
committee and published by the secretariat. Since this procedure is lengthy, a guideline
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by the experts designated by the regulatory parties before being referred to the
ICH Steering Committee for adoption.
Step 4 The final draft is submitted to the Steering Committee and "signed off' by the
three regulatory parties to ICH. It is then recommended to the three regulatory
bodies for adoption.
Step 5 The recommendations are incorporated into domestic regulations or other
appropriate administrative measures, according to national/regional internal
procedures.
requires at least twelve to eighteen months to be implemented. Even so, as soon as it
reaches the final step, the guideline becomes the actual law by which all ICH regulatory
authorities must abide.
Through this process the ICH forms a powerful discourse that combines scientific
precision and capitalistic efficiency. Yet to the public it emphasizes the science on
which this process is founded, asserting that neither political negotiations nor
commercial compromises are involved. As concluded in the ICH5 steering committee
statement,
The ICH process has achieved success because it is based on scientific
consensus developed between industry and regulatory experts and because of
the commitment of the regulatory parties to implement the ICH tripartite,
harmonised guidelines and recommendations.
It seemed that it is scientific, thus worth waiting for-scientific, thus worth trusting.
The ICH marches off on its way to conquer the world.
Guidelines: General Analysis and an Example
Although the ICH set a highly technical process for making guidelines, it has
achieved much since its foundation (for these guidelines and the dates they reached step
5, see appendix 2). As we can see in table 2.9, until November 2003, when ICH6 was
held, fifty-six guidelines had been finalized in the categories of quality (23 guidelines),
safety (15 guidelines), and efficacy (14 guidelines), along with four multidisciplinary
guidelines. In addition, some others were in the process of harmonization. Except for
common technical documents and medical terminology, the guidelines the ICH makes
basically cover this field from early development to production. There are many notable
among them, such as good clinical practice (GCP), ethnic factors, controlled trials,
statistical assessment, special populations in the consideration of clinical trials, stability
biotech/biologics, specifications on the quality of pharmaceuticals, and reproductive
testing, carcinogenicity, and genotoxicity in pre-clinical studies.
Industry certainly appreciates this achievement. Stuart R. Walker of CMR
International praised it. "I believe that the pharmaceutical industry must continue to
strongly support the ICH program. As a result of this initiative, the drug regulatory
process has become smoother, quicker and less burdensome, with the result that large
numbers of patients all over the world are able to receive life-saving and cost effective
medicines sooner than was possible prior to this program" (as quoted in Nutley ed.
2000:9). According to Walker, a single market of proprietary drugs, based on the
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framework established by these guidelines, is approaching.
However, looking retrospectively, it is interesting to see how these guidelines
were formed. If we see the dynamics of the topics brought up and the guidelines made
in the ICH conferences, shown in table 2.9, we can find a rough trend singling out the
ICH4 as the turning point. At the first two ICH conferences, 38 topics covering almost
all the first priorities were proposed, and at ICH3 and ICH4 most of them had been
turned into guidelines that were then incorporated into the basic fabric of the regulatory
scheme. Few topics were brought into discussion after ICH4, though there was still
some work been undertaken, such as revisions of some guidelines, additional concerns
about existing guidelines, and questions and answers about their implementation. In
other words, the foundation of the ICH guidelines had been built by ICH4.
A more detailed analysis can be made here on these foundational guidelines. The
eleven topics raised at ICHI were not specific. Many of them changed into more
specific ones for discussion at ICH2 and became guidelines at ICH3. Thus despite the
time-consuming process of harmonization, in general it did not take longer than two
years to make a guideline. In fact, at ICH 1 many people thought that this project,
though huge and bold, would be done by the ICH3, leaving only differences that would
be either too travail to deal with on that occasion or too major to overcome in a timely
fashion (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992:557).
Table 2.9 Guidelines That Had Reached Step Four in the ICH and Proposals for
New Guidelines, 1991-2003
ICH Number of Number of Guidelines that had reached
conferences new topics consensus
raised for quality safety efficacy multi- total
guidelines discipline
ICH I 11 0 1 0 0 1
ICH 2 27 1 1 1 0 3
ICH 3 9 4 6 4 0 14
ICH 4 4 7 4 3 0 14
ICH 5 5 4 3 4 3 14
ICH 6 3 7 0 2 1 10
Source: Compiled by the author from various documents.
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Nonetheless, the following meetings provided positive and negative reasons to
continue work after ICH3. On the one hand, they revealed that the ICH process itself
was a powerful tool for the implementation of guidelines, and this made industry think
that the ICH was an effective forum for dealing with any differences that remained. On
the other hand, some seemingly simple topics in fact were not that easy to harmonize.
For example, the pharmacopoeia was one of the first eleven topics taken into
consideration for guidelines, yet so far no guideline has been completed due to different
concepts of some products. Sometimes these topics were not critical and left pending;
however there were some that did have effects on the reviewing process, such as the
consideration of ethnic factors that would decide whether clinical trials should be
repeated for populations different than those involved in the original trials. Thus, in
order to take full advantage of this precious opportunity to make guidelines, one more
ICH conference was added (ICH4), and then additional ones were arranged by other
maneuvers.
Finally, let us take a brief look at how these formed guidelines work. Using
toxicity testing as the example, John Abraham and Tim Reed's study provides us with a
view of how the ICH successfully reduced the difficulty of requirements in the name of
technological innovation (Abraham and Reed 2002). Toxicity is a big part of preclinical
stage studies and is regulated in various guidelines under the category of safety (mainly
SI B, SIC, and S4A). As one of the "obstacles" transnational industry was concerned
about, this issue was proposed at the beginning of the ICH and guidelines were
gradually formed and implemented by the ICH4. According to the criticism this study
makes of the process of negotiation, the rhetoric of regulatory agencies, no matter their
orientation, was always "to put patients as the first priority," but in reality they worked
to accommodate industry's desire to loosen the necessary requirements.
As Abraham and Reed's study shows, the monitoring duration of chronic toxicity
testing was shortened from twelve months to six, and the number of animal species
required for carcinogenicity testing was decreased. Some tough standards, such as the
maximum tolerated dose method for determining the dosage used in carcinogenicity
testing, were replaced by flexible ones. All these changes lacked a scientific base and
betrayed the agencies' promises to patients and to public health. The authors conclude,
[T]he ICH process was an intermingling of technical, social and political
judgments, and not a series of scientific calculations. This is significant because
the implication is that the ICH process could have been constituted by a broad
range of interests, instead of an expert scientific forum for industry and
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government. (363)
For the authors of this study the "technical standard" would have a different meaning in
this circumstance. It conveniently wraps up the outcomes of complicated negotiations
in this conference by formulating a workable consensus via which each drug, as well as
capital, flows.
Marching Out: Formation of Global Cooperative Group
In its statement "The Future of the ICH" released at ICH4 (ICH 1997), the ICH
Steering Committee wrote that the reason to continue the "second phase" of its work
was to ensure three things: a mechanism to harmonize technical requirements based on
science, a process for updating and supplementing the current ICH guidelines, and a
platform by which future disharmony could be prevented through early collaboration
and the exchange of information. Meanwhile, the ICH activities moved out of the
regions of harmonization and began to seek the possibility of implementing as many
guidelines as possible. The statement reads,
With the successful completion of the first phase of international harmonisation,
it will be increasingly important to ensure that the objectives and outcome of
ICH are well understood and widely disseminated.... The important role of
WHO, both in actively disseminating the guidelines and encouraging the
wide-spread adoption and use of ICH guidelines, is warmly welcomed and is
essential if the long-term benefit of international harmonisation, in terms of
quicker access to effective new medicines, is to be available to patients
throughout the world.
Although the markets outside of the ICH regions, which accounts for over 80 percent of
the world's population, were too tiny to be incorporated in the original plan, the ICH
decided to extend the marginal effect of their guidelines and included these places in
the name of the "globalization of the benefits of harmonization."
The rhetoric the ICH used for this phase was the same: these activities were
pursued in the interest of the patient, the consumer and public health in order to prevent
unnecessary duplication of clinical trials in humans and minimize the use of animal
testing without compromising the regulatory obligations of safety and effectiveness.
However, in reality the content was different. Harmonization aimed at ensuring that
good quality, safe and effective medicines were developed in the most expeditious and
cost-effective manner was not the point, because such guidelines were already in place.
For the regions and states outside of the ICH club, the "harmonization" could be done
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in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. As its revised Terms of Reference states, the mission of
the ICH's globalization of standards was to "facilitate dissemination and
communication of information on harmonized guidelines and their use." A PhRMA
member even told me that basically the industry would not welcome any extra
regulations added on the existing guidelines, because it would not be cost-effective.
Therefore, although the WHO was thought to be the one responsible for the
globalization of these guidelines, its function was quite limited. It was too big and too
divided to have a focused point for its policy on proprietary drugs (recall its attempt on
essential drugs twenty years ago), and its role in the ICH is minor (WHO 2002:25). As
presented at ICH4, it would devote itself only to the adverse effects, monitoring and
reporting, and guidelines on generic drugs. The job of promoting these guidelines to the
non-ICH regions was taken up by the ICH Global Cooperation Group (GCG), an ad hoc
organization put together to serve this need.
The GCG was founded in March 1999 as a subcommittee of the ICH Steering
Committee. It was organized by the original six parties and serves as a bridge to other
countries that are affected by these guidelines. Its objective is "to make available
information on the ICH process and guidelines to non-ICH regions and to act as
resource for the understanding, and even acceptance, of many of the guidelines" (as
quoted in Nutley ed. 2000: 10). For this purpose it set principles for controlling the
distribution of this information, outlined as follows:
1. ICH will not seek to impose its views on any country, region, or company, but
will serve as a resource for information and data.
2. ICH will provide non-ICH member countries or companies with any document
related to the GCG initiative without charge.
3. This ICH subcommittee will work as closely as possible with WHO and other
international organizations to achieve these goals.
4. This subcommittee will not cause or require any change to the current ICH
structure or procedures of operation.
5. While some non-ICH countries are not in a position to utilize ICH guidelines at
present, these guidelines will be used as the basis of ICH's response whenever
information is requested.
6. The Global Cooperation Group will provide information upon request from
non-ICH countries and will make information available about the existence of
the ICH web site, the address for communications, and related information.
Obviously, in the attempt to spread the new standards to non-ICH counties, the GCG
did not expect to play an active negotiating role; instead, it functioned passively to
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ensure that the direction of the information flow from the ICH to non-ICH regions was
irreversible. It made several documents about the ICH and the GCG available on ICH
website; brochures were distributed at the ICH to non-ICH audiences. But it did only
this.
Even so, some regional organizations showed their interests in this group for
various concerns. The Pan American Network on Drug Regulatory Harmonization
(PANDRH) was the first to express interest. It is a large organization that has a long
history back to the interwar years; more importantly, the United States and Canada are
active member states of this organization. Thus from beginning it was invited to attend
GCG activities. Although the PANDRH contributed a lot to the greater recognition and
use of ICH products through ongoing harmonization and capacity-building efforts, the
economic diversity among its member states was an obstacle to this effort. According to
its presentation at ICH6, it only organizes some committees, and they work on different
guidelines; members can join them on a voluntary basis. The same situation can be seen
in the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN). For a long time it was thought
of as an EU-like economic body, and thus important to the harmonization of local
regulations for products, including pharmaceuticals. Although ASEAN was strongly
supported by the governments of member states, differences among these countries'
economies is obvious. For example, some advanced states, such as Singapore, did not
see much need to be incorporated into the market for generic drugs. But for many
ASEAN member states the market in proprietary drugs that Singapore was interested in
was too expensive for them.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) represents another interest.
Although it is too large to form a single market, the rising economy and consumer
power of East Asia enables this organization to be an active participant. Furthermore,
because of the subtle political tensions between the United States and the People's
Republic of China and tensions within the Western Pacific region, APEC carefully
avoids issues that would arouse political implications and focuses only on economic
issues. The concept of harmonizing local regulations and forming a single market is in a
sense the best topic for the burgeoning industry of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals
to work on. Of course, there are other organizations participating in GCG activities,
such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). They showed up off and on with and had little impact for reasons
that are pretty simple: they are not able to even think about this issue.
After the formation of the GCG subcommittee, the GCG made its public debut at
ICH5, where it organized a half-day symposium one day before the conference. More
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than two hundred people attended. In response to requests for more discussion, at ICH6
the GCG extended the symposium to a whole day, and over seven hundred people from
around the world attended. This confirmed that the GCG would play an important role
in following ICH conferences, and it would come to be more concrete and more
attractive to non-ICH regions due to factors such as the promise of permanent
representatives to the GCG clearly stated in its Terms of Reference.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHEN "HARMONIOUS" WEST AND "NOISY"
ASIA MEET
Finally, let me risk simplification by summarizing the ICH as well as this chapter
by means of two diagrams. The first illustrates the first phase of the ICH in terms of
harmonizing the standards and markets of the United States, the European Union, and
Japan (fig.2.2). As we see in the diagram, the isolated markets of these three
regions/states started to be brought together by the ICH, and the overlapping area,
which indicates the region where drugs can be sold freely, enlarges.
Fig.2.2. World of Proprietary Drugs before (left) and after (right) the ICH
After ICH4, the ICH moved its focus to those countries outside of it. As the
second diagram shows (fig. 2.3), through the standardization of all standards, it
continues to work to achieve a single global market/health community. Due to different
interests, some regional organizations have developed dialogues with the ICH through
the help of the GCG. However, the nature of this communication is rather
one-directional, from inside to outside.
As the most fundamental and most advanced venture to bring about a single
measure in the world of proprietary drugs, the ICH is an ongoing plan for the new
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millennium. For global pharmaceutical companies, there will finally be one standard to
fit all if the ICH follows this blueprint. The ICH project nicely echoes what Michael
Fischer observes about the interconnections of contemporary technologies: there is a
confluence of two temporalities on two ethical plateaus, one "operative as legacies of
the past in the present" and the other "operative already or potentially operative as the
result of a promised technological future" (Fischer 2003:155). The ICH locates its
achievements, the guidelines, in the history of standardization, and at the same time
persuades the public of possible benefits by projecting these universal guidelines into
the present. Both provide necessary motivation for the conference to grow and evolve.
Fig.2.3 World of Proprietary Drugs inside and outside the ICH
Even so, the ICH knew that things would not go as they wished when these rules
were introduced to Asia. As the area consisting of the countries that have undergone the
most rapid economic growth since the 1970s, East Asia is a new and promising market
for advanced commodities. However, the locomotive of East Asia, Japan, is
"troublesome" for its infamous protectionism and unique standards for imported goods.
Although the Japanese, as Kalman Applebaum shows (2005), have been successfully
"educated" about mental diseases and the new anti-depressant SSRIs through the ICH,
the interaction is not always that smooth in other cases. This is what I mentioned in
Chapter 1 as the second question regarding standardization: what standard is the best
for which customers? For the West, Japan's insistence on its own standards is purely a
non-tariff barrier. The cultural assumption behind this argument is that only Westerners
know the best standards for these West-originated goods. In particular, many say, just
twenty years ago Japanese products were not good enough to compete with Western
ones. However, is it possible that the Japanese have learned what is best for them?
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Take cars as an example. Although Japan reconstructed its manufacturing capacity
after World War II, it was still tiny. However, when smaller, less expensive and more
fuel-efficient automobiles became popular with the American consumer, sales of
Japanese cars improved rapidly. Two oil crises speeded up this trend, notwithstanding
the Clean Air Act of 1970. By the end of the 1970s, Japanese automakers were selling
2.5 million cars a year, while U.S. automakers failed to sell their cars in Japan. Some
responded to Japanese competition by retooling their factories to build smaller cars;
they even introduced Japanese production methods. However, they still to meet the
unique standard set by the Japanese. Then the United States started accusing Japan of
protectionism. They thought that Japan's unique standards and reviewing system were
an excuse that did not allow U.S. makers to fair play in the Japanese market. GM, Ford
and Chrysler, the "Big Three" automakers, pressured the U.S. government to negotiate
with its Japanese counterpart. Special meetings and programs were arranged in the
mid-1980s and further negotiations with European companies were introduced. The
goal of these action programs, in the end, was to set a universal standard, a game that
was fair to all players.
The Japanese did not consider the problem this way, though. They always felt that
they only wanted what they consider fittest for themselves. These unique standards
more or less reflect this naive need in an institutional fashion. Let us examine a
fantasized version of this argument by introducing an episode taken from the popular
Japanese manga (comic) Sanctuary. It starts with Ms. Bristol, the special assistant to
the President of United States (supposedly Bill Clinton), who flies to Tokyo with the
presidents of the Big Three to fix the problem of the American failure to penetrate the
Japanese car market. Famous for her tough style of negotiation, Bristol is confident of
the quality of U.S. products and believed she would win this negotiation until she meets
Congressman Asami Chiaki, an ambitious young elite.
Unlike the Japanese officials Bristol previously encountered, Asami tells her
clearly that the problem is not a purely economic one, but cultural as well. He asserts
that if Japan and the United States both removed the barriers to each other's products,
Japanese cars would beat American ones in both markets. To show her the social and
cultural roots of Japanese society, Asami brings Bristol to a public elementary school,
showing her how Japanese children are trained to be a part of a group and how they
enjoy this. Japanese values, including the pursuit of perfect quality, are one of the
things that make the Japanese whole. "It is useless to force Japan to buy your cars and
parts," Asami concludes. "If you insist on doing so, I shall say that it is only because of
your cultural prejudice [toward] the superiority of Whiteness" (fig.2.4).
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Fig. 2.4. The Cultural Dispute between Japan and the United States over
Car Imports, Portrayed in Sanctuary.
Left: Ms. Bristol smashes a Japanese car in a demonstration before flying
to Tokyo. Right: Her shocked face when she hears Congressmen Asami
say, "It is only because of your cultural prejudice [toward] the superiority
of the Whiteness."
Source: Sanctuary (Chinese version), vol., episode 6 and 8.
Although this manga has pointed out that cultural difference may play a big role
in the process of standardization, in the real world it is not easy to articulate and
solve.33 As we will see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Japan has its own logic to running
drug businesses and participating in the ICH. At the interface where two systems meet,
the eminently cultural issue of racial difference became the last obstacle in achieving a
universal standard.
33 In Sanctuary, Asami and Bristol engage in a one-night stand and she leaves Tokyo without
achieving anything.
Chapter 3
Local Tones: Medicine as an Instrument of Building Social Trust and State Visibility
Through ICH, the number of time-consuming, expensive phase III trials
required for an international launch will be reduced dramatically. This will not
only save time and resources-it will save lives and improve the health of
patients all over the world.
Frank Douglas
A thriving civil society depends on a people's habits, customs, and ethics-
attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action
and must otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect
for culture. ... [O]ne of the ironies of the convergence of larger institutions
since the end of the cold war is that people around the world are now even
more conscious of the cultural differences that separate them.
Francis Fukuyama2
PART I
LOCATING MARKETS IN JAPAN AND TAIWAN
Japan and Taiwan as Seen by Global Pharmaceutical Companies
As introduced in Chapter 2, for multinational companies the world of proprietary
drugs is expanding. Although it is time-consuming and costly to bring a new product to
market, once it is on the market, the reward is enormous. The larger the market, the more
benefits will be enjoyed. Thus, pharmaceutical companies' strategy, as the above quote
states, is to enlarge markets as much as possible at a minimum cost, all in the name of
public health. However, looking at the demand side of drugs, Chapter 2 reminds readers
that Japan can be a "troublemaker" and a roadblock on the way to selling drugs to East
Asia. It may not be a purely business concern that leads Japan to protect its market. In the
era of globalization, as Francis Fukuyama notes, cultural factors should be taken into
account. In addition to examining the tactics used in locating the Asian market, this
chapter will attempt to show what cultural logic is behind the drug business in this region.
Let us begin by looking at the national markets of Japan and Taiwan and their
In Nutley ed., "Benefit and Value of the ICH," p.l 1.
2 In Trust: The Social Virtues and The Creation of Prosperity, p.5.
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structure and size from the viewpoint of the United States. According to the IMS
HEALTH report on the worldwide pharmaceutical market, world sales have grown by
almost 11 percent between 1999 and 2003 (see table 3.1). Because of demographic shifts
(i.e., an increasing elderly population), changing epidemiological patterns, and increasing
public awareness about healthcare, as mentioned in Chapter 2, some predict that sales
will reach $677 billion in 2008.
Let us take a look at this world map and see where the main markets are. North
America is the biggest market for pharmaceuticals, with about a 50 percent share of the
total world pharmaceutical market. As expected, the European market is the second
largest, accounts for a quarter of the total market, and is dominated by Western European
countries. The third largest consumer in the global market is the area of "Africa, Asia, and
Australia" (AAA), which includes countries with varying ability to buy brand drugs. If
we take a closer look at this market, we find that Japan is the biggest contributor to total
consumption. The Japanese market is the second largest national market in the world, and
it accounts for about 16 percent of global sales and about two thirds of the AAA market.
The above sketch corresponds the parties that are invited to join the International
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH).
Table 3.1 Japan and Taiwan in the Africa, Asia, and Australia Market,
1999-2003 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Year/Country (percentage Japan Taiwan Rest of the
in the AAA Region) AAA Region
1999 53.4 (59.9) 1.8 (2) 33.9
2000 51.5 (73.3) 2.3 (3.2) 16.4
2001 47.6 (63) 2.2 (2.9) 25.7
2002 46.9 (59.7) 2.2 (2.8) 29.4
2003 52.4 (58.4) 2.2 (2.4) 35.1
Source: Adapted by the author from various sources.
Recognized as a growing market among the Newly Industrialized Economies
(NIEs)-which also include Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong-Taiwan has a noticeable
profile in the AAA area on this world map. In the past ten years, the growth of sales of
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alimentary tract, metabolism, and especially cardiovascular system drugs, among others,
has caught the industry's eye. Although it is much smaller than Japan, Taiwan is the 2 0 th
largest national market in the world (fig. 3.1). In the consumption of prescriptive drugs it
trails only Japan, Korea ($3.9 billion), Australia ($3.1 billion), India ($3.4 billion), and
the PRC ($4.0 billion) in its region (IMS HEALTH 1999). In per capita consumption of
pharmaceuticals, it still surpasses many countries, ranking 2 8 th in the world.
Following a brief sketch of Japan and Taiwan's national prescriptive drugs market, I
will further analyze the structure of both markets and their implications for global
pharmaceutical companies, especially those from the Unite States. Like many developed
countries, Japan's pharmaceutical market is characterized by its diversity and dispersion.
As shown in table 3.2, Japan has relatively more pharmaceutical companies than other
major drug-producing countries. Even so, these companies can be roughly divided into
two groups--companies of large size and those of medium or small size, which make up
the so called "double structured" market described by Kohara Hisaharu (1996: Chapter
3). 3
Table 3.2 Numbers of Pharmaceutical Companies in Main Developed
Countries, 1987-1991
Country \Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
United States 680 680 790 - -
*West Germany 1000 1000 1000 1000 -
United Kingdom 369 350 - 387 -
Switzerland - - 85 85 85
France 319 358 358 362 353
Italy 320 310 305 303 299
Japan - 1407 1457 1496 1738
*Since 1989 it has been part of the united Germany
Source: Adopted from the JPMA, Yearbook 1994.
The big companies in Japan, which are members of the Japan Pharmaceutical
According to Kohara, the big companies are those whose monthly production exceeds one billion yen.
The small companies are those whose production is below ten million yen. In 1993 Japan had 399 big drug
companies that accounted for 20.3 percent of the total number of firms and 96.4 percent of total production.
The small companies, though they made up over 60 percent of the total number, were responsible for less
than 0.5 percent of total production.
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Manufacturers Association (JPMA) and have always numbered fewer than thirty, behave
like global companies. Vast research and resources are invested, and some products are
sold overseas. In the domestic market, they are senpatsu kigyo, the leading producers.
The rest of this sector is made up of innumerable followers, kohatsu kigyo. These pick up
drugs that are out of patent and make their own products, called zorohin ("me-too" drugs).
Because zorohin need not repeat costly trials to meet the Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare (MHLW) requirements, they can find a niche for their products.
However, what makes Japan unique is the distribution of its market share. Thanks to
previously loose regulations on new drug patents, the conventional dichotomy of branded
drugs and generic ones is not clear. From 1993 to 2000, the concentration ratio of top ten
producers only rose from 31.6 to 40.6 percent, far lower than the 70 percent concentration
of U.S. drug firms. On the other hand, though the smaller followers are the main body of
the pharmaceutical sector, they must survive crude competition over small market share.
Drugs, after all, are not like cars; the variable nature of diseases and treatments naturally
makes it harder for other makers to take your established share. As a senior stock analyst
specializing in Japan's pharmaceutical sector informed me, many small companies
survive with only one or two generic drugs that have been produced since the company
was founded.
Based upon this understanding, we can start to see the role that global companies
play in this market, which is to a large degree marginal. A 1998 report shows that
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) member companies
have about $9.6 billion in annual sales in Japan, which is equivalent to a mere 15 percent
market share. According to the JPMA profile, among the top 20 JPMA member
companies in fiscal year 2002, only Pfizer (ranked 6th from the top), Novartis (1 th),
GlaxoSmithKline (16 6th), and Astra Zeneca (19 th) are foreign-investment companies. Even
Pfizer, the best performer, whose sales in Japan for 2002 totaled $1.78 billion, fell far
behind Takeda, the leader, by $3.6 billion. In short, these global companies sweep the
world, but not Japan, where Japanese companies are always the dominating players.
In contrast to the domination of local companies in Japan, it is foreign subsidiaries
that control the Taiwanese market. For them, Taiwan represents a market rather than a
business competitor. Despite its rising economic capacities, Taiwan has a weak
pharmaceutical sector. A 1998 report shows that local companies have only 31 percent of
the total market, while companies from the major global players take 64 percent,
including 20 percent by the United States, 14 percent by Japan, 11 percent by Germany, 9
percent by the United Kingdom, 6 percent by Switzerland, and 4 percent by France.
In terms of recent data, in 2003 the top twenty pharmaceutical companies took 63.2
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percent of total sales, which accounts for $2.12 billion. However, only three Taiwanese
companies--Yung Shin, ranked 15th , Tung Yang, 17th, and Sintong, 19th--are able to
make it onto this list. Beside, they are in fact producers of generic drugs, focusing their
marketing on pharmacies and clinics rather than hospitals, which can afford more
expensive brand drugs. Thus, it is fair say that the Taiwanese market for proprietary drugs
belongs exclusively to the foreign players.
The above situation also affects the marketing strategy of U.S. firms. The
international market for pharmaceuticals offers a wealth of potential for U.S. companies
and it grows at double digits annually. Intensified global research and development
activity, which generates a steady flow of new therapeutic products, is one of the key
factors fueling the expansion. Even so, PhRMA does not spend as much on the research
and development of pharmaceuticals abroad. As described in the Chapter 2, the research
and development expenditure of PhRMA reached $30 billion in 2001; however,
according to PhRMA's Annual Membership Survey (2002), only $4.56 billion, accounting
for 19 percent of their R&D budget, was spent outside of the United States.
Let us now trace these budgets. Western Europe enjoyed the biggest non-U.S.
investment at $2,441.2 million, or 52.3% of the total. The second and third largest were
Japan's $564.1 million (12.1%) and Canada's $245.7 million (5.3%). As an emerging
region, the Asia-Pacific region, which includes key states such as Taiwan, Korea and
Singapore, obtained $40 million. It is clear that because of competition, PhRMA makes
some investment in Japan; however, it is not comparable to the profits they earn. As for
Taiwan, because of the lack of local competitors, PhRMA considers it a pure market not
worth much R&D investment. It takes from Taiwan without giving anything.
Local Factors Shared by Japan and Taiwan
Although they have the most advanced products, it is not easy for global drug
companies to conquer East Asian markets. In this section I will introduce local factors in
Japan and Taiwan that determined the buying force and the restrictions on
pharmaceuticals. These factors fall into two broad categories: the national health
insurance (NHI) schemes and local drug regulations.
Japan has a long history of collective health care, the origins of which can be traced
to Goto Shimpei, the founder of modern public health in Japan and Taiwan.4 A former
4 Goto Shimpei (1857-1929) has a long international career as a politician and public health policy
maker making him a legendary figure in the modern history of both Japan and Taiwan. Among many Meiji
elites, Goto was typical as a medical doctor deeply involved in political affairs. He was one of the few
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student of German bacteriologist Robert Koch, Goto introduced the German model of
social welfare which, as many point out (Sugaya 1977, Fann 1998, Chang 1999), helped
to consolidate the newly born Japanese state (and later empire), which was faced with the
impending problems of the need for a robust labor force and the possibility of class
conflict. This development gained energy and was realized in Japan's first national health
insurance program in 1927. The making of this law deserves another book to discuss it
(for example, Sugaya 1977, esp Chapter 3); I just want to point out that the enactment of
the Health Insurance Law empowered the government to dominate healthcare affairs.
Using this new scheme, it integrated and took over in most cases pensions and welfare
packages previously provided by cooperative societies (kumiai), and its importance grew.
It made the state not only the ultimate protector of citizens' health and the provider of
healthcare; it ensured the existence of a robust Japanese race as the biological base for
this modem nation-state.5
The new and independent health insurance institution moved from the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce to Internal Affairs under the newly founded Bureau of Social
Affairs, and local offices were established, along with health insurance kumiai, as
specified by the law. The coverage of the insured extended with the military
government's march into the Asian continent and ended with the foundation of the
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) for the purpose of overseeing this task. At the
end of World War II, a system consisting of 10,349 kumiai and covering about 95 percent
of Japanese cities was formed (National Health Insurance Association 1948: 266). The
American occupation following the end of the war did not interrupt the Japan's national
health insurance. In fact, in Report of Social Security Mission, W.H. Wandel, the leader of
the mission, suggested the a unified system granting universal health care service to all
citizens should be offered by the government. By solving the financial problems of some
kumiai by replacing them with a government-run organization, coverage continuously
rose. In parallel with its strong economy, the Japanese government launched "insurance
for all nationals" in 1961. In 1973, the so-called "opening year of welfare", the
doctors who received formal training in Western medicine, and after studying medicine in Germany he was
chosen as the Head of Sanitation Bureau under the Ministry of Internal Affairs from 1890 to 1892 and again
from 1895 to 1898. The second enterprise he joined was Taiwan, where he was the Head of Civilian
Administration from 1898 to 1906; he introduced modern institutions almost the same as he had done in
Japan. As researchers note, Taiwan, as the frontier and first colony of Japan, granted Goto the full
opportunity to realize how a state-backed public health system could be possible. Because of his success in
Taiwan, he was made president of the Manchurian Railway, Japan's first national and semi-colonial
business overseas, in 1906. These works proved Goto a reliable bureaucrat; his career reached its climax
when he was made Mayor of Tokyo and then various other high-level posts in the central government.
5 I am grateful to Professor Hiroi Yoshinori at Chiba University for providing me with this political
economic observation.
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government even proposed a free health care program for people over seventy years old.
However, this promise could not be kept easily in the late 1970s when Japan's
economic growth started to slow down. The MHW, despite its increasingly complicated
functioning--not unlike a combination of the FDA and National Institutes of Health in
the United States-was no longer as generous as before. Worse, expenditures grew
rapidly with the advancement of medical technology. As a result, expenditure for
everything related to national health insurance became a major burden on the MHW.
Under the increasingly harsh economic regression, the roles of the MHW as the protector
of health and controller of the health budget were in conflict. National health insurance
became so difficult to maintain that the MHW ended up as a bureau dealing nothing but
this task.
Drugs were one of the main targets of budget control. As a single buyer, the MHW
controlled drug prices though the reimbursements paid to medical institutions under the
NHI. Each prescription drug had a fixed price announced every two years. After a long
and difficult negotiation in 1982, when the MHW founded a committee to control
medical spending, drug prices were cut by 18.6 percent of listed price in the next year, the
largest cut since the pricing system was enacted in 1950; they were then lowered almost
60 percent over the next five years. It was such a harsh cutback that the industry claimed
"winter" had come. The price cuts continued regardless of currency inflation during the
1990s; a 7 percent annual cut is shown in table 3.3.
Table 3.3 MHW Price Cuts, 1990-2000
Year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997* 1998 2000
Price cut (%) 9.2 8.1 7.4 8.5 4.4 9.7 7.0
*Special cut for revised consumption tax
Source: UBS Warburg (from 1990 to 2000) and Yashiro Mitsuo,
"Revision of NHI Drug Prices and Medical Fees, Fiscal 2002"
(2002)
For the price cuts the MHW designed a long and burdensome process involving a
very complex calculation mechanism (see fig. 3.1). Drugs are categorized into two groups,
branded and generic, and different pricing systems are applied accordingly. Drugs are
generally listed under the brand name for which product approval was granted. However
some drugs listed in the Pharmacopoeia of Japan, biological products, and others may be
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listed under a generic name depending on their active ingredients, formulation and
specifications. New drugs containing NCEs can apply to the NHI drug price list four
times annually at prices calculated by comparison with comparable previously listed
drugs. If no similar drug is identified, the new drug is priced according to the calculation
method. The prices calculated by this method are adjusted if they are more than double or
less than half of comparable pharmaceutical prices in the United States and Europe.
Fig. 3.1. Process of NHI Pricing for Prescriptive Drugs
WWII
i mammw I
Source: JPMA website, http://www.jpma.or.jp/12english/publications/
pub019d_nhi/
Before establishing its own NHI program in 1995, Taiwan had ten different public
insurance schemes: Labor Insurance (1950), Government Employees Insurance (1958),
Farmer's Insurance (1985), Low-Income Household Insurance (1990), and so on. Each
covered a particular subset of the population and fulfilled a particular political promise in
the postwar context of Kuomintang (KMT) government's control over the island. The
planning stage for the NHI took seven years, from 1986 to 1993, covering the critical
period of Taiwan's political transition to a vibrant democracy. To preempt the challenge
from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which had long advocated the establishment
of universal national health insurance, the KMT government submitted an NHI bill to
Parliament, and it was and finally passed in July 1994, less than a year prior to the
program's eventual inauguration.
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Taiwan's NHI scheme covers more than 96 percent of Taiwan's citizens. Third party
reimbursement is therefore an important consideration in any healthcare expenditure and
in procurement of pharmaceuticals. As expected, since the very beginning, price cuts
have been one of big issues with this program. Like Japan, Taiwanese government
applied a centralized system to control prices. Beginning in 1997, a series of price and
reimbursement controls were introduced by the Bureau of National Health Insurance
(BNHI), which operates a price-setting system based on international comparisons.
According to the guidance on drug prices enacted in 1999, new products without
bioequivalent competition are set at a median price of the product as it is listed in ten
developed markets. Basically the price is determined by a special committee and is fixed
after review: but prices products whose market prices were lower than 80 percent of the
reimbursed price in a price/volume survey were subject to revision. Further, there are
increased use restrictions placed on new drug reimbursement. Over 50 percent of new
drugs now have reimbursement limitations. In principle, the BNHI tried to make its
reimbursements approach the costs of these new drugs.6
Although it imports many foreign products, Taiwan is criticized for its regulatory
practices, the second local factor it shares with Japan that should be taken into
consideration. While some progress has been made in achieving rapid registration for
certain classes of drugs to treat life-threatening diseases such as AIDS and cancer, Taiwan
remains a late registration market for international companies. The reviewing time taken
to approve new compounds was long in the 1990s-as long as thirty months in some
cases, further reducing the exclusivity period provided by patent protection. Some long
reviews were related to regulatory delays in the registration of clinical trials, which were
requested via notice from the Department of Health (DoH) in 1993. These clinical trails,
which had to consist of at least forty subjects, were criticized as being too small to be
scientifically valid. In addition to registration trials, in most cases hospitals, with
government acknowledgement but not government mandate, required a formulary-listing
trial before a drug could be included on the hospital's reimbursement list. It was claimed
that these regulatory hurdles continued to prevent fast market entry of new drugs that had
been approved in other industrialized countries. Even so, the history of drug regulation in
Taiwan is relatively short. Only in 1970 did Taiwan pass its first law concerning control
6 On the other hand, like other countries that have national health programs, Taiwan controls its drug
expenses by supporting the use of locally manufactured generic products. For bioequivalent products,
BNHI allows a price (i.e., reimbursement level) close to 100 percent of the originator's. For common
products (i.e., no proven bioequivalent generics), BHNI approves a price near 80 percent of the originator's.
As will be discussed later in this section, PhRMA complains that these controls are discriminatory; local
companies enjoy a favorable market position due to the controls' application.
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of medications, and pharmaceutical firms followed by the establishment of the Good
Manufacturing Practices (GMP) requirements and criteria in 1982. Taiwan had no
regulations on clinical trials before the ICH.
In fact, prior to the requirement for local clinical trials, intellectual property was the
issue that foreign companies were most concerned with. Before the revision of patent law
in 1986, Taiwan protected manufacturing processes for new drugs, but not the end
products. Many new drugs patented elsewhere and registered in Taiwan lost their market
exclusivity. Of course, global companies suffered from this when some local producers
were able to "copy" their products; imported drugs would not be as competitive as local
ones in price. For example, Piroxiden (piroxicam) was a non-NSAIDs proprietary drug
produced by Pfizer and sold to Taiwan at the price of $25 NTD ($0.63, in 1986 dollars)
per capsule. However, when local copies came out in competition with the original, the
price fell to only $1 NTD. Because Pfizer objected to reducing its price below $12 NTD,
Piroxiden was first dropped from the general practitioner market and then badly defeated
by imported "me-too" products, such as those from Cyprus, in the hospital market. Pfizer
finally stopped selling this drug and retreated from Taiwan. Even after the modification of
the patent law and the establishment of a non-governmental, professional institute for the
technical review, PhRMA worried that confidential data it submits are not being protected
by the government employee confidentiality regulations.
Foreign companies encountered the same regulatory problems they later met in
Taiwan in Japan back in the 1970s, and the pace of change was slow. Prior to 1976, Japan
followed the German patent law that protected only for process patents for
pharmaceutical products. It meant that with "alternative production processes" for a
patented drug, Japanese companies could legally manufacture and sell it in their domestic
market.7 Fighting against strong pressures from domestic industry, the MHW finally
adopted product patents in an amendment of the patent law.
Also like Taiwan, Japan required registration clinical trials through the MHW and
listing trails for the hospitals where the products were to be dispensed. Before the
introduction of the ICH guidelines, Japan had rules from 1968 on clinical trials using
local subjects. In the 1980s there were special study guidance groups consisting of
"patriarch" specialists organized by the MHW. These groups drafted specialized
guidelines for conducting clinical trials in fields such as cardiovascular or gastrointestinal
disease, and these were imposed on any firm that wanted to sell drugs in Japan. For
foreign companies, the requirements were not necessarily tough to meet; however,
7 for another example including automobiles, see Cusumono 1989: 97-100.
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because they required local subjects and the format was incomparable with FDA
guidelines, these companies had to repeat all clinical trials before entering the Japanese
market. Although the MHW made efforts to streamline its reviewing process in the 1990s,
the delay in drug introduction still averaged three to five years. For global drug
companies, the main difficulty was not with their products but with the delayed market
entry due to these administrative barriers.
Let me sum up the local factors discussed above. For the global pharmaceutical
companies, the policies of Japan and Taiwan that affect their interests have three roots:
pricing and reimbursement, regulatory affairs, and intellectual property rights
enforcement. These result from the national insurance schemes implemented in the two
countries. This fact also contributes to the government's irreplaceable role as protector of
people's health and wealth. It may seem odd for PhRMA to decry the Wal-Mart practice
of pushing down prices by buying in huge volumes, but if we take the state into
consideration we will understand the partial logic behind the argument. For PhRMA,
these practices contribute to unfair competition. The market exclusivity and commercial
potential of their new products are reduced by the restrictions introduced by the
government, and the aim in PhRMA's mind is to favor the local competitors.
Thus PhRMA appealed to the U.S. government. The pernicious effects of foreign
government price and access controls, they claimed, hurt patients in the United States and
abroad, created market access barriers to U.S. exports, cost well paid jobs in the U.S., and
constituted unsound economic policy, even for the countries that employed them. The
government should recognize the potential harm to the U.S. trade interests resulting from
some countries' market-distorting practices in the area of pharmaceuticals. For all of
these reasons, PhRMA claimed, the U.S. government should make reforming these
anti-innovation market barriers a top priority of U.S. trade policy.
Pressures Initiated by the United States
In this section I will introduce two legal institutions that affect the U.S. international
trade policy on drugs: free trade agreements (FTAs) and Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 (hereafter Section 301, "Special 301," and "Super 301").8 These two institutions
8 In fact, concerning the institutional practice of research pharmaceutical companies trying to expand
their markets, Christopher Harrison lists four routes by which this is done (Harrison 204): domestic
solutions for the international market (i.e., Section 301), bilateralism without institutionalization (e.g.,
negotiations between the United States and other countries), bilateralism with institutionalization (e.g., Bills
C-22 and C-91 with Canada), and multilateralism (e.g., WTO or TRIPS). However, in this section I will
only review the two of these that are related to our Asian cases.
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are different in many ways; for example, the FTA is a diplomatic document worked out
based on the mutual understanding of the states involved. In contrast, Section 301 is a
domestic law and the actions it induces are unilateral and uninfluenced by diplomatic
concerns. However, both share the same goal: expanding the territory in which goods can
be sold freely.
The history of these institutions can be traced to U.S. trade policy in the 1960s.
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the U.S. established an interagency trade policy
mechanism, and this mechanism later evolved into an organization consisting of three
tiers of committees: the Trade Policy Staff Committee, the Trade Policy Review Group,
and the National Security Council/National Economic Council. These committees
developed and coordinated U.S. government positions on international trade and
trade-related investment issues. The Special Trade Representative (STR), the new
position created by the law, played a leading role in the development of policy on trade
and trade-related investment, as well as in the coordination of the interagency process of
trade policy formulation.
The STR's responsibilities substantially expanded in the 1970s through the Trade
Act of 1974 and other related laws. Congress made the STR responsible for trade
agreement programs and directly accountable to both the President and the Congress for
these and other trade responsibilities. In 1980, the STR was renamed as the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), centralizing U.S. government international
trade policy-making and negotiating functions. Its mission, in a simple reflection of U.S.
trade policy, is to open the world market for U.S. manufacturers as much as possible.
Over the past twenty years the USTR has grown into a strong institution that has two
offices working on five organizational lines; it has succeeded in making the United States
party to numerous trade agreements with other countries and participated in negotiations
for new trade agreements in a number of countries and regions of the world.
It is not necessary to discuss these trade agreements,9 but three significant
characteristics can be noted. First, although globalization is a term often used in
international trade, it is difficult to achieve this goal, and it depends on the scale of
negotiations. The larger the scale of an agreement, the more difficulties it faces. In fact, it
was not the WTO but rather rising regional networks of FTAs that brought about an
acceleration of international commerce. l° Although from 1994 to 2002 no free trade
9 For details, see the Office of United Trade Representative's website at http://www.ustr.gov/
trade_Agreements/Section _Index.html.
10 While emphasizing the importance of bilateral agreements, I do not intend to ignore the importance
of the WTO (see, for discussions, Harrison 2004, Chapter 8). As an international organization that oversees
a large number of agreements defining the "rules of trade" between its member states, the WTO was also a
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agreements were passed in the U.S. Congress due to pressure from domestic industries,
existing organizations provide a platform by which the United States conducted bilateral
negotiations, such as the U.S.-Singapore FTA, and other agreements led to broader
cooperation in various regions, such as the Middle East Free Trade Area.
Second, the main goal of these agreements is to eliminate "trade barriers" for
exports from the United States. Unlike the global WTO, where Europe, Japan, and the
developing countries are involved, in regional or bilateral FTAs the United States is
inevitably dominant. Following the principle of "diversion-and-appeasement," the United
States carefully chooses countries to negotiate with such that the impact on its own
domestic industries can be minimized. The U.S. believes that it can beat out all local
competitors if the game rules are fair and square. The third characteristic of trade
agreements is their diplomatic nature. In some cases they are pursued because of
concerns other than trade. For example, in order to prevent a "domino effect" from Cuba,
the U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement excludes this communist country.
For pharmaceutical companies, free trade is a stimulant to more sales. Over the past
two decades, market access and pricing issues also have been part of the U.S. trade
dialogue with Canada, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress
provided additional guidance on negotiating objectives, calling for increased transparency
in the pharmaceutical regulatory process, consultative mechanisms, and non-tariff market
access issues such as reference pricing. Let us take U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement
(AUSFTA) as an example. Signed in 2004, it is the first FTA to include specific
provisions dealing with non-tariff market access issues related to pharmaceuticals.
According to the agreement, it will eliminate over 90 percent of manufactured goods
tariffs between the U.S. and Australia, including those on pharmaceuticals. However, it is
likely that this FTA will badly damage Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).
According to Kevin Outterson, because the PBS's economic evaluation produces some of
the lowest patented drug prices, PhRMA hopes to do away with this system once the
AUSFTA is enacted. In fact, the USTR and PhRMA have made clear that their goal was
to increase Australian prices. 11 It is not surprising that PhRMA appreciates this FTA,
because it "Establishes strong legal standards for protecting intellectual property, which
target of protests by the anti-globalization movement. However, it is less related to this thesis and should be
an independent topic for discussion. Regarding global health, five agreements in the WTO are relevant: the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) and the agreement on the application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS).
I While working together, some people have been rewarded for these efforts. Ralph Ives, the chief U.S.
negotiator who added the provisions concerning the PBS into the AUSFTA, was promoted for this success
in April 2004 to the newly created post of Assistant USTR for Pharmaceutical Policy.
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encourages the search for new therapies and cures for patients" (PhRMA as cited in
Outterson 2004).
For countries who have not yet signed agreements with the United States, Section
301 is an aggressive, unilateral weapon with which the USTR can pry open their markets.
Section 301 emerged in 1962 and was designed to give the President greater flexibility in
resolving trade disputes. It was strengthened in the 1970s. As amended in the 1974 Trade
Act (19 U.S.C. § 2411), it is the principal statutory authority under which the United
States may impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts, policies
and practices that violate, or deny U.S. rights or benefits under, trade agreements, or are
unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce (III
A). In light of congressional and industry demands for more protectionist trading policies,
an amendment was made to Section 301 in 1979 that authorized the filing of private party
petitions with the USTR requesting investigation of foreign governments believed to be
violating trade agreements or otherwise harming U.S. commercial interests. These
amendments were strengthened further in the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, which introduced the so-called "Special 301," according to
which the USTR must review, by April 30 of each year, the practices of U.S. trading
partners and identify foreign countries that fail to provide "adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights," or have any acts, practices or policies which
deny "fair and equitable market access to United States persons who rely on intellectual
property protection" (IV B.) The USTR consults with foreign governments to resolve
issues. If in the eyes of the USTR a satisfactory resolution is not reached,
recommendations are made to the President for appropriate action, which usually involve
trade retaliation in the form of import tariffs and restrictions.
Pharmaceuticals are a typical case of Section 301 strategy. Speaking on behalf of
globally ambitious, intellectual property-intensive companies, PhRMA regularly submits
material about intellectual property violations affecting their products to the USTR.
Accordingly, in its annual report, Annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers (NTE), the USTR places the countries it negotiates with on the "Priority
Foreign Country" list or the "Priority Watch" list, depending on how damaging their
apparent malfeasance seems to be to U.S. commerce, and more investigations are
conducted. 12 Although the USTR will enter into bilateral negotiations with Priority
12 The procedure is as follows: the initiation of a Section 301 investigation can be requested by an
interest group, such as PhRMA, by the filing of a petition. After publishing the initiation, the USTR
provides an opportunity for public comments and starts consultation with the foreign government under
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Foreign Country to remedy the problem, this is backed by the threat of unilateral
retaliatory action if a solution amenable to U.S. interests is not reached. According to
United States Code (19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq), a retaliatory action can be taken unless
"substantial progress is being made in negotiations with the foreign country; or a delay is
necessary or desirable to obtain U.S. rights or a satisfactory solution" (III C.) Although in
reality retaliatory actions are rare and unusual, this measure creates real and powerful
pressure on U.S. trade rivals. In this sense Super 301 is the ultimate weapon in this arena.
It allows the USTR to identify Priority Foreign Country practices, the elimination of
which would be likely to bring about significant increases in U.S. exports. Within thirty
30 days of identification of Priority foreign practices, the USTR is required to initiate
Section 301 investigations of any Priority practices identified in the report. So far no
other country can trump Section 301 in trade negotiations.
Thailand is a salient example of a country that has had to face continued U.S.
retaliation (for more examples see Harrison 2004, Chapter 6). Thailand, one fourth of
whose export market is the United States, introduced a compromise bill on patents in
1988 after attempting to resist U.S. pressure to change its patent laws. The next year it
was listed as a Priority Foreign Country. PhRMA (then the PMA) successfully urged the
U.S. government to revoke preferential treatment worth $165 million that Thailand was
receiving through the U.S.'s Generalized System of Preference program. The Thai
government was forced to concede and passed new patent laws in 1992, which still
retained legal control over drug prices. It remains on the USTR's Priority Watch list and
the subject of trade retaliation. Hit by financial crisis in 1997, Thailand was unable to
bear U.S. pressure and sanctions any longer and was forced to accept U.S. suggestions for
further amendments to its patent laws. The amendments to its laws have resulted in
inflated drug prices, terminated opportunities for the parallel imports of less expensive
generic drugs. As of 2004, Thailand was still on the list as a "watch country."
As for Japan and Taiwan, Section 301 strategies have been applied from time to
time since the measure's enactment. Japan has faced them in areas including steel, silk,
leather, tobacco leaves, the semi-conductor industry, citrus, construction,
telecommunications, satellite equipment, superconductors, forestry, automobiles, and
films. Among these, satellite equipment, super conductors and forestry were the sectors
that made Japan one of the two countries listed as a Priority Foreign Country in 1989.
investigation. After the investigation, the USTR must make a determination of whether the foreign practice
is actionable under Section 301. This should be done within 18 months of the initiation of an investigation
involving a trade agreement that includes a dispute settlement mechanism, or within 30 days after the
conclusion of dispute settlement procedures, or within 12 months of the initiation of an investigation in all
other cases.
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Taiwan has faced Section 301 action over rice, automobiles, customs practices, alcohol,
tobacco, and later intellectual property, which made Taiwan a Priority Foreign Country in
1992. Even so, most of the time both these countries are not the main targets of this
weapon.
However, PhRMA continues to keep Japan and Taiwan on the list it submits to the
USTR. In its 1998 report, PhRMA took notice of Taiwan and Japan, criticizing their
regulation processes and pricing and reimbursement systems. In 1999, these accusations
turned into a clear wish to have both listed as Priority Watch countries. PhRMA claimed
that the new pricing system introduced by the MHW would significantly diminish the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry's trade surplus with this country. The same rhetoric was
used toward Taiwan's "five principles" for determining pharmaceutical reimbursement
prices. Furthermore, clinical trials are an issue. PhRMA thinks their elimination is
important to the spirit of free trade. Regarding the importation of bulk pharmaceuticals,
PhRMA criticized Taiwan's quality concerns over the ability of companies to import
multisite source products for repackaging. In 2001, Taiwan showed up in PhRMA's report
again, listed as Priority Foreign Country. Repeating the reasons that it had cited in its
1999 report, PhRMA concluded, "If Taiwan fails to convert its patent term length from
15 to 20 years for all patents, PhRMA member companies will face losses of $330
million from this issue alone, due to lost effective patent terms on 39 separate products.
PhRMA is currently studying methodology but estimates that total losses in Taiwan can
be conservatively estimated at $730 million."
On the surface PhRMA does not seem to be doing anything wrong-it fights for
liberalization. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that PhRMA practices equal justice. Two
Taiwanese officials told me of their uncomfortable experience dealing with a PhRMA
representative. At an international meeting in Thailand a PhRMA representative caught
one official who had just come into a conference hall. "Can you spare some time? We
have to talk," said the representative, according to that official. Assuming it was a private
gathering to exchange ideas, he agreed. "The resulted was this woman from the UK
brought ten or twelve CEOs of global companies to shoot me questions about our review
practices," he complained. "They put a colleague of mine and me in a corner and asked
us questions for about an hour. It was very impolite. It was impolite first not to make an
appointment in advance for this meeting, and so was the style in which they delivered
their inquiries. I was badly insulted when the PhRMA representative threatened me [by
saying] that Taiwan should eliminate all clinical trials in appreciation for the military
cooperation of the United States. I suddenly stopped her and said that was none of her
business. 'You are British.' I stared at her. After that, I will never trust her." Leaving aside
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the complicated political relations of Japan and Taiwan with the U.S., which deserve their
own study, the looming shadow of Section 301 alone is enough to make these countries
concede what many regard as their sovereignty and their economic welfare to the U.S.
agenda of externalizing its economic policies, domestic laws and businesses using the
crowbar of Section 301 and creating inevitable damage in the process.
As discussed in this section, the U.S. employs trade agreements and Section 301 as
weapons to open markets that its industry can then conquer with minimal resistance. Far
from the superficial excuse that its actions are an effort to further world trade
liberalization-apparently for the sake of developed countries-the United States exploits
its global economic power in the pursuit of its own narrowly composed parochial trading
interests. Complicated social and cultural concerns are reduced to economic factors, and
naive laissez-faire is the only solution they desire.
PART II
JAPAN'S HEALTHCARE: BUILDING A SYSTEM OF TRUST
Drugs in Japan: A Different Kind of Business
In 1986, the U.S. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA, now PhRMA)
opened its Tokyo office; it was one year after the release of a report on U.S.-Japan trade
negotiations on pharmaceuticals.' 3 This was the first time the PMA considered the
necessity of learning about this huge market so that their products could be brought in. It
soon appointed Paul Reed Maurer, then the East Asian representative of Merck Co., as its
Japan representative, the best choice available. 14 From this position Maurer wrote
frequently on his observations about the pharmaceutical business and market in Japan for
an audience of American pharmaceutical company managers. However, before long
various Japanese trade magazines asked his permission to publish these commentaries as
well. Before Maurer decided to turn these articles into a book, these pieces had attracted
interested readers in magazines inside and outside of Japan. In 1989, the book Competing
13 This was the so-called MOSS Report. For more discussions about this negotiation and its impact on
the pharmaceutical sector, see Chapter 4.
14 Before serving in this position, Maurer had worked for two giants in the pharmaceutical sector, Eli
Lilly and Merck. During his career in the pharmaceutical business, Maurer helped Eli Lilly to establish
Lilly Japan, the first fully foreign-owned subsidiary since the amendment of investment regulations in 1975.
In addition, with Maurer's help, Merck made an incredible majority equity position purchase in both Banyu
and Torii within the same week in 1983. In the local media at that time, Maurer was portrayed as the one
who could bring in a foreign giant able to break cultural and business barriers in Japan, allowing Japanese
companies to "sell themselves out" to foreign multinationals.
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in Japan was published in English and Japanese (Maurer 1989a and 1989b).
In retrospect, Maurer's observations were important not only because they filled the
knowledge gap in English-speaking audiences about Japan's pharmaceutical business;
more importantly, they were recognized by the Japanese as a reliable information
resource about themselves and a worthwhile introduction for foreigners. In fact,
Competing in Japan's Japanese edition sold far better than its English one. One reason for
this, as Maurer pointed out, is that he separated facts about Japan from the "Japan myth,"
a common term in the late 1980s. What he tried to achieve in this book was to provide
helpful information that could be useful to both Japanese and American companies. I will
not review his book in detail at this point, as many of his opinions will be incorporated
into the following sections in a more systematic way. Instead, I would like to note four
clarifications that Maurer made that were different from what Americans may have
thought about themselves with regard to their failures in Japan and about Japan and its
successes. 1
The first is the myth that "you cannot do that in Japan" (Chapter 2). Regarding
Japan's large and continuously growing market, the American companies always felt
frustrated when looking for good entry strategies. They found entry was more difficult
here than in other countries, and they tended to blame limitations on improper
government regulations and non-tariff barriers. Although Maurer admitted that
restrictions once limited options for marketing, these externally imposed barriers were no
longer a factor or excuse for the retreat of American companies. The door was always
open. The limitations encountered by losers, he pointed out, were those self-imposed
through their organizational structures, "minor-league" commitments to a major-league
market, and a lack of experience in dealing with Japanese competition (8). After
indicating the signs of improvement in the Japanese market, he suggested that any
company that wanted to gain a fair share in it must spend more energy and resources in
order to compete with the locals. It was not the conventional scenario of American
companies competing with European ones everywhere in the world; in Japan they had to
face a major-league team at home.
The second is the myth of global marketing (Chapter 3). Although it is powerful for
a company to centralize marketing decisions in order to perform more efficiently in its
allocation of marketing resources, this does would not work in Japan if little attention is
paid to the country's special requirements. In short, what is best for U.S. customers is not
necessarily the best for customers in the other parts of the world; flaws acceptable in
'5 I will use the English edition in this thesis unless I mention otherwise.
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cost-benefit terms to American customers are not necessarily acceptable to non-U.S.
customers who do not value this concept (19). In the case of pharmaceuticals, the typical
example would be as simple as drug doses. Although Americans may not be concerned if
major harm can result from an overdose, the Japanese always think the dose administered
to Caucasians is too large for the body weight of the average Japanese patient. Quality is
also an issue. Like oranges, bananas and eels, Japan sets a high bar on the quality of
products shipped to Japan. Minor details, such as an inconsistent coloring of a material
and black particles that appear in some shipments, would cause products to not be
accepted by Japanese customers and badly damage the credibility of the traders.
The third myth is that of Japanese management (Chapter 6). Although it was
fashionable to claim that Japan's success was due to its unique management style, Maurer
has different ideas based on his observations of the drug industry. He points out two
factors that readers should take into account to reconsider the competitiveness of
Japanese companies. The first is regulations. Before any attempt was made to standardize
local regulations, the Japanese government was infamous for its lengthy, time-consuming
process of drug review. It was correct that new products generally required 18 months for
a approval after new drug applications were submitted to the MHW, and price listing
could require another three to four months. Even so, these regulations were not set up
especially for foreign companies; all companies, including domestic ones, were subject to
them. Secondly, although the manufacturing capability of Japanese industry was well
known, this relative advantage was not likely to have a serious impact on U.S. firms.
Pharmaceuticals are not a production-driven industry. It requires long-term commitment
and up to ten years of investment in research and development before an effective
molecule can reach the market. This is a rule that applies to all companies, not just
American ones. No one has said competing in Japan was easy, but neither should anyone
believe that there are institutional barriers to success.
The fourth and last myth is that of the competitiveness of Japanese pharmaceuticals
in the global market (Chapter 16, 17 and 18). Originally, the Japanese pharmaceutical
industry was not international. In the 1980s, there were about fifty subsidiaries abroad but
they were accounted for by fewer than ten companies, and their exports accounted for
less than 5 percent of total sales. Wholly owned subsidiaries were established primarily in
those countries that were geographically and culturally close to Japan, and when signing
licensing agreements, exclusive rights for the Japanese company in Japan and other Asian
countries were reserved. Few people in Japanese firms had work experience outside
Japan, and the number of people familiar with foreign languages is similarly small.
However this did not mean that Japan would remain that way when American companies
153
intruded. Maurer noticed that some aggressive companies were prepared to step out while
still dominating home market. Although for him it was too early to predict the outcome of
their attempt, it was clear that future competition would be global. Thus it is of no use to
complain and ignore Japan's important presence in the global market, where product,
price, people, and profit planning are basics that can be applied everywhere.
The above opinions seem banal. Indeed, Maurer is just an experienced, keen
businessman based in East Asia. Thus the importance of his words has to be recognized
in the context of the tricky relations between the United States and Japan in the 1980s.
James Fallows, a former speechwriter to President Jimmy Carter and a veteran columnist
on Japanese affairs, commented that this relationship has
a fragile, walking-on-eggs quality, which makes people think that it's dangerous to
talk frankly in public. Many other international relationships are robust enough to
survive open discussion of disagreements.... But the American fraternity of
Japan-handlers, which includes mostly diplomats and a number of businessmen,
scholars, and journalists, instinctively stifles outright complaints about Japan." It is
a conflict that is better to face directly than to pretend does not exist (Fallows 1989).
The rest of this section is an introduction to the background of this relationship.
Although close Japan and the U.S. have been military allies since the Korean War,
significant tensions arose between them over economic issues. There remains a
considerable distrust between the two countries that will continue to affect relations
between them. In the early 1980s, American outrage rose over the significant trade deficit
and various related controversies associated with Japan. The more significant message
can be read in the export performance of the individual companies. Exports as a
percentage of total sales of the top ten companies in Japan are a whopping 48 percent,
whereas among U.S. firms this figure is only 15 percent.
It would be unfair to blame the entire U.S.-Japan deficit on either side, and it would
not be valid to take it as a purely economic problem. For example, economist Thomas
McCraw identifies the shifts in the U.S. and Japan's economic structures which can
explain this deficit (1 986: 29-30). In addition, early instances of trade negotiations
between the United States and Japan, such as those over the "textile wrangle" in the late
1 960s,6 have shown that the problem of trade friction turned out to be a combination of
16 The problem that gave rise to this negotiation can be traced back to 1956, when Japan's subjected its
exports of cotton textiles to the United States to voluntary restraint. Because existing agreements did not
encompass textiles made of wool or synthetic fibers, in the 1960s exports of such items from Japan to the
U.S. increased significantly. The United States requested that Japan voluntarily restrain its exports of
synthetic fiber textiles to America and was rebuffed. To secure the support of textile-producing U.S. states
in the 1968 presidential election, Richard Nixon promised to insist upon Japanese restraint of synthetic
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economic and political concerns. Nonetheless, the public did not conceive it this way. As
the two countries became the free world's top two economic powers, it was a common
thought for many Americans that this imbalance was a problem exclusive to the
relationship between these two odd political partners and economic competitors.
Americans believed that the Japanese were exploiting the open American market while
excluding the United States from a fair chance at penetrating Japan's home market.
Specific issues between Japan and the United States got tangled up in emotional
negativity and stereotyping, and at times certain opinions merited the label of "Japan
bashing."
In the mid-1980s negative stereotypes of the Japanese began to appear in popular
books and movies, such as Michael Crichton's Rising Sun. Along with the "Buy
American" movement, there were deep-seated fears of Japanese infiltration into the
American populace. According to a Newsweek report (October 9, 1989), "most now view
Japan as a greater threat than the Soviet Union. They consider its trading practices unfair
and think Washington should push Tokyo harder to change them" (12).
Fig. 3.2. Cover of Newsweek (October 9, 1989) and the title page for the
cover story, "Japan Goes to Hollywood."
Let us discuss in detail the cover and the title page of the cover story "Japan moves
to Hollywood" from this issue of Newsweek (fig. 3.2). The central figure of a Japanese
goddess contains multiple meanings. Columbia Pictures started using the logo of the
"Columbia Lady" in 1924 in an imitation of the Statue of Liberty, the symbol of the
American spirit. After over 50 years of Americans dreams and entertainment, it was
replaced by Japan. When Sony bought Columbia Pictures Entertainment, the biggest
textile exports and to make it a condition of the return of Okinawa to Japanese control. President Nixon
fulfilled this campaign pledge after three years of clumsy negotiations, and Okinawa returned to Japan in
1971.
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takeover ever, many thought that the Japanese had bought a piece of America's soul.
But what is more important is the way Newsweek portrays this conflict. It presents it
as an exclusive war between two giants. For example, the person who concluded the
Columbia takeover deal is shown on the article title page. He is Morita Akio, the Sony
Chairman. Alongside this description of a successful businessman who Americans have
not yet come to know is a biographical introduction that tells that Morita coauthored with
controversial figure Ishihara Shintaro a book called A Japan That Can Say No.17 Other
information boxes help to clarify the binary nature of this war. One box lists two groups
of people labeled as "hawks," or simply "bashers," and "the chrysanthemum club," or
"apologists." Another box shows the results of a poll about whether Japan had become a
threat to America. Such questionnaire themselves were a threat in my opinion; they
manipulated Americans' fearful attitude toward Japan by asking whether the Soviet
Union's military power or Japan's economic one was a greater threat to the United States.
The above interpretation simplifies the question of the economic disequilibria in
markets and exports between the United States and Japan. While aiming its maximum
exports at the United States market, which is proud of its free-trade principles, Japan did
not open its market in a reciprocal manner. Where the problem arose should be solved
first. Thus Newsweek cites the new USTR Carla Hills' comment upon arriving in
Washington for a business negotiation that she came "with a crowbar," meaning the
Super 301 unfair trading practices list. Opening the Japanese market was inevitable.
Only by acknowledging this background can we appreciate Maurer's comments on
the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. Although his attempt to apply his observations to
other high-tech sectors might not be equally successful, his observations on Japan are less
emotional and prejudicial. Maurer's basic outlook is American; he sees business as
nothing but business and Japan as the most difficult market--"if you can make it here,
you can make it anywhere." However, Maurer did not think that Japan was so totally
exotic that no communication could bridge the cultural differences between it and the U.S.
"Nothing is impossible in Japan," he emphasized at the end of Competing in Japan, if
only Americans could think about the way the Japanese do business and the uniqueness
of Japanese market (166-167). Business, for Maurer, should return to basics, namely, the
customers. He frankly listed these points:
It is an easy out to blame the "system" rather than taking a hard look in the
mirror and admitting you don't have the quality and quantity of people to get the
job done; admitting your regulatory affairs department hardly knows the people
17 The official English translation of this book was not published until 1991, by Simon & Schuster, but
this translation is a sanitized version, including only Ishihara Shintaro's writings.
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in the Ministry of Health and Welfare; admitting you have one salesman calling
on a hospital twice a week and a competitor has three people who live in the
hospital every day; admitting that during the past ten years three different men
were in charge of your Japanese subsidiary, and none could understand one
word of a business discussion in Japanese (167).
According to Maurer, the core of business is the universal "customers first," even in the
difficult market of Japan. The first step to solving problems is identifying the rules behind
Japanese customer loyalty to certain products. Do not complain about the rules, but learn
them.
Why do Japanese drugs win Japanese customers' hearts? What are the rules behind
this phenomenon, if not simple protectionism? In the following two sections I will
describe the social and cultural logic behind Japanese drug consumption. Unlike the
United States, which simply encourages innovation by applying high standards, I will
argue that the logic that makes Japanese people continue to consume drugs is trust. As
Francis Fukuyama has revealed (1995), Japanese society has a high degree of trust, and I
think this observation can be applied to the business of health care. Technology
innovations do not play a crucial role in creating new needs in health; instead, trust does.
Through a conventional network of trust consisting of the physicians, drug companies,
traders, and wholesalers, new products are produced, promoted, guaranteed, and
consumed by consumers. Under this scheme, safety is always more important than
efficacy, and manufacturing (GMP) more important than research and development
(GCP). The initiative to improve drugs is, like in the United States, accidental misuse of
drugs. Yet the mechanism is different. While the FDA creates a higher standard for drugs
every time in order to control quality, in Japan the public often criticizes the system that
drugs travel through, the corrupt relationship between physicians and drug companies. It
is a refreshing process of social trust.
Making Sense of Japan's Drug Environment
Leaving aside international pressures, this section will analyze the pharmaceutical
market in Japan from the perspective of policy making. It is well known that relative to
its population, Japan has a disproportionately large drug market; but where shall we begin
tackling this business? Let me introduce a simple yet often asked question: why does
Japan, as one of the leading countries in terms of technological innovation, export
relatively few drugs? Among researchers who have asked this question, Michael R. Reich
is probably the most notable (Reich 1990). Unlike many analysts who simply apply
157
conventional models of protectionist government intervention and free-market
competition, Reich reminds us of the importance of the medical policies introduced in a
historical context, arguing that Japan's pharmaceutical industry has been nurtured and
promoted through a highly regulated, well protected and continuously expanding
domestic market shaped by the government's health policy.
Fig. 3.3. Medical Expenditures and Pharmaceuticals as a Percentage
of Total Costs, 1991-2000
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Source: Suzuki Hiroshi 2003, http://www.akita.med.or.jp/rikai.pdf.
Let us first look at the expansion of this market. The health economist Stuart O.
Schweitzer has pointed out that the share of expenditures devoted to pharmaceutical
products in the United States declined from 1960 to 1990 compared with other healthcare
sectors. While expenditures devoted to hospitals hovered at 40 percent, the share for
pharmaceuticals dropped by about half, to 8.2 percent, in 1990 (Schweitzer 1997: 95-96).
However, Japan is different; pharmaceuticals have been a significant expense since the
introduction of its universal health insurance program, constituting nearly 40 percent of
the total expense. Though this percentage decreased in the 1990s due to Japan's long
economic recession and subsequent budget reforms, the proportion of expenditure was
still about 20 percent in 2000. Real consumption, on the other hand, increased from 40
billion yen to 50 billion yen (fig. 3.3). The Japanese even tease themselves about this
high level of pharmaceutical use, saying that their bodies are heavily "pickled" in drugs
(kusirizuke).
Indeed, in retrospect, we see a divergent trend in the growth of the Japanese and
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U.S. pharmaceutical sectors in the 1970s. While the FDA and industry elevated the
standard for new drugs, resulting in a double-digit growth rate in business, in Japan the
same growth rate was achieved neither by the exclusion of competitors nor by the
separation of the market by research-based companies. It happened by the unlimited
expansion of domestic consumption. To consider the structure of this expansion, on the
demand side, the rate of consumption of prescriptive drugs compared to OTC drugs rose
from 48.2 percent in 1955 to 85.5 percent in 1980, creating a large space for drug
development. Further, prior to the introduction of the 1997 reform, which increased
co-payments for health services and drugs for the insured and the elderly, full insurance
coverage resulted in visits for minor maladies making up one fourth of total medical
expenditures. The same trend is also seen on the supply side. The relatively low bar for
taking a drug to the market welcomed all domestic companies that wanted to develop
acceptable drugs. During the past three decades the number of companies did not
decrease in response to government quality control requirements introduced in the 1970s.
Thousands of new products were created by hundreds of producers; most were barely
qualified or were substitutes for existing products. The above situation, as many would
say, is a "greenhouse" for Japanese drug companies.
Reich does not totally reject the protectionist interpretation as a way of
understanding this "greenhouse." He does point out that the government protected its
domestic market from direct foreign investments. 18 Nonetheless, he does not say this
policy-which has benefited other industrial sectors, too-was a major influence on the
drug industry in Japan. An obvious fact is that these companies, though having grown
large, did not sell many of their products overseas, as is the case with companies in other
sectors. According to the JPMA's report, from 1970 to 1997 the MHW approved 929
NCEs, among which nearly two thirds were sold solely in Japan (JPMA 2001: 28). In
other words, Japanese firms did have a chance to sell their drugs to overseas, but they did
not; even after deregulation allowed U.S. companies to import their products into Japan,
most Japanese companies chose to stay in their home market.
Thus it is important to understand why Japan's drug industry is not as aggressive as
its other businesses, and I will point out two characteristics that contribute to this. The
first is the presence of a strong and vibrant marketing network that is directly linked to
production. All major companies in Japan have their own wholesalers and sales networks,
a situation that prevents latecomers from breaking into the market. Production cannot be
separated from sales. This marketing orientation has its historical origins back in the era
18 For example, until the early 1970s, direct foreign investment in and imports to Japan were restricted.
This policy indirectly helped Japan's drug companies acquire the technology they were lacking.
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of the Meiji Reformation, and is also tied to the origins of Japan's pharmaceutical
industry's origins in drug trading (Odagiri and Goto 1996; table 3.4). Most major
producers maintain their own sales departments and sales networks, which also deal with
foreign products. In addition, many drug trading companies turned to importing new
drugs and then establishing the production capacity to manufacture generic drugs.
Benefited by the unimproved patent law, these companies chose to focus on profiting
from marketing competition. Both types of companies gave rise to a complicated
marketing system that distributes drugs and shares benefits with everyone in the network.
Table 3.4 Developmental Paths of Major Drug Makers in
Twentieth-Century Japan
Development paths Name of Companies
Wholesaler of kanbo and Takeda, Shionogi,
traditional herbs--wholesaler of Tanabe, Fujisawa
Western medicine-drug maker
Government-sponsored Dainippon seiyaku, Maruishi seiyaku,
manufacturers Teikoku seiyaku, Tokyo yakuhin
New drug manufacturers Sankyo, Daiichi, Nihon sinyaku,
Morisita seiyaku, Banyu seiyaku
Importers and manufacturers Tomoda seiyaku, Torii yakuhin
Source: Tatsuno Takashi 2001:109.
The second characteristic of Japan's drug environment is so-called "physician
centralism" (yisichusin shugi). In Japan it was physicians, not pharmacists, who bought
and sold drugs. Although there are pharmacists and pharmacies, most dispensary work is
done by physicians, especially those who work for the clinics that are still the major
medical providers in Japan. This phenomenon also has a historical basis. During the Meiji
Era, Western-trained physicians were the only group of medical professionals presenting
a style that combined intellectualism and elitism. Since the foundation of the Japan
Medical Association (JMA) in 1874, physicians had formed a powerful profession.
Physicians are everywhere: they are professors and researchers in universities and
teaching hospitals, policy makers in the government, and, of course, healers of body and
spirit. Critic Mizumaki Chusei has pointed out that the JMA (2003), as the collective
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representation of Japanese physicians, has three faces: academia, policy and political
manipulation. Furthermore, a good relationship with the Liberal Democratic Party and
heavy involvement in local elections made the JMA the strongest lobbying group. By
excluding or ignoring the other medical professions, it controls knowledge and the
benefits from it.
The area of pharmaceuticals is no exception. Among physicians, pharmacists were
never regarded clinical professionals, though some may think of pharmacy as an
academic discipline. Although an attempt known as yiyakubungyo was made to separate
dispensing from prescribing by physicians, this policy was strongly suppressed by
physicians and remained almost functionless. 19 Though recognized in the West as
belonging to a medical profession, pharmacists in Japan did not really enjoy equal status
under the law. This situation has its historical roots: as Tatsuno Takashi laments, "Unlike
Europe, where pharmacy and its education were generated from the apprenticeship in the
guild, their development in Japan present a different path" (2001:140).
Since physicians prescribe and dispense most drugs, they profit from this business
by the price differences in the drugs they dispense. Because the reimbursement scheme
for physicians' service fees under the NHI is undervalued, physicians rely heavily on the
"pharmaceutical margin" (yakka saeki) for their income. According to health insurance
law, physicians there are reimbursed for prescribed drugs by insurers based on the drug
list prices set by the government and reported by drug companies. However, this list price
is not the one by which traders sell drugs to physicians. In order to secure the largest
price difference, physicians ask drug companies to lower the sale price as much as they
can. As a result, an increasing gap between drug list prices and the price paid by doctors
is created. Odagiri and Goto report that such yakka saeki was estimated by the MHW to
be worth 1.3 trillion yen in 1987, nearly a quarter of the total payments by patients and
the fund for drugs prescribed by the doctors and hospitals (1996: 244-246). Although this
problem has been around since the 1950s and some attempts were made to resolve it in
the 1980s, nobody but the JMA and drug companies can decide the suitable (list) price for
each drug.
At the local level, what makes the marriage of physicians and drug companies
possible is a special group called puropa. Derived from the English term "propaganda,"
the function ofpuropa is to ask physicians to use their company's drugs, or if they
already do, to use them more. Although in the United States we can find the counterpart
19 ~Yiyakubungyo was brought up during the American occupation by General McArthur and conditional
agreement was obtained, with hesitation from the JMA. However, too many "exceptions" resulted in this
policy going nowhere; over 90 percent of dispensed prescriptions were still made by physicians.
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ofpuropa in medical company representatives, 20 in Japan puropa have a different focus,
even following the introduction of a licensing system regulating them in 1997.21 Puropa
are hired by drug companies to maintain and expand their marketing networks and are
more like salespersons than purely information providers. As in other sectors,
salespersons usually do their best to please their customers. However, what make puropa
different is that physicians are their only customers, and they are difficult to please. Thus
the basic task of puropa is to build up a good relationship with physicians in the areas
they are responsible for. Their work begins as early as the time when these physicians are
still residents. To fulfill these future customers' personal needs, puropa do everything for
them, such as copying papers, buying textbooks, bringing lunches, sponsoring after-work
gatherings and holiday activities, taking care of physicians' family members, arranging
visits and overseas trips, and of course, holding conferences where their drugs can be
promoted. As portrayed in Yamasaki Toyoko's famous novel Siroikyoto (The Giant Ivy
Tower, 1965), puropa are young, attractive women aggressive enough to be willing to
sleep with their customers to obtain greater sales for their drugs.
The above social foundations have created a complicated network consisting of
drug producers, wholesalers, dealers, and physicians. It is not merely a marketing system,
but a system of interpersonal relationships. Only by understanding this network can we
see the basis of the over-consumption of pharmaceuticals in Japan. There are three
consequences. First, before intervention by the MHW, the Japanese in general had to pay
higher prices for drugs than people in other countries. Although it is hard to find a basis
on which a fair comparison can be made because of the different dosages Japanese people
consume, Reich cites a report from 1982 indicating that drug prices in Japan were
"significantly above" those in Switzerland, West Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, and
France (1990: 132). Second, the volume consumed is increasing. Since the drug sales
margin became the main income of local practitioners, the more drugs they prescribe, the
more they earn. Doctors tend to dispense large amounts of drugs, more than patients need,
to increase their income. The third consequence of the over-consumption is a high
turnover rate in drugs. Policy analyst L.G Thomas III notes Japanese doctors' "brand
disloyalty" behavior: unlike British physicians, whose brand loyalty allows British drug
firms to afford the extravagant cost of developing a drug with a long product life,
Japanese physicians prefer the latest and most expensive product, resulting in a fast
20 On the subject of the culture of pharmaceutical sales practices in the United States, Michael J. Oldani
provides a pioneering but excellent ethnographic account. See Oldani 2004.
21 This system consists of examinations for people who want to be medical representatives. They are
required to have basic knowledge of medicine and medical administration, such as information on packing,
drug policies and regulations, and requirements for post-marketing surveillance reports.
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turnover rate. The "life cycle" of drugs launched in Japan was only five years in the
1990s, compared to fifteen in the United States and twenty in United Kingdom (Thomas
2001: 65, 106). Although there are many factors contributing this phenomenon, we
should not forget the effect of the marketing network. In reality, physicians are loyal to
the network that brings them these products. In order to keep drug circulation active,
companies have to develop new products to make physicians satisfied, even if these
"second generation" drugs have only minor differences from their precursors.
As part of the social fabric, this marketing network is not closed to local and small
companies, but it is closed to those companies not familiar with it. As part of the
domestic drug industry, every company had its own network that does not necessarily
overlap or compete with others. A firm specializing in gastro drugs will not step into the
field of asthma. For them, the most important concern may not be improving their
products but keeping their marketing territory. The market decides and ensures the
survival of a drug company. In contrast, for foreign companies it is definitely not a
system of free competition. As Maurer suggests, they have to know the rules and build up
their own networks. It is reported that some international brands started to establish their
own subsidiaries in Japan after the bar for foreign companies was removed. However,
many of them soon found that marketing in Japan was difficult and time-consuming.
Worse, they could not create crucial relationships with the doctors and hospitals as well
as their Japanese counterparts could (Odagiri and Goto 1996: 246-247). This difficulty
cannot be understood by the simple explanation of protectionism. In the following section
I will examine the cultural roots of this network and the role government plays in it.
Trust as the Cultural Foundation of the Drug Marketing Network
Following this discussion of the drug distribution system in Japan, this section starts
by looking at innovation, considered to be the core of any industry. Compared to the
standard of drug innovation in the United States, discussed in Chapter 2, Japan's drug
innovation is primitive, wasteful, uncompetitive, and inefficient. These differences are
apparent as Thomas compares the pharmaceutical industries in Japan and United
Kingdom in terms of their "ecosystems" (Chapter 3). The results are summarized in table
3.5. According to Thomas, Japan's "pathologies" include weak research and development
abilities, a loose regulatory mechanism for innovation, and non-professional marketing
strategies. All result in Japanese firms being behind their competitors.
This explanation implies that if global companies can build their own distribution
networks and apply the same marketing skills, they should beat every local firm due to
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their superior innovation ability. From this perspective, it seems to global drug companies
that there is no question that, wherever they live, patients deserve the best drugs, namely,
their products. However, the fact is that even after the deregulation of importation,
foreign companies did not conquer Japan's market as expected. I quote a mid-1980s
British industrialist: " do not believe that selling in Japan is a matter of price.... If you
sell into Japan, by and large Japanese only buy from you if there is no Japanese
alternative. If there is a Japanese alternative, they will match you on price, no matter what.
It is a matter of national pride" (John Harvey-Jones 1986, as quoted in Cohen 1998:
79-80).
Table 3.5 Comparative Ecosystems of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers:
Japan versus the United Kingdom
United Kingdom Japan
R&D global Local
university science strong Weak
efficacy regulation stringent Lenient
pricing regulation innovation-driven drop with no
discrimination
Marketing evidence-based service-based
Result breakthrough drugs Imitative
Source: Adapted from Thomas 2001, Fig.4.2.
To understand this situation, it is helpful to again bring up Maurer's advice that
Japan has unique requirements that companies should pay attention to and respect. In
other words, customer characteristics are always important, even in the field of medical
care. Schweitzer points out that although the pharmaceutical market is determined mostly
by professionals, it does not mean that the customers have no way to express their
"demand," which is distinct from the professionally determined idea of "need." As
medical economist Stuart Schweitzer points out: "market demand... entails a desire and
willingness to pay for a product or service.... The difference between demand and need is
more than semantic. It is important in differentiating between what 'is,' or what 'will be,'
on the one hand, and what 'ought to be,' on the other" (1997: 73-74).
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Putting aside the supply side discussion, we need to know Japanese customers' real
demands-that is, their preferences on drugs. The Japanese's insistence on their own
products may simply be a banal form of nationalism; however, I would like to suggest
that cultural factors are involved in drug customers' behavior. Following the formation of
connections among those who deliver prescriptive drugs, in this section I will argue that
trust, as a basic concept that builds personal relationships in Japan, is the key to the logic
that glues together the social fabric I described in the previous section. The question at
stake is, if pharmaceuticals are not purely commodities on which a simple
seller-consumer relationship is established, on what relationship can this style of business
be achieved?
In the European-U.S. context there has been a range of literature addressing trust
and its social meanings, among which Trust and Power is pioneering (Luhmann 1979).
From a theoretical perspective Niklas Luhmann argues that trust is a social relationship
subject to its own set of rules. It occurs within a framework of social interaction and
personality. In situations when we have to act in spite of uncertainty and risk, trust means
"to behave as though the future were certain" (10). Thus, as Piotr Sztompka (1999: 25)
points out, trust can be defined as "a bet about the future contingent actions of others."
Along with this trajectory varieties of trusts can be developed for different targets (the
objects we trust) and substances (the content of the relationships); all of them are woven
into the broad, collective social network called culture.
However, here I will look at trust from an "upside-down" perspective using Francis
Fukuyama's well-known analysis (1995). Starting with various distinct cultures in the
world, Fukuyama discusses Italy, Taiwan and Hong Kong (as Han Chinese), Japan, Korea,
Germany, France, and United States. I appreciate this approach for two reasons, one
general and the other specific. Generally, this study has a clear focus at the national level;
Fukuyama aims to emphasize the cultural milieu where all social relationships are
generated and shaped by the flow of politics and history. The second reason is related to
the theme of the present study. The sociological literature presumes the concept of risk
assessment and management, from which individual trust is built. Although this may be
true of health discourses in the United States, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is not the case
in Japan. As will be shown in this section, the Japanese appreciate natural ways of
maintaining health (yojo, "nurturing lives"). The less intervention in the natural course of
bodily recovery there is, the closer it is to yojo. Furthermore, they build their faith on
drugs based on the network by which they are delivered. Therefore, "safety," rather than
"efficacy," becomes the first priority for Japanese people who consume pharmaceuticals
and for the government that regulates them.
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From Fukuyama's viewpoint, Japan is a high-trust society (Chapter 14 and 15). In
contrast to countries where there is trust among family members or blood relations, the
Japanese have a complicated yet self-governing culture of institutions of trust. The
government is not the only thing they respect. Other institutions include student
associations at school, companies that provide life-long employment, and after-work
social clubs; anyone who joins a social group will be protected and has a reasonable share
of the responsibility and rights (the notion of iemoto). In fact, the Japanese are fully
aware of the importance of this concept. For them, shinyo (trust) is the deep feeling that
one seeks to feel before entering into a relationship.
Medicine is a field where shinyo is of particular importance. Its historical origins, as
ethicist Kimura Rihito points out, can be found as early as the formation of modem
institutions (Kimura 1991). In the tradition of Japanese medical practice, physicians were
cast as conduits ofin, the Confucian ethics of benevolence, and this became the center of
the medical relationship. The appropriate way of healing a person under such relationship
is characterized as "the art ofjin" (jinjutsu). Physicians were required to act with
benevolence toward their patients and were responsible for their welfare as part of a trust
relationship. As expected, this trust relationship was achieved in a patriarchal manner:
physicians fulfilled their responsibility by acting in an authoritative way. Even so, as a
group the Japanese are used to this. As the famous psychiatrist Doi Takeo explains, there
is a unique concept by which Japanese to develop relationships with others, which he
refers to by the Japanese term amae (Doi 1971). Doi argues that amae is based on an
infant's relationship with its mother. Although it is not limited to family relationships,
when it occurs in other relationships it is perceived in terms of the relationship between a
parent and a child. Amae involves a "trustful dependence" through which nothing bad
will happen if one person is dependent upon another person who has good feelings for
him or her. Doi also points out that amae involved conscious awareness; that is, Japanese
are consciously aware of those upon whom they depend.
The idea of amae can be nicely applied to the physician-patient relation. According
to Kimura's interpretation, the patient's relationship to the physician is analogous to that
between a child and the parent, where the latter acts to do what is best for the former.
Many criticize Japanese medical practice because doctors take too little time with each
patient. Indeed, a meeting of less than five minutes would seem to be too brief to develop
a comprehensive dialogue by which a sound prescription could be written; however, we
should take into account the social function of a clinic in terms of its accessibility in a
community. Most Japanese clinics serve neighborhoods where they are familiar with
everyone. In turn, the high accessibility of clinics allows patients as many and as frequent
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visits to their doctors as time allows. Not all brief patient-doctor meetings are functional
or necessary to curing diseases; they are also social, and they maintain patients' contact
with professional who know their bodily condition well.22 Also, as in other Japanese
relationships, patients have their own will, yet these needs always have to be considered
as part of the dynamics of the relationship, which Kimura calls "related autonomy." The
ultimate goal for a medical relationship is a harmonious situation of wa, the essence of
Japanese spirit.
Given this understanding, we can now consider why some "backward" parts still
exist in the field of medical care in Japan. For example, until the early 1990s, many
Japanese still utilized the so-called "stored drug" system (okigusuri). It has a long
tradition originated from Toyama, where local traders sold boxes containing frequently
used drugs together with brief instructions. They distributed these boxes (or sometimes
bags) to families so that they could take the proper medications whenever they had minor
problems. The vendors would supply the amount of drugs to be taken and clear the
balance with their customers every year or six months. The "stored drug" system was
widely used and formed a national sales network lasting well beyond the end of World
War II; even after that, it was active in some areas for domestically produced OTC drugs.
To answer why the Japanese still supported this system, we have to remember the
relation of amae. Toyama vendors were not purely salespersons. The book The Medicine
of Toyama: Pioneers in Marketing (Endo 1993) carefully documents how these vendors
built up trust relationships with locals, such as via acquaintance with local dialects or
never claiming money before customers mentioned it. Once the relationship was built; it
lasted forever. This model can also explain why many small companies are able to
survive with only one or two generic drugs, and are pleased to do so. "Why don't they
have any intention of improving the drug and expanding their company?" I once asked an
insider. "Well, if you understand the Japanese," he said, smiling, "you will find that, for
these people, the drug is not a business per se. It is a service, relationship, and network, in
which they situate their lives and feel comfortable. They are happy with this lifestyle
22 An interesting and often discussed example of the traditional physician-patient relationship is sharei,
the reward for receiving medical care. This is widely considered by outsiders as both distinctive and
negative, because physicians should not accept any reward other than their deserved payment for service;
however, the Japanese have long taken sharei for granted. If we understand this behavior as part of a social
network bounded by the spirit of reciprocity, we find it is just a modem variation and extension of this
social relationship. The price of a reward may not be crucial, but the social meaning it carries counts. As the
same researchers realize, sharei is everywhere in medical practice, ranging from a large amount of money
to a bottle of salad oil or whisky for a bonkure (a traditional Japanese holiday) occasion. The gift-like
sharei, just as in tradition social settings, smoothes the relationship between the physician as a craftsman
and the patient who needs help.
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unless someone pushes them to change."
The advent of the modern state imposed an institutional shell on these relationships.
As discussed in Part I of this chapter, the NHI unified various welfare schemes and made
the state the ultimate insurer for all citizens. Under this patriarchal and nationalist
structure, the amae tradition was preserved by the practice of community-based care,
with a non-profit spirit and an elite-led essence. Two unique concepts are introduced here
as salient examples of the government's mentality of intervention. The first is the idea of
yiryohojin, meaning "juridical person of medicine." Unlike in the United States, it is
illegal to operate healthcare facilities on a for-profit basis in Japan. When modern
institutions grew too big to be controlled by a single person, corporate-style organizations
called yiryohojin were introduced to solve these problems while allowing institutions to
retain their non-profit essence. This is done even though in reality these yiryohojin
operate with the same financial incentives as a for-profit enterprise.
Another example is the regulatory restriction on the transfers of shonin. Shonin are
manufacturing approvals granted by the government to local traders to make sure they
take responsibility for a certain product. For foreign companies, it is an unreasonable
system, since this approval has no relationship to patents and similar proprietary rights
held by firms. Even a simple change to a new import requires submission of data and
information and the acquisition of a new shonin. The revision of the Pharmaceutical
Affair Law in 1983 allowed foreign manufacturers to hold shonin in their names when
importers in Japan imported their products under other certificates called kyoka;
nonetheless, only firms that previously had either licensed production in Japan or
marketed in Japan through Japanese firms holding shonin could take advantage of this. In
short, as the gatekeeper of its citizens' health, Japan trusts no foreigners. For the MHW, it
is entirely appropriate to require the manufacturer or importer, who is within the Japanese
jurisdiction, to bear all responsibility for efficacy, safety and quality of a product in order
to protect the health and safety of the Japanese people. In that sense the present
legislative framework is most efficient, reasonable, and practical for the purposes of
protecting the health and safety of the general public.
From this perspective we know why safety, not efficacy, is always the primary
concern in Japanese drug regulations. For the Japanese, health is not an ideal status to
pursue; in contrast, it is an effort made to compliment the natural course of life. This
notion is realized by the state and reinforced through regulations. Sociologist Nakane
Chie (1970) points out that Japan as a whole is a segmentary system consisting of clusters
of hierarchies, each of which has a clear boundary to its territory (Chapter 3). Thus, in the
field of healthcare we see players such as the MHW, JMA and JPMA fighting against
168
each other over various issues. Nonetheless, the distinctions between their territories,
though clear, are dynamic; under the scheme of the Japanese state they are all aware of
being members of a group when confronting foreign entities. In this sense the
government is recognized as an apparatus for ensuring the absolute safety of its people.
Numerous measures are taken for this purpose, and this has constructed a
self-contained system in which risk is out of the question. Every foreign firm should have
a "guarantor" in Japan, and everything foreign must be checked by a trustworthy process.
It is with a similar mentality that a "Japanese-style" clinical trial is conducted. Before the
ICH, clinical trials in Japan were comparative studies with existing products controlled
by a few professors at top universities. Cases were collected from various places under
the assignment of the senior professor in charge. Although few physicians involved in the
trials knew the details of the study, they were concerned for the safety of their patients
throughout the clinical trial. On the other hand, the practice of physicians at the trial sites
was seldom checked and qualified; the drug companies, though they sponsored these
trials and took care of all administrative work, were not allowed to question these
physicians, because this would damage their professional dignity and break the trust
relationship. In short, it was a system in which trust was placed in individuals, rather than
evidence, to ensure the safety of an unknown product.
Finally I shall introduce the way this system evolved. As described in Chapter 2, the
FDA elevated its standards for drug approval after several disasters in which mistakes
were made and unsafe drugs were approved. It was the same in Japan, where drugs that
harmed patients triggered the evolution of the regulatory system. However, there were
differences in the consequences that followed. Instead of the higher and tougher standards
employed by its U.S. counterpart, the MHW was conservative in the way it improved its
regulatory system. First, in terms of administration, the MHW slowed down the
registration process for new drugs and added more mechanisms that increased the
credibility of each review. Second, it required stricter measures for the reporting of
adverse effects. Even so, the patient harm from drugs did not cease. In contrast, according
to Takano Tatsuo (1981), from the late 1967 to the late 1970s such cases increased with
the increasing consumption of pharmaceuticals. The more cases were identified, the more
intensive were the measures that were introduced.
The consequence of Japan's institutional changes, compared to the United States,
was the establishment of an institute for monitoring adverse drug reactions. A
semi-governmental fund was first founded in 1979 to provide benefits to sufferers of
adverse pharmaceutical reactions that occurred in spite of appropriate use of medicines,
and this was enlarged into a new institute, the Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and
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Research (OPSR), after two colossal disasters: transfusion-caused AIDS (1985-1992) and
herpes drug-caused sudden deaths (1993-1996). For the former, the reform included the
research and development of medicines and medical devices, and for the latter, full
responsibility for technical reviews of all new drugs. In 1997, the OPSR began new
activities around clinical trial guidance and compliance reviews for new drug approval
applications in line with government efforts to improve the evaluation of new drugs.
Though it resembles the FDA, the OPSR has a different orientation, as stated in its
objectives:
Relief of adverse drug reactions suffered by providing benefits including medical
expenses, personal damage pensions and bereaved family pensions. Enhancement
of people's health by providing services for the promotion of technological
development and services to improve the quality, efficacy and safety of medicines
and medical devices. (OPSR website)
Its effects can be seen on new drug reviews. When user fees were instituted in the United
States in 1992, the FDA successfully shortened the NDA review time from twenty-three
months in 1993 to fourteen months in 1996. However, the reviewing time in Japan has in
fact been prolonged to as long as forty-four months in some cases. The case of Vioxx, as
reviewed earlier, exemplifies the necessity of this delay. With its tough safety-checking
process, the OPSR can satisfy the Japanese in many ways. Yet it is certain that global
companies would prefer that these barriers set by the national government in the name of
health and welfare were not present.
PART III
HEALTHCARE IN TAIWAN: POLITICAL PROMISE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Promoting the Health Miracle, Promoting Taiwan
Just a week before the 2004 World Heath Assembly, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) chose "Health of Nations" as the theme of its
fourth international forum. Since its launch in 2000, this forum has been a summit that
brings together business and labor leaders, civil society figures, government ministers,
and leaders of international organizations to discuss key issues of the twenty-first century.
This was the first time that it had chosen a topic other than economics. In conjunction
with this first-ever meeting of health ministers was the initiation of a three-year project
focusing on measuring, analyzing and improving the performance of health systems. All
this makes this forum a must-attend event that attracts both government officials and
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pharmaceutical industry leaders.
Among the few Asian speakers invited, Kim Dae-jung, Nobel Peace Prize winner
and former President of South Korea, was certainly the most well known. He was the
keynote speaker addressing "East Asia in the Twenty-First Century." However, it was
Chang Hong-Jen from Taiwan's BNHI who provided the forum audience with examples
of competitiveness for the future. Indeed, according to the UK-based Economist
Intelligence Unit, in 2000, among all developed and newly industrialized countries,
Taiwan's healthcare performance was second in quality only to Sweden's. Among
Taiwan's healthcare achievements, its NHI program is the most obvious.
Chang appeared on a panel discussion on "e-health," an emerging concept
concerning the growing use by patients of the internet to gather information on diseases,
medications and treatments. Chang's report, titled "Where Are We in IT [information
technology]: Taiwan's National Health Insurance," presented an important aspect of the
BNHI's recent project of recording medical information on smartcards (credit card-sized
devices embedded with small microprocessor memory chips). He explained, "Using
German technology, we implemented a C3.3 billion investment to equip Taiwan's 23
million people and healthcare workers with smartcards. This program has already saved
three times the amount invested." As expected, his words moved the audience. Daniel
Viel, the director of the French industry periodical Pharmaceutiques and the moderator of
the panel, suggested afterwards that Taiwan would be the first country that to make such a
system workable (Taiwan implemented this system later in 2004). Of course, Chang's
presentation style was unforgettable. In his early fifties, Chang had already served as a
senior M.D.-bureaucrat, and had a great deal of government experience. He is one of the
few Taiwanese medical elites who chose to pursue a career in public health in the early
1980s and one of the promising officials promoted to deal with foreign issues.
Furthermore, he is talented at rhetoric. His Harvard-cultivated English nicely matches the
sharp ideas he delivers, giving listeners the refreshing feeling of a sip of hot Taiwanese
Oolong tea.
Even so, good speeches do not consist of empty words alone. Chang used a half of
his presentation to introduce Taiwan's NHI, the fundamental framework that contributes
to the success of Taiwan's public health. It is an exemplary combination of a socialistic
program with the spirit of capitalism. As discussed previously, before Taiwan's NHI was
established, 41 percent of the Taiwanese population was uninsured, and the majority of
these were children under fourteen and adults older than sixty-five, whose need for
healthcare was greatest. Yet political tensions pushed President Lee Teng-Hui to decree
that the NHI begin operation by March 1995; its hasty inauguration followed amidst
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chaos and confusion. However, the public warmly supported the outcome of this program.
As famous writer and human rights activist Po Yang commented in an often quoted line,
it was "the first time in our history that people dare to be sick, can afford to be sick, and
be sick without any worries. They can accept whatever diseases that attack them."
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Indeed, from its birth Taiwan's NHI was the focus of experts in health policy,
especially at about the same time that President Clinton's ambitious plan to provide
comprehensive health insurance to all Americans lay in ruins. Showing the picture of
Taipei 101, the tallest skyscraper in the world, in the title slide, Chang's presentation
adeptly pointed out two sources for the increasing rate of public satisfaction with
NHI--from 39 percent at the beginning of the program to 60 percent after six months and
70 percent or higher thereafter. Its bold promise of mandatory enrolment (over 99 percent
of population was covered) and the wide range of coverage (no gate-keeper system)
explain this welcome. On the financial side, the NHI's performance is bright. The
national expenditures on health did not rise significantly with the addition of this burden.
These expenditures consume from 5.27 to 5.29 percent of Taiwan's GDP, a number
lower than many benchmark OECD countries that provide the same kinds of services.23
This is worth noticing, because we can compare it with the performance of the United
States, whose per capita health expenditure is over 2.5 times greater at 12.9 percent, as
shown in fig. 3.4. The BNHI seems to have achieved an impossible goal. It claimed that it
was able to establish an affordable, universally accessible, high public satisfaction
framework with an acceptable quality of care. The story of Hu related at the beginning of
23 The reason for this lower rate, as Chang summarized, is that Taiwan's NHI exercises a precise
mechanism of budget control characterized by cost sharing for ambulatory and inpatient care and drugs, a
comprehensive benefits package, and a fee-for-service approach, all under a global budget.
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Chapter 1 is testimony to this promise.
Of course, there are many factors that contribute to this. Some factors are
institutional, such as the bargaining power of the BNHI in dealing with global
pharmaceutical companies, and a free market on the health delivery side that allows
competition among health providers. Also there are social and cultural factors in
Taiwanese medical practice. For example, Taiwanese physicians work very hard for a
relatively low physician's fees.24 In addition, it is Taiwanese custom for families to
provide daily care and company to hospitalized family members. Finally, the Japanese
style of doctor-patient relationship can be found on this island as well. The traditional
image of physicians is authoritative, and that of patients is compliant; a trust-like relation
shapes the needs and demands of medicine. These factors result in a relatively stable
environment for medicine, upon which the NHI was put into practice.
Even so, the Taiwanese government plays a role even more crucial than Japan's
does, specifically in introducing the NHI scheme, and we see this intention in Chang's
presentation. Given the fact that Taiwan just underwent transformations of
democratization, the government's ability to execute this program, and its past
accomplishments in health policy, show its competence in this area. Chang knew well
that from its beginning the NHI was not just a health program but a political promise,
leaving behind the previous corrupt regime and building a new statehood on the ability to
improve the people's welfare. Yeh Chin-Chuan, the first CEO of the BNHI, emphasized
this objective: "We all hope that coming generations can live in a fair and just society,
forever free from disease, fear, and menace. This is precisely the objective of the NHI:
equal opportunity medical care and the highest ideals of individual and public health for
future generations in the Republic of China [Taiwan]." It seemed that Chang was proud
of this vision and of the fact that it was triumphantly fulfilled.
However, these accomplishments were not enough. In addition to demonstrating its
competence to its citizens, the Taiwanese government was concerned about making its
achievements recognized by other countries. In this sense, the NHI was not a political
promise but an agenda for health that made Taiwan visible in the global context. Thus, in
addition to spreading the "gospel" of the NHI, Chang was an active participant in other
presentations. For example, when Per Wold-Olsen, president of Merck's Human Health
Europe, Middle East and Africa division, reported that the Internet has been critical in
providing up-to-date information to AIDS and osteoporosis patients, Chang added that
Taiwan has promoted public education on the control and prevention of AIDS through the
24 Taiwanese general practitioners usually work more than 12 hours a day, from 9 AM to 10 PM, and
see as many patients as possible at a rate of about US$3- 10 per patient per visit.
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Internet since 1997 and was the first Asian country to use this new technology to
publicize medical information.
This desire for recognition was strongly displayed in Taiwanese newspapers, which
cast Chang's appearance more heavily with a different focus than the international media.
For example, one newspaper emphasized the seemingly minor point that Chang was
introduced as being from "Taiwan" instead of "Chinese Taipei," the name used in some
formal international settings. Some newspapers focused on Chang's aggressive promotion
of Taiwan's success in the past, which seemed irrelevant to his presentation. According to
them, Chang reminded the audience of the panel on infectious disease control of Taiwan's
pioneering experience in malaria eradication in the 1950s and 1960s, when Taiwan was
still a member of the WHO-in 1962, with the help of the WHO and other international
organizations, Taiwan claimed to be the first developing country to eradicate this
insidious disease. These reports give the impression that Chang was not promoting the
NHI but Taiwan itself. As one newspaper report concluded, "In just over a week [at] the
World Health Assembly, Taiwan was able to make its presence felt in the development of
health systems. What made this global exposure more meaningful was the ministerial
meeting, which was held at the same time as the forum."
Confused by the complicated relations between health and politics demonstrated in
local media, I talked to Chang Hong-Jen one day after a lecture at the National
Yang-Ming University, his alma mater. He quickly clarified two points. First, it was
indeed the first time the OECD invited speakers from Taiwan, and it was the Taiwanese
government's efforts that made this happened. Because Taiwan's sovereign status is
politically repressed by the PRC, the point was not whether its NHI was important
enough to deserve a presentation; rather, Taiwan has always been promoting itself to
confirm its existence. Chang recalled and explained the process. Although still not a
member of the OECD, Taiwan is a specific observer in its Global Forum on Competition.
Thus as soon as the Taiwanese government knew the theme of the forum, it strongly
sought a chance to present its health insurance program. Because of the OECD's political
commitment that no Taiwanese ministers would be allowed to attend the meetings, Chang,
who had just left the position of Deputy Director General of Taiwan's DOH, was chosen
for this job. "So you see I was there as a compromise," he concluded as if it was nothing
special.
The second yet equally important point is the topic Taiwan chose to present. Chang
emphasized repeatedly that "political" reasons notwithstanding, Taiwan's NHI deserves
global visibility. For him and for Taiwan, international conferences are tricky. They are
not places where people meet and exchange ideas. For Taiwan the conference was an
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arena and Taiwan was the gladiator; every appearance was a cruel battle to be noticed and
remembered. Thus, Chang told me, "You have to be strong on some topics to earn
people's attention." Of course, he did not reject the reality that sometimes opportunities
for visibility are not given for the best topic or at the best time, yet when they arise,
Taiwan has to do its best. "I am happy that I know Taiwan's health insurance is one of the
best we can contribute to the world," Chang said. "Taiwan does not have many things that
it can share with advanced countries, and I think health insurance is one of them, like our
semi-conductors, monitors, and bikes. Therefore, I never feel a lack of confidence when I
present our program to them."
Since Taiwan cannot participate as a country, its appearances have to be achieved
by individuals like Chang. As a medical technocrat he knows clearly what he is able to
present to the world and what is possible. Malaria eradication, though old, is one item
that is presentable. However what surprised me was the fact this episode was not only
history but are also a vivid memory in people's minds that helped construct the dignity of
the state. When asked why he changed his career from medicine to public health, Chang
referred this period as the "golden age" of Taiwan's health policy. It was the time when
internationally reputed scholar of public health Cheng Kung-Pei (KP Cheng), who was a
senior WHO consultant, led this field in Taiwan. "It was a time of victory. We were full of
energy and thought that we could do everything," Change recalled excitedly. As he spoke,
Chang gave me a sense that what he was talking about was not Taiwan's health but the
island itself, making me to think of health policy as something other than simply
improving people's health or welfare.
A couple of questions need to be asked: 1) with regard to the issue of drugs, I
wonder whether Taiwan has formed as "presentable" a policy in this field as it has in
health insurance; 2) concerning individual agency in making heath policy decisions, I
wonder what medical elites like Chang think of their careers-do they serve people's
health needs as well as the excellence and advancement of Taiwan, and are these goals
achieved without conflict? 3) concerning the visibility of Taiwan through its health
performance, I wonder if there exists a drug policy that could serve the needs of the
Taiwanese people, and what social and cultural factors might limit its achievement. In the
rest of this section, I will discuss these issues in order to enrich our understanding of
health in Taiwan.
An "Imperfect Copy" of Japan? Taiwan's Drug Industry and its Failed Attempt to
Catch Up
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Let us return to the social characteristics of Japan's health care. If we look deeply
into the social fabric upon which Japan and Taiwan's NHIs operate, we find astonishing
similarities in medical culture between the two countries. Like in Japan, Taiwanese
physicians dominate all healthcare affairs. They are social elites who have survived a
series of cruel competitions starting in kindergarten. Most of them have the same life path.
They are born in middle-class families, many of which are physician families, and have
received the best education afforded in the areas of their residence. General examinations
for entrance into high schools and universities confirm their superior intelligence, and
medical schools, as the first priority for those who are interested in medicine and life
sciences, are the destination where these talented individuals meet their future colleagues
and shape their imaginations about the business they are going to serve. Considered the
best on the best, these medical graduates are the expected leaders in medical care and in
society.
This idea was reflected in the landscape of Taiwan's medical environment up until
the mid-1990s. It was characterized by numerous clinics, which provided a wide range of
services to their community. In 1994 there were 74.41 medical institutions for every
100,000 people, and of these about 95 percent were clinics. The real number was larger
than this, since small private hospitals were in reality extensions of clinics and controlled
by individual physicians. Most physicians chose to establish their own clinics, usually at
their homes, after receiving resident training. This type of career is called kaiyeyi, literally
meaning "doctor with his/her own operation." These small, single-handed clinics spread
everywhere, especially in urban areas, delivering the full gamut of primary care service to
their neighbors. When physicians felt the need for larger facilities, they enlarged their
clinics by adding more beds and spaces in the existing infrastructure. In Taiwan, hospitals
are defined as medical institutions with beds, but until recently, clinics were free to add
beds to "upgrade" themselves to small hospitals; these "hospitals" are bigger clinics
where physician is still the manager.
Another career track for medical graduates was to be hired by hospitals. Unlike with
hospitals in the United States, no open system is found in Taiwan. Dual practice in both
hospital and clinics is prohibited for physicians employed in hospitals. Lacking a
functional differentiation among different types of hospitals and a referral system, most
hospitals provide various services, from outpatient care and admissions to intensive care.
The salaried doctors working in these hospitals enjoy the advanced facilities and continue
their specialty training. However, there are tradeoffs in this pyramid of power/knowledge.
Salaried doctors have to keep competing with each other in order to be promoted to
higher, more powerful positions. As described in Ho Wen-Yung's popular novel Baisejuta
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(The Hospital, 1999), the inside of this "white ivy tower" is full of power struggles,
corruption and factional fighting.
No matter where these physicians choose to work, basically they are the only people
who determine which drugs should be prescribed to patients. Like in Japan, until very
recently the separation of drug dispensing did not exist in Taiwan. This was even more so
for kaiyeyi, most of whose income came from the sale of drugs. In this trading network,
we can easily find all the terms and behaviors that have been discussed previously. For
domestic drug companies, Taiwan has dealers who bring their products to hospitals and
clinics. Other dealers work for foreign companies importing drugs into Taiwan.
Alongside the wholesalers, companies have their own sales representatives (propa) to
promote their products directly to doctors. They do the same as their Japanese colleagues,
copying textbooks and papers for junior residents and tending to various personal needs
of senior visiting staff.
The direct consequence of this, as we might expect, are seen in drug prices. Due to
the single payer system introduced under the NHI scheme, Taiwanese physicians tend to
ask companies to lower the prices of their products in order to earn more from the
difference between the amount they pay and the amount paid by the BNHI. Taking the
antidepressant Sinzac for example, it is reported that a private hospital buys this drug at
$2.4 NTD (about $.07 U.S.) per dose, but the BNHI pays $41.5 NTD (about $1.22 U.S.).
There are mainly three areas of contention. First, when healthcare providers buy large
batches of medication, pharmaceutical companies give them discounts, but these are not
reflected in the fees charged to the BNHI. Second, general practitioners provide only
basic reports on total pharmaceutical use, rather than case-by-case reports, and there is a
gap between the amount paid by the BNHI for daily doses and the actual costs of the
pharmaceuticals. Third, healthcare providers use low-cost substitutes but charge the
BNHI for the high-cost originals. All this results in a difference even larger than Japan's
yakka saeki that is criticized as a "black hole" (yaojia heidong) of pharmaceutical costs.
The facts reviewed above might give the impression that Taiwan has copied the
way Japan developed its medical care, and this is not surprising: it was Japan that built
the modern medical institutions in Taiwan during its occupation of the island from 1895
to 1945. The influence from Japan did not wane when the KMT regime took over.
Taiwan's foundational medical institutions from before the war continued to be robust
and thoroughly disseminated into the Taiwanese's everyday lives.25 As the table 3.6
25 For example, Taiwan inherited the Japanese categorization that considers vitamins a drug and not a
nutrition supplement. The Japanese historically have used three criteria for regulating vitamins: the shape or
form of the product, whether a dosage is specified, and whether the manufacturer makes a health claim.
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shows, there are various time lags by which the major reforms were transferred from
Japan to Taiwan. If we consider pharmaceuticals as a part of an advanced industry, it is
easier to relate this impression to a broader framework, which Ezra F. Vogel calls
"waves of industrialization" (Vogel 1991). According to his interpretation, Japan, the
"late developer," resumed its industrialization efforts in the first decade after the end of
World War II and returned to its former status as the leading power in Asia. Yet over the
next three decades, four small, nearby "late late developer" states, of which Taiwan was
the leader, made their own breakthroughs. If this pattern of development can be applied
in the pharmaceutical sector, we could expect that with a similar medical environment,
Taiwan would enjoy the same development as Japan did in the 1960s.
Table 3.6 Major Reforms in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, Japan and
Taiwan
Year of introduction Japan Taiwan
NHI scheme 1961(1928) 1995
Mandatory clinical trials for pharmaceutical products 1968 1993
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) validation 1974 1982
Revision of Patent Law from process patent to entity 1975 1986
patent
Policy intervention on drug prices 1978 1998
Fund for the relief of adverse drug effects 1979 2000
Approval system for foreign-produced drugs 1983 1991
Dispensation separation 1986 1997
Clinical trail guidelines 1989 1993
ICH guidelines implementation 1991 1998
Source: compiled from various sources by the author.
Unfortunately, it did not. Up until the mid-1990s Taiwan was still considered a
country of generic drugs. According to the United Nations Industrial Development
organization (UNIDO), Taiwan is a category C2 country, recognized as one that produces
only generic drugs and not bulk pharmaceuticals (for the details on this categorization,
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According to the MHW, if any of these criteria are likely to provide the average person with the
understanding at the time of sale that the substance has a medicinal purpose, then it is classified as a drug.
see table 2.2). Its industry is composed predominately of small-scale generic
manufacturers, except for twenty-eight foreign-investor plants that formulate and produce
drug products. Although in the 1990s there were 406 registered manufacturers (producers
of non-Western products are excluded), the number of companies that had passed GMP
validation was few.
Fig. 3.5. Production, Exportation and Importation of Western
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Source: Adopted from Hsieh 1999, Fig. 3-1.
Considering this structure from a historical perspective, we can identify a
three-stage trend in the evolution of Taiwan's drug market and industry (fig.3.5). In the
first stage, from the 1960s to 1980, the volume of drugs consumed (indicated by the
importation figures) did not rapidly increase compared to the take-off of Taiwan's
economy. Although some foreign companies, mostly Japanese ones, established
subsidiaries in Taiwan, their numbers were few. The second stage is characterized by the
rapid increase in the consumption of drugs in the 1980s. In this decade the drug market
increased five-fold. Even so, Taiwan failed to develop any research and
development-based companies of its own. Because of the government's policy on foreign
investment and technology cooperation, the number of foreign pharmaceutical companies
increased form seventeen in 1977 to twenty-eight in 1989. These newcomers were mainly
100 percent Western-owned companies; they soon beat out their Japanese competitors.
Along with the increasing living standard and increasing need for high-quality
medical care, the drug market and the amount of importation both grew in the 1990s; yet
only foreign companies benefited from this. On the one hand, the implementation of
mandatory GMP validation in 1987 eliminated about 200 local companies by badly
weakening their competitive abilities. In addition, the surviving firms were not well




policy on drugs. While this policy mainly kept out more foreign companies, it did not
protect local ones. Thus only tough drug producers, such as Yung Shin, Tung Yang,
Standard, and CCPC, survived competition with foreigners in the big hospital and
medical center markets. It was reported in 1996 that only seven local producers had plans
for research and development.
What was worse for local companies was finding their niche in this
physician-dominated market. Although the Taiwanese NHI scheme has been criticized by
PhRMA for its reimbursement policy that favors local competitors-for example, both
high and low quality (i.e., not bioequivalent) generics that are reimbursed at prices near
the level of products made by research-based firms-the GMP companies know that
salaried physicians do not favor the high quality generic drugs made by local companies.
First of all, global competitors can afford a greater budget for the promotion of their
products, both branded and generic, than the locals can. More importantly, Taiwanese
physicians, especially those in big hospitals, simply distrust local products. As elites
practicing high-standard medical care, they tend to believe that local products are inferior,
and they are willing to "sacrifice" larger profit margins in order to maintain their
credibility with patients. On the other hand, although private hospitals and clinics prefer
local products, they would only choose those offered at the lowest price for the drugs
they need. For them, cost-benefit, not quality, is the first concern. Thus, as Hsieh
Shing-yen points out, even after the introduction of GMP validation, some small
companies that failed to produce high quality drugs only survived by a low prices and
flexible production strategies. They produced various types of drugs, from generic to
OTCs, and even herbal medicine, and changed their main products according to the needs
of the local market. Thus, in the 1990s some GMP companies collapsed after losing the
quality battle to global companies in hospitals and the price battle to small companies
(Hsieh 1999: 190-191).
Let me sum up this section. Despite many similarities with Japan, Taiwan's
pharmaceutical industry is weak. It has no research-based companies and even the
GMP-validated (now current GMP) companies are in danger of extinction. If Japan has
successfully created some companies that are strong enough to resist the West, Taiwan,
like an imperfect copy, has no idea what to do with itself in the era of globalization.
The Fragile Foundation of Trust and the Role of the Government in Health Policy
In this section I will discuss two interrelated characteristics that made Taiwan
develop so differently from Japan in the drug business. The first concerns the social
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foundation of trust. Jerry Chiu of Nomura Research Institute explains this difference in
terms the different mentalities toward drugs. While the Japanese rely as much as they can
on domestic products, the Taiwanese would like to use as many foreign products as
possible (Bio Era 2002). In other words, the Taiwanese do not trust their products.
However, trust is a social behavior. As Fukuyama claims, trust is "the expectation that
arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on
community shared norms, on the part of other members of that community" (26).
According to Fukuyama, these norms can be about subjective values such as the nature of
God, but they can also be secular ones such as professional standards and codes. If we
consider Japan has a group-oriented cultural norm that goes beyond single individuals or
the state, apparently Taiwanese customers seek another norm of trust.
In Part II of this chapter I discussed how the Japanese conduct drug business by
forming personal networks in which everyone trusts each other. It is the rule that
PhRMA's Maurer emphasizes repeatedly in understanding the Japanese market. The
"exotic" standard imposed by global pharmaceutical companies, though scientific, met
trouble in fitting into this network. In Taiwan we seem to see the opposite. The Taiwanese
physicians, though they enjoy high profits from prescription drug price differentials,
insist on costlier foreign products. Personal networks may determine their choices of
brands (i.e., no brand loyalty), but they would not make them "convert" from foreign
products to local ones. It is the same mentality on the patients' side. Unlike the Japanese,
who think that Japanese drugs best serve Japanese bodies, the Taiwanese believe that
imported drugs are always superior to domestic products.26 In other words, while the
Japanese trust in the social norm of personal networks, the Taiwanese trust the norm of
science embodied by "foreign" drugs. If patients receive medicines and find that they are
domestic, they will think they are not being well treated or do not have a good
relationship with their physician. I once heard a comment in a clinic in Taipei that
physicians only prescribe foreign drugs to those they want to have better results.
On the surface this seems superstitious. A former Taiwanese DoH official, a medical
elite of course, complained to me that ordinary people have no idea of what "foreign"
means. Drugs marked "imported" can be from a wide range of countries, from the United
States at the top, to Italy or Spain in the middle, down to Cyprus. He did not understand
why Taiwanese drugs, supposedly better than many foreign products, failed to win
people's trust. When I quoted studies and public opinions about the problems in the
government's practice of GMP validation in Taiwan, he looked irritated and replied:
26 For an example of such public opinion, see Zongguo Shibao [China Times], March 31 2004.
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"Who, who said this? You cannot question our government. We should trust in its ability
to protect people's health. Let me say, if a product can show acceptable bioequivalence
and bioavailability to the originals, I do not see any reason why we cannot say it is equal
to these foreign products." It seemed to this official that it is people's misunderstanding
that makes difficulties for the government. Professionally, everyone knows that the
government maintains public health, and thus people should follow and appreciate what
the government does for them but not criticize it from the outside. This was what he
meant.
His response drew my attention to the second social characteristics that makes
Taiwan's drug business distinct from Japan's-the role of the government in health policy.
According to Fukuyama, Taiwan belongs to the category of Han Chinese societies, which
are characterized by their low degree of trust (1995: Chapter 8, 9). In the PRC, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and Singapore, kinship is highlighted as the first avenue of building up trust
among people. Fukuyama cites Gordon Reading's observation on Hong Kong business to
describe the "radius of trust": "The key feature would appear to be that you trust your
family absolutely, your friends and acquaintances to be the degree that mutual
dependence had been established and invested in them. With everybody else you make no
assumptions about their goodwill" (75). Therefore, it is paradox for these companies to
enlarge while maintaining family-style management. It is also a paradox for the
governments of these countries to establish themselves as worthy of their citizens' trust.
Fukuyama reminds us of the dominant role that the government plays in a low-trust,
family-based society in order to allow for large-scale business. The state must step in to
help create trust through subsidies, guidance or even outright ownership (30).
Nonetheless, Fukuyama does not further question on what social basis the state, an
artificial apparatus beyond all blood networks, legitimates control over society.
From this perspective we can see, in terms of the social/domestic and
historical/international, profound differences in medical policy between Taiwan and
Japan. First, concerning the constitution of society, the difference is nicely captured by
the famous author Lin Yu-tang, who comments that Japanese society is like a piece of
granite while Chinese society is like a loose tray of sand, each grain being an individual
family. Given this, in Japan the state is merely a political shell around this social granite,
but in Taiwan the state has to seek external supports in order to exercise its power. From
this viewpoint we can see the reason for the Taiwanese's deep distrust in local products.
They do not trust the products' quality or the government's credibility. On the basis of
their everyday experience Taiwanese people think they know how these drugs are
produced and how they pass validation. In contrast, they believe that all foreign products
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have passed quality control before being sold and are therefore trustworthy. Apparently,
the ICH is the latest reason for the Taiwanese to choose foreign goods.
The problems of trust and the state can be well demonstrated in the case of Japan
and Taiwan's NHI programs. In Japan, before the establishment of the NHI scheme, there
had already been many self-organized cooperative societies (kyosaikumiai) dealing with
issues concerning the social welfare of their members. The national program just
incorporated these existing civic communities with a light touch. However, this was not
the case in Taiwan. Except for some local organizations, such as farmers' and fishers'
associations left by the Japanese colonizers, Taiwan did not have any societies of this
kind. The Taiwanese, especially people of Hakka ethnicity, have a strong supporting
network based on familial ties, but they do not extend this trust to any group outside the
family, including the government. Without this kind of institutional support, the social
foundation of the NHI in Taiwan is fragile.
Thus we are compelled to ask what makes Taiwan's NHI program successful.
Concerning the secret behind the high satisfaction rate and low expense, I argue that for
the Taiwanese the idea of risk sharing is foreign. It is the concept of kinfun that makes
possible the calculation of how much Taiwanese people pay and expect to get from the
NHI. Roughly translated as "discrimination," the operational meaning of kinfun is
holding the best for oneself rather than sharing with others. The reason why the NHI
program is welcome is because it offers much greater value than what it costs.27 The NHI
even offers services for those who were residents but have left Taiwan for years, like Hu,
whom I mentioned in Chapter 1. As a top BNHI officer once teased, it the Taiwanese are
pleased when they can have everything but pay very little for it, which he called the
culture of"all you can eat." Quality is not expected. A popular rhyme makes this point:
"Taiwan has three 'treasures' [bao]: labor insurance [laobao], health insurance [iianbao],
and all-you-can-eat buffet for only $299 NTD [chidaobao]!" Sometimes superficial
criticisms of the NHI can be heard, especially comparing it to other countries; however,
in reality people do not truly expect it to improve because they do not want to pay
anything extra. In fact, since the enactment of the National Health Insurance Law in 1994,
some clauses concerning the reevaluation and readjustment of the payment rate have
never been put into practice due to public resistance (Clauses 19, 20, 21, and 34, for
example). As Yeh Chin-chuan comments regarding the definition of Taiwan's NHI, "It is
27 It is notable that at the beginning of Taiwan's NHI, many people resisted paying because they
thought the program would soon go bankrupt. However, when it entered its second year, these people asked
government to add them in and wanted to waive the penalty. Another example is the lowest ever public
satisfaction rate reached in fall 2002 (59.7%) when the Minister of Health attempted to raise both premiums
and co-payments, which had not been done since the NHI began. See Yeh 2002, pp. 1 7- 1 8.
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like a blank check.... Our government is not allowed to tax more, to raise payment, but
has to provide the best service continuously. The NHI is an unlimited company that has
only obligations but no rights" (2002: 113-14).
Finally, let us discuss the difference between Taiwan's and Japan's health policy
internationally. It cannot be understood without tracing how Taiwanese medical elites
form a career consciousness about their role in health policies in history. This
consciousness can be traced back to Taiwan's past achievements in its "golden age" of
public health. It is known that before the abolition of martial law in 1987, Taiwan was an
authoritarian state thoroughly controlled by the defeated KMT; interestingly, however, the
KMT did not show much interest in public health up until the 1970s. No big projects
were conducted and no serious attention was devoted to this matter. In this "hands-off'
environment, the people in charge of public health affairs were all Taiwanese medical
elites, which was unusual, and their works were to a degree independent from other
departments under this regime. While the KMT exploited ever means it could in its fight
with the mainland, Taiwan's public health was restored after the various wars it endured
by international forces. These institutions, which included the Joint Commission on Rural
Reconstruction (JCRR), WHO, UNICEF, and the Rockefeller Foundation, provided
almost the entire budget for its health policies before 1972.
I have discussed the international public health collaborations of the early postwar
era in depth elsewhere (Kuo forthcoming). The United States first helped Taiwan to build
up a network of public health units through which two kinds of policies,
problem-oriented projects and public health demonstrations, were applied. In the
following fifteen years, various achievements were made: malaria was successfully
eradicated in the 1950s along with many other infectious diseases, and the birthrate was
efficiently controlled in the 1960s. Alongside these changes, the most important impact of
the new public health policies was the emergence of a group of local people, whom I call
health technocrats, on the decision-making level. Functioning as liaisons between the U.S.
aid institutions and the KMT, these medical elites found a position from which they could
maintain their professional pride while fulfilling their passions for social reform after the
Japanese colonization.2 8 Of course they were practical and loyal, to a certain degree, to
the KMT, but at the same time they maintained good relations with U.S. aid institutions
and international health organizations, from whom they sought world-class public health
for Taiwan. Thus, their attitude toward public health was not one of serving but to rather
28 It would be interesting to consider this idea as a continuation of the "in-between" identity of
Taiwanese doctors after the Japanese colonization. For more a more academic analysis of this identity and
its relations with colonial theory, see Lo 2002.
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educating their people. Taiwanese physicians had a tradition of leading social movements,
but the new rulers simply repressed all possibilities that might threaten their control. After
the February 28 Incident of 1947 and the "White Terror" that followed,29 most Taiwanese
medical elites retreated from participating in public affairs. Even so, in the emerging field
of public health, they found access to social participation as policy makers.
This consciousness makes these elites' role in the making and execution of health
policy tricky. Unlike Japan, where medical policy does not carry much meaning outside
of its own field, Taiwanese medical elites expect these policies to be a part of larger
projects of social reform. Although it was hard to win local people's social trust and the
legitimacy of the ruling power was questionable, Taiwanese health officials shared a
patriotic, progressive belief that these policies were necessary to improving the quality of
society on the one hand, and to making Taiwan able to contribute to the world on the
other. They may not have liked the KMT regime or any political power, but they
genuinely thought that they spoke for an ideal Taiwan that would soon be globalized and
developed.
Only with this understanding can we understand why Chang Hong-Jen wants to
defend the NHI. He told me, "To make Taiwan a developed country we had to introduce
[the NHI] anyway. We cannot wait for the people to understand what we are doing."
Facing endless criticisms of the NHI, Chang was confident about overcoming people's
distrust while imposing regulations that could improve Taiwan's international status.
Echoing former DoH director Hsu Tsi-chou's tenet on public health, Chang said, "I do not
care if people blame me. My goal for Taiwan is always clear-to be one of the best in the
world."
CONCLUDING REMARKS: PROBLEMS WITH DRUGS AND THE STATE
In this chapter we have heard the "local tones" of our non-Western characters. This
chapter starts with a quick view of the pharmaceutical markets of Japan and Taiwan from
29 The February 28 Incident is in fact an uprising that occurred on February 27, 1947, when a police
agent attempted to confiscate black market cigarettes from an elderly Taiwanese woman. After an onlooker
was accidentally shot to death, a crowd demonstrated next day (February 28) demanding a trial for the
agents. The KMT governor-general, in response to their anger over its monopolistic control, chose to
declare martial low and enforced curfews immediately. During the following months, many Taiwanese
medical elites, most of who were selected to negotiate with the government, were arrested and executed
without trials. The initial purge was followed by the time of repression known as the White Terror, which
lasted until martial law ended. Thousands of Taiwanese were imprisoned or executed for their opposition,
real or perceived, to the authoritarian KMT regime. Even after democratization this is still a highly volatile
political issue.
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the viewpoint of global companies, and then it turns to considering how they see
themselves (their monologue, or "voice one," as discussed in Chapter 1) by introducing
their related medical environments and focusing on their different social and cultural
backgrounds. I will sum up the issues raised here and mention how they relate to the
chapters that follow.
For some U.S. policy makers, Japan is a mysterious state. It has the most advanced
agricultural technologies, but it seldom exports its products. The Japanese government is
hesitant to open its market to foreign countries, even when the price and quality offered
are cheaper and better. U.S. policy makers tend to give the simple explanation of
protectionism to this problem. In the case of pharmaceuticals, while Japanese regulators
protect their domestic industry, they seem to put their patients in jeopardy by delaying
access to the most advanced medicines through lengthened review times and specific
requirements for clinical trials.
Although this chapter has pointed out the social factors that should be taken into
account in considering Japan's "irrational" behavior, this problem does exist. As Thomas
claims, a "new drug lag" is appearing. For example, of the 149 drugs approved in the U.S.
between 1992 and 1996, 51 percent were not available to patients in Japan by 2000. Even
ordinary Japanese people are aware of this.
For example, in Say Hello to Black Jack, probably one of the most popular manga
on medical issues in Japan,30 an episode appeared on the issue of drug lag. While treating
a woman suffering from pancreatic cancer with chemotherapy, Dr. Saito Eiji, a young
intern in the cancer ward, is discouraged to discover that in the repertoire of
chemotherapeutic agents effective against pancreatic tumors, only the out-of-date Gemzar
(gemcitabine) can be used and paid for by Japan's national health insurance. Doctors
know this reality, and the main problem resides not in their ignorance but in the
reviewing process for new drug approval. When the astonished Saito asks his adored
advisor Dr. Zyoshi Naoki about this problem, Zyoshi tells him the cold facts: "This
situation [that only one chemotherapeutic agent is available for a certain cancer] is not
restricted to cases of pancreatic cancer. Japan does not recognize many anti-cancer agents
that have been used overseas" (fig. 3.7). An even more sad statement follows: "For
today's bureaucratic system of the WHLW, these drugs require at least ten years to be
30 The "Black Jack" in the title refers to the superhero physician of Tezuka Osamu's classic strip.
Created in January 2002 as homage in Shukan Morning, this comic has sold over 4.5 million copies in total.
Because of its popularity, it was adopted to a TV drama serial by TBS in 2003 and won several awards at
the 37 th Academy Awards for television programs. Its impact is not limited to the domestic realm. It has
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recognized."
Fig. 3.7. Scenes from the episode "What's inside a smiling face" (egao
no uragawa) in Say Hello to Black Jack
Source: Say Hello to Black Jack, vol.5, Episode 46.
We have learned the advantage of holding clinical trials from the Vioxx case, and
now we learn the opposite scenario. Can the Japanese government keep its promise of
protecting people's unique health needs while encountering bio-globalization? How can
Japan play the game with global pharmaceutical companies by its own rules? On the
other side, can global companies be patient and appreciate Japan's custom of medical
care? Etienne Labbe, medical director of Synthelabo Recherch6 Japan, once stated, "For
the time being, to overcome difficulties in conducting clinical trials in Japan, one must
remember three rules: 1) stay calm, 2) try to understand the Japanese way of thinking, 3)
respect the local rules" (1995: 32). However, as we will see in the next chapter, these
capitalists did not do so. For them, the ICH has become a battle in which Japan will
finally be captured by globalization.
And we turn to Taiwan. As described above, Taiwan does not have a strong
pharmaceutical industry, nor does its government have the people's trust. However, as
policy makers, the Taiwanese medical elite try to both improve the quality of medical
care and educate their people. For them, the state is crucial as a tool for catching up with
advanced countries and as a means by which to improve people's lives. The "golden age"
of public health, when Taiwan was globally known for its achievements in health care, is
the source of their energy.
Ironically, the Taiwanese state is their biggest obstacle. In 1965, the United States
announced the end of its financial support to Taiwan. In 1969, the last and the biggest
problem-oriented public health project, the Family Planning Program, reached
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completion. These factors forced Taiwan to step into a new era of independent health
policy. However, just as it began to pursue better public health for itself, other countries
severed their international political relationships with the island, ostracizing it from the
rest of the world. In 1971, seven months after the Department of Health was founded,
Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations. It was no longer recognized as a state; the
"golden age" of public health, though great, was gone.
Thirty-five years have passed since then; Taiwan's public health system became
strong and independent in its own right. But it had been, and still is, isolated and totally
ignored by the world. As we see in Chang Hong-Jen's presentation to the OECD,
returning to the "golden age" is no longer a feasible way to improve Taiwan's health
status; this action has clear political implications involving rehabilitation of relationships,
as a normal state, with others. How do these medical elites "save" Taiwan from this
complex situation? How can they deal with the capitalists' requests alone, given that their
government is not globally recognized? As we will see in Chapter 5, the ICH, as an




Marching in East Asia, Struggling toward the Global
On a hot, humid summer morning in August 2002, I took the subway to Nihonbashi,
the heart of Tokyo's business district, to visit the Japanese subsidiary of an American
clinical trails services company, which I will call P International. Along with higher
technical standards for clinical trials, the rise of contracted research organizations (CROs)
responds to an increasing need for pharmaceutical companies, especially those who
cannot maintain a big department to deal with the complex requirements for drug
approval, to turn to other, specialized firms to provide diverse clinical trials services from
laboratory to bedside. The goal of this division of labor is to smooth the entire clinical
trial process from beginning to end through the management of placement, principal
investigator recruitment and training, contract and budget negotiation, regulatory affairs,
coordinator assignments, patient recruitment, data collection, quality assurance, and
compliance. 
Occupying two floors in a small building in a quiet neighborhood, the
world-reputed P International has a quite modest presence in Japan. Before meeting John,
the director of this office, I assumed that I find the company headquartered in a huge
building named after it, as is the case with many Japanese companies. John received me
in a small conference room where he briefed me on his company. He told me that it was a
recent decision for P International to open its Japanese subsidiary in 1997. Apparently,
the ICH was the reason, and John described its influence. On the U.S. side, the ICH
offered pharmaceutical companies a technical instrument by which the Japanese market
becomes accessible at reasonable cost. On the Japanese side-more importantly, in John's
opinion-the conference presented a platform from which Japanese companies could see
and realize the imminent arrival of globalization. The collapse of Japan's bubble
economy made the high-level decision makers of the P International hesitant to rush into
investment, but the guideline that attempted to bridge racial differences changed their
mind. Asia may have been a market for pharmaceutical companies for years, but only
after the ICH did it offer an opportunity for CROs, since both sides needed a mediator
capable of dealing with local regulations and scientific requirements. Japan, which has
the biggest market and the most advanced pharmaceutical industry in the region, was
chosen as the beachhead for P International.
Though the above reasoning sounds perfect, it does not match my observations. In
fact, I had heard some of the realities behind globalization from a friend of mine, a stock
The increasing role of CROs in clinical trials outside of the United States, though important, has not
garnered much attention in the medical anthropology literature. Although because of volume limitations
this thesis must leave it a topic for future study, I recognize Adriana Petryna's pioneering work in this area,
which calls attention to the ethical meaning of human subjects in global clinical trails (2005).
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analyst who introduced me to John, and John told more over our thirty-minute
conversation. The mutual understanding and communication, according to John, do not
exist. In contrast to big companies that have their own business partners for this task, P
International had hard time finding its niche in this market. Racial difference is still
considered an essential factor in drug review; the new guideline does not make it easier,
but rather more difficult. John was impeded in persuading local companies to sell their
drugs overseas and in conducting local clinical trials under the new guideline to get drugs
approved in Japan more quickly. The former effort, John concluded, was hopeless.
Except for few big names, such as Takeda and Yamanouchi, Japanese pharmaceutical
companies are weak. They fail to produce really innovative products that can pass the
global standard, and they cannot compete with other companies in overseas markets.
More crucial is the fact that they are not aware of the importance of high-quality clinical
trials, which are most important in the drug business. "Japan's companies are never R&D
oriented," John said.
On the other hand, the main office of P International does not support John's efforts
to establish sites for clinical trials. The cost of doing clinical trials in Japan did not
decrease after the implementation of the ICH guidelines. Clinical trials using Japanese
subjects are required for most cases and are still difficult to conduct. Having lived and
worked in Japan for years, John thought that he knew the problem. He told me that
Japan's clinical environment is primitive; clinical trials are still controlled by professors
in university hospitals and their methodology needs improvement. Moreover, like foreign
pharmaceutical companies in this country, foreign CROs that lack established local
connections can rarely gain any ground. Quality does not seem to be the main concern for
Japanese companies' choice of partners. John did not say that the ICH or the guidelines
were of no importance. "At least a channel is there," he stated. However, a legal channel
could not promise any cooperation unless real exchanges of understanding took place.
Looking around this office where only six people or so worked, I read a deep frustration
in John's face.
To relieve this heavy atmosphere, I switched the topic to other Asian countries. "If
Japan is so difficult, why not try other places?" I asked. John quickly answered that for
the CROs Japan must be the first in East Asia, since it has the largest national market and
is the only country that does not accept clinical data produced in other Asian countries.
The conventional logic for other commodities does not apply to drugs, where consumer
power matters. For P International, the ideal situation would be to apply Japanese data to
other Asian countries, not the reverse. Even so, John felt pressure from the CROs in these
countries. John was impressed by the aggressiveness of Albert Liou's Apex in Taiwan and
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Robert Teoh's Propharma in Singapore, in contrast to Japan's conservative,
mind-your-own-business attitude; the former has established subsidiaries in Korea and
the PRC, and the latter is trying to secure a position as the Asian representative for global
companies. Recently they both showed strong interest in the Japanese market. It may not
be P International's explicit policy to have Asian strategic alliances, but it would not
exclude this possibility if the shortest way to doing business in Tokyo had to be through
Taipei or Singapore. When the interview came to end, John gave me Albert's contact
information and asked if I could visit him if I stopped by Taiwan. "Let me know what he
thinks," he said.
On the way back to the other side of downtown, where my host institution was
located, I thought of the best way to make sense of the situation John had explained to me.
It seemed like Japan had had a chance to meet the global at the ICH but had failed to
seize the chance because of its old-fashioned methodology, backward clinical trials
environment and bureaucracy. On the other hand, other Asian countries, though not the
main target in this global plan, tried to take advantage of the situation and make their
markets more appealing. All these dynamics have to be traced back to the ICH and the
debate on the issue of racial difference, and this is the starting point of my investigation
in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4
Weaving Quarrels into Harmony: Presenting Japan in the Bio-Global
[I]f we pass from the white man to the black or the red man, through all the
intermediate variations, it is no longer the difference, but the analogy, which
strikes us. ... Thus, the European, with his graceful and elegant forms; the
Negro, characrterised at once by the colour of his skin and the peculiar contour
of this head; the American Indians, with a red skin and Herculean form, and,
lastly, the Chinese, with a yellow tint and oblique eyes; are all derived from the
same stock, and form a single chain. ... Such is the solution science gives of this
interesting question of the primitive unity of man.
Marcel de Serres (1845)1
The ICH harmonisation process has not only promoted a much more
harmonious and productive relationship between MHW and companies of all
the three ICH regions, but also helped to improve access of innovative new
drugs for patients, as intended, through the effective use of clinical data across
the three regions. I hope ICH will continue to work to the benefit of patients




COMPETING VOICES/INTERPRETATIONS: A MODERN FORM OF RACIAL
DEBATE
Pharmaceuticals and Race: Ambiguity Across Culture and Health
This chapter will look ethnographically at how Japan joined and presented itself in
the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH), the bio-global stage set for the
world of proprietary drugs. In a "slow-motion" fashion, the chapter will first deal with
"pre-ICH" negotiations with the United States around 1986 on the acceptance of foreign
clinical data, and then with the debate over racial difference with other parties in the
In "On the Unity of The Human Species", reprinted in Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850,
edited by Hannah Franziska Augustine, pp.201-202.
2 In Nutley ed., "Benefit and Value of the ICH," p.4.
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Expert Working Group (EWG) meetings in the ICH from 1992 to 1997. The reason for
marking two distinct periods is two-fold. Not only is it essential to capturing the
complicated origins of how race is conceived in drug regulation; it also explores two
modes of negotiating, one bilateral and the other global. Ethnographic inquiries of voice
and setting are foregrounded as necessary to deepen understandings of how Japanese
resistance to the bio-global has crystallized around the notion of "race."
This thesis has no intention of analyzing the complicated intellectual background
and development of the concept of race, which could be the theme for another thesis.
Nonetheless, it shall outline in brief the differences in concerns about race and drugs
between Japan and the Western world (i.e., Europe and the United States), to which end I
think the above quotation from Marcel de Serres is useful. De Serres, then teaching at the
University of Montpellier in France, published a paper in the Edinburgh New
Philosophical Journal about the possibility of forming a scientific basis for the
comprehensive unification of all races into a single species with a single origin. Having
mastered comparative anatomy, de Serres tried to provide in this paper a spectrum-like
scale by which all variation in the external characteristics of existing races could be
located and measured. With skin color, for example, he rejected the notion that variation
was due to differences in living circumstances or evidence that different races were
different species. The way that de Serres explained the primary unity of human races was
a biological, thus scientific, one. He argued that between the second epidermis and true
skin there existed a thin pigmental apparatus that determines the coloration of the skin.
Thus, different degrees by which this organ develops make distinct the skin appearance of
the major races-white, black, red, and yellow. Yet the boundaries can be crossed if we
observe all the different races together with the "intermediate" varieties between them.
The races can thus be considered a single species consisting of a series of subgroups that
have variously tinted skin; on one end of this spectrum stand the "elegant" Europeans and
on the other the "peculiar" blacks.
Although this pre-Darwin text made the effort to group all races into one species,3
one thing we should know is that like all his Victorian contemporaries, de Serres was
intensely aware of the differences among humans and intended to argue against those
who treated them as total distinctions. In addition, it is remarkable that he reasoned the
fundamental unity underlying superficial differences, which latently reflected a parallel
trend of biological or scientific racism. Although all human beings belonged to a single
species, the reference or measure for differentiating these races was an imaginary
3 For a concise review of the various ideas about race and racial difference in the early nineteenth
century, see the introduction to Race: The Origins of an Idea, 1760-1850.
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Caucasian man. Although it had been powerfully proven that the different races were
fundamentally the same, the possibility of crossing the boundaries between them also
created a tension whereby the superiority of a race was not essential and permanent. This
kind of racist ideology, as we know, resulted in some extreme forms of such sentiment,
including the Nazis' "cleansing" of some "inferior" races during World War II.
However, after World War II, racism as a political concept transformed from a
national ideology aimed at justifying superiority in the world to an ideology used by
dominant ethnic groups to legitimize their relationships with minorities in domestic
affairs. Meanwhile, the role science played was transformed. Instead of proving the
biological and intellectual superiority of a certain race, science now tended to hide
cultural prejudices with the production of supposedly "objective" knowledge. A clear
distinction between "superior" and "inferior" races was blurred and a simple proposition
for science and racial politics evolved into a complicated landscape of ethnicity and
society. It was no longer proper or politically correct to exclude any ethnic group from
the human species; but along with this transmutation of the broad realm of "human
beings," new boundaries, categories or standards began to emerge.
Concerned with the entangled meaning of biology and society in an American
context, Donna Haraway provides us with a seemingly odd yet powerful frame of mind
for appreciating the twentieth century world (Haraway 1997: Chapter 6).5 According to
Haraway, biology or bodily knowledge is not merely a meditative discourse that can be
separated from society. Instead, it is "a linguistic sign for a complex structure of belief
and practice through which I and many of fellow citizens organize a great deal of life, ...
a complex web of semiotic-material practices that emerged over the past 200 years or so,
beginning in 'the West' and traveling globally"; it "emerged in the midst of major
inventions and reworking of categories of nation, family, type, civility, species, sex,
humanity, nature, and race" (217). This argument is followed by three
period-paradigmatic configurations in which race, population, and genome figure as "key
objects of knowledge" (table 4.1 ); the first two objects are discussed in this chapter.
The first configuration, from 1900 to the 1930s, is characterized by a clear
distinction of human races I have mentioned previously. What is worthwhile discussing is
the second configuration, dating from the 1940s to the 1970s. Technically speaking, a
4 The same kind of unity/demarcation can be found in the debate over bodily origin and gender
difference in Enlightenment Europe. The emerging modern anatomy saw that males and females had the
same bodily composition, but men were the only reference. See Laqueur 1990, Chapter 3.
s I thank Professor Haraway for reminding me of this historical shift, which helps me to locate Japan's
approach to the world of pharmaceuticals. For discussions concerning the "delay" of the genomic step in
pharmaceuticals and Japan's intentions toward genomic research in the pharmaceutical field, see Chapter 6.
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population differs by one or more genes from other groups of the same species. The gene
is a rhetorical idea and a material unit that defines characteristics of a population. The
frequency of a certain gene within a population presents the status of population and the
possible paths of its evolution; the flow of genes between populations creates population
differences that also bind the species together. Following this argument, we find in the
medical field a new way or a new language to connect population and disease.6 Although
genes might be too new a tool to widely be used in clinical practice, their functional
phenotypes, along with various factors identified by the established epidemiology, served
to separate out the characteristics of medicine and society and the dynamics between the
two realms. These practices constructed the identity of a population by linking the
frequency of some factors to a certain disease; meanwhile, they constructed the identity
of a disease by tracing the phenotypes of patients in a certain population.
Table 4.1 Configurations on the Biological and Society in the Twentieth-
Century United States
6 Haraway chooses to highlight this period in Family of Man as the time when the norms of the nuclear
family, heterosexual marriage and gendered labor division were constructed. However, using her
perspective, this thesis will try to explore how population as a "key object of knowledge" is related to
medical discourse.
196
Dates 1900-1930s 1940-1970s 1975-1990s
Key object of Race Population Genome
knowledge
Data objects Tree genealogies, Gene frequencies Genetic databases
taxonomies
Legal Eugenic sterilization UNESCO statements The Biological Diversity
and laws are passed by on race, 1950, 1951, Convention, NATFA,
political 30 state legislatures are written from point GATT, and the WTO
documents in the United States of view of population include provisions on
from 1907-1931 genetics and modem patenting biological
evolutionary synthesis materials
Status of race Race is real and Race is an illusory Race reemerging in
as fundamental. object constructed by medical discourse albeit
epistemological bad science, while being a hotly contended
object remaining prominent issue in cultural, political
in science in domains of social struggles.
Source: Adapted from Haraway 1997, Table 6.1.
Considering people who take drugs as a whole, race disappears into the notion of
population and is reconstructed as one factor, like gender or age, which affects the
performance of drug. In the pharmaceutical field, such differentiating within a population
in this way is new. In pharmacologist Werner Kalow's pioneering study,
pharmaco-anthropology is defined as a branch of clinical pharmacology that deals with
inter-ethnic differences in the response to metabolism of drugs. In drug development,
racial difference is usually dealt with in terms of categorization into the main
races-Caucasians, Asians and blacks.7 The way to tell the difference between them, as
expected, is by frequencies of genetic expression. Kalow claims in a later study that the
inter-ethnic differences in drug-metabolizing capacity are now "a well-established fact."
The only things scientists need to know are as follows: how frequent or how widespread
the genetic differences are; to what extend these differences are of medical and
7 Pharmaco-anthropology is an interesting field, one in which medical research and social science
encounter each other. Yet our concern here is by which route each discipline approaches this field. While
many anthropologists stopped pursuing a biological definition for "socially constructed" race, life science
researchers such as Kalow claim their authority over this field by using the language of science. However,
what is problematic here is how Kalow can make this claim without having an acceptable definition of race.
For this reason an STS study on race is necessary. In Chapter 5 of Emergent Forms of life and
Anthropological Voice, Michael Fischer has done a detailed analysis of such discourses. This chapter, with
the same intention yet on a different trajectory, will try to show how this scientific discourse gets "stocked"
in the ICH, forcing it to reveal the cultural assumptions behind it.
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science.
Paradigmatic Craniometry Measure marker Genetic mapping
technical practice (HLA, ABO blood)
frequencies
Rhetorics Family trees Universal family of Human Genome Project
of man (HGP) and Human
unity/ diversity Genome Diversity
Project (HGDP)
Ideal of progress Everything moves in The universal sharing Multiculturalism and
stages from way of life is at the networking are ideo-
primitive to origin. System logically dominant in
civilized. Hierarchy management should sciences, business and
is nature at all levels produce cooperation liberal political practice
of organization
toxicological importance; under what circumstances these differences should be
considered; and which populations should be included (Walker, Lumley and McAuslane
eds. 1994: 28). From this viewpoint, the discussion over race becomes detached from
ethnicity. Under the scheme that takes a population as a whole, the term "race" refers to
all factors that are clear genetic traits, whereas "ethnicity" encompasses traits linked to
other factors, such as lifestyle and environment.
About the same time, some administrative attempts were made to deal with
concerns about racial differences. Among these, those taken by the European Community
(EC), which hoped to form a single market for pharmaceuticals, were pioneering.
Although the establishment of common rules and regulatory requirements created a
homogeneous background for this ambition, some biological differences could not be
easily reduced. Recognizing the heterogeneous nature of a European population divided
into politically determined states, the goal the EC sought in terms of racial difference was
an integrated regulatory system in which all clinical data produced could be used across
the region by mutual recognition among local authorities. From this viewpoint, race was a
different problem. Unlike the pharmaco-anthropology, which considers differences within
a drug-testing population, the EC aimed to form an administrative platform by which
clinical data from the populations of the member states could be made reliable and thus
able to be shared. In this sense, the problem of racial difference is one of identifying if
race might be a problem in the process of mutual recognition and if the genetic
differences due to race may be ignored. According to Rashmi Shah of the Medicines and
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), UK, concern over racial difference
was first raised by the European Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP).
Since 1985, the European Cooperation in the field of Science and Technology Research
has conducted a project titled "Criteria for the choice and definition of healthy volunteers
and patients for Phase I and Phase II studies in drug development," in which
polymorphism in drug metabolism is one topic (Walker, Lumley and McAuslane eds.
1994: 22). These attempts resulted in European conference on pharmacogenetics in 1990
as well as a draft on ethnic difference by the CPMP before the foundation of the ICH.
However, the above approaches concerning racial difference met problems in Japan,
an Asian country consisting of an Asian race. For global companies, it is a totally exotic
population, in terms of both its regulatory system and its racial composition. It is different
from the problem of minorities, such as Asian Americans, in the United States, which
started to gain attention in clinical trials from 1988 when the FDA requested data analysis
for drug efficacy and safety with respect to race and gender (Walker, Lumley and
McAuslane eds. 1994: 112). Although U.S. minorities may be genetically different from
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Caucasian Americans, basically they live in the same medical environment, such that less
than 5 percent significant difference was reported (113).
On the other hand, Japan's drug registration system is different from those in
Europe and the United States. Using the United Kingdom as an example, Hirokawa
Kazunori and Colin Dollery compare the top fifty drugs in Japan and UK, finding that the
differences between the two countries is complicated (Hirokawa and Dollery 1994). The
features of Japanese clinical trials, as I have partially discussed in Chapter 3, have much
to do with their debatable methods, such as the use of multiple endpoints and vague
indices. Apart from these differences, there are also many other social and cultural
differences that are hard to reduce to adjustable factors. Most, if not all, differences are
the result of a divide between Japanese conceptions of the body and foreign ones. As the
authors of the study remind us, "the possibility of genetic differences in sensitivity to
drugs should be taken seriously." The bodily sensitivity described here seems to be
superstitious, but it is real. For instance, anti-ulcer drugs are widely prescribed under the
hypothesis that the gastric mucosa of Japanese is more sensitive and irritable (81). Thus
the European approach of forming an administrative platform linking Japanese and
Western population s would inevitably turn to an approach based on the racial differences
between Asian countries and other countries.
Even so, as discussed in previous chapters, global pharmaceutical companies have
to conquer the second largest national market in the world, even though it may be
culturally and socially exotic, and they hope to do this as soon as possible. For the
reasons outlined above, the issue of race emerged in Japan's relationship to the world of
proprietary drugs, and the ICH is the global stage for this drama. The conventional
accounts we know from the Western side tend to describe this encounter as a process of
political negotiation refereed by science. This is understandable, for the West itself is an
area where cultural prejudices concerning nationalism and race have existed for centuries,
and the realm of pharmaceuticals is no exception.
Lionel D. Edwards of Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. recalls his experience of racial and
national differences in accepting foreign clinical data in the 1970s, when he was told by a
UK regulator that "English data was very good, Scottish reasonable, Welsh data was
acceptable, and that U.S. data was not helpful for an English population" (Walker as
quoted in Lumley and McAuslane eds. 1994: 10). However, acknowledging that the
Western world has had rich experience dealing with such conflicts, Edwards knows this
attitude would not be acceptable today, at least for Europe or the United States. In other
words, like many Westerners we will hear from in the rest of this chapter, Edwards
regards the orientation of ethnic problems in clinical trials as an administrative or even
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political one. Assuming the existence of a primary unity among populations (i.e.,
assuming a heterogamous yet united human species), Westerners like Edwards tend to
believe that unless evidence can be found attributing differences between Asians and
Caucasians to scientific factors (e.g., genes) or to subjective factors (e.g., life habits, risk
factors, or medical practices), clinical data produced in the West should be acceptable in
other places in the world. Japan's resistance, according to this theory, is not scientific, but
based on a feeble belief in its racial uniqueness.
The above voice, which I call the "Western/capitalist view," is consistent all the way
through negotiations before and during the ICH. Guided by this assumption, Western
negotiators applied strategies to force Japan to become "enlightened" by scientifically
accepting foreign clinical data as well as culturally accepting the idea of the fundamental
unity of all human populations (i.e., by being administratively united with other
regulatory authorities). Nonetheless, this chapter has no interest in repeating the
traditional narrative about how the light of science "penetrates" dark and mysterious Asia
and makes it willingly accept; that narrative will merely serve as the background or
"counterpart" to this chapter. Instead, in the hope of to portraying the subjectivity of the
state, I will explore the process of cultural encounter in a slow-motion fashion, following
every step of the capitalists in order to make sense of Japan's responses to the call for
unification. The "slow motion" ethnographic approach is necessary because the scientific
facts are not in serious dispute, but the explanation and interpretation are.
Furthermore, we must not reject some conventional observations on the frictions
between Japan and the United States, such as those by the veteran political scientist
Stephen Cohen. Cohen comments on the unfairness that Japan perceives regarding the
U.S.'s use of trade protocol Super 301 (for more, see Chapter 3), which allows the United
States to perform the roles of prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner in determining what
is acceptable trade behavior by other sovereign states (1998: 47). What I would like to do
is to address where these narratives fail to interpret the "deadlock" of a negotiation. As
we will see in the debate over racial difference in clinical trials, the lack of interpretive
power of discourses relying on Western concepts such as "health" or "consumers' rights"
returns us to "old-fashioned" frameworks such as the nation-state from the first
configuration Haraway describes when these discourses are applied to how Japan chooses
to present itself when encountering globalization.
On the other hand, this chapter has an ethnographic concern that should be taken
into consideration about Japan's voice of resistance: that is, the place where the
negotiation dialogues occurred. If we read the secretariat of the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (MHW) Osamu Doi's praise of the ICH quoted at the beginning of this chapter
200
carefully, we can see that he does not totally reject globalization; instead, he welcomes it.
According to Doi, Japan did appreciate having a fair chance to speak directly to the
global, and the rhetoric of public health and science was also good for it. In other words,
from an ethnographic point of view, it is necessary to separate the action of Japan's
resistance into two parts: the place the debate was conducted and the content of the
debate. Apparently, Japan welcomed the former but disagreed with the latter.
In order to tell the difference this chapter is divided into two parts. Part I deals with
the "pre-ICH" negotiations, particularly the U.S.-Japan Market-Oriented,
Sector-Selective Discussions (MOSS) held in 1986. The second part deals with the EWG
meetings on racial difference, the so-called "E5 working group," and the making of the
E5 guideline. This chapter not only describes two periods in which this problem was
formulated; it also shows two modes of negotiation, with a shift in scene from a bilateral
meeting to a global conference. The originality of this ethnography thus not only resides
in its empathy in listening to the non-Western voices, but also in its awareness of the
situation in which voices were presented and heard.
Echoes of the Past: The Dualistic Nature of Differences in the U.S.-Japan Context
This section will discuss the cultural background of the "pre-ICH" dialogue over
racial difference. It starts with a conversation disclosed by Yakujinippo [Pharmaceutical
News] on October 5, 1998, which featured Doi Osamu and Professor Mizushima Yutaka
of St. Marianna Medical University. In this conversation both individuals reviewed the
foundation of the ICH, its impacts on Japan's clinical trials, and how Japan confronted
the wave of internationalization. However, what caught my attention was the historical
analogy the newspaper used in the title of this conversation: "ICH is the 'Black Ship' of
Drug Regulation." The symbol of the "black ship" is commonly used in many references
to globalization and carries multiple meanings, as Mizushima pointed out: "Perhaps it
[this analogy] is a bit over used, [but] the ICH, so to speak, is like the black ship..., thus
it is unavoidable to use a universal standard for the sake of ethical concerns as well as
scientific requirements in clinical trials." The black ship metaphor refers to the arrival in
1853 of four American warships in Tokyo Bay. The ships were led Commodore Matthew
Calbraith Perry, who became the first foreigner to open Japan to trade after a 250-year
isolation.
In fact, Mizushima's statement is not alone; the analogy of the black ship is often
seen in reports about globalization and the ICH. The meaning that this analogy delivers is
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manifold. On the metaphorical level, it indicates a situation in which contact is
unavoidable. As read in this conversation, Japan was hesitant to change. Doi remembered
that when he brought the idea of Japanese participation in the ICH back, globalization
was a "taboo-like" issue. It seems that the ICH pushed Japan to face globalization
unwillingly, but this is not true. It does not mean that before the foundation of the ICH,
Japan did not import any drugs from foreign countries. According to a survey by
Yakujinippo, in 1984 Japan imported 1.77 billion yen worth of drugs from the main global
producers, an amount that is small compared to other sectors, yet still significant. The
analogy should be considered as dramatizing the point where Japan had to start to deal
with globalization: to resist it or accept it.
In the context of global commerce, the analogy of the black ship implies an origin
which results in this situation. Stephen Cohen has pointed out that this common rhetoric
is widely used in describing U.S.-Japan trade. Remembering Commodore Perry, Japan
envisioned the reappearance of the "black ships" when the United States requested a
more open market in the 1980s and accused the U.S. government of not understanding
how to master its market (Cohen 1991: 194). In this sense, the ICH seemed to be another
American ship, one that would open up Japan's drug market. The United States was both
the cause of and the obstacle to globalization. On the one hand, it catalyzed Japan to face
the world, yet on the other hand it limited the way it was possible to deal with Japan.
It is interesting to look at Japan's two-stage encounter with globalization via the
black ship analogy. In fact, the historical contact between the United States and Japan has
been heavily dramatized and reconstructed by the way that the Japanese have formed
their image of the United States. Let us just take this one example to see how this contact
is told and retold. It is said that Perry brought a letter from U.S. President Millard
Fillmore to the Emperor of Japan, hoping Japan would agree to open certain ports to
American vessels so that trade could begin. However, in one of the new history textbooks
for Japanese junior high school, this story has had a new focus added to it: a passage
saying that the Shogunate could not reject this letter because it was threatening. It is said
that along with this letter, Perry handed Japan's emissaries two white flags and a letter of
his own stating that "We are ready to attack you in case you fail to open your doors to us,
and victory will surely be ours. We are, however, willing to make peace with you, if you
raise the white flag indicating surrender." The textbook passage concludes, "Such a
threatening diplomacy, forcing a country to accede to demands by use of armed force, is
known as 'gunboat diplomacy,' an approach frequently resorted to by the Western powers
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in their dealing with Asian countries."8 Though interesting, according to historians
Masato Miyachi and his colleagues, the above interpretation is weak on the historical
source it uses (2001: 46). I am not an historian on Japan or diplomacy, nor do I have any
intention of entering the debate about whether Parry's letter really existed. But what I
want readers to pay attention to is the way Japan formulates its past experience about
rejoining the world: namely, why it suffers and casts the United States as its unfriendly
mediator. The history may be adjusted, but the intention is real.
On the other hand, the United States has its own historical and racial locus by which
it formulates its image of Japan. This past, as historian John Dower nicely traces in his
War Without Mercy (1987), is the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945, an episode in which
both the Americans and the Japanese racially subjugated their respective enemies. Dower
reminds us that for Americans the image of Japanese brutality and bestiality was closely
related to Japan's actions in the invasion of Asia, such as massacres in Nanking and
Manila. Among Americans these accounts seemed to insinuate "the field day they'd [the
Japanese] enjoy if they marched through the streets of Washington" (17). Of course,
Americans tended to racialize this war, and through this process they treated the Japanese
state and the Japanese people as two sides of the same coin. The legacy of this treatment
has survived into the postwar period; Japanese nationalism became the starting point by
which the United States constructs its image of Japan.
Here is one example, taken from an issue of Time Asia on August 16, 1999. This
issue, titled "Japan Returns to Nationalism," shows on its cover a young Japanese man
decorated with hinomaru flags, his mouth open as if he is shouting to the world of
Japanese nationalism's resurrection. Articles in this issue successfully delivered the
patriotic, though selective, picture of the Japanese in the era of globalization. By singling
out recent "right-wing" phenomena, such as the wish to take back territory lost to Russia,
commanding schoolchildren sing the national anthem that honors the Emperor, rearming
the country's military force, and, most importantly, revising the "peace constitution"
created during the American occupation, the issue presents an image that readers can
easily relate to the military nationalism of World War II. According to Time Asia, the
unsettling reality that nationalism is on the rise again, as suggested in a comment by a
political analyst: Japan "will make laws that enable them to do whatever they want to do"
(18). Some borderline-racist arguments can be found to support the above observation.
8 Atarashii rekishi kyokasho (New History Textbook), p. 176. Quotation from an alleged letter of
Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, translated by Miyachi et al. in Miyachi et al. 2001: 44.
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The fiery writer and mayor of Tokyo shihara Shintaro's Japan That Can Say No series9
is one of the symbols of these right-wingers. Also heavily cited is the recent series
"'Haughtiness Manifesto" (gomanizumu sengen) by cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori. l°
The magazine quotes Kobayashi's famous comments on the actions of Japanese soldiers
in World War II, which is regarded as politically incorrect: "Let's be proud of our
grandfathers who fought against white imperialistic Europeans and Americans" (17). It is
understandable the issue of history textbook; any attempt to downplay the violent
behavior of the Japanese military would be interpreted as a recurrence of nationalism and
therefore harshly criticized.
The contrasting images that Japan and the United States have constructed of each
other from histoircal memories resemble the dualistic nature of Japan's worldview. It is
seen in nihonjinron (theories of the Japanese), which characterizes Japan as "the self' and
foreigners or the West as "the other." As Peter Dale points out, it is a "dialectics of
difference" and is articulated in the form of the uniqueness of the Japanese (1 986:
Chapter 4).11 The Japanese have constructed an image of the West so as to clarify the
boundary between "Japanese-ness" and "Westem-ness." Like the arrival of the black
ships in the past, the West and the United States are dangerous because they bring contact
that would force Japan to accept foreign standards that do not fit the people well. The
uniqueness of the Japanese can only be justified by this dualistic order supported by
cultural and historical manipulations.
However, it is equally important to note the same tendency in the United States,
which has created a stereotype of Japan that is essentially racial. The U.S. tends to ignore
Japan's intentions and self-conception and interprets everything as military nationalism.
The interpretation of nihonjinron is an example. Despite noting Japan's nationalist threat,
9 The first book of this series is "No" to Ieru Nihon (A Japan That Can Say No. Tokyo: Kobunsha,
1989), coauthored with Morita Akio. This book was followed by three others by Ishihara and other authors,
Soredemo "no" to ieru Nihon (A Japan That Can Still Say No. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1990), Danko no to ieru
Nihon (A Japan That Can Absolutely Say No. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1991), and Amerika sinko wo suivate yo
(Dumping the Myths on America. Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2000).
10 Kobayashi began to serialize Gomanizumu sengen or "Gosen" in 1991 in the weekly magazine Spa!
The cartoon boldly defied taboos in Japan and established his Kobayashi's fame as a critic. The title of the
series, "Haughtiness," is from his final remark-"can I be haughty?"-in every episode, and the first
special edition was Sensoron (On War), published by Gentosha in 1998, made him a national phenomenon.
After that about every year he produced a special edition of Shin gosen, such as Taiwanron (On Taiwan,
2000), Sensoron 2 (2001), Sensoron 3 (2003), and newly published Okinawaron (On Okinawa, 2005).
" As Dale points out, from this viewpoint, the world consists of two parties-Japan and everyone
else- that are always comparing themselves to and mimicking each other. A list of comparisons by which
Japanese uniqueness (as well as the homogeneous "other") is characterized, ranging from geographical
conditions to intellectual style or mentality, can be found in Dale 1986, Chapter 4. In short, the two parties
have nothing in common.
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in this same issue of Time Asia, Japan expert James Fallows ignores the sensitivity of the
Japanese's notion of self by dividing nihonjinron into two opposing schools of thought.
One side is formed by a large outpouring of books and articles, almost all in Japanese,
about the reasons that Japan and Japanese people are unique. On the other side are a
smaller but more splenetic stream of rebuttals, mainly written by foreigners who have
read nihonjinron and mean to expose its lunacy to the outside, English-speaking world. In
short, assuming a universal standard for judging all people and cultures in the world, the
United States tends to polarize its relation to Japan, casting itself as "rational" and the
other as "subjective."' 2
It is not the goal of this thesis to analyze whether the United States employs
"gunboat diplomacy" toward Asia, nor do I presume to know whether Japan wants to
resume the military nationalism by which won it an empire, a humiliating defeat and
occupation. I do want to point out the dualistic nature of the encounter between the two
countries. For Japan, the encounter forces this Asian power to remember the hostile
arrival of the American ships, which symbolized the presence of "the other" and led to an
unwilling opening to the world. The two-stage process of globalization is thus
predestined. For the United States, it was an odd meeting with a country that was both
familiar and strange to it. Japan did not follow any rule the United States applied to other
countries, which were either too similar or too weak for any differences between them to
be noticeable. Japan was an enemy, it surrendered, and it is now a political partner and an
economic competitor; however, it is sill a mystery rather than a simple portrait of
nationalism.
Unavoidable Encounter and Circles of Negotiations
The "pre-ICH" encounter of Japan with the global took place under the structure of
MOSS. Part of the reason for these talks was commercial conflict in the mid-1 980s, as
reviewed in Chapter 3. Following the discussion of the dualistic nature of the dialogue,
12 A typical interpretation of this division is Stephen Cohen's Cowboys and Samurai (1991), which
portrays samurai and cowboys as characteristic of the fundamental differences that divide Japanese and
Americans. Cohen traces Japanese behavior back to its pre-modern period, when "the samurai of the
Tokugawa era seem to have been transformed into the new breed of managers and bureaucrats who guide
modem Japanese corporations and government agencies" (73). In the same manner, he portrays America
this way: "It is the youngest of the major industrial countries. It is one of the few countries born out of
genuine revolution. It is the only country in the world to be formed by people from every other country in
the world; one of a handful of countries without feudal or class patterns, having been founded by
immigrants who came overwhelmingly from the lower classes" (98).
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this section will focus on the political background on which the dialogue took place and
the conventional accounts of these negotiations.
In his famous book A Japan That Can Say No, 13 Ishihara Shintaro suggests a
bilateral talk exclusively between the United States and Japan-which he calls the "G2",
following the formulation of the then group of seven (G7) structure-so that a frank
dialogue can be established along with a clear Japanese identity.
When there are only two parties meeting, Japan will have no choice but to say
"yes" or "no" without resorting to gray areas. Japan must be equipped with logic
and reason whenever it says "no." Best of all, by holding a G2, Japan will only
have itself and the U.S. with which to be concerned, making it easier to stick to
the "no." (Chapter 11)
When stating this, Ishihara assumed this ideal situation was yet to come. However, this
was not quite true. The political atmosphere of the 1980s had stimulated such a meeting.
It was created by former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, who aggressively dealt with
the United States and established good relations with then U.S. President Ronald Reagan.
Thus it was expected that an exclusive conversation between these two world powers
would take place sooner or later under such a "G2 establishment" (itsu taizei).
However, having a conversation does not mean that will be fair. Apparently, both
sides thought this relationship was not fair to them. On the Japan's side, Ishihara charges
that during the "Ron-Yasu" (Ronald and Yasuhiro) era Nakasone behaved like a "lowly
yes-man" to Reagan's suggestions on topics ranging from global deployment to economic
policies (Chapter 9). A negative term, "G2 problem" (/itsu mondai), was coined to
indicate the possible frictions in this relationship, the most noteworthy example of which
is perhaps the yen-U.S. dollar agreement of 1987, in which the yen was forced, through
bilateral U.S.-Japan talks, to a value of 140 yen to one dollar, as compared to 264 yen to
one dollar in 1985 (for details on this valuation, see Funabashi 1992, 111-3).
The United States was not satisfied with these negotiations either. As mentioned in
Chapter 3, it was threatened by Japan's sky-rocketing economy and frustrated in its
efforts to conquer its market. To the Americans, Japan always seemed to protect its
producers rather than its consumers; it has never conformed to the free-market,
consumption-oriented model. These negotiations did not bridge the gap in U.S.-Japan
relations, which, as Cohen concludes, got even wider over the last three decades: "In
1969, the United States was annoyed with Japan's import barriers, export aggressiveness,
13 Here I use a complete yet unofficial English translation available on a website. It was done back to
1989 shortly after its original was published.
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and $1 billion bilateral trade surplus with the United States. In 1997, the United States
was annoyed with Japan's import barriers, export aggressiveness, and annual bilateral
trade surplus in the range of $50 billion" (1998: ix).
From these long-existing problems and failures of negotiation, Cohen summarizes a
model which he calls "negotiating in circles." Based on the assumption that Japan's
hesitancy toward the global takes the form of protectionism, Cohen describes two
scenarios for negotiating patterns-or two strategies that Japan employs to beat the
United States in U.S.-Japan negotiations: the United States protectionism version and the
import market access version (1991: 151-152). According to the discussion in Chapters 2
and 3, the issue of pharmaceuticals belongs to the latter. Its scenario, modified from
Cohen's model, goes as follows:
Scene : The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
complains bitterly of the lack of reciprocity in Japan's trade practices. Overt
barriers, cultural practices, industrial structure, and dirty tricks are cited as
restricting market access.
Scene 2: The United States Trade Representative (USTR) applies pressure, saying
that grave consequences are in store for Japan if it does nothing to correct its
trade disequilibrium by allowing other countries to sell more to it. The Japan
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA) complains of the
reappearance of "black ships" and accuses the United States government of
shamelessly and misguidedly meddling in Japan's domestic affairs.
Scene 3: The "internationalist" MHW quietly thanks the Americans for the vivid
threats, saying that they are useful levers in internal debates. They point out to
the Japanese protectionists that export growth is at risk if no international
standard is set. The MOSS negotiations begin; the Americans are advised that
they need to invest more energy in understanding the Japanese market.
Scene 4: Negotiations between Japan and the United States face problems. Other
issues are brought up and no concrete agreement is reached. The Japanese
definition of implementation bears little resemblance to the United States
definition. There is almost no measurable subsequent increase in U.S. market
share.
Scene 5: The PhRMA expresses dismay that Japan did not truly obey the spirit of
the agreement to liberalize the market. The MHW responds that it should
respect local customs. Private lobbying continues.
Scene 6: After a brief interlude, both sides express dismay at the continued enormity
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of the bilateral trade surplus. Return to Scene 1.
It seems like there is no way to break the circle; however in practice it is possible.
Karel Van Wolferen's Enigma of Japanese Power is one book that provides a solution to
this problem. According to Van Wolferen, Japan would never accept a deal provided by a
weaker party. With Japan's stubborn political system, free talk is impossible. Only by
showing dominance can the United States force Japan to accept a request or at least make
some compromises. This book's popularity is apparently understandable, because it
serves the agenda of powerful lobbyists who believe that the U.S. should retaliate against
Japan's economic success. "It has nothing to do with threats," said a Pfizer Japan officer.
"We just wanted to sell our goods to this country. We want to play a fair game."
The practice of the MOSS negotiation should be understood by this logic. As Cohen
points out, the advent of MOSS is "the most important development in the bilateral
dialogue" at this moment (1991: 43). The purpose of this new negotiating format was to
avoid tedious case-by-case complaints and vague accusations on issues of principle. The
MOSS talks were designed to address all identifiable, particular Japanese trade barriers in
areas in which American businesses were thought to be internationally competitive and
yet unsuccessful in Japan. The public watched the progress of the talks closely, and many
writers addressed its impacts (for the U.S. side, see Cohen 1991 and 1998, McCraw 1986;
for the Japanese side, Masuda and Tsuchiyama 2001, Funabashi 1992, Tanaka Naoki
1989, and Takenaka 1991).
The MOSS talks limited to four sectors: telecommunications, electronic products,
pharmaceuticals and medical devices, and forest products. Even so, the talks were
difficult. In late September 1985 an interim report on MOSS talks results was announced,
but it reportedly took four days of nearly round-the-clock negotiations before both sides
were willing to sign the report (Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei) [Japanese Economic
News], October 2). During the talks, the U.S. government had warned that if satisfactory
progress was not made, they would retaliate using Article 301 or some other means. It
also indicated that it had new items it wished to have addressed in the MOSS talks in
1986. Talks in the electronics and telecommunications fields had positive effects. The
forestry products negotiations were a total standoff. The MOSS talks concluded in August
1987, having achieved only modest Japanese concessions, mostly in the form of tariff
reductions and some relaxation of regulations.
Some policy analysts saw the results that the MOSS talks achieved positively. They
believed that MOSS had successfully forced Japan to face its excessive exports to the
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United States and its restricted domestic market. Although ultimately the negotiations did
not achieve the $1000 million rise in imports expected by the U.S. side, it at least
established a precedent for effective negotiation that could be followed up.
In fact, the United States did follow up as soon as it finished the first round of
MOSS. It said that Japan had not delivered on what it had promised. MOSS did yield
some progress, but not enough. Some critics did not give any credit to the meetings. As
Cohen cites, some U.S. negotiators' frustration and cynicism toward Japan were
expressed in the joke that "MOSS really stood for 'more of the same shit"' (1991 : 43).
This seems to be a consequence of the United States' disappointment with Japan's
repeatedly broken promises about opening its market. The Maekawa Report,' 4 for
example, released in 1986, presented a typical exercise in Japan's promise making. The
basic policy suggested in the report was to transform Japan from an exporting nation to
an importing nation, but the report was severely criticized for its lack of specific, concrete
measures.
Based on this, the United States again brought out the threat of trade retaliation. On
May 25, 1989, when U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, in accordance with Section
301 previsions, singled out Japan, Brazil, and India as having engaged in unfair trading
practices, U.S.-Japanese trade relations came to their toughest point. After several clashes,
the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) was created to save the fragile
relationship. It was a breakthrough, as Cohen recalls (1991: 49). Five negotiations were
held from September 1989 to June 1990,' 5 and Japan was dropped from the list of
countries being sanctioned by the United States. In the 1990 report on U.S.-Japanese
relations by the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies (1990), subtitled "A
new world environment; New questions," trade friction was still the most important issue
for both countries; the MOSS negotiations was nothing but an episode in the long march
of the United States to the Japanese market.
Pharmaceuticals in the MOSS Negotiations: Similarities and Differences
Strangely, the settlement whereby foreign clinical data were accepted does not
14 The full title of the report is "Report of the Economic Structure Adjustment Study Group for
Integrating the Economy into the World." It was prepared by a study group led by Maekawa Haruo, then
the Bank of Japan Governor, after which it was informally named.
15 The first round of negotiations was held in September and November of 1989 and February of 1990.
The results it achieved are summarized in an interim progress report released in April 1990. Before a final
report was signed and released in June 1990, two more meetings were held. For a brief summary and a
short commentary on what SII achieved, see SAIS 1990: 44-46.
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follow any of the scenarios portrayed in the previous section. The first contact between
Japan and the United States concerning the clinical standard for pharmaceuticals and the
issue of racial difference was initiated during the MOSS talks, according to Naito
Chikayuki, one of the key persons in charge of creating the Japanese guideline for clinical
trials.' 6 However, it was neither front-page news attracting public discussion nor a
controversial issue in the related literature about U.S.-Japan trade friction. Like other
sectors, the talks about pharmaceuticals and medial devices stared in January 1985. But
despite the newness of the issue when it was first slated for negotiation, it only took nine
months to reach an agreement.
This does not mean that issues in the pharmaceutical sector were simpler than those
in other sectors. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 2, the drug industry is a rather more
complicated issue for negotiation than other industries because it involves both
equipment in factories as well as human subjects and lives. However, we also find some
similarities between pharmaceuticals and other sectors. For example, under the scheme of
standardization of products, the same rationale applied to settling concerns about racial
difference can be seen in the negotiations on telecommunication equipment. The
Japanese agreed to accept the results of certain equipment-testing procedures conducted
in the would-be exporter's country and to set operating standards for telecommunications
equipment more closely comparable to those in the United States. The same kind of
negotiation was also seen in the area of wood products. The problem with
pharmaceuticals and medical devices was whether foreign data was acceptable in Japan
or if a universal standard was possible. Even so, an agreement was soon achieved.
Some believe that the reason for this quick settlement was the fact that Japan
imported a relatively large amount of drugs. Nikkei predicted before the negotiations that
"since Japan's deficit on pharmaceuticals is so large, basically the MHW should not be a
spark for the Japan-U.S. economic frictions" (January 26 1985). Since Japan had
imported pharmaceuticals from foreign countries, the agreement would not contain any
numerical targets that might create penalties, a practice common in negotiations in other
sectors.
Basically this observation was correct; however, I would like to point out that the
Japanese delegation had an important factor aiding this success: this was the first time the
MHW was formally involved in this kind of negotiation. Certainly it was not unusual to
invite Ministries other than the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (e.g., the negotiations on rice import). However, it was
16 For brief background on MOSS and its relationship with the acceptance of foreign data and racial
difference, see Naito 1991, esp. 188-189.
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unusual not to have the MITI as the "quarterback" in this negotiating team. 17 Unlike the
U.S., which organized the standard "triad" team of Treasury Department, State
Department, and U.S. Trade Representative for commercial negotiations, on the Japanese
side the MITI was actually absent.' 8 In short, this time the Japanese did not want to deal
with business but with health.
This unusual scenario made the negotiation on pharmaceuticals take a direction
unfamiliar to those who were acquainted with Japan-U.S. negotiations. For example,
Stephen Cohen has pointed out that the U.S. team usually behaves like a "three-way
cleavage" (1995: 196).19 This time, however, the chorus played in unison. The Treasury
Department was the choir leader and the team fully reflected its will to open Japan's
market based on standard consumption-oriented rhetoric, as discussed in previous
chapters. On the other side, detached from the conventional image of Japanese
aggressiveness, the Japanese team led by Vice Minister of the MHW Yoshimura Hitoshi
was self-controlled. It accepted almost all the suggestions from the U.S. side, including
approval and licensing processes, listing, and other administrative issues. As reported,
among the topics discussed, particularly good progress was made in the area of
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. This was the only sector that reached a concrete
agreement. What made pharmaceutical issues easier to resolve, in my opinion, was
mainly the nature of the MHW bureaucracy. It is not an institution for commerce but for
health. For the MHW, the standard of pharmaceuticals was a problem of science and
could be solved scientifically.
In this atmosphere the issue of the acceptance of foreign data was introduced.
Although the related regulations had existed since 1976 and three modifications had
occurred in 1980, 1982 and 1983, it was acknowledged that the range of acceptance was
quite limited (only phase I data under some restrictions). Thus Japan did not accept any
clinical data made in other countries before the MOSS talks; all clinical trials had to be
performed on Japanese subjects before a drug was allowed to be marketed in Japan,
irrespective of its testing history in other countries.20
The U.S. team explained two market effects that these testing requirements caused.
17 According to the Report on Market-Oriented, Sector-Selective (MOSS) Discussions, the Japanese
team was led by the MHW with the assistance of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the
Embassy of Japan to Washington, D.C.
18 An OPSR expert told me that it was the Cabinet that referred the request to the MHW. It was an
unusual arrangement and it surprised the FDA when they were contacted by the MHW for discussion.
19 Funabashi adds in his analysis that the Whitehouse was an additional factor that shaped the U.S.
policy of foreign business and frictions. See Funabashi 1992: 79-87.
20 For details about the drugs abandoned or suspended during their applications, see Naito 1991 (1985):
482-483.
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First, the extremely costly duplication of testing placed a burden upon foreign firms that
their domestic competitors in Japan did not have to face. Second, duplicative testing in
Japan delayed product marketing. On Japan's side, the fundamental concern was the
difference between the Japanese and Caucasian Americans. The MHW expressed its
worry that a lack of Japanese clinical data might endanger drug users. Even so,
conversation was still on the right track; no one drove these disagreements in the useless
direction of arguments over capitalist hegemony or nationalist resistance. In the first
vice-ministerial meeting of the negotiations, held on March 12, 1985, the U.S. side
suggested that waivers for local clinical trials be given to those drugs that would not be
impacted by racial differences.
As the negotiations moved from commercial question about waiving clinical trials
to the matter of which trials related to racial difference, they became easy. The Japanese
had assigned a group of scientific experts to study this matter under the heading of
"testing and test data" before the negotiation. 21 Expert-level discussions between the
MHW and the FDA regarding each nation's policy were held on May 26. With some
conditions, the MHW agreed to accept foreign clinical test data for regulatory approval of
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and in-vitro diagnostic reagents (Yakujinippo, July 4
1985). The results were as follows:
1. With regard to pharmaceuticals, foreign clinical test data will now be accepted
for all examination/testing requirements except for the following three items
where there are immunological and ethnic differences between Japanese and
foreigners: comparative clinical trials; dose finding tests; and absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and excretion tests.
2. Foreign clinical test data will now be accepted for in-vitro diagnostic reagents
except those with new parameters (i.e., those that measure an entirely new
substance as a diagnostic indicator), and those in which immunological reaction
problems could occur with the materials to be tested.
3. Foreign clinical test data will now be accepted for medical devices, except those
implanted in the human body and those affecting organic adaptability. (14)
The above resolution was approved by both sides in June 1985 talks in Tokyo. The
relevant regulatory action taken was Notification No. 660 for the "Handling of Foreign
Test Data for Pharmaceuticals, etc.," dated June 29 and effective July 31, 1985. It was
one of the first and fastest-resolved issues in this set of negotiations.
21 This was "The study group for the evaluation of the foreign clinical trial data," led by Naito
Chikayuki, then the director of Department of Internal Medicine, Tokyo Teishin Hospital, in 1983. The
evaluation report was released in May 1985.
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Under overwhelming politico-economic pressure from the United States, the case of
pharmaceuticals seemed to present a "win-win" situation for Japan, allowing the country
to make its first step toward the global. Earlier the United States had changed its
regulations to allow non-U.S. data as the sole basis for approval; Japan reconsidered now
the possibility of accepting foreign data based on this.22 It might be said that medicine is
science, separable from politics, but in fact it was not that simple. Reading the
notification carefully, we can find the cultural boundary that the MHW drew for this
acceptance.
Two points should be noted. First, it excluded all test waivers related to human
bodies. For example, on pharmaceuticals the MHW asked for a near-repetition of phase II
and III clinical trials, which are done on human beings. On in-vitro diagnostics it
mentioned in particular the necessity of collecting domestic data for blood testing
reagents. And on medical devices it required domestic clinical trials for all devices
implanted into human bodies, such as pacemakers, intrauterine devices, contact lens, and
breast implants.
The second point is the trust-building endeavor on pharmaceuticals. As discussed
previously, Japan's medical care, along with its social system, is based on trust. Thus
while it accepted foreign data, the MHW demanded "picky" requirements. Foreign
applicants not only needed to comply with existing guidelines between Japan and the
country where the clinical trials are done-the acceptability of their data was also judged
on the basis of medical practice. Also required was the building of credibility: all
investigators had to be listed with full resumes of their achievements in the field related
to the tested drug, and all the institutions involved as well.23 When these documents were
translated, which was also required, the resumes of the translators were also listed in
order to make sure that the translation was faithful.
Indeed, the deepest concerns about clinical trials rested on issues surrounding the
body which could not be easily reduced to regulatory terms. In this sense, the MOSS
settlement did not change anything. As commented on by Shintani Tetsuro of the JPMA,
"it is not exceptional for Japan to conduct separated tests to fit its own nationals' body
physics (taikaku) and predispositions (taishitsu)" (Nikkei January 30, 1985). However, it
is hard to say whether the MHW was practicing a protectionist trade discourse or
protectionism of body and health. It clearly stated that its position opened the gates for
22 For details of this change, see FDA 1985.
23 It is interesting that for situations where the signatures of investigators were not available, such as
their deaths, additional documents had to be provided by applicants explaining the reasons.
213
international trade, but it also guarded its people's bodies and health. The MHW stated,
"Holding maintenance of people's health and safety as its supreme end, [MHW] is
making a serious effort at smoothly admitting foreign products while trying to understand
foreign requests" (WGDA 2000: 233). As we will see in Part II, the MHW's position did
not change behind the scenes when the issue of racial difference was debated. In just
three years the stage was transformed from the bilateral MOSS negotiations to the more
complicated ICH negotiations.
PART II
RACE AND GLOBAL PRESENCE: DEBATING RACIAL DIFFERNCE AT THE
ICH
From Bilateral to Global: Forming a Conference for Regulatory Experts
Part II will address Japan's encounter with the ICH and the temporary settlement of
the racial difference issue in the E5 guideline "Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of
Foreign Clinical Data." It deals with, in order of appearance, the creation of the ICH as a
global forum, the formulation of the racial difference problem and scientific research on
the issue, and the political arrangements needed to make a temporary settlement. Unlike
the "pre-ICH" mode of its negotiations with the United States, Japan took the initiative
and brought the sensitive issue of racial difference to the broader, technology-oriented
ICH, turning around their approach to this problem.
Even so, there were some concerns that remained unchanged in this new mode,
such as the "dialectics of difference" discussed in part I. Although all participants agreed
with a vague interpretation of the biological essentialism of race, quarrels over the
definition of racial difference and its clinical significance continued as the field changed
from culture to science and then from science to politics. The original break over which
standard (Caucasian, Asian, or a mix) should be used for studies haunted the conference.
Worse, in terms of administration, a nationalist concern over how a universal standard
could incorporate subjects from a specific country (i.e., the Japanese) was added. All
these made the final result, the E5 guideline, nothing but a reflection of the complicated
nature of this problem. In this sense, globalization did not gain anything by fusing things
together; instead, it wove conflicts and contradictions into a superficial harmony named
"the guideline."
Let us first return to the bilateral mode. While regional experts still urged the United
States to "push harder on trade" or encouraged the Japanese and the Americans to deal
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with their trade problem rather than "pretending it didn't exist," the discussion on
pharmaceuticals and the acceptance of foreign clinical data had silently departed from the
MOSS negotiations and was no longer a cause of trade friction. Although the MOSS
follow-up meetings continued, as shown in table 4.2, they did not involved important
issues, including the acceptance of foreign clinical data. The discussion deviated further
and further from the "regular track" of bilateral business negotiation; this was because the
global ICH rather than the trade-oriented MOSS became the scientific and administrative
platform for discussion.
Table 4.2 MOSS Follow-up Meetings, 1986-1996
No Time/place Main topics discussed
I August 1986/ Confirmation of MOSS agreed topics
Washington, D.C. Drawing up of approval standard for vitamins as OTC drugs
2 March 1987/ Confirmation of MOSS agreed topics
Tokyo
3 April 1988/ Confirmation of MOSS agreed topics
Tokyo Calculation of formula for prices of new drugs
4 March 1989/ Calculation of formula for prices of new drugs
Washington, D.C. Acceptance of U.S. quality management data for medical
devices
5 May 1990/ The Central Social Insurance Medical Council
Tokyo Setting reimbursement rates for implantable medical devices
6 November 1991/ Highly advanced medical technology
Washington, D.C. Proceeding period of in-vitro diagnosis
7 June 1992/ GIP (Global Internet Project)
Tokyo Highly advanced medical treatment
Standard proceeding period of In-vitro diagnosis
8 November 1992/ Specific therapeutic materials
Tokyo GIP
9 April 1993/ Guidelines for customary dealing of medical devices
Tokyo GPMSP (Good Post Marketing Surveillance Practice)
10 October 1993/ Classification of medical devices
Tokyo
11 December 1994/ Specific therapeutic materials
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Source: adopted from the Drug Administration Working Group, Japan 2000:
235-239.
In Chapter 2, I reviewed the foundation of the ICH and its motivations on behalf of
global drug companies and business (Chapter 2, part III). However, commerce does not
represent all the concerns of this conference. In this section, I will review the ICH from
the viewpoint of the regulators and medical technocrats. I argue that it was their wish to
form a global platform that made the establishment of the ICH possible.
It is hard to trace the exact historical origin of the ICH, but it is was surely no later
than the first MOSS experts' meeting held in Rockville, Maryland, in May 1985, where
MHW experts learned from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the Western
style of drug regulations. The FDA did not have a major presence at the MOSS
negotiations, yet they appreciated this dialogue when they met the MHW experts directly.
It was reported that the experts from both sides discussed "the possibility of setting
bilateral or multilateral common standards for the acceptance of foreign clinical data."
Afterward, the FDA and the MHW agreed in principle that "it is desirable to work toward
a system of international harmonization" (MOSS Report 1986: 14).
The meeting had more impacts on the Japanese side. Before MOSS, the MHW was
a very "domestic" ministry. Besides, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it was already occupied
in the routine duty of administering national health insurance. However, the MOSS talks
broadened the horizon for the MHW. One former MHW official remembered that the
MITI complained when the MHW was assigned for the negotiation, but they insisted that
they were able to handle this task.24 This action also marked a shift of the people in
24 The replacement of the MITI by the MHW had to do with what Chalmers Johnson has observed
regarding the fragmented nature of Japan's bureaucracy, which itself has a long history dating back to the
Meiji period. Eachjikohonyi, or ministry, has its own territory and looks after only that territory. I will
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Washington, D.C. Highly advanced medical treatment
Request for the relaxation on drug regulations
Hard Gelatin Capsules
12 July 1995/ Hard Gelatin Capsules
Tokyo Introduction of insurance system for new techniques
Specific therapeutic materials
13 March 1996/ Hard Gelatin Capsules
Tokyo Insurance reimbursement
charge. I have mentioned that in Japan, physicians play a dominant role in all medical
affairs, including drugs. However, when dealing with foreign countries, another group of
experts specializing in drugs was responsible. These yakkeigikan, pharmaceutical affairs
technocrats, are very different from the conventional idea of Japanese bureaucrats.
Although they are not at the highest level of the bureaucracy, they are in charge of
regulatory issues. Cohen is right when he observes that the MHW technocrats chosen
were smart, outstanding, and curious to know new things. It was during the MOSS
negotiations that these officials witnessed a different system of drug approval. "Only
since then have I realized how 'Japanese' we are in such a business," one regulator
remembered.
More stimulation came from the MOSS-like negotiations with the EC starting in
December 1986. Like the United States, the EC requested a market-oriented negotiation
that included cosmetic products, pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Two experts'
meetings were held: one for medical devices and cosmetic materials in June 1987, and the
other for pharmaceuticals in September 1988. Agreement was reached to omit
"unnecessary" clinical trials when the MHW officials met with their European colleagues,
who were mainly experts from the EC commission and the European Federation of
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), which represents the European
pharmaceutical industry. The time was right to create a forum of these experts.
Chapter 2 reviewed the official origin of the ICH, the International Conference of
Drug Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA) held in Paris in 1989. However, this description
does not say anything about the mechanism by which such a program was initiated. In
fact, the ICH had a "non-commercial" and "non-political" beginning that had nothing to
do with the ICDRA. Organized by the WHO, the ICDRA had been held since the 1980s,
yet not much had been done concerning regulations that improved the safety, efficacy and
quality of innovative medicines. The idea to form a conference on this matter originated
from a private meeting of experts on drug regulation from the United States, Japan and
Europe occurred. There seemed to be a spontaneous need for these regulators to do
something for themselves. They were science people with scientific thoughts. It was a
brainstorming meeting in a small room, Elaine C. Esber, then the FDA representative and
one of the few people who has participated from the foundation of the ICH, remembered.
Esber was not able to remember who exactly was present: "I can count, five or six, not
many" she said of the meeting excitedly. But what was clear to her was that a consensus
was soon arrived among these regulators. They agreed that international standards for
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argue that since drugs were not considered a "business," the MHW, which was a more health-oriented
institution, was not much influenced by the MITI or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
new drugs were not only desirable but necessary. "So, let us do it!" was the conclusion
reached.
However, the ICH could not be realized without administrative backing. Esber said
that she then brought the proposal to harmonize regulations on drugs back to the FDA,
asking for its support. Following the agreements between Japan, the United States and the
EC, the latter two signed an agreement in November 1989 to hold biannual expert
meetings on scientific and technical regulation of food and pharmaceuticals (Nikkei,
November 14 1989). Two officials were key to realizing this concept: F. Sauer, who was
involved in the harmonization of the rules among EC countries, and Nelly Baudrihaye,
Director of the EFPIA, who had worked closely with the EC Commission. These officials
proposed that three regions-the EC, U.S. and Japan--discuss how to stop the
duplication of so many studies by harmonizing requirements. They got the advice of the
WHO, the support of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries (IFPMA),
and the agreement of U.S. and Japanese regulatory bodies. Meanwhile, experts continued
to work on issues and topics they could bring to this conference. As written in the
proceedings of the first ICH conference, its preparation owed much to "the many
technical discussions between experts which have taken place at international symposia
dealing with regulatory requirements" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992: xix). Their efforts
finally resulted in the first ICH conference in 1991.
Now let us return to the shift of the dialogue channel from the MOSS to the ICH.
Chapter 2 discusses two characteristics of the ICH that provide the reasons for replacing
bilateral negotiations such as the MOSS. First, the ICH's membership is exclusive to the
countries able to produce and consume proprietary drugs. Thus instead of making
agreements one by one, this forum was expected to be able to generate more timely and
productive results. Second, the ICH made possible direct conversation between industry
and regulators. If the MOSS talks had to have the involvement of political parties, such as
trade representatives and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ICH presented a more
direct means by which the needs of producers and regulators could be clearly heard.
However, here I would like to discuss the MHW's attitude toward this conference. How
did Japan perceive this gathering?
Many might be surprised that the MHW in fact showed substantial interest in this
conference. Elaine Esber mentioned to me in an interview that Kurokawa Tatsuo, then the
MHW representative to the ICDRA, cordially supported her scientific proposal from the
beginning. This information is confirmed from the Japanese side. For example,
Kurokawa reported that at the third EC-Japan experts' meeting, which was held
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immediately after the ICDRA, the EC representatives asked Japan to join the endeavor
(ICH-Japan Study Group 1993: 7). Doi Osamu, then the director of the new drug division
of the MHW, commented of this request that Japan was in fact invited as a gaiatsu, or
"external pressure," in order to keep German and French pharmaceutical companies at the
negotiating table. Doi also noted that it was the MHW's experiences at the MOSS and
other bilateral negotiations that made it realize that a forum dealing with both Europe and
the United States was inevitable (1999:10). Therefore, we are compelled to ask, why did
the MHW decide to turn to the global while at the same time globalization was
attempting to capture Japan?
This question can be answered by three aspects of the conference. First, from
practical aspect, the MHW understood and appreciated the operation of gaiatsu. It is a
common negotiation practice in Japanese culture. From a domestic perspective, although
the MHW does not have much of an obligation to protect domestic industry, it did have
reason to welcome the gaiatsu of the ICH. This pressure would help the regulatory
authority's international connections and give it the scientific requirements it needed to
flight against the conservative medical authority of clinicians and professors, which was
considered an obstacle to reform. Besides, in an international context, the MHW was
happy to be a gaiatsu for other countries. It was a logical dimension of international
politics to them, and it demonstrated Japan's significance in world affairs.
Related to the political operation of gaiatsu, the political aspect of the MHW's
active participation reveals an unspoken wish to "escape" from the bilateral framework of
negotiation in which the United States was always dominant. As Cohen observes, there
was a trend for Japan to move from bilateral to multilateral negotiations in the 1990s
(1998: 28-30). According to Cohen, Japan's strategists assumed that they had a better
chance of wining if disputes were arbitrated on a multilateral basis. In addition, since the
late 1970s Japan had wished to improve its foreign relations from bilateral to multilateral.
As Tanaka and Miyazaki both point out, the key to this change was Europe's position as a
reemerging market and negotiator. Europe not only relieved the direct tension between
the United States and Japan; it also became an important part of global market (Tanaka
1989: 73-40; Miyazaki 1990:45).
From all this we can see two reasons for the MHW's participation in the ICH. The
passive reason, as Bernd Knabe points out, is finding an ultimate solution to all the
economic frictions occasioned by drug approval requirements (Knabe 1988). Nonetheless,
the ICH was also an active means of avoiding a market-driven conflict in which the
United States tried to force its drugs on Japan and Japan responded by putting up
non-tariff barriers. The MHW's major concern instead was whether the ICH's scientific
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and technological orientation would be accepted and abided by the U.S. and drug
companies, or whether the latter would try to exploit it for their own purposes. In fact,
Doi recalled the FDA's hesitation over founding the forum. He reasoned that the U.S.
hoped to universalize its standards and thought that a multilateral forum might prevent it
from reaching this goal (1999: 10-11). This wish can be read also in Kurokawa's
comment on Japan's relationship with Europe and the role it played in its inclusion in the
ICH.
Finally, on the cultural and ideological level, joining the ICH coincided with the
Japanese worldview. The words "international" and "harmony" in the ICH's title caught
the MHW's imagination. Partially because of their inexperience in international
negotiations and partially because of the title of the conference, the MHW truly believed
that in the field of health and body, harmony (as distinct from unity in a Western sense)
could possibly be achieved. The term wa, translated as "harmony," carries special cultural
weight for the Japanese. It is the best way in communication: when divergent viewpoints
are integrated into an acceptable solution, then wa emerges. Another concept related to
wa is mutuality and reciprocity. Kawashima contrast the role of wa in Japan with
individualism (1967): "Wa is not mechanical co-operation, starting from reason, of equal
individuals independent of each other, but the grand harmony (taiwa) which maintains its
integrity by proper statuses of individuals within the collectivity [and] by acts in
accordance with these statuses" (264, as quoted in Gudykunst and Nishida 1994: 24).
Thus the making of harmony is considered a social process confirming each participant's
status. As the only non-Western party to the conference, Japan treasured this opportunity
and expected to confirm its status as an equal to the United States and Europe in every
international stage; this was the possibility it saw in the ICH.
The above explanations are key to understanding why Japan was comfortable with
joining the global. In contrast with conventional perceptions of Japan regarding
protectionism and globalization, I did not hear any objections or suspicions from the
technocrats about joining the conference. The MHW even expected this conference to be
"also a help for making our pharmaceutical industry international" (MHW 1990: 187). In
fact, before joining the ICH the MHW had asked the JPMA do a survey of all member
companies concerning overseas markets and sales (JPMA 1989). The results indicated
that about 90 percent of companies had considered the future unification of the European
market, and many had established bases in either the United States or Europe. However,
thirty-three out of forty-two companies that answered the questionnaire complained that
the absence of a bilateral or trilateral agreement on the related regulations would be a big
hurdle (39). Although the MHW had little experience in business, this result was enough
220
for it to join this conference.
The same tone can be also read in the 1990 MHWAnnual Report, which does not
mention the ICH by name, but includes a chapter titled "Japan's Contribution to the
World" that says that "the MHW is joining actively an international conference with the
United States and EC, along with others, for the harmonization of standards. It will
contribute to the making of this scientific, appropriate standard" (MHW 1991: Chapter 6).
With this optimism, the problem of racial difference was handed over to a group of
experts and regulators.
Bringing Culture into Science: Formulating Racial Difference in the ICH
In the following three sections, I will trace how racial difference was discussed at
the new conference. As discussed in Chapter 2, the EWG meetings were the main arena
where debates over each guideline took place, and the E5 guideline, though it took much
longer than the others, was no exception. From the viewpoint of scientific controversy the
debate process can be divided into three rounds, each with a distinct focus (for
information about these meetings, see table 4.3 and table 4.7). The first round began with
the first EWG meeting September 1992 and lasted until the release of a position paper in
August 1994. It focused on the scientific evaluation of whether racial difference had any
significance in drug development. From this time until ICH3 was held in November 1995,
a second round of discussion took place that featured heated debates over whether factors
other than genetic polymorphism should be taken into consideration. The third and final
round was built around a workable proposal for dealing with racial difference. It
proceeded by establishing an operational definition of racial difference as a factor that
could be "bridged" by the extrapolation of clinical data from one country or population to
another. This thesis will go through these discussions round by round. However, along
with analyses of conflicting arguments, ethnographic concerns will lead it to examine the
dynamics of discourses in which race was not a biologically fixed point of reference, but
a field defined and shaped by the actors involved.
This section is an introduction to the topics and initial investigations. Since race is
so obvious a subject, people might think it is an easy topic to start discussing. However,
this was not the reality. Two considerations needed to be taken into account in addressing
race. The first was a technical concern that the cultural intuition of "racial difference"
makes no sense in a scientific context. In order to initiate a scientific discussion, race had
to be given a form that was scientifically arguable. Maybe we should think of it this way:
in this instance of drug regulation, how can concerns about racial difference be presented?
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The second concern had much to do with the existing complicated relations between
science and culture. As a controversial issue in both realms, it was hard to keep the topic
in only one realm when it is discussed. Thus if the ICH wanted to examine this issue, the
question had to be asked as clearly as possible in order for there to be no unwanted
complications.
Although racial difference was not given as an independent subject for discussion at
the beginning of the ICH conferences, tensions concerning the issue were apparent.
Originally, in preparatory meetings the issue was considered to be ethnicity and was put
on the agenda for a panel on "studies in support of special populations"; yet following
consideration of possible cultural implications, only aging people were selected for
inclusion in this discussion. At ICHI, a panel on "design/requirements for dose responses
trials" was arranged for under the category of efficacy. Presenters from the United States
and Japan recognized the fact that the Asians tended to administer smaller dose regimens
than Americans (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992: 479-511). Therefore, the category of
efficacy and the issue of dosage seemed to be a natural starting point to exploring
differences between the three regions. Even so, people on this same panel expressed
worries. William Wardell of the Warner Lambert Company, for instance, argued that
harmonization should start on two fronts: medical and cultural, and "we need to clarify
any medical-scientific difference and to understand cultural difference." It is obvious that
medical difference is a subject of scientific investigation, but the reason for studying
international cultural differences in medicine and therapeutics was to enable researchers
to "separate the cultural from the scientific differences, and so use valid scientific data in
support of international application anywhere" (488).
Wardell's caution reflected the tense political background to the subject of racial
difference in relations between Japan and the United States in the 1980s. It was reported
in 1983 that Nakasone Yasuhiro said of Japanese racial homogeneity that "the Japanese
have been doing well for as long as 2000 years because there are no foreign races"
(quoted from Fallows 1986: 41). He infamously commented in 1986 that Japan's racial
homogeneity had helped it become a more "intelligent society" than the United States,
"where there are blacks, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans and the level is still quite low"
(Wysoski 1986). Thus I was told by conference participants that the United States did not
want Japan to bring up the issue of racial difference, at least not in a form that could be
related to Japanese nationalism. In short, Wardell and others hoped that Japan would
separate its state from its people.
On the other hand, the MHW insisted on the importance of this issue. Presenting at
the opening ceremony of ICHI (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992: 24-26), Doi Osamu
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elaborated the Japanese perspective in two ways. First, rejecting conventional thinking on
globalization that assumed a one-way distribution from the West to the East, Doi argued
that the mission of the conference should be to achieve "mutual acceptance" of foreign
clinical data. "We are not yet satisfied with the present status of global harmonization
through scientific discussion at this ICH meeting," he said. Second, Doi considered racial
difference to be an essential issue that impeded the promotion of mutual acceptance, and
believed it could be solved by scientific investigation. He claimed, "I believe and I hope
that this issue will be discussed from a scientific point of view at the ICH meeting and in
its expert group meetings." In other words, while the United States and the EC tried to
"incorporate" Japan into their proposals for globalization-namely, to have either a
restricted racial consideration in each trial or an administrative integration that would
compromise Japanese sovereignty-Doi insisted on Japan's national presence within the
global scene. He did so based upon his strong belief that the Japanese nation and race
could be defined by science.
Because of Japan's insistence, the issue of racial difference was first brought up at
the topic-searching meeting held in Washington, D.C., in March 1992. It was softly
rebuffed by the European Union (EU, formerly the EC) and the United States in the first
round, but as soon as this was heard by MHW expert Naito Chikayuki, Doi Osamu, the
leader of the MHW delegation, urged that the issue be put back on the list. Naito
remembered: "It was noon; I had lunch with other MHW delegates. I reported to Doi that
our proposal of racial difference was declined earlier this morning, but he insisted that it
must be in. I did not know exactly how they made it; the only thing I heard is that the
MHW went to meet the FDA to talk over this issue, and it was finally added as the third
priority in the category of efficacy."
Of course, Doi's fervent insistence might be due to his personality, but it could also
be understood as an assertion that has multiple implications. On the subject of clinical
trials, the MHW had been accused of not keeping its promise to accept foreign data; in
fact, Japanese regulations required every foreign applicant to repeat almost all clinical
trials they had already done somewhere else.25 Thus the issue needed to be reconsidered
in one place or another, and Doi intentionally chose to make the ICH the place. This
decision had political implications, as it was an escape from the MOSS framework and
moved the crucial issue of racial difference to a new platform. The MHW hoped that by
resolving the matter of racial difference it would no longer be an excuse for protectionism
25 These are the so-called "three repeats": the absorption, distribution, metabolism, and elimination
tests of phase I, the dose finding tests of phase II, and the comparative clinical trials between Japanese and
foreigners of phase III.
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and "Japanese style" clinical trials.
Table 4.3 Timeline of Discussions on the E5 Guideline, 1992-1995
Source: adopted from Koyama 1999: 58, Table 1.
In an atmosphere that mixed optimism and suspicion, racial difference entered the
field of science in the context of dose-response trials. Although aware of the genetic
polymorphism and environmental components of racial difference, at the first EWG
meeting the experts only agreed to conduct comparisons of Japanese and Caucasians in
the area of pharmacokinetics. Specifically, these studies mainly focused on the absorption,
distribution, metabolism, and elimination (ADME) of drugs among these two groups. The
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Time Event Achievements
March 1992 Steering Meeting in Washington, D.C. Subject accepted
September 1992 First EWG meeting on E5
October 1993 ICH 2 in Orlando, Florida Retrospective study on racial
difference reported by Japan and
EU
March 1994 EWG meeting in Tokyo Draft I drafted
August 1994 Position paper released
October 1994 EWG meeting in Brussels Draft 2 formed, in which
"triage" was proposed
February 1995 EWG meeting in Athens Draft 3 formed; temporary
settlement of the acceptance of
phase I and II data
March 1995 EWG meeting in Washington, D.C. Draft 4 formed in which bridging
study was proposed
July 1995 EWG meeting in Brussels Draft 5 formed; "triage" and
bridging study approaches used
simultaneously
August 1995 Draft 6 circulated
November 1995 ICH 3 in Yokohama Draft 7 formed; temporary
settlement of the acceptance of
phase III data
MHW undertook a retrospective study, looking at differences in results from healthy
volunteers and patients for products submitted for approval in Japan since 1985. The
Center for Medicines Research (CMR) carried out a survey in the United States and
Europe, collecting data from phases I, II, and III.
Even considering only the biological factors, these comparisons had a hidden
agenda: they were intended to see whether there was any collective significance to race
by weighting individual and interethnic differences.26 On the surface they seemed to
echo an American approach to the evaluation of how much weight should be placed on
race in clinical trials; however, the FDA showed little interest. An FDA expert shared
with me his opinion on racial and individual difference. "You ask me why we did not care
much about racial difference," he said. "I will tell you that it is because it is less
important than many other factors, all of which compose a complex situation concerning
what we call a disease and a person. If we do want to take racial difference into account, I
will say, for example, in the field of cancer research everybody is in fact a race. All
patients are unique in some ways. They should be considered as individuals and every
disease should be treated accordingly." As a scientist he thought the E5 EWG asked the
wrong questions. Nonetheless, in the context of the dialog this agenda was very important.
Since Japan conceived of state and race as bound together, the other parties to the ICH
saw it as crucial to refute the myth by blurring the boundary that separated Japan from
"the other." In short, they wanted to play a "zero-sum" game. Dose-response was no
longer a focus; the concept of nation-state was.27
The results of the first scientific investigations were a surprise. The MHW assigned
a study group to conduct scientific studies,2 8 but their results did not support the
Ministry's "nationalist" assumptions. Yasuhara Hajime's retrospective study on eight
new chemical entities (NCEs) shows that, in spite of some hormonal differences and
genetic polymorphism, such as cytochrome P-450 enzymes, intra-ethnic differences in
the ADME data were greater than interethnic differences (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994:
440-442). Using differences in AUC (area under concentration of a drug in the body) and
Cmax (maximum effective concentration of a drug in the body) as parameters, it was
26 It is not a fortuity for these scientists to apply this approach to clarify whether racial difernce exists.
According to David S. Jones's current study on the history of medical researches on racial differences, it is
a tendency shown in these studies that they emphasize more on the importance of difference among
individuals than that due to different racial groups. I thank Professor Jones for this important information.
27 The subject became an independent topic titled "Dose-response information to support registration"
(E4). It reached step two in March 1993, and the step four draft was signed off by the ICH Steering
Committee on March 10, 1994.
28 It began with studies of the anti-TB drug INH, a dose-response study on NASID drugs, and P450
polymorphism.
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reported that for most drugs, the differences in AUC and Cmax between Japanese and
people of other races were within a two-fold range, meaning that no significant difference
could be found. The other study showed more striking results. The data of a
methenytoin-type drug, UL-O 1, showed significant differences in AUC and Cmax between
the two groups tested that might have been contributed to by racial differences. However,
comparing PK parameters, Yasuhara found extraordinarily high values in two Japanese
subjects and one non-Japanese subject; these values' difference from the mean values of
their respective groups were even larger than the interethnic difference. In short, the
findings betrayed the Japanese belief in a homogeneous racial group.
It was so dramatic a result that the E.U. experts extended its implications to their
own studies. Stuart Walker of the EFPIA pointed out at ICH2 that interethnic difference
only accounted for approximately 11 percent of total individual genetic variation. He
boldly concluded that the varying frequency of genetic polymorphism of the cytochrome
P-450 enzyme is likely to have "considerably less impact on drug kinetics and dynamics
than other non-racial genetic factors or environmental influences" (D'Arcy and Harron
eds. 1994: 444). Since then, the UL-01 study has been widely cited as a "classic,"
scientific proof that racial difference is of no clinical significance. It was believed that if
Japan did not accept this result it would be accused of being irrational and unscientific.
Did Japan really have no way to escaping this dilemma? Scientifically, yes;
culturally, no. Yes, because Japan did have some ways of arguing against the
implications of the UL-01 study. JPMA representative of the EWG Uwoi Tohru, for
example, pointed out that the results were badly analyzed due to the improper use of
statistics (Uwoi 1999: 45). Not only did this study not enroll enough subjects to prove the
results they claimed (six Japanese and twelve Swedes), but the way the data were
interpreted was misleading. Uwoi admitted that there were indeed two Japanese
individuals with high AUC and Cmax values; however, for the comparison to show racial
difference, it was necessary to stratify the population and balance out these anomalous
figures. For Uwoi, there was no statistical sense to the claim that there was no racial
difference.
Nonetheless, Japan did not respond this way, for it would have been culturally
unacceptable. In order not to challenge the presumption that the Japanese were unique as
a group, the MHW chose to accept the conclusion of the UL-Ol study, "abandoning" that
part of PK testing for mutual acceptance. In other words, the MHW chose to break the
process of clinical trials into pieces instead of breaking the definition of race itself into
individual pharmacokinetic factors. For the sake of administration, the MHW insisted that
anything proved racially insignificant (in comparison with individual variations) should
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be subject to mutual recognition between Japan and the West; however, this result could
not be applied to other areas of clinical trials unless more studies showed similarities
between Japanese and Caucasians. For example, in the same presentation Yasuhara
pointed out the racial difference found in PD data, another biological indicator used in
phase I studies. Later he found more genetic polymorphism indicating racial differences
in metabolism, such as N-acetylation, debrisoquine hydroxylation and S-mephenytoin
hydroxylation (Yasuhara 1994).29
Some might think that Japan violated rules of science, but it did not. Science should
bring light to cultural controversies, but the results of these studies revealed how limited
it was. Perhaps, as Donna Haraway claims in her three period-paradigmatic
configurations (see table 4.1), in the stage when population, not race, featured as the "key
object of knowledge," race was cast as an "illusory" construction by bad science and only
remained prominent in domains of social science. In fact, having been controversial in
bio-medicine for a long time, race was a topic which Western scientists did not know
more about than their Japanese colleagues.3 0 It is convenient to simply make the
criticism that that Japan's racial discourse has no scientific foundation. However, relying
on a naive category to divide all human beings into Caucasians, Asians, and blacks, the
Western agenda on race, which is based on the primitive unity of all races, is also
problematic. The division between the West and Japan is not due to the fact that the
former is more "scientific" than the latter. Instead, it is a conceptual one: while the West
hopes to separate the concerns about race from those about the state, Japan goes in the
opposite direction.
It became clear that the Western concepts of race and state were of little to no help
in dealing with this problem. Japan was invited to the ICH for negotiation as a state, and
all parties agreed to consider the Japanese a distinct group; however, the two sides of this
debate had different presumptions. In opposition to Japan were experts who assumed the
"primary unity" of human beings and considered all races to be the same unless
differences could be clearly identified or proved or the integration of regulations could be
worked out so that no significant difference was found. However, for the MHW, the
presumption was that the state and race were inseparable. Bodily factors, such as
"Caucasians are taller and heavier," "eating habits are different," '"Japanese have a less
tolerant gastrointestinal tract," and "Japanese are more liable to depend on medicine and
29 The frequency of poor metabolizers was, respectively, 10%, < 1%, and 20% in Japanese people and
50%, 10%, and 5% in Caucasians.
30 For a critical review on the concept of race in scientific studies, mainly in the Western world, see
Duster 2003.
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more sensitive to side-effects" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994:434), were real to the
MHW. Unless similarities could be shown that proved otherwise, the Japanese should be
considered different from others. As Naito wrote in the first annual report of the ICH
study group concerning racial difference, it was dangerous to simply accept the clinical
trial data done in foreign countries: "No matter how advanced they are, we cannot accept
them without having any clinical trials done in our country" (ICH-Japan Study Group
1995:82). The PK was just a start. For the Japanese, racial difference from the West must
be found somewhere else if it was not present in PK levels. This division also marked the
end of the "zero-sum" game and led the EWG to a tug of war over the definition of race,
described in the next section.
From Racial to Ethnic: The Tug of War on "External Factors"
Upon the preliminary settlement of the issue of PK testing, the battle moved on to
whether more tests could be waived. This was important for global pharmaceutical
companies because it took much more effort to fulfill the requirements of these trials;
waiving the duplication of testing on local subjects would save lot of money and time (for
more analysis, see Chapter 2). From the viewpoint of commercial negotiation, the first
round showed that Japan's bottom line was the PK data; it would trade this and close the
conversation in order to preserve control over phase II and phase III trials. On the other
side, the West was eager to break Japan's line, trying to push harmonization further into
phase II and/or phase III. Since Japan could not easily accept the notion of the racial unity
of all human beings and waive all local tests, the game could not be brought to an end.
However, the situation was more complicated. In fact, nobody knew that the ICH
would develop into a long series when it began. Although people thought one ICH
conference could not solve all problems, three were thought to be enough. As predicted
by FDA representative Elaine Esber, "[for some areas] specific areas for action and
methods for resolutions were identified with anticipated timetables for resolution in at
most within two years (ICH2) and others by 1995 (ICH3)" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992:
551). On the other hand, the MHW hoped to maintain this conference as long as possible.
According to Doi, the EC and European industry that did not want to continue the
conference; however, "to promote our industry to overseas, the MHW needs a platform
on which conversation can be conducted ... With the help of the FDA and PMA [PhRMA]
the rule to have the ICH held every two years was determined" (Doi 1999: 11).
Now the impasse in reaching a settlement on racial difference provided a reason to
keep the ICH going. The question was how to continue the discussion. Let me summarize
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what was obtained for the prolonged game. At the fifth EWG meeting the first draft
agreement was drafted, yet nobody was satisfied. Japan agreed to waive the PK study
when applicable, but asked to have dose finding and clinical trials done in Japan. The EU
and U.S., in contrast, wanted to grant full waivers to some drugs that were the least likely
to vary racially. As shown in table 4.4, the Japanese representatives showed a negative
attitude toward waiving trials. They did not assert that the Japanese were different from
Caucasians, but they claimed that the matter was too complicated to be studied. On the
other hand, Stuart Walker of the EFPIA believed that the results of UL-0 study could be
applied to tests in other phases of clinical trails. He agreed that there were some
differences found between the three regions, but he thought that they could be accounted
for.
Table 4.4 Comparison of the Interpretations of Racial Difference by Japanese
Representatives* and Stuart Walker
Stages Japan's interpretation Walker's interpretation
Phase I PK No significant difference No significant difference
study PD Differences observed No significant difference
(P450, NASID) (P450)
Phase II Dose Differences found; racial Differences found; can be
study finding difference suspected harmonized
methodologically
Phase III Clinical Related to both genetic and Related more to
study trials environmental differences; environmental differences;
too complicated to waive can be methodologically
harmonized
*Japanese presenters on the panel on racial difference at ICH2: Naito
Chikayuki, Yasuhara Hajime and Kumagai Akira.
Source: summarized from D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994: 427-468.
Staring with this understanding, environmental factors were introduced into the
discussion. Forgetting the possible implications of culture, each side developed its
strategy on the use environmental factors to help understand racial difference. Stuart
Walker, for example, argued for these factors a subject for study because all differences
in clinical effectiveness appeared to be due to "methodological differences between the
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three regions and the use of lower doses, rather than a real difference in how the patients
were affected or responded to the drug" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994: 451).
Disregarding the role biological difference played in phase II and phase III studies, he
focused on social factors, such as medical practice, dose regimens, and trial design, and
thought that these could be corrected by statistical means and thus harmonized.
Obviously this approach echoed the EU's administrative concerns about its multi-state
situation. 3 1
On the other hand, the MHW referred these "non-racial" factors back to racial
differences. Naito Chikayuki, for example, commented that to study environmental
factors was unrealistic and time-wasting: because "environmental factors consist of many
aspects, such as culture, medical traditions, philosophy of doctors on drug treatment, diet,
religion, doctors' and/or patients' education, doctor-patient relationship, climate, body
size, and so on, we thought that it would be very difficult to assess them properly and to
reach some degree of harmonization" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994: 429-430). The
complexity of these factors was not the point; the point was that a substantial number of
local subjects were necessary to make the various factors testable as a whole. In order to
make possible the determination of the best dose without adverse effects, race was a
crucial factor in "balancing out" other variables.
In this unusual context, the battlefront on racial difference extended from the
exclusively biological to a broad concept that included the cultural and the social. As
soon as these "external factors" started to be taken into consideration, the racial
differences in drugs' behavior (ADME) were no longer a main concern.32 The
consideration of race turned into the consideration of ethnicity. Robert T. O'Neill of the
FDA reported the EWG's decision to make an "operational definition of ethnicity" that
could be practically implemented (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996: 430). Even so, the
conceptual division remained. While the EWG led an analytical drive, using algorithmic
tools to try to exhaust the influence environmental or "non-racial" factors, a holistic
appeal was put forth by the MHW. The MHW argued for the evaluation of net drug
effects through the accumulation of data from clinical testing based on existing racial
categories, namely, Japanese, Caucasian and black. What should be incorporated into the
31 Marisa Papaluca even pointed out the fundamental role regulatory authorities played in the
harmonization of drug information, which could be "an important factor leading to actual 'non-ethnic
difference' in clinical responsiveness across Europe for the analyzed new drugs" (D'Arcy and Harron eds.
1994: 462).
32 According to Naito, ADME was not an important issue at all in accounting for racial difference. He
reminded me of the MOSS talks, where he had suggested that the MHW drop the requirement for repeating
ADME tests. However, he emphasized that upon the advice of one FDA expert the MHW decided to add
ADME to the list of factors to be considered.
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list and what should not? The tension was so high that it prompted the EWG to turn to
anthropology, the discipline of the study of human beings. As rapporteur Naito Chikayuki
summarized, "The so-called ethnic difference might be sometimes deeply influenced by
environmental factors rather than genetic ones. Therefore, when we consider ethnic
factors in a long-term perspective, we may have to take account of anthropological
approaches" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1994: 430).
As a result, the definition of race was loosened. Etienne Labbe and Jean-Marc
Husson of the EFPIA voluntarily worked out a draft list of factors to be considered, but
this led to nowhere. Compiled with the help of one representative whose wife was an
anthropologist, it might have been a good chart for academic use but was definitely not
practical for forming a practical guideline. As stated in the position report released in
August 1994, about forty factors were mentioned under the categories of either
"objective," "pharmacologically related" or "subjective," and related studies were cited (a
summary of this research is listed in table 4.5). Everything could be racially related.
While the EU and U.S. experts assumed they were working on an operational definition
for negotiation, the MHW regarded this attempt as a list of priorities for topics that
should be discussed first. The MHW was unsure of the extent to which these external
factors could be accounted for and remained passive in this part of the discussion.
Table 4.5 Ethnic Factors considered
Objective differences
Topics selected Study cited
Population Majority and minority Edwards 1992
composition Genetic diseases such as sickle cell disease, Vesell 1989
thalassemia
PK and PD Pupil dilation Chen & Poth 1929
Liver enzymes Drayer, et. al. 1977
Acetylator Wood, et. al. 1991
Drug induced SLE Hess 1982, Rieder, et. al. 1991
Debrisoquine-sparteine metabolism Wood, et. al. 1991, Zohn, et. al.
1989
Mephenytoin metabolism Kupfer, et. al. 1988
Phenothiazine metabolism Kumana, et. al. 1987
Propranolol and imipramine metabolism Eichelbaum, et. al. 1990
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Leiberman, et. al. 1990
Drugs on central nervous system
Tricyclic antidepressants
Lithium
b-blocker and ACE blocker
Ca and K channels
Wood and Zhou, 1991, Poland
1991
Strickland, et. al. 1991
Jefferson, et. al. 1987, Lin, et.
al. 1986, Takahashi 1979
Hall 1990, Fries, et. al. 1986,
Kiowiski 1985, Osler, et. al.
1987, Zhou, et. al. 1990
Kiowiski, et. al. 1988
Pharmacologically related differences
Topics selected Study cited
Alcohol Diet and metabolism Medoza 1991
Geographical, Sickle cell disease Medawar 1961
nutritional, Diltiazam-induced PR prolongation Rubio, et. al. 1992
and others Antipyrine metabolism Lin, et. al. 1986, Henry, et. al.
1987
Myocardial infarction rate Robertson 1977
Felodipine and nifedipine bio-availability Baily 1991
Age, height Weight variations Metropolitan Life Insurance
and 1980
weight Age variations World Almanac 1992, WHO
1992
Subjective differences
Topics selected Study cited
Medical practice Dose administration, therapy preference, doctor-patient No study cited
relationship, report of adverse effects, expectation of drug
effects
Adverse Effects Monitoring EU study 1993
Policy Efficacy versus safety, tolerance of adverse effects No study cited
Terminology Names and definitions of diseases, range of hypertension, Dziewanowska 1992,





Dose arrangement Different concerns on efficacy, safety, toxicity, etc. Edwards 1993, Papaluca
1993
Source: Adopted from ICH2 E5 EWG 1995[1994]: 286-289.
The EU and U.S. experts knew this problem, but they did not know how to solve it.
Even after intensive revision, as shown fig. 4.1, there were still many factors. Originally
the EWG members considered having an anthropological investigation before the
discussion continued, yet ultimately this was not realized (Uwoi 1998a). Furthermore, it
was noted that if the topic of racial difference was delayed, it would need to be
considered within all the completed guidelines, such as El (population safety exposure),
E2 (clinical safety data management), E4 (dose-response information), E6 (GCP), and E7
(studies in geriatrics) (ICH2-E5 EWG 1995[1994]: 285). This development realized
Naito's prediction for ICH2: E5 was an issue encompassing everything.
The E5 met a deadlock. There was indeed a growth of knowledge on race, yet no
substantial progress was made. To address too many factors meant to address nothing.
Things seemed to go back to the original point and everyone fell into deep frustration and
distrust. Etienne Labbe expressed to me his sense of powerlessness: "I was alone in
EU ... , nobody wanted to take care of this difficult topic. ... I read a lot of papers to try to
identify those 'ethnic factors' that could explain the differences and preclude the
acceptance of high quality Western clinical studies, and prepared a table today attached to
the GL [guideline] E5. Many factors are mentioned in it, but, except for some rare cases
of genetic differences, no one really impacted the clinical data but one: THE CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES" (emphasis original).
Fig. 4.1. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Factors Concerning Ethnic Difference in
the Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data
Intrinsic ~ Extrinsic
Genetic Physiopathological conditions Enviro ntal
___Cc c ____ ... ..___....... -.- 4 _ __ _
Sex Ianuage (barrier)
Height Age CultureBody weight Smoking Medical practice
I Liver [ Therapeutic
ADME Kidney Alcohol approach
Genetic CV Function Food habits Climate
polymorphism SunlightReceptor F Pollution
Sensitivity Stress
Race | a Regulatory
(Racial practice
Polymorphism) methodology
Source: D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996:435.
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On the other side, Naito complained about the rudeness of the global
pharmaceutical industries: "They only wanted to waive all required clinical trials that
should be done in Japan before going to the market. It is very unscientific and I cannot
stand it. I do not know why they hesitate to do clinical trials in Japan." He commented on
the attempt to make these racial factors clear: "The fact that the racial differences are
resulted from factors other than genetic differences, in contrast, became an overwhelming
hindrance to the harmonization" (ICH-Japan Study Group 1995: 137). He thought that in
such circumstance, guidance, not a guideline, was the best solution, because "we thought
we were facing up to very difficult problems to be solved by the time of ICH3, which was,
at that time, supposed to be the final ICH meeting" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996: 424).
Naito recalled what he really thought at that moment: "As a rapporteur of the E5 EWG I
was ready to accept if no agreement was achieved."
Bringing Science into Politics: Making a Guideline Workable
At this point, all scientific attempts had proved to be failures. The MHW had ceased
studies on external factors, and the EU had already stopped earlier. However, the research
on these factors at least clarified the standpoint of each regulator and was written into the
third draft of the guideline. The MHW would accept PK data with restrictions and
promoted simultaneous phase II and phase III clinical trials based on Japanese, black, and
Caucasian populations. Focusing on administrative integration, the EU tried to limit these
factors to a manageable amount. The FDA, which seemed to be an arbitrator than an
appealer, always focused on the quality of clinical trials but not geographic variations.
How could they get the dialogue going? The old framework of negotiation that had torn
the clinical trials to pieces seemed not to work anymore.
On the other hand, although the JPMA's attitude toward the acceptance of foreign
data was ambiguous,33 the global drug companies became impatient. Most of them were
really not interested in a scientific understanding of racial differences; they just wanted to
have a predictable guideline for their application processes. For example, the U.S. ICH
Steering Committee Chairman Alex Giaquinto suggested an administrative solution of a
"regulatory floor," an explicit statement of the minimum requirements for interregional
approvals. The PhRMA also prepared for a situation in which not all drugs would be
33 One senior expert told me that they did not really care about the domestic market, but neither did
they hope it would be easily penetrated. For a typical response from Japan, see Koyama's comment in the
ICH3 in D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996: 452.
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granted waivers for clinical trails. It commented, "We are left to deal with the paradox
that some, but not all, compounds may prove to have clinically significant inter-ethnic
differences" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996: 434).
This concession inspired the EWG to search for new negotiation frames based on
the above table of factors concerning racial difference. Two transitional proposals were
subsequently submitted. The first strategy, as Uwoi Tohru recalled, was a
decision-making tree. It could be described as a final attempt to save the old framework
by rearranging the external and intrinsic factors into a flow chart by which decisions
could be made. It was to be used to judge which part of a clinical trial was racially
sensitive and therefore when additional trials were required. Starting with PK testing,
crucial factors were singled out, such as the PK curve (linear versus non-linear),
metabolic pathway (ethnically sensitive or not), the effective range (wide versus narrow),
and so on. However, as might be expected, the chart grew into an enormous tree as the
discussion continued and became too complicated to manage.34
The second and better-known strategy was "triage." It first appeared in the second
draft in October 1994 and lasted until ICH3. Unlike the decision-making tree, which still
tried to waive some trials for each drug, the "triage" strategy tried to "save" some drugs
from repeated local trials by evaluating their characteristics. If the NCE was concerned
about racial effects, additional clinical trials could be required when drugs were marketed
in other places. The table concerning racial difference functioned here as a map that could
locate those drugs that would be subject to additional clinical trials. The determining
characteristics were summarized by Naito as follows: 1) the characteristics and usage of
the drug and modality of therapy (long-term or short-term use; administered orally or by
intravenous injection); 2) the dose response in different populations; 3) the developmental
status or stage of the drug; and 4) the intended population to be exposed to the drug
(D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996: 425). Although this strategy was practical in that it
minimized the number of drugs that would need more clinical trials (or maximized the
number of drugs that needed no further trials), it met with difficulties. From a technical
point of view, since the characteristics were different from one product to another, it
would be impractical to list all possible conditions in a guideline.
On the surface, it seemed that no scientific guideline could be made. However,
these strategies should remind us of the political nature of guidelines. It is not necessary
that a guideline describes the truth; it must merely address the way people create a social
consensus called "truth." Up to this point, the EWG had wished for an explicit guideline
34 Some of these judging points are listed as shown in the appendix D of the E5 guideline.
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on racial difference because they expected that it could be operationalized precisely.
However, it was unrealistic to try to come up with such a rule among people who were
conceptually divided.
It was Roger L. Williams of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER),
FDA, who saved this negotiation by bringing up the concept of bridging studies. This
successfully released the tension caused by the cultural differences over race. Naito
recalled, "Yes, I remember clearly the day when I was asked about the concept of
bridging study by the FDA, I told myself that it was just what we pursued." Of course, at
that time the EWG faced huge pressure from the Steering Committee, which needed to
take over the job if no progress was seen (Uwoi 1998a). However, this did not mean that
EWG members finally found the ultimate answer to the problem of racial difference. On
the contrary, the bridging study was the event that ended this hopeless scientific pursuit.
The notion of the bridging study was first mentioned in the fourth draft of the
guideline, where it was conceived "as a study to generate the necessary information to
permit the extrapolation of the phase III efficacy data to the region's population" (D'Arcy
and Harron eds. 1996: 425). At first glance, it was an improved version of the "triage"
strategy-when local agencies suspected that a drug might have racially specific effects,
they could require the producer to provide additional data using local subjects. In reality,
however, this was a political compromise that satisfied the cultural imagination of race on
all sides. Unlike the triage concept, where the criteria for additional trials were
predetermined, in the bridging study scheme local agencies reserved the right to order
them. While industry appreciated this strategy, assuming that no more clinical trials
would be required if their applicant drugs showed no racially specific effects, the MHW
accepted it for different reasons. Having failed to secure a requirement for local clinical
trials for every drug, it considered the bridging study a "redemption" whereby small-scale
trials specifically for the Japanese could be requested (ICH-Japan study group 1995: 137).
Philosophically speaking, considering the cultural division over conceptions of race and
state, the bridging study carefully marked the territory where the ICH could regulate the
matter of racial difference by turning it from a problem to be solved into a manageable
question.
Some struggles were seen at ICH3; some representatives wished facilitation of the
triage strategy and others argued that there would be intentional barriers set by regulators.
Even so, the concept of bridging studies basically began to prevail. One pharmaceutical
representative commented to me cynically that the bridging study compromise was just a
new form of the Japanese-style clinical trial (i.e., keeping some clinical trials done in
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university hospitals in Japan under the supervision of senior physicians), but the Japanese
felt hurt as well. For example, Uwoi Tohru complained to me that it was not until the
advent of the bridging study that the global pharmaceutical companies correctly used the
word "extrapolation." "Before then, all the so-called strategies were only applied for
waivers," he added. He was right. People were not satisfied with the bridging study
concept, but it was the best they could get.
Table 4.6 Definition of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Factors of Racial Difference
Source: Adopted from the ICH E5 guideline.
All previous strategies were wrapped up in this new scheme; the bridging study was
thus described as if it was the product of a coherent, scientific narrative. We witness the
bridging study's birth at the ICH3 proceedings. The categories of"extrinsic" and
"intrinsic" factors of racial difference remained as the first criteria by which to judge
whether a product was racially sensitive (table 4.6). Following the first evaluation
(mainly PK and PD information), questions were asked to confirm which trials had to be
repeated in phase II and III stages. Here the concept of a decision-making tree and triage
were preserved, as shown in fig. 4.2. The bridging study was used when no waivers could
be applied. Where requested, smaller trials would be arranged (Koyama 1999: 59).
The drafting of the guideline proceeded smoothly (a list of EWG meetings held
after ICH3 is shown in table 4.7). The sixth and seventh drafts, which almost reached
Step 2, were criticized for being confusing and unclear (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996:
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Factor Definition Example
Extrinsic Factors associated with the Includes social and cultural aspects in the
racial factors environment and culture in which a region such as medical practice, diet,
person resides. Extrinsic factors socioeconomic status, and particularly
tend to be less genetically and more important to the reliance on studies from
culturally and behaviourally different regions, practices in clinical trial
determined. design and conduct.
Intrinsic Factors that help define and Includes genetic polymorphism, age,
racial factors identify a subpopulation and may gender, height, weight, body composition
influence the ability to extrapolate and organ dysfunction.
clinical data between regions.
431 and Naito et. al. 1996), but it was soon realized these drafts were as clear as could be
conceived. Much bargaining took place on this point. Japan argued that bridging study
should apply to tests in phase I and phase II. Furthermore, in some cases it required a
larger sample size for bridging studies. On the other side, the FDA did not want to accept
Japanese data because its quality did not meet their "comfort level." In addition, PhRMA
asked Japan to limit the number of bridging studies to only one per product (for the
"ceiling policy"; see Naito 1999: 6-7).
Fig. 4.2 Bridging Algorithm Model
.*H " A d-~o*, Extrapolate Bridging/ull
(Bridging)
Rgtwle Z: l8n.idging l o~ rihal (Dose-Response)
Source: D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996:439.
These conflicts, although painful, reinforced the necessity of the bridging study
approach.3 When the idea of a clinical data package appeared in the tenth draft as the
criterion for determining when a bridging study was required, the triage concept became
history (Naito et al. 1997).36 Step 2 was finally signed off in March 1997, and the final
draft was announced at the ICH4 that November. As these drafts clearly state, the
guideline "is not intended to alter the data requirements in the new region; it does seek to
define when these data requirements may be satisfied with foreign data" (D'Arcy and
Harron eds. 1996: 431).
35 The conflicts were also related to the discussion over good clinical practice (GCP, E6 guideline) in
Japan; however, since this requires more discussion, I choose to leave these for a future study.
36 The term "clinical data package" here refers to the clinical data on test drugs required for the
evaluation of whether they have racial effects. Yet the idea that it should be "complete" aroused heated
discussion at the birth of the E5 guideline. The Japanese thought it would imply that no bridging study
could be required if this data was claimed to be "complete."
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Table 4.7 Timeline of the Discussions on the E5 Guideline, 1995-1998
Time Event Achievements
November 1995 ICH3 in Draft 7 formed; bridging study approach confirmed
Yokohama
January 1996 Draft 8 circulated (full side phase III was asked by the
MHW)
April 1996 Two corrected versions (draft 9 and draft 10) derived
from draft 8. Complete clinical data package proposed
May 1996 EWG meeting in Draft I I and draft 12 formed (triage concept dropped)
Virginia
July 1996 Draft 13 and draft 14 circulated (bridging study limited to
one per product)
September 1996 Draft 15 circulated
November 1996 EWG meeting in Draft 16 circulated (bridging study related to safety
London required)
March 1997 EWG meeting in Narita Draft 17 circulated; the step two reached. Draft 19
formed
November 1997 ICH4 in Draft of the E5 guideline announced
Brussels
February 1998 EWG meeting in Draft 20 formed; step four reached
Washington, D.C.
August 1998 E5 guideline implemented (draft 21, the final version)
Source: adopted from Koyama 1999:58, Table 1, and Naito et al. 1997.
The final implementation of the E5 guideline in August 1998 marked the temporary
end of the long journey of racial difference back and forth between the realm of science
and politics. Of course, the ICH is a rather a scientific, technology-oriented forum and not
really a politically driven one like the trade-oriented MOSS talks. But this does not mean
that all cultural controversies and prejudices could be properly settled. On the one hand,
the E5 guideline favors industry: as pharmacologist Helene Dumitriu pointed out, the
guideline should just be called "acceptability of foreign clinical data," since "it aims to
overcome obstacles to using foreign clinical data (whether they represent genetic
differences or differences in medical culture)" (Dumitru 1998: 142). On the other hand,
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however, we see resistance from local authorities: as Uwoi mentioned, it was helpful that
the members of the E5 EWG realized that "[the bridging study] required the
accumulation of administrative experience among regulators" (Uwoi 1999: 48). So after
all, what had been divided was still divided.
The E5 guideline, as a product of political bargaining, hides all quarrels under a
superficial harmony. It provided Europe and United States with feasible ways to make
"extrapolatable" racial data that travel across different regions; meanwhile, it satisfied the
MHW's nationalistic agenda by giving it administrative privileges to decide whether
Japan would like to join the global. From this perspective, the guideline should not have
worked for each side given this self-conflicted aspect of its nature, but this was not quite
true. This is the theme of another chapter, in which Taiwan's encounter with the global is
addressed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: RACE, DRUGS, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
VOICE OF THE NATION-STATE
In ending the story about the birth of the E5 guideline, perhaps we should ask, What
can we learn from it? I summarize the three lessons we can learn from this selective
ethnography of Japan and globalization. First, providing a concrete study case deepens
our understanding of the cultural scheme of a world organized around the notion of
"population." Second, focusing on the case of pharmaceuticals, the story of the E5
guideline defines two distinctive modes by which Japan encountered the bio-global. Only
through the observations of a "slow motion" narrative can we catch the real-time
responses of the local as it faces globalization. The third lesson is that ethnography offers
a practical way of appreciating the voices appearing in this narrative. It tries to describe
their characteristics as something other than a collection of individual voices, or as
fictitious voices forged by the ethnographer, an issue I will discuss at the end.
Regarding the first lesson, let us return to the beginning of this journey, where I
cited Donna Haraway's creative sketch of the three techno-scientific configurations of the
world (mainly the United States) in the twentieth century. As a salient example of the
mechanisms by which this world operates, this ethnography supplements Haraway's
observation of the replacement of a configuration from the first part of the century based
on an essentialist notion of"race" with a "scientific" configuration based on population
that she links to the period from the 1940s to the 1970s. Having not yet moved on to
Haraway's next paradigm, based on the hot concept of genome, the world of proprietary
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drugs operated under a conception of population that utilized scientific tools, such as
statistics and the frequency of genetic expression, to measure a population and define its
behavior (Haraway 1997: 219-229). There seems to be an interesting "lag" between the
formation of cultural norms and how these norms are practiced in reality, but I would
assert for now that this is because of the technological nature of the biological/social units
that construct the world of drug research, marketing and regulation.37
However, unlike Haraway, who turns to a study of the cultural norm of families as
the basic unit of this socio-biological mess, this thesis takes a different approach, trying
to understand the topologies of the biological/social units that construct this world. I have
argued elsewhere that population is not merely a biological category; in some historical
situations it can function as the foundation of a political entity (Kuo 2002). The
discussion of racial difference at the ICH provides us with a good example whereby we
can explore different topologies in the realms of biology and society and explain the
fundamental divisions in concepts of race and society.
Fig. 4.3. Biological Classification of Populations (left) and Societal
Classification of the World (right).
WORLD
Source: D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1996:444 and 450.
Let me take for example Etienne Labbe's ICH3 presentation on ethnic difference
and the harmonization of regulations. He listed two distinct and "arbitrary" classifications,
one biological and the other societal, by which race and state can be defined (fig. 4.3). In
the biological classification (left), race was located between the level of the nation and
the human species. Thus, biologically speaking, race is a larger category focused merely
37 In fact, as we will read later in chapter 6, there are uneven developments, even distinct routes though
which each state moves from one configuration to another in terms of biology and society. Using the ICH
as an example, the originality of this ethnography partially resides in its attempt to reveal the complicated
nexus where these routes cross at the global level, creating cultural and ethical conflicts that are neither
essentialist nor constructionist.
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on biological characteristics. In the E5 discussion on "racial" as compared to "ethnic"
difference, Labbe stated that "'ethnic' may be more adequate since it covers genetic and
cultural aspects, defining a more homogenous sub-population than 'race' does" (D'Arcy
and Harron eds. 1996: 443). As we know from the previous discussion, this interpretation
fits with the FDA's approach to the consideration of racial difference in clinical trials.
However, when moving to the societal classification of the world, which showed
the harmonization the ICH hoped to achieve, we see contradictions. The goal of the ICH,
according to this diagram (right), was to seek administrative integration between the level
of region and that of the world. It made perfect sense for Europe, since at beginning the
EC [EU] used this approach to harmonize regulations among its member states. After the
United States and Japan joined this discussion and formed a global platform for the
discussion of racial differences, it still worked, for race could be interpreted as a larger
unit beyond the state. It just added some more states into discussion (for the purposes of
the harmonization talks, the U.S could be considered a region consisting of many states
and Japan a state). However, when EWG members decided to work out ethnic factors,
they met with problems. They had to take local factors into account, thus making the state
not just an administrative unit, but a carrier of biological characteristics (as referred to by
the category of "nation" in the biological topology). All this made a mockery of the
pursuit of a scientific guideline and administrative integration.
On the other hand, Japan held to only one topology, both biological and social.
Borrowing Labbe's classifications on the biological side, the MHW fused ethnicity,
nation and race into a single unit, "the Japanese," and on the sociological side it collapsed
the level of tribe into that of the state, which was represented as a "region" in the ICH.
The two classifications could thus be interchanged within the unit of the nation-state,
which comprised both an administrative organization and a collective population sharing
the same biological characteristics.
From this perspective, the differences between Japan and the West may be as subtle
as those concerning the conceptual scales by which conceive the state and race in relation
to each other. However, while Labbe tried in vain to persuade his colleagues of his views,
the problem of the scales resided in conflicts arising from the fact that, as suggested by
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern, "what appears in one society as a focus of significance,
a key artifact, in another can be 'an accessory activity"' (1991: 74). These conflicts are
also seen in the MHW's appeals to the West. While the MHW hoped to deal with the state
and race together, the other parties drove the discussion in the opposite direction. Perhaps
we need not follow Strathern's philosophical discussion about which epistemology
anthropologists should stand by in their works; however, we should keep in mind the
242
practical problem she reminds us of. She writes, "The anthropologist's contexts and
levels of analysis are themselves often at once both part and yet not part of the
phenomenon s/he hopes to organize with them. Because of the cross-cutting nature of the
perspective they set, one can always be swallowed by another" (75). Conventional
interpretations of the making of the E5 guideline fall into this exact trap. Like Marcel de
Serres in the nineteen century, the ICH attempted to operationalize the primary unity of
human races by imposing its viewpoint (or context) on local agencies. When this strategy
failed, as shown in this chapter, the practical approach of bridging studies eventually
arose. With this result, however, European and U.S. experts accused Japan of playing
politics. However, if these misunderstandings stem from a conceptual division over
definitions of race and the state, how can we judge whether one side is more scientific
than the other?
At this point, this ethnography tries to give a "symmetrical" or "fair" interpretation
to Japan's behavior, which is the second lesson we can learn from these events. Although
this chapter does not differ much from previous studies of the Japanese, utilizing
concepts such as the dialectics of difference that tends to split the Japanese from the rest
of the world, it does reject non-anthropological and Western-centric accounts that portray
the Japanese as conservative, closed off, and always rejecting globalization, or as selfish
economic animals that pay no respect to the rules of the free market. Using the case of
pharmaceuticals, this chapter carefully traces the process of Japan's encounter with the
global, presenting a totally different scenario from conventional discourses, which only
blame Japan's protectionism.
This chapter identifies two modes of this encounter, one bilateral and the other
global. The dynamics of the encounter moves from strictly business to science and
cultural values. The bilateral mode started with the needs of the global drug industry, as
described in Chapter 2, to exploit as much market as possible before the patents on their
products expire. Drug companies attempted this through the United States, the world
superpower. For this reason pharmaceuticals were listed in the MOSS talks, the most
important event in 1980s U.S.-Japan relations. Obviously, MOSS was a difficult channel
for dialog. In addition to the trade friction reviewed in Chapter 3, this chapter points out
that the polarized imagination of the differences between Japan and America does not
belong to Japan exclusively. All these prejudices confirmed policy analysts' expectations
about the difficulties these negotiations would face. However, negotiations over
pharmaceuticals presented an exception; because of the participation of the
"non-political" MHW, the negotiations were quickly settled. From their perspective,
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drugs were not a business for profit, and there was no responsibility to promote or protect
industry.
The MHW went further and helped form the ICH, a true global stage that gave
Japan a chance to move away from its normal relationship with the United States.
Compared to the MOSS talks, the ICH was less political because it avoided the direct
involvement of governments. The MHW had enough reasons to join the ICH; the
"harmonization" of the title echoed well Japan's cultural values and in practice it fitted
well with what Japan was seeking from globalization when its economy peaked in the
postwar era. Only through this can we understand why Doi dared to make the issue of
racial difference a topic for discussion. Even so, the ICH did not guarantee that science
could build a standard acceptable to both Japan and the West. The second part of this
chapter identifies the limitations of science. The point is, whose science should be chosen
in judging racial difference? At first, polarization seemed to return, but this time due not a
political prejudice but to a cultural division, with Europe and the FDA on one side and
Japan on the other. It was this division that resulted in a failure to make a purely scientific
guideline. In the end, superficial harmony was achieved at the cost of clarity.
Of course, the Western experts and industry people I have talked to blamed the
MHW's ambiguous standpoint for this failure. Just as I have read in many books about
Japanese mentality, these individuals said that the MHW was hypocritical in its
negotiations. In their opinion, the Japanese attitude toward racial difference at the
meetings was always changeable and uncertain. Basically, I do not agree with this
account. I know that the Japanese seldom express their true feelings to foreigners, and
there is a distinction between "principle" or "standard" (tatemae) and "real intention"
(honne) in their social practices. Even so, I do not think it is appropriate to make an easy
link and reach a subjective conclusion that cooperation at the ICH was Japan's tatemae
and closing its market to the world was its honne.
I agree that at the ICH the MHW did not insist on some issues, such as the category
where racial difference belonged. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Japanese wanted to
include it in the category of safety but not in efficacy, but representative Naito did not
insist. He said, "E5 later developed into a complex topic independent from others in that
category. As it went, which category it belongs to meant less and less for us." But, except
for these minor issues, the MHW's standpoint on racial difference was firm and
consistent: as the nation-state of Japan, Japanese people should be considered separately
from other races. The bottom line for harmonization, as seen, was PK testing, and the
MHW accepted this long before the formation of ICH. If there is a problem of
communication, it might have resided not in whether Japan was willing to speak its need,
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but in whether its voice was clearly heard.
The significance of the institutional voice, as I have reviewed in Chapter 1, is the
third and last lesson this ethnography hopes to offer. Here I shall define three formations
of voice that can be heard in this ethnography. First, on the dialogic level, Japan did have
a clear voice, if we listen carefully. Before getting involved in this field, I could only hear
interpretations from one side. However, my fieldwork enabled me to hear voices from the
other side as well. In fact, despite the industry people blaming the MHW for being
obscure in its opinions, the MHW's standpoint was clearly stated in local material.
Although this does not mean that fieldwork can help us to approximate reality, it does
help me to know better the context in which these voices argue against each other. As
shown in table 4.9, each side had its own interpretations of the issue and the way it was
settled; in such a case, these opinions and strategies should be considered as institutional
voices.
Secondly, as stated in Chapter 1, a conference is a structured conversation, and this
was especially so of the ICH. The second part of this chapter nicely demonstrates this
characteristic. After the Steering Committee accepted racial difference as a topic for
discussion, it was moved to the EWG meeting, where all subsequent debates took place.
In addition, the process of discussion in EWG, as mentioned previously, had to follow the
ICH procedural rules. Thus, as we can see in this chapter, each round of discussion
covers several meetings and the change of topics can be easily traced through the drafts.
In other words, the different institutionally voiced opinions as can be heard through
archival studies of these meetings and interviews based on these documents.
However, the above characteristics are not specific to Japan. They can also be
applied Europe or the United States. What is specific to Japan's institutional voice is the
way its opinion on racial difference was presented. As seen in this chapter, I did collect
some individual voices to support my observation, but basically these voices are as
coherent as if they were spoken directly by the institutions the speakers represented. Of
course, cultural consensus played a big part in this phenomenon, but there are still
structural factors worth considering. First, in the case of E5, there were in fact fewer
people involved than we might think. The MHW organized teams for the ICH topics that
consisted of experts (senmonka), usually professors from the national institutes and
teaching hospitals, supported by the MHW and led by a high-level administrator
(imukan). In the case of efficacy topics, Naito Chikayuki led the invited experts; the
yakkeigikan involved were Kurokawa Tatsuo and later Tominaga Toshiyoshi. Although
Doi Osamu was the official leader of the MHW delegation, the delegation itself was
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highly fragmented-basically, each team worked independently. In a parallel with Sheila
Jasanoff's keen analysis of the role of science advisors in U.S. policy making (Jasanoff
1990) in Japan senior physicians enjoy absolute power in determining medical policies. A
JPMA scientist told me that in the case of E5, Dr. Naito's opinion was the opinion of the
MHW.
In addition, the E5 team had yakkeigikan as its members. As mentioned before,
yakkeigikan are a new species in the government, but their origin should be understood in
the larger context of Japan's bureaucratic culture. Japan is a country run by a remarkable
bureaucratic body that determines almost all its policies. Thus for those elites who want
to work for the government, being and working as a bureaucrat is a life-long training
process. Yakkeigikan belong to this group. In addition to the usual training received as
bureaucrats, they are sent to short-term programs to update their knowledge of specific
areas. They are capable of coping with the system and the knowledge that is discussed. In
short, they are small, homogeneous group. As Kitakawa and Kainuma observe (1985),
they were self-controlled and disciplined, repressing their individuality in order to
promote their national values (167-170). As globalization came, they gained the power
through the mechanisms of bachigai and gaiatsu pointed out by Sharon Traweek
(Traweek 1996).38 Like high-energy physicists, these technocrats used the gaiatsu of the
ICH in the name of internationalization (kokusaika) to gain the power to issue drug
regulations. They worked at the margins of two empires: the global conference dominated
by the FDA and the PhRMA, and the Japanese bureaucracy led by physicians and
medical officials. All these factors created in this group of people a unified reformist
voice; the absolute safety of drug used and the health of Japanese nationals was what
these technocrats defended.
Though I am not sure whether he knows it, I see all these institutional
characteristics in Tominaga Toshiyoshi, who became Director of the Fundamental
Research Promotion Division, R&D Promotion Department, OPSR. It was a mid-summer
evening in 2003; 1 was just about to wrap up one of the longest interviews I had done in
Tokyo with him, and it had been pleasant. He talked with confidence about how the
yakkeigikan had improved the primitive good clinical practice (GCP) regulations, the
policy to promote the contracted research organization (CRO) industry, and the ICH.
However, when I asked about the E5 issue, he was reluctant and not as confident as
before. He seemed to be deciding what he should tell me. Finally, he spoke: "It is a
sensitive issue, really. Many people were involved and we fought very hard, some from
38 The original meaning of bachigai in Japanese is the situation of feeling improper or out of place.
Here it indicates the difficulty of categorizing some individuals in Japan due to their overseas experience.
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inside and others from outside. We were independent and followed science always," he
tried to assure me.
"But, what was your opinion?" I asked. "How did you figure out your existence as
an individual alongside this bureaucracy?" I emphasized the word "individual."
Tominaga seemed not to expect this question. He looked at me for a while, and
replied: "It is the MHW's responsibility to protect people's health even when they are not
aware of the danger. People live in trust of the government."
Although this statement was well-spoken, it was not the answer to my question, and
I knew it. "It's getting late. Perhaps we can talk over this topic next time. Thank you so
much," I concluded. Yet Tominaga did not reply. With his back to the setting sun, he sat
in front of the window and his shadow covered me. A voice came slowly from the dark:
"Do you really think that a technocrat cannot have his individuality?" I was stunned. As a




Countermelody in a Fugato Called "Bridging": Taiwan Catches up with the ICH
What clearly is left out of this un-historical historiography is the politics of the
people.... This was an autonomous domain, for it neither orientated from elite
politics nor did its existence depend on the latter. ... The ideology operative in
this domain, taken as a whole, reflected the diversity of its social composition....
However, in spite of such diversity one of its invariant features was a notion of
resistance to elite domination.
Ranajit Guha 1
I have to voice, for only my own voice can prove my existence.... It must be me
[who would vanish] otherwise. I would be blown by a burst of squalls, like a
match [flame], from any direction. Just that easy.... My voice proves my
existence, therefore I keep voicing, continuously.
Ji Xian 2
PART I
LIVING PEOPLE, MUTED STATE: TAWIAN AND THE WORLD
The Politics of Voice in the Modern World
In Chapter 4 we witnessed a "dissonance" between Japan and the other ICH
participants on the issue of racial difference. Although, like other dissonant notes, this
discussion requires a "resolution" (a harmonic chord) according to classical music theory,
my study has shown the failed approaches that attempted to reach it by simply
eliminating other voices (i.e., making a unison of notes). This, as we now know, did not
work with Japan and contributed to an unresolved situation-even the guideline that was
made was vague. However, the story did not end there as some policy analyst of
U.S-Japan relationship might suggest. As we will see, when Taiwan joined the debate it
turned the situation into a fugato, a more complicated musical form in which every
melody is independent in its content yet combined with the others forms a common
theme. This chapter is thus an ethnographic effort to find this lost melody that will refresh
our understanding of the fugato called "bridging."
In Ranajit Guha 1982, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India," pp. 840-41.
2 "Wo de shenyin yu wo de cunzai" (My voice and my existence) from Sansi Chienji [my first thirty
years: a collection of poems], 1945.
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But first we have to know how Taiwan can express itself, given its difficult political
situation described in Chapter 3. It is not a fortuity for an anthropologist to read subaltern
studies if she or he is keen to understand the politics of people's voices and how they are
treated in historical narratives. This field is well articulated in the manifesto of Guha, the
key founder of subaltern studies, which I quote above. As we know, subaltern studies is
an academic discourse as well as a cultural formation that originated in the rejection of
conventional interpretations about the independence of India and its political
consequences. The histories projected by these interpretations, which Guha criticizes,
were based on conceptions of colonialism and nationalism that were dominated by
colonists and elites. In order to resist this domination, the project of subaltern studies set
its course by calling attention to the peasants whose voices were missing from these
narratives.
The early works of this school of thought provided convincing evidence of the role
of these people, though the way they were represented became an issue in later works.
According to this emerging presence, the subaltern can be understood as a kind of
collective individual, conscious of itself, an author, an actor-in short, the classical
subject. This allows the subaltern studies movement to differentiate between the subaltern
itself and the representation of it by imperialism, and thus calls attention to the blank
spaces in previous discourses. Anthropologists can learn more from these studies. As the
quote above indicates, Guha had no intention of making the subaltern either a
"supplement" or a "counter-discourse" to existing historical interpretations. It is instead
an agency that creates an autonomous discourse of politics in its own right. In this way,
subaltern studies deviated from the banal approach of Marxism and "history from below,"
and the anthropological term "voice" is thus appropriate as a description of its intentions.
Inspired by subaltern studies, this chapter is an evocation of some of the missing
voices in the discourses on science and politics concerning the ICH and globalization.
Unlike Guha's resistance to nationalist and colonialist interpretations, my ethnographic
motivation is an echo of Stephen Tyler's criticism of scientific discourse (or, if I may,
"scientific centrism") that has preoccupied the modem world (Tyler 1986). "In the
totalizing rhetoric of its mythology," he writes: "science purported to be its own
justification within its own discourse, and the more it controlled its discourse by
subjecting it to the criterion of proof, the more uncontrollable its discourse became" (123).
We have witnessed, in the making of the E5 guideline described in Chapter 4, how the
endeavor to make a universal standard for all human races succumbed to the various
interests of politics and business. Since this is a tale of the modern world (or the
postmodern world, in Tyler's terms) "allowing for certain intentional interpretative
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liberties" (125), this chapter devotes itself to an ethnography of the scientific narratives
that attempted in vain to make this guideline work.
Also, instead of dealing with a general category of people, as subaltern studies does,
this thesis chooses Taiwan as its main character. It is of specific importance because, at
the level of discourse, the voice of the Taiwanese people is definitely different from that
of the state. As will be shown in this chapter, it is easy to access Taiwanese people's
individual voices or various collective voices, and these are lively and undeniable.
However, as a state, Taiwan resembles the last book in Ray Bradbury's fictional world of
Fahrenheit 451; its existence is only recognized when the world tries to erase it from all
discourses as if it never previously existed.
The most recent example can be seen in a World Health Organization (WHO)
conference held in Phuket, Thailand, on May 3, 2005, about the reconstruction of South
East Asia after the huge tsunami disaster in December 2004. As a state nearby, Taiwan
did what it could to help the affected countries: it sent rescue teams and donated $55.72
million, the eighth largest such sum in the world. Even so, Taiwan was not allowed to
participate in any of the conferences concerning the tsunami, and this is not exceptional.
According to local sources (Lianhe Xinwenwang [UDN News], May 7, 2005), the WHO
agreed that experts from Taiwan should join the post-tsunami discussion; however, after
the Taiwanese delegation arrived, they realized this meant only their personal opinions
and not their appearance as a group. They were like air-no name tags, no introductions
when joining the discussion, no communication with WHO officials, and no record of
their participation. If global conferences are a discursive stage for states, "The WHO
ignored the existence of Taiwan; ... it did not even want to leave any trace about its
participation," the newspaper commented.
The above situation is nicely illustrated by Ji Xian's poem quoted at the beginning
of this chapter. Ji, recognized one of the influential poets in post-war Taiwan, wrote this
existential poem as a thoughtful response to political uncertainties, and it was brought up
again sixty years later by President Chen Shui-bian immediately after the People's
Republic of China (PRC)'s announcement of its threat to absorb Taiwan by any means,
including non-peaceful ones.3 Borrowing this poem, Chen indicated the cultural aspect
of the problem of Taiwan's statehood; Taiwan is already an independent state; what is
problematic is its legal existence as such in global society. Taiwan is an "illegal resident";
the PRC has been attempting to make this so by every means. Erasing Taiwan's voice is
the first step, Chen emphasized; those who are repressed and treated unfairly and unjustly
3 Chen addressed this poem in the opening ceremony of World Poem Festival held in Kaohsiung on
March 25, 2005.
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should make their own voices heard, firmly and steadily, for keeping silent and remaining
passive helps the repressors justify their deeds.
As a Taiwanese who grew up and was educated on this island, I know from personal
experience its absence from the political map of the world; however, it is an accident that
relates its silent voice to the International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). In other words,
from the initiation of my investigation of Taiwan's involvement, its problem has been to
be treated as an autonomous domain; Taiwan is not a necessary part to the
accomplishment of the ICH's project, nor does it hope to change its situation through the
ICH. Its "intrusion" into the discourse on the ICH and E5 guideline, I can see
retrospectively, is rather an unwitting start on an odyssey to discover a writerly agency
that has been long disregarded and to find the missing meaning of ethnographer whose
craft is to make ethnographic text a "process-entity" or means for cultural critique. The
rest of this section explains this journey.
In the midst of my fieldwork, I arrived in Taiwan in November 2002 and began
lecturing at National Yang-Ming University (hereafter YMU). Not having intentionally
chosen where or for how long I would stay, I found YMU to be a small yet interesting
school. It is a research complex located in Shihpai, a suburban town north of Taipei, and
it consists of about thirty institutes. Despite its short history, thanks to the take-off of
Taiwan's economy and the government's decision to allocate more resources to medical
care and research, this school possesses three characteristics that set it apart from the
others in Taiwan: an intensive involvement in medical policy making at the national level,
a huge investment in life sciences research, and a strong interest in pharmaceutical
development and biotechnology.4
After spending several years away, Taipei was new to me. However, at the time I
was not very interested in exploring the city because it was only a brief resting place on
my academic journey. In a few months I would either return to Tokyo, my field site, or to
Boston, where my intellectual home is located. After completing my duties at school, I
spent a lot of time in the dormitory, reading field notes and writing paragraphs on my
observations on Japan's health care and business. The first semester finished, but I was
still in Taiwan; the time passed so slowly, as if it could stop forever. Like Hans Castorp in
Magic Mountain, I started finding that I might not be able to return to Tokyo in the near
future. I decided to attend two courses on medical policy and the biopharmaceutical
industry. I said to myself, since I was in Taiwan now, why not make the best use of the
4 For a discussion of the importance of the National Yang-Ming University in the context of the history
of modern medicine in Taiwan, see Kuo 1995.
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place?
During the next term, I attended Professor Huang Weng-Foung's research seminar
on pharamcoeconomics and health policy and a series of lectures on current trends in
biopharmaceutical development organized by Professor Tien Weichen. Both seminars
were policy-oriented and distinct in their formats. As the former Director General of the
Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs (BPA), Huang strong-headedly and powerfully led
discussions. In contrast, Tien, who had long served as the president of the Development
Center for Biotechnology, showed his good connections with industry. Many CEOs were
invited to give lectures, making this seminar a must for people who wanted to know the
latest about biotechnology and its possibilities in Taiwan. Basically, I participated in
Huang's reading seminars frequently and went to Tien's from time to time, depending on
the topic. They spoke, and I listened.
I had not expected the information and reflections that these seminars gained me.
Concerning the core of ethnography, Stephen Tyler points out the function of the
interaction between speakers and hearers:
Every act of saying is a momentary intersection of the "said" and the "unsaid."
Because it is surrounded by an aureola of the unsaid, an utterance speaks more
than it says, mediates between past and future, transcends the speaker's conscious
thought, passes beyond his manipulative control, and creates in the mind of the
hearer worlds unanticipated. From within the infinity of the "unsaid," the speaker
and the hearer, by a joint act of will, bring into being what was "said." (459)
This was not the case for my fieldwork in Taiwan at the time, since I was a passive
listener at the beginning. However, as this chapter shows, the more I listened, the more I
found that was interesting to know. From this ambiguous situation of saying and listening,
my ethnographic journey departed.
Outside of the Global: Huang Weng-Foung, a Veteran Technocrat
In a seminar room at the Institute of Health and Welfare Policy, Huang Weng-Foung
opened his lecture on international health policy by sharing his long dream of working
with the WHO, where his mentor Hsu Tsi-chou served at the Office for the Western
Pacific Region from 1970 to 1979.5 As one of the Ph.D. bureaucrats appointed and
5 Hsu Tsi-chou (1920-1986) is one of the key persons who established Taiwan's public health system.
His life and career also reflect many aspects of the ways Taiwanese intellectuals cope with their
self-identities. He was born in Tainan. Like many Taiwanese elite under Japanese occupation, Hsu went to
Japan and studied medicine at the Imperial University of Kyoto. After graduation he moved to China,
working at a Japanese hospital during the Sino-Japanese War. When the war ended he was enrolled in the
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promoted by that veteran of international health, Huang presents the typical image of an
elite technocrat hugely influenced by the maverick Hsu Tzi-chou. Before moving to this
school, he had worked for the DoH for over fifteen years.
"This is the way I start a day," Huang said. "I get in the office and go to my desk, on
which the computer is central. I turn it on and click the icon, and out pops Explorer,
where the homepage has been set to http://www.who.int-you know, the website of the
WHO." Like a stock analyst does with the Wall Street Journal, Huang browses the latest
news at the WHO everyday, even more than once a day sometimes: what are the ongoing
projects in the Western Pacific Region, who will take charge of them, where is a disease
epidemic breaking out, etcetera. Huang sighs and worries with the WTO; he rejoices at
what they achieve and comments on what goes wrong, as if he is the person in charge.
"Just like watching shows," Huang stated. It seemed to be an odd opening for a lecture
about international health. Instead of sketching the scope by which the international
health should be defined and the issues covered, Huang started with a self-confession,
something trivial and common enough that people would not normally think about it.
"Does this have something to do with finding a job at the WHO? Does it have anything to
do with international health?" I asked the student on my right.
Later I learned that it was a thoughtful opening with pedagogical goals. In fact,
Huang has used this anecdote on many occasions when speaking about Taiwan's
participation in world health. The fact is, for the Taiwanese people, it is just not possible
to access global organizations such as the WHO, and Huang knows this well. In fact,
Taiwan has been completely cut off from this organization, as one of eighteen
U.N.-associated organizations, since 1971. As a medical student, Huang witnessed all the
consequences of this, the first and most immediate of which was the halt of all formal
contacts and cooperative projects, including training programs. Then, except for the
current working members, no new recruiting of Taiwanese to the WHO took place. Some
Taiwanese kept personal connections with the WHO, but these ties faded and eventually
Peking Union Medical School, where he received six months of training on disease control. Since Hsu can
speak fluent Taiwanese, Mandarin and Japanese, he was soon selected to serve in the government when it
moved to Taiwan with the defeated KMT. He was also selected as one of the first group of Taiwanese to
study in the U.S., where he earned a master's degree in public health at Pittsburgh University. He served in
different places after returning, and because of the international fame he earned for his role in Taiwan's
family planning project in the 1960s, he was invited to the WHO Regional office two years before Taiwan
was expelled from the organization. During his nine years of service at the WHO, Hsu helped to spread the
"Taiwan experience" to countries suffering from overpopulation and poor rural health. Even so, he was
forced to step down from the position, and he returned to Taiwan when the PRC opened its door to the
world. His was appointed as the first Minster of the Department of Health with high expectations, and he
successfully trained the group of technocrats who became Taiwan's public health policy makers. Hsu died
of liver cancer in 1986.
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disappeared in the early 1980s.6
As a result, information about Taiwan was dropped from all global health figures.
Although the government kept updating all the statistical data and made them the same as
those used in other WHO member states, these data are just "missing" from all WHO
statistics and the subsequent circulation of knowledge. I really mean missing, because the
information on Taiwan is not absorbed or incorporated into the information on the PRC.
The PRC is unable to obtain the latest data for practical reasons-to do so would entail
recognizing Taiwan as an independent political entity. Taiwan became a state that had
been erased from the information maps of the world, such as the annual The World Health
Report. 7 Nobody knows how large it is, where it is located or what its population is. On
the other hand, the world is "ignored" by Taiwan, a self-satisfied state. No complete
information on any WHO member country, including the PRC of course, is available in
any library on this island.
In addition to the cruel isolation, which can be seen in other fields as well, Haung's
ironic lament had implications closely connected to the historical context. This is not
simply the complaint of a zealous fan of the WHO who, like a Red Sox diehard,
continues to support her beloved team even though she moved to Geneva from Boston
ten years ago. Huang's behavior can be more accurately explained as that of a Taiwanese
nationalist suffering from "phantom limb syndrome." Originally called "hallucinated
limb," phantom limb syndrome became widely known to physicians when about 6,000
amputees returned from World War I. Research suggests that 70 percent of amputees
continue to experience sensation as if they still had the lost arm or leg. Some amputees
even believe their lost limb is still intact.
It is almost the same in the case of Taiwan's relationship with the WHO. Under the
name Republic of China (ROC), it was one of the countries that founded this organization,
and by the 1970s it had received substantial assistance with the development of public
health. I have argued elsewhere that the result of the process was the reconstruction of a
modem medical institution upon the Japanese legacy from before wartime further
6 According to Huang Pei-Yu's study (1996), 29 experts were employed on global projects for the
eradication of malaria and other parasitic diseases, public health policy, family planning and nursing,
mental health, and women's and children's health. These Taiwanese experts were not forced to resign or
change their nationality after membership was taken over by the PRC. The reason for this, according to an
expert, is because the PRC would not have been able to fill the jobs if all the Taiwanese experts had left.
Also, the WHO hoped to retain a certain amount of experts who were familiar with China (112-114).
7 To take Taiwan's population control as an example, although the U.S. Population Crisis Committee
has twice rated Taiwan's program the best of all developing countries', Taiwan is shut out of The World
Fertility Survey, The Demographic Health Survey, and other related medical data-gathering and analysis
efforts under the auspices of the WHO. In addition, according to a Taiwanese expert who used to work at
the WHO, the WHO destroyed all data on Taiwan from before 1971. See Huang 1996: 117.
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strengthened by the international aid for problem-solving projects, such as the eradication
on malaria and the population control program (Kuo forthcoming). As I have described in
the Chapter 3, the "golden age" of public health in Taiwan had an obvious international
component; in turn, the world considered Taiwan a good example of what was achievable
in a developing country. At a personal level, these projects changed Taiwanese experts'
vision about their role in the world. Starting with Hsu Tzi-chou, many technocrats trained
post-war received scholarships to study abroad, mostly in the United States. Upon
returning, they formed a group that shared a common vision. 8 From their training in the
United States they realized the problems and knew the importance of cooperation with
American experts; the success of these projects and the international fame provided the
proof they needed.
However, all this has gone, and gone so soon that only a few people were even
aware of its influence. Before the global outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) in 2003, the WHO denied Taiwan's existence, trying to repress it into history.
Having been isolated for so long, Taiwan seems to have forgotten how to link the WHO,
the "lost limb" that once carried it out into the world, in order to return to the global.
Huang portrays himself as a member of a generation whose careers had been changed by
this loss. He admitted, "It is unlikely I will serve at the WHO, at least in the position I
would like to serve in." He added when showing a photo of the current Director General
of the WHO, Lee Jong-wook, "Lee was born in 1945, and is just a few years older than
me. He started his career in the WHO in 1983, around the same time I had been involved
in some governmental projects and was appointed as Director General of the BPA. After
nearly twenty years of working experience in different global programs and regional
offices, this enabled Lee to be elected as the leader of this big institution. Meanwhile, my
work limited me almost completely to the domestic. I have lost the chance and am too old
to catch up with him now."
Aiming at the highest position in the WHO, Huang is indeed ambitious and is proud
of his abilities. Like other Taiwanese elites, Huang was born into a family of physicians
and was well educated, earning a degree in pharmacology at National Taiwan University
(NTU) Medical School a Ph.D. in hospital management at the University of Minnesota.
8 According to the WHO report (WHO 1988), since its establishment it has provided fellowships to
physicians and public health workers in developing countries to study a specific topic in public health, such
as epidemic control, health education, or health management. The budget increased by three times during
the second decade of the WHO's existence (1958-1968) and achieved great progress by helping the
receiving countries to train their own health personnel. For example, in 1960 there were almost no doctors
in Congo, yet after sending 140 medical assistants to study overseas, by 1967 all positions in its health
system were filled by locals.
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His plan to head a hospital run by his family changed in 1978, when he was invited by
Hsu Tzi-chou to return to Taiwan to fill a post at the DoH; at 29, Huang became the
youngest section leader there. He soon built up a reputation in the field of good
manufacturing practice (GMP) and drug pricing. Naturally, he was one of the government
negotiators dealing with PhRMA. He found his true interest in policy and made the best
of it. "Asia has increasing influence on the world other than [through the] economy. In
the 1990s the WHO elected a Japanese Director General, Nakajima, and now a Korean. I
believe I could do a better job than they have done, if I had a chance," he commented.
I started to understand what he was saying. The key concept Huang emphasized was
chance. He admitted, "I never cover up the fact that Taiwan is not a dejure part of world
health. We know it has been isolated for more than thirty years." Huang stared around the
room and continued, "We do not want anything outrageous; we just hope to return the
global and be treated like others." As I listened I looked around the classroom; the
students felt the emotion yet did not seem to be persuaded. Apparently it was difficult for
them to conceive of the vision their teacher was trying to create. The damage has been
done. These students lacked contact with foreigners and the chance to work with them.
But Huang continued, "That is why we need international health taught here." "I want to
be international. The Taiwanese have to be international. Unlike other states, Taiwan's
right to join international activities [guoji kungian] is not taken for granted. We have to
earn it with blood and sweat. Thus it is not only my hobby but also my duty to follow the
WHO news as close as possible. Through the news I try to live with the global. In the
following one hundred minutes I will show you the way by the world operates, and this
will prepare you for the time [when] we prevail. I cannot tell you when or how, but I
believe that it must come."
I doubted whether the global vision could be taught this way, but I have to say it
was the most touching opening of any international health lecture I had ever attended. As
Taiwan belongs neither to the category of the developed world, nor to that of the
developing world, its public health problems should be considered in the context of
global politics. The country is too rich to cry for help, yet it is not advanced enough to
offer the services others can't. What Taiwan needs is just a position in world health of
reciprocity; what it once possessed it wants returned. Thus a national movement to return
to the global has arisen. Along with its democratization, Taiwan's campaign to rejoin the
WHO has continued since 1997. This chorus expands year by year, attracting the public,
scholars, and lately the government. It becomes a ritual-like movement for all Taiwanese
that take place every year during the World Health Assembly, including lobbying events,
protests, and bilateral negotiations with possible supporters.
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Even so, the welcome Taiwan has earned is still thin. The outbreak of SARS
illustrates well the problems that Taiwan has experienced in its efforts to join the global.9
Taiwan has found a loophole-like entry into the global health network. During the SARS
outbreak, Taiwan was excluded from the WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network and only received second-hand information from Center of Disease Control
(CDC). Only after serious breaks in the disease control network caused by a large-scale
nosocomial outbreak in April did the WHO reluctantly respond to Taiwan's requests and
took the initiative to send specialists to offer guidance. Taiwan's experts were able to take
part in a SARS-related meeting hosted by the WHO for the first time in the mid-May; all
were designated "as permitted" by the PRC government as a "courtesy."
The PRC's failure in containing the epidemic has weakened its voice in the WHA
when it opposes Taiwan's participation. The time of return seemed to have come. There
was a mutual need to include Taiwan in the global. The consequences of the failures of
SARS control in the era of globalization tarnished the WHO's image:
The globalization of infectious diseases is such that an outbreak in one country is
potentially a threat to the whole world. The need for international cooperation on
epidemic alert and response is greater today than ever before due to increased
population movements, growth in international trade and biological products,
changes in methods of food processing, social and environmental changes.
(Government Information Office ROC 2004)
SARS showed how serious it was for the WHO to overlook Taiwan: this country is a busy
center for international trade and hosts more than 300 thousand people from South East
Asia. Thus, because "any loophole in this global health networkpresents a danger for the
global community" (emphasis original), Taiwan cannot be excluded from the WHO.
While waiting for judgment day, Taiwanese people felt excited and frustrated. The
U.S. first showed positive support for Taiwan's wish, yet the PRC's disgraceful
performance disappointed all who had eagerly hoped. Wu Yi, the PRC's Minister of
Health, made a forceful speech that was considered insulting and cheating to the
Taiwanese at the General Committee of the WHA. She pointed out that the PRC
government had promptly responded to the outbreak in Taiwan and had provided all
necessary information. Thus Taiwan's plea to join the WHO was a "political ploy" and
part of"separatist" activities. Wu scornfully asserted, "Their true motive is not to develop
health undertakings in Taiwan but to create 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' in
the international community.... The political attempts of the Taiwan authorities have all
0' For related information on this outbreak in Taiwan, see CDC-Taiwan 2003.
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met with failure in the past six years. This year will see the same result." With intensive
lobbying, the PRC's allies did not vote for Taiwan, successfully blocking its WHA bid.
While Taiwanese officials expressed their regret at this result, what tore harshly at
the Taiwanese people's heart was a scene that followed. When asked why Taiwan's need
to join the WHA was ignored, Sha Zukang, the PRC's representative to the U.N. in
Geneva, replied impatiently, "Already declined! Haven't you heard the decision of the
assembly? Who cares about you (Taiwanese)? [shei ii nimen]" (emphasis original, fig.
5.1).
Fig.5-2 Taiwan's Campaign Team Cheered Up by Banners Reading
"WHO ISOLATES TAIWAN?" in five languages (left) and Sha
Zukang's rude response to Taiwan's plea (right).
Source: Video clips from Taishi Xinwen [TTV News], May 19 2003.
The same scenario was repeated in 2004. Although that year Japan joined the "pro"
group, under the PRC's political pressure the assembly decided to leave Taiwan's request
pending. In a speech about Taiwan's efforts to join to the WHO, the President of the
Taiwan International Medical Alliance, Deng Jou-fang, admitted that SARS had proven
that even a serious global epidemic or pandemic could not overcome political repression
(Deng 2003). "We do not need any emergent issue in order to join the WHO. SARS is a
signal strong enough to make the world acknowledge the political situation we
experience." There seems to be a long way ahead for Taiwan on its way to the global.
Resisting Capitalism: Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu, an "ROC" Nationalist
It was not easy to meet Professor Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu. In his early fifties, Hu had
been a senior faculty member of the Pharmaceutical Research Institute, National Defense
Medical Center (NDMC), Taiwan's oldest military medical school. I was introduced to
Hu by one of my university colleagues who worked under the direction of Hu at the
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Taiwan Product Quality Research Institute, a non-profit organization devoted to the
inspection of GMP and related research. Hu continued carry out his ideas by founding
this institute after he returned from the BPA, where he served as the Director General.
"He is very knowable on drug polices. If you want to know more about the Asian market,
you should visit him," my colleague encouraged me.
Of course, I knew this well. Hu was a typical elite produced by the NDMC. After
earning his Ph.D. in clinical pharmacokinetics, he was appointed as a member of the
Advisory Committee on Pharmaceuticals (ACP) in the DoH, on which he continues to
serve. Hu is quick, smart, and full of energy. As the Dean of Research, Development and
Continuing Education at the NDMC, he is always busy. When I asked him when would
be a good time to have an interview, since he looked busy, Hu only replied, "Let's do it
now or never. I cannot give you a block of time; I am fully occupied by work."
I originally expected to find out his thoughts on the state of Taiwan's drug
regulations before the government took note of the ICH and the relationships between
regulation and the Taiwanese drug industry. The regulations, as discussed in Chapter 3,
were known to be somewhat loose. Because Taiwan's amended patent law could not grant
market exclusivity protection to products that had been registered before 1986 but had
failed to make it on market before the amendment, the global pharmaceutical industry
tried to compensate for this loss by forcing Taiwan to set high technical bars. They knew
that drug quality was the key to separating their originals from local "me-too" copies.
Although the Taiwanese government introduced the GMP system in 1982 and completed
implementation in 1988, the local manufacturers' quality was still questionable; local
firms were not good enough to produce qualified generic drugs.
Clinical trials were another technical bar that widened this gap. Previously, most
clinical trials were done in different Taiwanese hospitals for the purposes of formulary
listing. They were an administrative process and the standards were so low as to be
meaningless. Thus when competition with local companies heated up, global firms felt
"extorted" by these unnecessary clinical trials, which slowed down their sales and
increased their marketing costs. Thus the global drug industry wanted the government to
require a single trial for all of Taiwan, but one that was good (and costly) enough to block
local competitors. Since 1986, PhRMA has pressured the Taiwanese government through
the USTR in U.S.-Taiwan trade negotiations. One of the results was an agreement to
require 24-subject trials for bio-equivalence (with half the participants designated as a
control group) in 1989. These studies, at an estimated cost of 1.2 million NTD each, were
difficult for the producers of generic drugs to conduct. Before the introduction of the ICH,
the bar was further elevated, requiring trials recruiting at least forty subjects for every
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product that sought registration beginning in 1993. In addition, the modified law included
a seven-year safety monitoring system for generic drugs that entered the market.l° This
was the so-called "July 7 announcement" (notification number: 08246232). As far as is
known, this amendment was related to the 1992 trade negotiations in which Taiwan was
listed as "priority foreign country" in an annual Section 301 report (see Chapter 3).
Like a movie director reviewing his work, Professor Hu recited the above story for
me with his commentary. While listening to his views about this scenario, I was
impressed by his enthusiasm and outspokenness. Unlike the people I met in Japan, Hu
was fluent in English and did not mind anyone quoting his words. He looked powerful, as
if he worked for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and not the government
of a small country. "Everybody likes to work with Oliver, because they know that I
always lead the team that never loses," Hu said. His interpretation goes as follows.
Taiwan's negotiation with the United States was a continuous fight against unequal
treaties that could be traced back to the opium war of 1842. For Hu, the modification of
the patent law or the amendment of the law of pharmaceutical affairs was not the point.
The point was the unending desire of global companies to conquer Asia. Hu described the
various ways PhRMA pushed Taiwan to surrender. "These guys always believe in the
top-down approach but not that [of] communication among professionals. They go
directly to our Minister of Economic Affairs, our Premier, even our President, through the
American Institute in Taiwan. They can always find a way to accuse you of malpractice.
What they want is to enjoy a barrier-free market. Even so, I just do not buy it."
Hu believed that the government should be the only apparatus to resist such a
political invasion, and he thought he did a great job. He reminded me that although the
United States forced Taiwan to require clinical trials for retrospective pipeline production
protection, Taiwan did not sign this treaty until 1993, when almost all new chemical
entities patented before 1986 had developed into products in market. Hu stated, "I totally
understood the situation of Huang Weng-Foung and Hsiao Mei-Ling, my predecessors [as]
the Director General of the BPA. We are old friends from the ACP and are a team." He
remembered the scene when Taiwan and the U.S. negotiated in Washington in 1991. "It
'0 In fact, the United States considered it a retrospective protection for the products patented by 1986
but marketed after then. Originally in the U.S.-Taiwan business negotiation meeting, held March 7-9, 1993,
the USTR strongly insisted that protection extend longer than eight years, while Taiwan thought seven
years of protection was enough. The negotiation resulted in a compromise: for the first five years, the
companies producing a generic drug had to submit the results of a local clinical trial on the same scale as
the original. For the sixth and seventh years a bioequivalence study had to be conducted at validated
laboratories.
I I The American Institute in Taiwan is the informal embassy of the United States to Taiwan that has
been in operation since the end of diplomatic relations in 1978.
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was in winter. Huang was there on behalf of Hsiao. I was there, too, as a visiting fellow at
Johns Hopkins [University]. Huang called me one day before the negotiation. I shared
with him my thoughts that contributed the success of this negotiation." The deal Hu
referred to was the 40-subject clinical trial agreement. Taiwan promised that in order to
replace all meaningless duplicate listing trials, the DoH would ask for one "good local
clinical trial" for each product that sought a market in Taiwan. In Hu's opinion, it was not
a trade-off, because Taiwan needed to build up its experience in clinical trials. "Huang is
a good technocrat, and I know science. That is why we can work together well."' 2 Aware
of the changing role of clinical trials in boosting the biotechnology industry, Taiwan
welcomed this amendment and used it as a "payoff' to trade for a certain moment of
peace from these hungry capitalists.
The evidence, Hu pointed out, was that PhRMA asked Taiwan to remove the
clinical trials requirement after 1994, because they found that they did not need it
anymore. PhRMA claimed that the 40-subject trials were not "scientific" enough and thus
were an "inappropriate non-tariff barrier." But this time Taiwan could not return to the
dark ages. Hu taught me that the rule for medical regulations is that only a higher
standard can replace an existing one. But PhRMA did not care. It made other complaints
about Taiwan's reviewing practices-that the DoH's review process was too long, that the
facility for clinical trials was not sufficient, and so on-which according to Hu were
nothing but childish tricks to undermine the Taiwanese government's drug regulation
credibility. For him, in the field of pharmaceuticals there should be mutual understanding
among all countries, and the authority of such an understanding should be respected. Hu
was strong and did not like to see his country looked down upon. He said during the
interview, "Leave this to Oliver and it will be done. All companies know this." Indeed,
for Hu, Taiwan seemed not lose any battle against these companies. His memory is a
series of victories. He teased, criticized, and made fun of PhRMA for its ignorance of
science, lack of local knowledge, and poor imagination. He explained, "Being a
bureaucrat in Taiwan, you have to be smarter than your rivals. You have to penetrate their
conventional thinking and provide an agenda for them. You must not follow their rules of
game and you must lead them to follow your vision."
Hu's ideals are so high that he still insisted on calling Taiwan the "Republic of
China," a term that almost nobody knows outside of this island. Let me introduce the
background of this complicated fact. Firstly, Taiwan does have formal diplomatic
relationships, which can be seen in table 5.1, in which all fourteen organizations it holds
12 This view was confirmed by Huang Weng-Foung; he said that these negotiations started a new era of
clinical trial policy in Taiwan.
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membership in are listed. It is clear from this list that most of these organizations were
established before Taiwan was expelled from the U.N. They are organizations for
agriculture research, an old agenda for boosting the economies of developing countries.
These organizations are legacies of global aid to Taiwan. Although Taiwan's economy has
transformed from agriculture to industry, some of these organizations still function
well-with little or no political influence. 13 Meanwhile, Taiwan continues to participate
in some economic organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the
Central American Bank for Economic Integration. Although Taiwan is active in these
organizations, they are too small and regional to have any impact on the world economy.
More questionable is Taiwan's role in them. It serves as a major donor; it gives other
member countries financial support in order to win their political loyalty. Terms like
"money diplomacy" or "money bullet diplomacy" are used to describe this dilemma.
Table 5.1 International organizations in which Taiwan holds membership
as a state, 1995
13 For example, the Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center, a non-profit international
research institute, is active and has a global reputation; its approximately twenty internationally recruited
professional staff and 210 locally recruited researchers are based in Shanhua, a small town in southern
Taiwan.
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Name of Organization Founding Headquarters Year Status
Date Location Joined
Asian Development Bank 8. 22. 1966 Manila, Philippines 1966 Member
International Cotton 9.5.1939 Washington, D.C., USA 1946 Member
Advisory Committee
International Office of 1.25.1924 Paris, France 1954 Member
Epizootics
Asian Productivity 5.11.1961 Tokyo, Japan 1961 Member
Organization
Afro-Asian Rural 3.31.1962 New Delhi, India 1968 Member
Reconstruction Organization
Food and Fertilizer 4.24.1970 Taipei, ROC 1970 Founding member,
Technology Center for the host state
Asian and Pacific Region
Central American Bank for 5.31.1961 Tegucigalpa, Republic of 1992 Member
Economic Integration Honduras
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Junhua minguo waijiao nienjian
1995:798-803.
Putting aside the minor organizations in which it can hold membership under the
formal name ROC, Taiwan remains a member of some larger international organizations
in which it is impossible for it to appear under its proper name. Indeed, since 1971, the
problem of how to name the country has been an issue in its international relations. Its
competitor, of course, is the PRC, who took over Taiwan's seat at the U.N. Even so,
Taiwan's attitude changed with global politics. In the beginning, Taiwan was trying to
maintain its membership (under the name ROC) in any international organization it could
while resisting the PRC's various applications for membership. This rationale for this
policy was know by the phrase "gentlemen won't stand together with thieves" (hanze bu
lianli), meaning that the KMT (the ROC) would not coexist with the Communists (the
PRC). However, after the PRC's open-door policy in the late 1970s, it became harder and
harder to maintain this stance. This was especially so when the PRC used the same policy
in their efforts to establish diplomatic relations, asking Taiwan to leave or to
"downgrade" its status to that of a part of the PRC. In order to maintain its visibility,
Taiwan had change its attitude toward the PRC from a rigid "no talks, no contact" to the
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South-East Asia Central 1966 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1992 Member
Banks
International Seed Testing 1921 Zurich, Switzerland 1962 Member
Association
Asian Vegetable Research 5.22.1971 Shanhua, Taiwan 1971 Founding member,
and Development Center host state
Association for Science 1972 Manila, Philippines 1972 Member
Cooperation in Asia
World Trade Organization 1.1.1995 Geneva, Switzerland 1995 Observer (became
(WTO, formerly GATT) Member in 2002)
International Commission 3.21.1969 Madrid, Spain 1972 Observer
for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tuna
Inter-American 4.8.1959 Washington, D.C., USA 1991 Observer
Development Bank
more flexible "no avoidance, no stepping down." 14 The insistence on a proper name, in
this instance, became less important.
Fig.5.2 Chinese Taipei Olympic flag (upper left) and Taiwan's National Flag
(lower left). The sad fact that Taiwan cannot present its national flag in
any global situation, including the non-political Olympic Games, made
Chen Shih-Hsin, the first ever Taiwanese gold medallist, cry at the medal
presentation ceremony (center and right).
Source: Public Source (left, upper and lower) and Illustrate Bank Muzi at
http://gallery.muzi.com (center and right).
Some compromises were made to maintain Taiwan's memberships in the face of the
PRC's interventions, of which the most well known was the "Olympic committee
formula." In 1975 the PRC tried to join the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on
the condition that the ROC Olympic Committee be ousted. The IOC, however, did not
accept Beijing's U.N. formula. It decided instead to let the PRC join as the "Chinese
Olympic Committee, Peking [Beijing]" and call its Taiwan counterpart the "Chinese
Olympic Committee, Taipei." The decision was soon readjusted to reflect the political
reality, with the official names changed to "Chinese Olympic Committee" and "Chinese
Taipei Olympic Committee," respectively, For Taiwan, Olympic athletes represent their
Olympic committee, not their country. A concomitant change was that the Chinese Taipei
Olympic Committee was not allowed to fly the national flag of the ROC at the Olympic
competition; the flag could not be hoisted and the country's national anthem could not be
played when its athletes won medals (see fig.5.2). Despite Taiwan's protests, this
arrangement was formalized and used as the reference for Taiwan's membership in
14 According to Kao Lang's study (1994), since the 1980s, Taiwan's diplomatic policy can be
summarized in the following four principles: 1) to enhance the relationship with those states that already
had formal relations with Taiwan through more cooperation on agriculture and industry; 2) to form relations
with states that Taiwan did not yet have formal relations with by establishing representative offices; 3) to
win diplomatic recognition of newly founded countries; 4) to actively participate in global organizations.
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almost all important regional and international organizations, such as the Asian
Development Bank and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and later the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
I noticed that Hu consistently used the name "ROC" to refer to Taiwan. It seemed as
if to him this title was the way he showed his commitment to his country. "Don't doubt. I
am an ROC nationalist. I will never change the name of my nationality at any global
conference," Hu told me when I asked him about this. He explained his battles with the
PRC to me with the following analogy: "Just like in a community, we live across the
street from the PRC. We have a good garden, where beautiful flower blossoms, but the
PRC's garden is only a weedy sward. They know that our garden is good; that is fine. But
how dare they change their door plate to ours and claim that it is their garden!" In fact,
Hu's standard Mandarin reveals his ethnicity and he does not hide it; however, as a
mainlander, he had no intention of heaping pity on the PRC.15 "I do not hate these people,
though they are near-sighted and their behavior is foul. I fight only because they treated
us too unfairly. They stomp on my dignity and push me into a comer." Professor Hu's
nationality might be confusing, but his standpoint is clear. He has a strong commitment to
the country in which he is living, whether it is named Taiwan or ROC. What he worries
about is that this country he loves so much is too weak to keep out global capitalism.
When I asked him how to improve our pharmaceutical industry, Hujust said, "You tell
me!" It was the first time he admitted his limit as a government officer, and the interview
ended with it.
The Road to Excellence: FMPAT, the Medical Nationalists
I visited the Federation of Medical Professional Alliance in Taiwan (FMPAT) on a
sunny afternoon just before its twenty-sixth training course on clinical trials. The FMPAT
is located in downtown Taipei across the road from the NTU Medical School, Taiwan's
oldest medical school, founded when the island had just been handed over to Japan. Like
its campus, which juxtaposes old colonial-style buildings and minimalist modern ones,
this school always reminds one of its long history of incubating the Taiwanese
intellectuals who treat people's bodies and minds on the one hand and pursue excellence
in medical research on the other.
5s "Mainlander" here refers to a category in Taiwan's domestic politics. Taiwanese mainlanders are the
descendants of soldiers and refugees who moved to Taiwan with the defeated KMT. The political
preference of such people is usually presumed to be pro-KMT and pro-unification with the PRC. I will
return to this point in Chapter 8.
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The FMPAT has remained in the place where it was founded. Among those engaged
in social movements advocating for Taiwan's liberalization and democratization, the
FMPAT was praised as "the conscience of our society" (FMPAT 2002: 3). Founded by a
group of medical professionals who were mainly graduates from the NTU led by
professor Lee Chen-Yuan (1915-2001), an internationally renowned scholar on snake
venom research and the successor of Tu Tsung-ming (1893-1986), the first Taiwanese to
obtain a doctoral degree in Japan, the FMPAT states that its goal is the revival of the spirit
of the many Taiwanese physicians who devoted their careers and lives to social reforms
under Japan's rule.16 Demanding immediate reform to end the KMT's one-party rule, the
FMPAT instigated and participated in several demonstrations in its early years for this
purpose, on issues such as the direct election of the president and the self-determination
of Taiwan's future. Because these activities were famous and influential, for the public
the FMPAT was seen as political, a group working for nationalism rather than for medical
reform. When I began some archival studies on Taiwan's regulatory drug environment, I
encountered the FMPAT, for it was the first group to realize the importance of clinical
trials, and it organized courses and seminars on this topic. This interesting finding led me
to decide to visit the FMPAT; I was curious about the reasons they had started this effort,
and why it became the only issue directly related to medical science that they worked on.
"We started this project with a very simple idea; we wanted to do something to
improve our medical standards up to the world level," said Wu Shuh-min, the President
of the FMPAT and one of key founders of this association. The son of Wu San-Lein-a
Taiwanese intellectual, politician, and businessman-Wu Shuh-min continued his father's
career as a strong sponsor of many social movements. However, besides his busy political
life, Wu was also a well-established physician specializing in the respiratory system. He
graduated from Kaohsiung Medical College, the school founded by Tu Tsung-Ming, and
had practiced in the United States for over twenty years before returning to Taiwan.
According to Wu, it was not originally his idea to introduce modern clinical trials.
However, when K.C. Chen, the founder of the International Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IRPMA) in Taiwan and one of the founders
of the FMPAT, suggested the idea to him, Wu gave his full support. Although
pharmacology was a remote discipline in Taiwan's clinical practice (see Chapter 3), Wu's
16 In fact, the FMPAT's birth was the product of a famous demonstration in 1991 against, among other
things, laws that badly violated freedom of speech. That demonstration was held in front of the NTU
Medical School, and in March 1992, Lee formed an association-the FMPAT-to continue the social
reform efforts the Taiwan Cultural Association, one of the most influential opposition groups during
Japanese colonization, started in the 1920s and he immediately obtained support from his former student
physicians.
266
foreign experience had proven to him the importance of clinical trials in medical science.
In addition, Lee Chen-Yuan's opinion was important. As an M.D.- Ph.D., Lee always
thought that the FMPAT should give more emphasis to issues of public health and
medical policy, and his knowledge of pharmacology made him appreciate the role of
clinical trials in the advancement of pharmaceuticals. He made the final decision on this
project, and Wu and Chen took charge of it.
K.C. Chen revealed more of the origins of this project. I interviewed him at
Maywufa Biopharmaceutical Enterprise Group, where he was serving as CEO when it
became the first Taiwanese research-based drug company to go public. "Working at that
time for Bristol-MyersSquibb, I was one of the few members from the pharmacological
area," Chen explained. Even so, having worked in industry for over thirty years, Chen
had different concerns. "I knew well that clinical trials were the key to this industry and
to the competitiveness of Taiwan's biotechnology. But I needed physicians' help." Thus,
Chen has preached this idea since the FMPAT's founding and obtained Wu Shuh-min's
support. The ICH was one of most important events triggering this project. "We the
industry knew well the ICH since its beginning. However, without any foundation, how
can Taiwan talk about the ICH? In fact, at the beginning, only Wu and I worked on this
project," Chen remembered.
The project Chen was referring to was the establishment of training courses. From
1992 to 1994, the FMPAT organized a series of introductory lectures titled "A Conference
on Clinical Trials." As expected, at beginning not many people paid attention to this
activity because of its newness; others knew of its importance but were hesitant to come
for political reasons. "You know, the FMPAT was regarded as NTU-centric and
politics-driven," Wu Shuh-min further explained. Wu and Chen in fact arranged meetings
with hospital officials who thought participation in these lectures could lead to
"improper" political interpretations, clarifying the lack of political agenda and the
beneficial character of the conferences. "Good physicians can tell the difference," Wu
said. "For instance, we visited a famous physician in cardiovascular disease. We told him
the reason for these lectures and promised him a special seminar on cardiovascular drugs
to be held soon; he understood and agreed to come."
Another problem was the content of conferences and speakers. Clinical trials are an
advanced interdisciplinary science. Looking at the titles of these lectures-"The FDA and
its Role in Clinical Trials," for example-we can see that they were neither specific nor
well organized. As K.C. Chen admitted, he did not know much about what should be
taught in these lectures and who should be invited, and he called upon his old friend
Shaw T. Chen, then the medical group leader of the FDA. K.C. Chen recalled, "In fact, it
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was Shaw Chen who urged [me to consider] the idea of modern clinical trials when I was
at Squibb. So it was natural to think of him when this project started."
Shaw T. Chen had a different approach to clinical trials. Unlike other Taiwanese
doctors, Chen earned his master's and Ph.D. degrees in chemistry at Johns Hopkins
University before pursuing a medical degree, and he had a chance to work at the FDA,
where he received rigorous training in the conduct of clinical trials. Chen had a clear goal
when he went into the study of clinical trials. In fact, he grew with the expansion of the
FDA (see Chapter 2). "Perhaps it was not a bad thing to stay in the United States," he said.
"Although I did not know exactly what was going on in Taiwan, I know the best in the
world." Despite K.C. Chen's recommendation, Shaw's participation in the FMPAT's
project was minimal at first. For this, Shaw has his own interpretation. "I was watching,"
he recalled. Considering Taiwan's drug development environment, Chen was thinking of
what would be the most efficient way to introduce the most advanced ideas on clinical
trials.
Apparently, Shaw Chen's concerns touched the most fundamental question about
these lectures: what were their educational goals and target audience? Clinical trials are
not just a concept or a method. They are closely linked to existing regulations and require
cases to practice on. Since clinical trials are such a broad field, there needed to be a clear
idea of who the audience was and which topics were suitable. Unfortunately, this was
simply difficult for Taiwan. Some initiatives, such as the state-sponsored Taiwan
Cooperation Oncology Group, focused on scholarly research in clinical trials, but the
FMPAT refused this approach, for its impact was slight. Even so, the FMPAT's "public"
approach was problematic as well. The industrial base in Taiwan was so weak that it was
unable to provide enough practice cases or incentives for physicians to participate in
clinical trials; this effort was destined to have limited influence.
So what, then, was the FMPAT's goal? Returning to Wu's comment at the beginning
of this section, these lectures were considered to be a social reform. There was no
relationship with the development of industry; the underlying reason for these lectures
was to fulfill an elite ideology that Taiwanese physicians should pursue excellence in
knowledge and practice. Their excellence and superiority, as demonstrated historically,
was believed to be a force that would lead to more social movements. It was another kind
of Taiwanese nationalism aimed at reaching the global standard. This is what tied these
people together, as Wu Shuh-min indicated when I asked how he knew Shaw Chen: "I did
not know him before. But we shared the same ideology." Wu explained that he and Chen
were members of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, an oversea
Taiwanese group that argued for Taiwanese self-determination.
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Although I wondered how far this project could go, I appreciated Wu, K.C., and
Shaw's ideas. There must have been something more than rational calculation that made
them do this. I suddenly remembered a poster hanging in K.C. Chen's office that showed
an eagle hovering over a canyon. At the bottom was written a verse from Isaiah in
Japanese, English, Chinese, and Taiwanese.' 7 I went over the words of this passage in
my mind: "But those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on
wings like eagles, they will run and not grow weary. They will walk and not be faint"
(40:3 1). With a strong belief in the righteousness of its actions, the FMPAT walked on its
way to excellence in clinical trials.
PART II
THE BIO-GLOBAL CONNECTION: FORMING AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE
IN THE ICH
Setting the Channel: The E5 Guideline as a Way in
In the Part I, I described three groups or individuals who presented three
perspectives concerning Taiwan and the global. As a medical technocrat, Professor Huang
focused on Taiwan's isolation and the education of a new generation who can bring
Taiwan back to world stage by recalling the "golden age" of Taiwanese public health. Hu,
an "ROC" nationalist, gave Taiwan's existence a new meaning by focusing on its
strategies of resistance to global capitalism and political threats. This vision had formed a
firm standpoint, somewhat like that of the MHW officials, and Hu considered the United
States to be the main, if not only, source of global capitalism and the PRC the source of
repression. It is thus necessary to remain "independent" from these powers in order to
preserve Taiwan's dignity. In the same direction as Hu, the FMPAT worked on a way to
make Taiwan more competitive in the era of biotechnology. These medical elites believed
that Taiwan's statehood could be ensured only by its economic power and medical
excellence.
Although these people vividly constructed their visions about Taiwan and about
how it should present itself in the world, they could not be said to constitute the
"pre-ICH" mode of Taiwan's international presence, because, as I have noted repeatedly,
Taiwan could not make use of statehood to generate its institutional voice. Stephen Tyler
has shown us how difficult it was to create speech, to make it meaningful and capable of
17 The Taiwanese translation of this quote is written in the romanized form introduced by Western
missionaries in the nineteenth century.
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generating more meanings by interacting with other speech (Tyler 1978). His observation
can be used to help understand state agencies. At the global level, the above voices are
too fragmented, too vague, and too "meaningless" to be recognized as speech articulated
by a state agency. However, in writing ethnography, my job is neither to lament Taiwan's
current situation nor to advocate the necessity of giving Taiwan a proper status. It is also
not my job to "forge" a voice for Taiwan or use this voice to justify Taiwan's de facto
existence. Far from this, in this section I will take note of the dynamics of how an
institutional state voice for Taiwan was formed and how it was recognized by the global.
I hope to show two intertwined pathways by which this was achieved. The first can
be roughly understood as the trial of "translation" as described by Bruno Latour (1993). I
will show the process by which some individual voices were magnified, synthesized and
institutionalized. These "Archimedean points" formed a trial of strength that produced a
voice that was recognizable to the global. The second trial was the formation of a
rhetorical agency, as described by Stephen Tyler (1978: 141-149). Echoing Tyler's
analysis of intersubjectivity and its necessity in sustaining communications, my argument
is a somewhat a reversed agenda in which Taiwan's "ICH mode" made itself a rhetorical
subject by maintaining its voice in its ICH communications. These communications, I
will argue, construct a dynamic field about the ICH that always refers to Taiwan's
interdicted statehood. A final attempt to realize agency will be discussed at the end of this
chapter.
I did not witness the birth of Taiwan's institutional voice on the ICH, nor did I find out
about it intentionally. I came across this voice in a lecture at YMU before the outbreak of
SARS. The speaker was Chu Mong-Ling, the executive director of the Center for Drug
Evaluation (CDE), and the title of lecture was "The Role of Regulatory Science in the
Pharmaceutical Industry." Before attending his lecture I knew nothing about this person
and the institution he headed. I was only there because his speech belonged to a lecture
series called "Introduction to Biotechnology and Its Management" in which I regularly
participated. The speech title looked interesting, but I did not expect that it would have
much to say about Taiwan. Having examined Japan's experience in encountering the ICH
for a while, I was not sure whether Taiwan played any role in this affair as well.
The lecture went as I thought. In the first part Chu reviewed the origin of regulatory
science in the nineteenth century, the establishment and development of the FDA, and its
involvement in drug development. In the middle of the talk he moved to the initiation of
the ICH and the need to establish global technical standards for new drugs (for more
details, see Chapter 2). Up to that point, nothing went beyond my expectations. However,
when his talk turned to a slide of"Taiwan Formosa," my attention was caught. It showed
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Taiwan's drug regulation development in parallel with the evolution of the ICH (fig. 5.3).
Chu traced the origin of Taiwan's development to the "July 7 announcement" in 1993,
which founded an ad-hoc committee called "ICH-Taiwan," improved the country's
clinical trial environment, and later established the CDE, the largest organization for
in-house drug review in Asia outside of Japan, in 1998. As a counterpart to the ICH, the
CDE provided a wide range of services and was actively involved in many reform
initiatives, such as reviews of clinical trial protocols, inspections of trial sites, the
establishment of a pharmaco-vigilance system, and the implementation of GMP. In
addition, it had organized a series of international conferences on the ICH, the third of
which was scheduled for November 2003.
Fig. 5.3 Evolution of Taiwan's Regulatory Environment.
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Source: Chu Mong-Ling's Slide Presentation, March 4, 2003.
While listening to Chu, I could not help but wonder how much I could rely on his
accounts. My political sense told me that Taiwan would not be able to attend any global
organization, even the "non-political" WHO. In addition, the ICH, as described in
Chapter 2, is an exclusive club for states that have the most advanced pharmaceutical
industries. Taiwan did not belong to it. I asked myself how the CDE could achieve what
Chu had described. If Taiwan could be allowed to join the ICH, it would be interesting to
compare it with Japan, which always seemed to resist globalization. However, it was
likely that Chu was just exaggerating Taiwan's contributions to the world in a way that I
had heard on many occasions of this kind. I was obliged to clarify these problems.
After the lecture, I caught up with Professor Chu. I told him about myself and asked
if I could make an appointment for interview. To my surprise, as soon as he knew my
intentions, Chu said, "Why don't I drive you downtown so that we can talk on my way
back to the office?" I got in his car. During the ride, Chu explained to me that Taiwan had
in fact seized upon an issue by which it could cut through to the ICH: bridging studies.
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Bridging studies! It was just what I was concerned most about in Japan's frustrations with
the ICH and vice versa (Chapter 4). I felt that there must be some relationship to my
previous fieldwork, but Chu stopped the conversation there. He referred me to Chern
Herng-Der, his Deputy Director. "If you are interested in bridging studies, you should talk
to Dr. Chern. He is a clinical pharmacologist and has been involved in the E5 guideline
since 1995."
When we arrived at the CDE, Chu introduced me to Chern and we made an
appointment. I wanted to know why and how the E5 guideline was an issue for Taiwan at
the ICH. Chern and I talked in a meeting room at lunchtime. In contrast to Chu's heroic
portrait of Taiwan's involvement in the ICH, Chern revealed that this relationship had
modest origins, rather like the impression he gave of himself, a typical physician from
Southern Taiwan.'8 He was not the first Taiwanese to attend the ICH, Chern clarified.
Taiwan had sent people there since its beginning. The person who had attended ICH 
worked for FMPAT, but she did not even take any notes. Also attending were a specialist
from the BPA and two section managers; they also attended ICH2. Although they were
government people, their voices were only background noise at the ICH. Chern explained,
"In almost all global conferences, we were total outsiders. Our presence did not mean
anything. Not because of being isolated and excluded; we just failed to find a way in. No
ideas were exchanged; no information was shared. Most importantly, without these
channels, no experience was accumulated."
Chern admitted that he did not know anything about this conference before he
attended ICH3. One day Chern saw a poster about the ICH conference on the activity
board at the NTU hospital, where he was the newly appointed chief of clinical
pharmacology, and he found it interesting. He then called Hsiao Mei-Ling, the Director
General of BPA at the time, asking her to send him to the conference. Hsiao, one of the
disciples of Hsu Tsi-chou and the successor of Huang Weng-Foung, led the ACP, where
Chern was a junior member. "We are both alumni of the NTU and have known each other
since I was abroad." Chern finally obtained a chance to attend ICH3.
Chern's eyes were wide open at the ICH, even though he was still foreign to it. As
an expert long involved in the GCP, Chern soon found that it was not necessary for
Taiwan to draft its own guideline, since the ICH would replace it all anyway. "The task
now is how to follow these activities in a timely fashion," he wrote in his journal. Chern
18 Like many Taiwanese physicians of his generation, Chern was born into a physician family in Chiayi
and graduated from the medical school at NTU. According to an article about his career, when he was asked
why he wanted to study medicine when he applied to the NTU Hospital, one of the best in Taiwan, he
answered, "For me, it is not an ideal or a wish; rather, it is natural choice after appreciating my father's life
and career over the years."
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was curious about every issue discussed but had no idea which was the most important.
"It was a drug company that told me about bridging studies," Chern recalled. As an
outsider, Chern did not have a chance to talk to people except those who were also from
Taiwan. He learned about the controversial concept while having breakfast with a
representative of a foreign company. "My intuition told me it was the chance we needed
to catch!" Chern looked excited when he showed me his journal entry about his decision
to attend the section meeting on the E5 guideline, which had just reached Step 2, and he
learned a lot:
The analysis of the ethnic factors is just what [concerns me] most. The
categorization of these factors (as corresponding to the categories of Asian,
Black, and Caucasian) can be a new concept worth being introduced to Taiwan.
This requires more thought to tackle the [right] problems, such as bridging study,
triage, and regulatory floor. (Chern's personal journal, November 3, 1995)
Also, Chern was aware of Japan's "awkward" insistence on racial difference, although he
did not clearly understand it. In the same journal he wrote that the Japanese lacked
creativity and rationality, with a footnote indicating what he meant by that: "Their
[scientific] logic sounds unclear, and the explanation is not satisfactory."
It seemed to Chern that Taiwan might be able to differentiate itself from Japan if it
followed the rules set up by the ICH, as he wrote in a personal report immediately after
ICH3 (1995 ): "I can see three issues that will have an immediate impact on Taiwan....
How to accept 'foreign data' is the most controversial but a very important step toward
harmonization. I see, though not clearly, the tendency in the future towards three major
races in the world, Caucasians, Blacks, and Asians, which will be incorporated into early
clinical trials and replace all local requirements.... It is arguable that the Japanese data
can represent all Asians needs for scientific evidence. Yet, on the other hand, Taiwan
cannot close itself [off] and reject all foreign data (like Japan does) if it wants to join the
global market."
I let Chern clarify further by asking whether he felt that the racial difference did not
really exist. He corrected my use of the term "feel." "I am a pharmacologist, and, for your
reference, my dissertation is on pharmacological genetics," Chern answered. He knew
well the most extreme cases cited by the Japanese on the different metabolic rates in
Asians and Caucasians. However, he did not think that those differences were large in
general. "Japan's response was not consistent with my clinical knowledge that only a few
people need readjustment of the dose." I asked how he felt if no Taiwanese clinical data
were to be used before a certain product was imported. Chern insisted again that we
should separate the standard issues from those of racial difference. "Indeed, Taiwan's
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standard was primitive; yet this was not the reason that we did not care about possible
racial differences or requested more trials with local subjects. We recognize these
differences and would like to [address them with] clinical data that meets scientific
standards," he replied. Apparently, Chern was taking the same approach as the FDA on
racial difference.
But beyond the above considerations, Chern was keen to Taiwan's political status.
Taiwan needed to build an instrument to articulate its voice, and hosting global
conferences was the only way to sustain such a voice. He wrote in his journal, "The last
day of the conference gives me a feeling of attending a historical event and want to rush
back to start a big project or mission, that kind of thing. Great conference; I did learn
much about the art of managing such an event." As soon as he returned he began to act.
He wrote a report for Hsaio and proposed a three-year project for the FMPAT, persuading
them to establish a committee to follow the ICH. In this proposal, he argued that this
committee should follow the ICH closely. For the ICH, it demonstrates how it was very
much in Taiwan's interests to implement the guidelines and express the country's wish to
host conferences. He concluded, "The following three years will be crucial in deciding
whether Taiwan will be a center for clinical trials in Asia." Chern explained to me his
reasons to choosing the FMPAT to conduct this project: first, the members of the FMPAT
were mainly NTU alumni whom Chern was acquainted with. Its leader, Lee Chen-Yuan,
was a renowned pharmacologist who had been one of Chern's teachers. Second and most
importantly, Chern knew that the FMPAT had previously organized training courses on
clinical trials; he could not think of a better group than the FMPAT to be in charge of
clinical trial regulations.
A few months later, a committee was founded under the sponsorship of the DoH. It
was established in the spring of 1996 as the "ICH in Taiwan" committee (hereafter
ICH-Taiwan). Chern's individual seed of thought had a place to grow.
Intrumentalizing Taiwan's Voice: From Local ICH-Taiwan to Global CDE
ICH-Taiwan did not obtain its financial support solely to follow bridging studies or
GCP; globalization and business strategy were also key factors. In a review article on the
formation of the ICH-Taiwan, K.C. Chen, its Secretary General, explained why the DoH
decided to fund this committee (Chen 1998). He mentioned that the APEC general
meeting, held in October 1995, had resolved to establish a Cooperation Center for Good
Clinical Practice in Singapore (CC-GCP, later called APEC CCG). This resolution
brought pressure to bear on Taiwan's hope to serve as a center for clinical trials in Asia.
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Yet, it also provided the impetus for academia, industry and government to work together
to form an organization that could extend the country's efforts into global activities such
as the ICH.
Like the ICH itself, the main body of ICH-Taiwan was the Steering Committee,
which was chaired by Wu Shuh-min of the FMPAT. Under this committee were three
expert working groups. These groups are not intended to deal with single guidelines;
rather, they are oriented toward solving problems that arise during the implementation of
ICH guidelines. As shown in fig. 5.4, these groups are concerned with one global and two
domestic tasks. The GCP working group finished the Taiwanese edition of the GCP
guideline, which was later revised to catch up with the E6 guideline, in November 1996.
In addition, it introduced the GCP inspection system.
Fig. 5.4 Structure of ICH-Taiwan
Taiwan Steering Committee
Expert Working Group Expert Working Group Expert Working Group
GCP Foreign Relations Clinical Trial Conduct
GCP Promulgation International Seminars Central IRB
GCP Inspection System ICH Clinical Trial Center
IND APEC CCG Clinical Research Training
NDA
New Drug Approval
Source: Chen 1998, Fig. I.
The working group in clinical trial conduct established a joint institutional review
board (JIRB ) to accelerate the protocol review process. With the help of the FMPAT and
Chem, the JJRB successfully expended its coverage to include five medical centers,
including the long-competitive NTU hospital and VGH Taipei, three quasi-medical
centers, and nine regional hospitals by June 1998. The length of the review process was
reduced to two to three months. The clinical research training courses continued. With the
help of Shaw T. Chen of the FDA, from 1996 onward this working group initiated a new
series of workshops. These workshops were held regularly three times a year, and for
each one three U.S. speakers from academia, industry and regulatory agencies were
invited. By 1998, 1,779 medical professionals had attended these workshops.
The most interesting expert working group, in my opinion, was the one on foreign
relations. Headed by K.C. Chen, this group was devoted to maintaining close relations
with the regional CC-GCP. Meanwhile, it kept watch on the ICH, hoping to make
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connections with it and host international conferences, though at that time only few
people though this was possible. The ICH-Taiwan identified itself as a follower of the
ICH, and it was far behind. For example, in order to update information from the ICH,
ICH-Taiwan published a bi-annual newsletter starting in July 1997. This 30-page thick
newsletter did not in fact contain much information, a reflection of the cruel fact that at
that time Taiwan did not have much exchange with the global.
Even so, an organization had at least been formed. In order to make itself visible,
Taiwan had to have a focus instead of just passively receiving information. The issue of
bridging studies came up again at ICH4, where Taiwan's first organized, substantial
delegation, consisting of 36 representatives from the DoH, academia, FMPAT, and
IRPMA, was in attendance. 19 Led by Lai Mei-Shu, then the Vice Director of the DoH
and a colleague of Chang Hong-Jen, ICH-Taiwan conducted a collective, systemic
observation of the ICH at this meeting. Unlike at ICH3, this time the Taiwanese delegates
were prepared and knew what to pay attention to.
Chern raised several points in his report to ICH-Taiwan (Chern 1997). First, up until
the fourth conference, the ICH had proposed 45 guidelines, 36 of which had been
completely implemented. The main task for the future of the ICH member countries was
not to create new guidelines but to put them into practice domestically and in non-ICH
states (for an analysis of these guidelines, see Chapter 2, Part III). It was an opportunity
for Taiwan. Second, as it still remained in Step 2, the E5 guideline had become an
obvious obstacle to harmonization. The main point of debate, as described in Chapter 4,
resided in the possible repetition of clinical trials using local (Japanese) subjects. Thus,
Chern predicted, the E5 guideline would be an issue even after its implementation.
Third and most importantly, the Taiwanese delegates clearly apprehended Japan's
attitude toward racial difference. In fact, it was this controversy that allowed Chern, as a
clinical pharmacologist, to approach ICH members. Chern spoke to Tominaga Toshiyoshi
of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and learned that Japan did not allow
products that had not been subjected to a clinical trial in Japan to be imported, even if
their phase I data showed no significant differences in effect based on racial difference.
Chern also asked Naito Chikayuki, the MHW expert on the E5 guideline, about Japan's
attitude and learned that although Japan would not be pleased with the guideline to come,
it would have to implement it. Chern raised this issue with the EU, and Jean-Marc
19 The size of this delegation was indeed eye-catching. Among Asian countries other than Japan, which
sent thirty-five people to the conference, Taiwan had the biggest delegation, compared to Korea's twenty
and the PRC's 14. In fact, it was the also the biggest delegation in the history of Taiwan's participation in
the ICH.
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Husson of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
(EFPIA) replied that they assumed Japan had a baseline for the acceptance of foreign data
and had carefully examined the coming guideline. All this helped Chem understand the
situation. He concluded that if Taiwan could seize the opportunity to be the first non-ICH
state to follow the ICH guideline, it would be a great leap toward the country becoming a
center for clinical trials in Asia.
Still, Taiwan needed a chance to prove itself to the global. For this, hosting a Drug
Information Association (DIA) meeting was a turning point that came at just the right
time. Founded in 1964, the DIA is a non-profit, scientific, member-driven association
with over 27,000 members (DIA 2001). Every year it organizes over thirty meetings,
workshops and symposia around the world, most of which are held in the United States;
but some are also held in Europe, Canada and, starting the 1990s, Asia. The DIA's plan to
hold an international symposium in Taipei titled "Recent Developments in Clinical Trials
in Asian Pacific Region" gave Taiwan the necessary opportunity to promote itself at
ICH4. Thousands of brochures advertising the symposium were distributed, along with
booklets on Taiwan's GCP reform. Taiwan's dream seemed to be nearing reality.
Nonetheless, I wondered why Taiwan was chosen. Why had the DIA given Taiwan
the chance it needed? Chern told me a story of contingency: the DIA did not intentionally
choose Taiwan for this symposium, and he never thought of making it such a big event.
Again, personal networking had proved important. In July 1996 Chern attended a DIA
workshop on GCP in Tokyo. It was a small conference organized by Tsutani Kiichiro,
then a professor at Tokyo Medical and Dental University. It was held in a lecture room at
the university and only ten foreigners were invited, each from a different country. After
the conference Professor Tsutani invited all the guests to dinner and asked whether there
was any country that could host the next meeting. "I volunteered," Chern said. "I did not
consider the DIA much; I thought that it was not a big deal."
Chern did not know the amount of important publicity attached to this conference.
When he reported the idea of hosting it to ICH-Taiwan, all the members were excited.
They immediately decided that this symposium had to be large and global. This plan was
reported to the DoH, which decided to link it with the government's ongoing
biotechnology development policy.2 0 The most immediate influence it had on the
20 In September 1995 the Taiwanese government organized an inter-ministerial committee on the
enhancement of the biotechnology industry. A few months later it established a committee on the
pharmaceutical industry under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, streamlining the administrative
requirements for transfers of technology. For a brief introduction in English to Taiwan's biotechnology
policy before the 1990s, see Yuan 1990. For recent developments, see Asia-Pacific Biotech 20, a special
issue on biotechnology in Taiwan.
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government was seen in April 1997 at the meeting of the Science and Technology
Advisory Group, where the advisors recommended strengthening the legal dimensions of
the drug regulation system. The DoH, echoing this decision, proposed the establishment
of a professional, semi-governmental organization. According to its proposal, this
institute, which later became the CDE, was formed to help make Taiwan a center for
manufacturing and production. The forces of business and globalization made brought
about the realization of the "global" CDE.
The 1998 DIA symposium acted as a catalyst for all these actions. Held only a few
months after the birth of CDE, it was a festival to celebrate its bright future. For this first
ever event, the most crucial was on foreign speakers. Tustani helped to invite those who
had attended the previous DIA meeting, and the DIA supplied the FDA officers Taiwan
most needed to have in attendance. For example, among the speakers were ICH
coordinators Roger Williams, then Deputy Center Director for Pharmaceutical Sciences,
and Robert Temple, the Director of Office of Drug Evaluation. More importantly, Taiwan
set the focus, ethnic factors, for the conference. It arranged a half-day session on this
topic, and Williams and Temple, who had been involved in the E5 Expert Working Group
(Williams is the person who suggested the idea of bridging studies; see Chapter 4), shared
their experiences. From a retrospective viewpoint, it was the most successful part of this
conference.
Yet Chern did not stop there. He knew well how to promote a conference and how
to promote Taiwan itself. Before the conference, he negotiated with the DIA to publish
the proceedings in its DIA Journal (vol. 32, supplementary issue, November 1998).
Chern felt at that time that the journal would be one of the few to cover this issue in Asia;
besides, the DIA needed more members in Asia due to the rising proprietary drugs market
there. On the other hand, as a guest editor, Chem knew how to "force" presenters, most of
whom were extremely busy, to contribute papers for this issue. "We sponsored their flight
tickets only when they submitted papers. No paper, no ticket," Chern said. He finally
selected thirty papers, half of which were either written by Taiwanese authors or about
Taiwan. This was not a direct promotion of Taiwan, but it ensured that information about
the symposium and about Taiwan would continue to be disseminated after the event.
Furthermore, in catching hold of this precious chance, Taiwan was attempting to
establish a global network to maintain its national voice. The formation of the
Asia-Pacific Clinical Research Alliance (APCRA) was proposed at the end of the meeting.
Ten countries whose representatives were present joined, and Chern served as chief
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correspondent.2 1 Chern explained, "I simply did not want this be a single event. A
network can help its effect last longer." He carefully explained this network in a
memorandum (Chern 1998): the APCRA would be identified as an informal network of
experts interested in drug regulatory science, and would have no political affiliation. Like
the ICH, it would have a steering committee working primarily on bridging studies; it
would also deal with the implementation of other guidelines and other cooperative
initiatives. Joint training courses and regional conferences would be arranged by the
committee and experts from the FDA and Japan would be invited. If everything went well,
"We can prepare a regional conference in May 1999 and invited them as consultants,"
Chem claimed.
It seemed like everyone had seen a light ahead for Taiwan. After attending the
annual meeting of the DIA in Boston in 1998 with Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu, Chern felt a new
era might be coming soon. He wrote in ICH-Taiwan Bulletin, "I believe the DIA would
be a starting point for Taiwan to be the center of clinical trials in Asia. In the 'post-DIA'
era, more challenges would come, and we should step forward and welcome them."
Creating Its Own Stage: APEC as an Economic/Political Arena
"What was your next step in the so-called 'post-DIA' era?" I then asked Chern
Hemg-Der about ICH-Taiwan and the CDE. Although the DIA is a global association and
had allowed Taiwan to host an international meeting, it seemed to me that this was just an
event, an occasion. Its impact on the global was small. Of course, Chern had made the
most of this conference by editing an issue of the DIA Journal in which Taiwan was the
main character; however, the country could not bring up issues or start follow-up
discussions if there was just one gathering. Subsequent conferences would wash out the
memory left by earlier ones; big, global conferences would cover discussions that had
taken place at small, regional ones. That is the rule of conferences, or better, of
information in the modern world (for more discussion on this point, see Chapter 1). The
CDE, despite its pioneering position among Asian states, would be soon marginalized and
surpassed by other regional powers. Although it proposed the formation of the APCRA, it
was not attractive enough to develop a whole series. Taiwan, after all, is not the center of
Asia.
My argument goes as follows: there are so many conferences held around the world,
21 They were Kiichiro Tsutani of Japan, Shin Sang-Goo of Korea, Ellick Wong of Singapore, S. L. Lin
of the Philippines, Iwan Darmansjah of Indonesia, Muhammad Aabdul Malek of Bangladesh, Vichai
Chokervivian of Thailand, Chim Choy Lang of Malaysia, and Su Ling of the PRC.
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not only in big cities like New York or Washington, but also in lesser-known places. Yes,
many big figures came to the DIA meeting in Taipei, but they would soon forget it. They
were not movie stars or pop singers. They had no obligation to remember where they had
visited and whom they had met at a single conference. Chern agreed on this point. "That
is why we planned to set up a regional network on pharmaceuticals and clinical trials. We
did know the fact that we must step out of Taiwan, but the political reality was really
harsh." Indeed, although the CDE was encouraged to attend the CC-GCP dominated by
Singapore, Taiwan could not share leadership with this competitor.
So Taiwan aimed its efforts at recognition to the "non-political" forum of APEC.
Founded in 1989, this regional network gradually developed into an active forum around
the Pacific basin. Its main goals are economic and trade-oriented, with members engaging
with one another as economic entities. The key to achieving this vision are the "Bogor
Goals," set at an APEC summit in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, of free and open trade and
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike the WTO or other multilateral trade bodies,
APEC members have no treaty obligations. The organization operates on the basis of
non-binding commitments, open dialogue and equal respect for the views of all
participants.
In addition to the economic benefits it brings, APEC membership has political
significance for Taiwan because it is the only forum in which Taiwan and the United
States can meet formally. Both Taiwan and the PRC noted this when both countries
applied for APEC membership in 1991. With the help of Korea, an agreement was made
between Taiwan and the PRC. Taiwan's presence in APEC was allowed on condition that
it used the name "Chinese Taipei" and that its Minster of Foreign Affairs could not be
part of its delegation. The tension between Taiwan and the PRC did not disappear, though.
When Taiwan tried to make connections during meetings, the PRC attempted to block all
possibilities.22 In view of its history of blocking Taiwan from a Free Trade Treaty with
Japan and the U.S. and later with Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN), it is
doubtless that the PRC is the one and only obstacle to Taiwan's hope of global
recognition, and the two countries' relationship in APEC is no exception.
The project to establish a network on pharmaceutical regulatory science focusing on
bridging studies was submitted by Taiwan and discussed at the sixteenth Industrial and
Scientific Technology Working Group (ISTWG) meeting in March 1999. As expected,
22 One silly but possibly true example of this tension has to do with the fact that at AEPC banquets,
Taiwan's seat is usually next to the United States, as the seats are arranged in alphabetical order. One year,
however, the rumor spread that the PRC pressured the host country to move Taiwan's seat to another place,
for it did not want to see too many formal contacts between Taiwan and this superpower.
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the CDE and FMPAT were the main advocates. However, Chern admitted that at the
beginning he did not know if APEC could serve this purpose. "I should put it this way: a
chance came and I caught it. That is all," Chern remembered. The call for proposals was
first sent to Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), and the Vice Minister
passed a copy on to the DoH, asking it whether it had anything to contribute. Hsiao
Mei-Ling, then the Specialist General of the DoH, made a call to Chern.
When talking with Hsiao, Chern got the feeling that the proposal for establishing a
pharmaceutical regulatory science network would fit the needs of the ISTWG "As you
know, seeing that bridging studies would be an important issue for Asian countries, we
had the idea to form an Asian network for the ICH regulations. It was the way we thought
through which Taiwan could become the center for clinical trials in Asia," Chen said.
"And APEC offered us a better stage than the APCRA. Since drug regulation is an
economic issue concerning industry and science, it would be better if this network was set
up based on an existing one."23 Therefore, with the help of Yang Shih-chien, then
Minister of State in charge of the affairs of science and technology and an APEC veteran,
the CDE and FMPAT drafted the proposal "APEC Network of Pharmaceutical Regulatory
Science-APEC Joint Research Project on Bridging Studies" (proposal number: 16.B.6.07),
which was sent to the ISTWG along with the other seven proposals.
The project looked attractive. The overall objective was to establish a platform for
solving common problems and better mutual understanding on issues on drug regulation.
It would contribute to APEC's priority activities by enhancing policy dialogue and review
via networking and joint research projects. It would harmonize drug regulations in the
region with global pharmaceutical research and development activity, which in turn
would raise the level of standards in clinical research, drug development and regulation in
APEC countries. Even so, Taiwan realized the difficulties that this plan would involve
and tried its best to prevent possible political obstacles. The proposal had to be endorsed
by two member states in order to be sent the general meeting, so Director General of BPA
Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu wrote to the directors of pharmaceutical affairs seeking their support.
On the non-governmental side, Chern Herng-Der persuaded his colleagues at the newly
established APCRA of the importance of this network. Shortly before the opening of the
meeting, two groups of Taiwanese delegates were sent to gain more support: MOEA
officials went to Hong Kong, where the ISTWG meeting, the main battlefield for this
issue, was being held. Hu, Chern, Wu Shuh-min, and K.C. Chern of FMPAT, joined by
Shaw T. Chen, rushed to Singapore and Malaysia, trying to advocate their standpoint on
23 Another concern was that the APCRA included some South Asian countries, which were unlikely to
participate in activities on a regular basis.
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the topic. 24
Let us move on to the meeting of the ISTWG in Hong Kong.25 Taiwan's project
went smoothly. Following Taiwan's extensive communication with other member states,
the CDE's proposal earned sponsorship from Singapore, Philippines, Mexico, Malaysia,
and Australia. However, the attitude of the PRC could not be predicted. Since every
project required all member states' commitment, the atmosphere of uncertainty lasted late
into night as under-the-table talks and political negotiations went on. Chern expressed his
anxiety on that day. "As a scientist, it is really far beyond my head. The only thing I have
learned is that the negotiations met deadlock. The PRC held a strong attitude that no
proposal from Taiwan could be passed. When I talked to the PRC delegates, they
confirmed this. One even told me that he did not see any problem in this project, but he
could not betray his government's decision."
Later I learned the reason behind the PRC's refusal. It was purely political and
contingent; it had nothing to do with pharmaceuticals. In February 1999, the U.S.
Department of Defense issued a report on Security in the Taiwan Strait, mentioning the
increasing missile threat by the PRC. In order to achieve effective control, this report
introduced the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system that would include Japan, South
Korea, and possibly Taiwan (later Taiwan was "formally" excluded by the U.S. but
"informally" included by Japan). This single explosive issue had an immediate impact on
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright's visit to the PRC in early March as well as the
discussions at the ISTWG meeting. Apparently, science had done its best, but politics
made the final decision.
Chern recalled, "We worked till the last minute and learned that the PRC was going
to boycott all the proposals brought up by us. Thus we could do nothing but do the same
to their proposals."26 In so doing, the Taiwanese delegation explained again that it had no
intention of blocking any projects for political reasons, and that it wished other countries
could do the same in the interest of friendship and cooperation. Facing this situation, the
ISTWG resolved that these projects could be conducted if the conflicts between Taiwan
24 According to K. C. Chen, the visit was a rare success. "Though they are officials, Hu and Chern are
professors and scholars. Wu is a senior physician and his long experience in the United States helped us to
explain the need for harmonization. As for me, I had just been inaugurated as president of the Federation of
Asian Pharmaceutical Associations, the biggest organization of this kind in Asia. Thus, it was me who
provided the channel needed to reach the top of each country. Fortunately, we obtained all we planned."
25 The following reconstruction on the sixteenth ISTWG meeting is based on a report published in The
ICH-Taiwan Newsletter 6, and on the reports of informants who attended it.
26 In that meeting Taiwan proposed eight projects (three for Group A, one for Group B, and four for
Group C), compared to the PRC's one (Group B). Except for Taiwan's "political" objection, the PRC
proposal was criticized as unqualified by other members and re-submission was requested.
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and the PRC could be solved.
As the political clashes between the United States and the PRC on the TMD system
waned, there was no reason for the PRC to impede an economic project like the proposed
pharmaceutical regulatory network. With the help of the United States, the next ISTWG
meeting, held in Seattle in August 1999, approved the proposal for the APEC Joint
Research Project on Bridging Studies.2 7 Its minutes briefly summarize the approval:
With respect to 17.B.6.06 proposed by Chinese Taipei (and held over from the
16th ISTWG meeting pending consensus), the group endorsed the proposal with
support from Australia, Philippines, Mexico and Malaysia.
After waiting for two yeas, Taiwan was finally granted a chance to build a stage for
global conversation, a series of conference of its own.
Making the Power of Voice: Searching "Scientific Evidence" for Bridging
The CDE soon prepared the first network meeting, held in Taipei on May 7 and 8,
2000. Eight countries-the United States, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia, Australia, and France-sent representatives, and various regional directors
from leading companies also attended. It was the issue of bridging studies that brought
these people here. More importantly, it enabled Taiwan to lead a global conference on its
own, and allowed Taiwanese officials to sit with key persons from around the world.
This network followed existing political relations within the APEC, which I will
briefly sketch here. APEC is a big organization consisting of 21 member countries,28 but
in realty it is divided into regional groups. Excluding the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) member states and remote Australia, in Asia there are three groups
outside of Japan: the ASEAN, the newly industrializing economics (NIEs), namely
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the rising PRC. Since the United States,
Canada, and Japan were already formal members of the ICH they would not be actively
participating in this meeting. Some ASEAN counties and the PRC, despite their huge
populations, had relatively weak drug-buying power. In addition, because of political
concerns they were hesitant to attend any conference hosted by Taiwan. This left only the
NIEs as possible candidates for leading this network. Except for Hong Kong, which was
27 According to K. C. Chen, Shaw T. Chen was asked to express Taiwan's wish to host this network,
thus the United States later supported this proposal.
28 The APEC member stats include, in alphabetical order, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
People's Republic of China Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Thailand, United States,
and Vietnam.
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taken by the PRC in 1997 and was thus unlikely to actively join in the meeting, Singapore
and Korea were the most advanced countries, but they were not well prepared to conduct
bridging studies. Thus Taiwan knew that it was the only country qualified.
For first APEC meeting, the CDE prepared three themes for discussion: ethnic
factors, implementation methodology, and regulatory perspectives. The first theme
worked on intrinsic and extrinsic factors that were of concern in Asian populations. The
second was about bio-statistical methods to be used in applying the concept of bridging
studies. The third was experience sharing on current practice of the E5 guideline. The
entire meeting tried to carry out a systematic review of ethnic factors and their estimates
impacts on drug regulations rather than drawing any conclusions.29 Industry
representatives, who expressed uncertainty about how bridging studies would affect
approval processes, questioned Japan directly in this new forum, asking how the E5
guideline could be practiced without any "political" considerations. However, Taiwan's
main expectation for this meeting was not just to provide a stage for these groups. It had
to have its contribution, its distinct voice, in this debate.
To achieve this purpose the CDE could not avoid a confusing but basic question that
had greatly concerned the E5 EWG all the way through the making of the guideline. That
is, how should an "Asian race" be defined? Once Taiwan decided to consider racial
difference in its reviewing process, it had to provide an explanation of its policy.
Although the CDE's claim was attractive and accepted basically all Asian data, it looked
like a political strategy lacking any scientific foundation. Chem Hemg-Der admitted this
problem: "In fact, when we set up our bridging study policy we did not have any
scientific evidence. We just followed what the ICH suggested. The 2000 (APEC) meeting
made us clear up the differences in our policy from those of OPSR (Organization for
Pharmaceutical Safety and Research), but we still did not have evidence."30
Indeed, race was the key question that the CDE could not avoid. Following the
"Western" logic that divided the world into three different racial groups-Caucasians,
Blacks, and Asians-the CDE was not interested in proving the differences between
Asians and Caucasians. Instead what it sought was a scientific study that demonstrated
how "close" East Asian people were to each other biologically; this would show that
29 Some suggestions were made at this meeting, such as various statistical models to solve the problem
of the extrapolation of existing data (for details, see Chapter 7, part II). Moreover, transparency and
efficiency would be stressed in all bridging study consultations. For example, it was suggested that a
checklist should be used to consider whether the applicant drug was racially sensitive.
30 In fact, internal documents show that the CDE did not have any idea of the extent to which racial
difference among Asian races should be taken into account after the 2001APEC meeting. See the meeting
minutes of the 2 0 h Government-Industry Joint Meeting on Clinical Trials, June 1, 2001.
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bridging studies were necessary and that a single bridging study for all East Asians would
be adequate.
Fig. 5.5. East Asian populations and their genetic relationships by HLA
mapping
0.1 
Note: Left: East Asian populations analyzed in Lin Marie's study: 1. Minnan
and Hakka ("Taiwanese"); 2. Thai-Chinese; 3. Singapore Chinese; 4.
Thais; 5. Vietnamese; 6. Buyi; 7. Southern Han; 8. Miao; 9. Li; and 10.
Northern Han.
Right: Neighbor-joining tree of 24 populations in Asia (Nei's standard
genetic distance).
Source: Lin et al. 2001 :Fig. (left) and Fig.2 (right).
However, such a study was not easy to find until Chern saw a paper published in
Tissue Antigens in 2001 (Lin et. al. 2001). In the rest of this section I will do a brief
ethnography of this paper, tracing how this scientific study was produced and interpreted
according to political concerns. However, when it traveled to the ICH, it served as the
scientific basis for the CDE's discourse on racial difference. The issue the paper dealt
with was the sensitive matter of the racial origin of the Minnan (Holonese) and Hakka,
the so-called "Taiwanese. "3 1 Conventional accounts say that the ancestors of these
people originated from the Central Plains of North China and migrated to southeast




coastal area during the invasion of northern pastoral nomads. Hence these people
represent the descendants of "pure" northern Han Chinese belonging to the great tradition
of Han (huaxia). Arguing against this assumption, Lin Marie and colleagues analyzed the
human leukocyte antigens (HLA) haplotype frequencies from samples collected from
East Asian races, as shown in the left of fig. 5.5, and they constructed a phylogenetic tree
by measuring the genetic distances between these samples (using Nei's standard). The
authors wanted to show the genetic affinities among these races.
The result of this study is interesting. The tree shows that Taiwanese people have a
close relationship with southern Asian populations such as the Vietnamese, Buyi,
Southern Han, and Miao. According to Lin, this corresponds with another historical
account that says that the Taiwanese are the descendants of a southeast coastal indigenous
population, the Yueh, and not northern Han Chinese. The relations among Asian races can
be better illustrated by neighbor-joining tree shown on the right in fig. 5.5. As we can see,
in this genetic map the Minnan and Hakka (in boldfaced type) merge first with
Thai-Chinese and Singapore Chinese, and together cluster with the other southeast races,
except for the independent Li. The body of this tree loosely encircles the races from the
north, including northern Han, Hui, Man, Buriat, Uygur, Kazakhs, Inner Mongolian,
Japanese, and Korean. Thus, this study concludes that the traditional account of the origin
of the Taiwanese is not scientific. HLA mapping tells us the truth: that the Taiwanese,
along with southern Han and other Asian races from the south, belong to a historical tribe,
the Yueh that is distinct from the northern Han. Furthermore, it maintains a split between
the populations in Taiwan and those in southeast coastal provinces of the PRC by
calculating blood type frequencies of these populations. Although the Taiwanese migrated
from the southeast part of the Chinese mainland, Lin et al. suggest that they might be
genetically distinct.
Although this is a scientific paper, those familiar with Taiwan's politics can sense
the political motivation behind the study and its implications. Taiwan has long been
troubled by the question of how to identify itself as a political entity separate from the
PRC. I cannot review in detail here all attempts to make such a distinction, but briefly,
because its global visibility is illegally repressed by the PRC, Taiwan has to reject by any
means anything related to this superpower, including culture and race. According to Ding
Xueliang, a Chinese political activist (Ding 2000), Taiwan's "anti-zhonghua"3 2
32 Zhonghua is a troublesome term hard to translate into English. As a vague term for the Chinese race,
conventionally it means everything that is "Chinese" or has Chinese characteristics. Even so, when it is
used for a political purpose, such as in Ding Xueliang's article, the term can be narrowly read as "China,"
as its political representation the PRC, or as everything related to that country. In order to preserve the
vagueness necessary in Taiwan's case, I chose to keep the term way it is written in Chinese. For more
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movement works in four different yet related fields. In politics, the Taiwanese reject
joining the Communist authoritarian regime. In worldview, they assert their separate
status from Mainland China. In culture, Taiwan is anxious to build its own interpretation
of its past and its own verbal expression (the "Taiwanese" language). In biological terms,
it hopes to cut its racial ties to the Han Chinese, which provide the PRC a priori
justification for taking over the island. From this viewpoint, Lin at al.'s paper can be
categorized as a refutation of both cultural and racial connections with the Chinese. As
the authors claim, "We hope to clarify the truth about the origin of 'Taiwanese"' (193,
emphasis added).
This paper quickly aroused attention when it was published, since it was the only
scientific literature that dared to address this sensitive topic, and because it confirmed the
difference between the Taiwanese race and Han Chinese.3 3 Therefore, after it was
introduced in a newspaper, it was soon translated into Chinese and was widely circulated
(as a full article, an abridged version, and a brief summary). Lin was later invited by the
Taiwanese community in the United States to speak about the study, and her speech was
transcribed and disseminated as a popular non-scientific article. Alongside these
documents, an enormous quantity of secondary materials is available on internet BBSs
and discussion boards, and in newspapers, criticisms, discussions, citations, and
explanations; and they continue to spread and circulate. The PRC, as expected, did not
like this research. Its academia openly attacked Lin with harsh criticisms. For example,
on August 19, 2002, the newspaper Haixia Shibao [Strait Times] reported that scientists
at the Chinese Academy of Science criticized Lin's study as "absurd, disgraceful, and of
no scientific merit." One famous geneticist even said, "The attempt to apply [the result]
to fulfill any political goal is also a shame. [There is no doubt that] the people in
Mainland China and the Taiwanese share the same blood and come from the same
ancestor." Though it was a scientific document, Lin et al.'s study was brought into the
political discourse of state and race.
However, in the context of ICH, this paper moved in the opposite direction, which I
call the "displacement" of politics in science. It was Chern Herng-Der who found another
use for this paper. He said, "One day I read a column about harsh criticisms on Lin's
discussion on Taiwanese people's understanding of their identity in terms of political status and cultural
affinity, see Chapter 8, part III.
33 Before Lin's paper, others had tried to clarify the origin of the Taiwanese through the analysis of
immunoglobulin, G6PD deficiency, a-thalassemia and b-thalassemia, and other biological markers such as a
9-bp deletion. For details, see Chu 2000. Regarding the study's political sensitivity, in fact, it was reported
that when Lin submitted this paper to Tissue Antigens, one editor member from the PRC strongly requested
that the board reject it, but this attempt did not succeed.
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motivation for this study. Before then I had no idea about this study, but I was grabbed
when reading this news. I immediately checked the reference and found this paper.
Strangely, I had a feeling that it might be what I want, and it really is." Chern surprised
me. I wondered how he could interpret this paper, if not politically. He showed me a
figure from Lin's paper, the one I have used above (fig. 5.5, right), and explained, "You
see, Holo and Hakka belong to the group of the southern Han. But, we should remember
that Taiwan also has mainlanders, the northern Han if you want to say. To put it another
way, we have both. If the northern Han are close to the Japanese and Korean, we can say
that Taiwan is perhaps the only state that has both kinds of Asians subjects. That is, we
are the best place to conduct clinical trials."
Fig. 5.6 Correspondence analysis of"Taiwanese" with other racial groups.
Red arrows indicate the distance between the Taiwanese (MN and HK)
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Chern introduced another figure in Lin's paper that shows the two-dimensional
image of the distances between the ethnic groups of the world (fig. 5.6). Its description
reads, "Minnan and Hakka are closely related to the southern Han, and are clustered with
other southern Asian populations. Northern Han are separated from the southern Asian
cluster, and form a cluster with other northern Asian populations." However, Chern read
this figure in a different way. Instead of reiterating the difference between the north and
the south, he pointed out to me how close they are in comparison to Caucasians and
Blacks. "Lin's study nicely echoes to my understanding on racial differences: Asians
should be considered a group compared to Caucasians and Blacks." Chern even told me
that Lin would soon publish another paper on the relations of the Asian races by tracing
their P450 genes. "I think its result will give more support to my theory," Chern said




Chern's interpretation was powerful, and for me, a shock. He gave me a sense of a
gestalt of scientific and political perspectives; many observers could only follow popular
perspectives. While in the original context, people saw only the separation, the break
between Taiwan and the PRC, Chern saw continuity, the sameness among all Asian races,
including Han Chinese.34 Presuming that Chern knew the conventional interpretation of
the study, I asked him whether he realize this "misreading." I did not know Chem's
political beliefs, but I assumed that the interpretive switch he was making would
encounter resistance and be difficult to promote. Surprisingly, however, Chem's succinct
reply did not even address this topic. "It just felt right," he said. Looking at my puzzled
face, he added, "Of course, I know my reading is different from many others. In fact, I
have consulted Dr. Lin to make sure that my interpretation is acceptable, and she agreed
with me." Chern then revealed his relation with Lin: both belong to the Taiwanese
Presbyterian Church, a religious group that has long been involved in social reform and
the self-determination movement during the period of KMT control. "We were not
acquainted with each other before. However, because of that paper, we got to know more
about each other. In fact, we share the same ideas," Chem concluded.
I was truly fascinated by the notion of"the same ideas." What was that? Chem did
read this paper differently. If he did not follow the scenario of "conversion," or even
"enlightenment" in the support of Taiwanese nationalism, what did he mean by saying
this? I suddenly realized that the Kuhnian metaphor of scientific revolution did not fit this
discussion (Kuhn 1962: Chapter 10), and that I might have made an incorrect assumption
about whether Chern's interpretation was convincing. Arguing whether the Taiwanese
race is related to the PRC in this scientific paper did not represent revolution in the linear
sense. Chern's reading could rather be considered a "displacement" of knowledge
accomplished by detaching it from the original reading and context and putting it into a
new network. Race was not at stake in this paper-the state was. Chern's reading
revealed a deeply embedded implication in Lin's "racist" discourse that secured the
integrity of the Taiwanese state. Lin did not insist on a nation-state like Japanese
scientists did for their country; she just wanted to reject a racial account that might justify
the PRC's desire to intervene in Taiwan.
In other words, Lin's paper is a political declaration of a break from the imaginary
34 In fact, the interpretation should be taken further based on this figure. Blacks and Europeans are
much closer to one another than Northern and Southern Chinese. However, the genes used here may not be
truly representative of the genes involved in drug effects. Mitochondrial sequence, Y chromosome sequence,
SNIPS, etc. could be used instead.
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unified Chinese race of the PRC. Chern's interpretation of Lin's paper, though it looks
like a "betrayal" of Lin, complements her argument. His reading does not reject links to
Mainland China, but it also constructs more links for Taiwan to the world. It is thus a
declaration that puts Taiwan back on the world map as a state and skips the PRC in the
process. The concept of bridging studies, in this sense, is a political statement: it does not
overplay Taiwan's racial uniqueness (or the uniqueness of Han Chinese), which would
pose the danger of giving the PRC a reason to "unify" with Taiwan. Instead, it just
silently replaced a racist slogan "Chinese are all over the world" (so that they deserve
clinical trials on their subjects) with the nationalist/global one, "We are all Asians
creating world harmony." Only by the above interpretation can we understand why
nobody argued against Chem's "misuse" of this paper. When I asked Wu Shuh-min about
the paper, he replied that he did not feel there was anything wrong. Again, he seemed to
have "the same ideas" as Chem.
With this scientific work, the discourse of CDE's bridging study policy was
complete. This paper later appeared in every subsequent discussion of the E5 guideline.
For example, one paper by Wang and Chern stated that "in general, Taiwan accepts all
Asian data. A study by Lin et al. in 2001 found that the so-called 'Taiwanese', accounting
for 91% of the total population in Taiwan, are comprised of Minnan and Hakka people
who are closely related to the southern Han, and are clustered with other southern Asian
populations in terms of HLA typing. ... As the Taiwanese regulatory authority
acknowledges the trial data conducted in Taiwan regardless of the ethnic origin of the
subjects, it will acknowledge all Asian data as well" (2002: 40). "Now no one can beat
me at bridging, since I have gone through all scientific problems," Chern claimed, like a
confident child who knew he would get the best possible score on whatever test was
given. For me, only one problem was left: how to advertise this idea to the world?
Sustaining the Voice: Reaching Out to the World, Looking Back to Asia
While organizing meetings and facilitating the implementation of the bridging
policy, the CDE was eager to reach out to the annex of the ICH, the Global Cooperation
Group (GCG). As described in Chapter 2, the GCG is a tool to fulfill the capitalist desire
to achieve a single global market. It disseminated information about the ICH to
"outsiders" in an effort to avoid unnecessary requirements for drug registration in these
countries. Although the GCG could never bring about any change in the ICH's structure
or operations, it was the only place where the voice of non-ICH countries could be heard.
For the ambitious CDE, it was perhaps the only available channel by which Taiwan's
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voice would be able to reach the core of the ICH.
To achieve this end the CDE needed a proper identity. This is because the GCG
only worked with organizations, and therefore APEC was Taiwan's ticket on board. It is
hard to locate the point at which the CDE initiated its appeal for participation in GCG
activities, but we can see some hints at the 2000 APEC meeting, where Bertram A. Spiker,
the PhRMA representative of the ICH Steering Meeting and the co-chair of GCG, was
invited to make the closing remarks. At this meeting, Spiker was impressed by the CDE's
bridging policy, and the effect was immediate. Knowing that the PhRMA would host a
half-day satellite session before ICH5, to be held in San Diego in November 2000, the
CDE asked to present its policy on bridging studies and PhRMA soon agreed.
It was an occasion that benefited both PhRMA and Taiwan. From a capitalist point
of view, PhRMA did not want any "extra" trials-that is, trials required by regions other
than the United States, Europe, or Japan. This was especially so in the case of the E5
guideline; nobody knew how to make it work and how to prevent the same kinds of
requests from being made by non-ICH counties. At this point, Taiwan was a good
example. It is rich to buy advanced drugs. Its regulatory authority followed the ICH and
faithfully adopted them into their regulations. Although following the E5 guideline does
allow the possibility of requesting local trials, the CDE's policy seemed to allow trial
requirements for almost all applications that had no racial sensitivity to be waived. It
could be a model for non-ICH countries, and thus it should be widely advertised.
On the other side, Taiwan appreciated this opportunity. The CDE knew that it was
bridging studies that made this appearance possible. Unlike large developing countries
such as Brazil and India, whose huge markets made them a topic at ICH5 as potential
invitees to the ICH, Taiwan had to find a way to catch up with the global. APEC was the
first stage of crafting a sustained voice, a voice that Taiwan could now continue to sustain
by its appearance at the ICH. Taiwan seemed to have returned to the "golden age" of the
1960s, when it was a shining star of public health in the Western Pacific region. At that
time, Taiwan was a recipient of aid and the Western countries were the aid donors. Thirty
years had passed. Finally, at the dawn of the new century, Taiwan returned to the global
stage, this time as an invited partner.
The time for ICH5 came. On the morning of November 8, two hundred people from
regulatory authorities around the world attended a meeting hosted by GCG co-chair
Elaine Esber. In the first part of program Chern briefly, for perhaps ten minutes,
explained the CDE's work on bridging studies with presentations by GCG members. The
most creative arrangement was yet to come. In a panel discussion, Chern suggested
Chang Hong-Jen, then Taiwan's deputy director of the DoH, present Taiwan's efforts to
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catch up with the ICH on behalf of ICH-Taiwan. Chang was the first high-level
government official who was able to make an appearance on such an occasion. Of course,
as I described in Chapter 3, Chang had had abundant government experience, including in
pharmaceutical affairs. However, what made Chang's presence meaningful was his
position: he was a Taiwanese official seated with the top representatives at an
international summit.
Table 5.2. Presenters from the ICH Steering Committee
* teleconference presenters.
Source: adopted from 2001 APEC website. http://www.cde.org.tw/
documents/ activities/download/active_apec2.htm.
Of course, this satellite meeting was small. However, it enhanced the CDE's
connection with the ICH. Looking at the list of 30 presenters at the second APEC
symposium on the APEC Network of Pharmaceutical Regulatory Science-APEC Joint
Project on Bridging Studies (hereafter the 2001 APEC symposium), it is clear that Taiwan
was able to host a real global festival. About four hundred people from Asia, Europe and
the United States attended. Five topics surrounding bridging studies were discussed: 1)
implementation of ICH guidelines in the APEC region; 2) regional bridging strategies for
industries; 3) pharmaceutical regulatory science; 4) regulation and consultation processes
for bridging study requirements; and 5) statistical models for bridging studies. Obviously,
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ICH member Name Affiliation and position
Elaine Esber Founder of ICH, former FDA representative to
ICH steering committee and co-chair of GCG
U.S. Robert O'Neill* Office Of Biostatistics, FDA, E5 EWG member
Robert Temple* Director, Office of Medical Policy, CDER, FDA
Bertram Spilker Senior Vice President of Scientific and
Regulatory Affairs, PhRMA, co-chair of GCG
E.U. Yves Juillet EFPIA, ICH Steering Committee member
Uwoi Tohru JPMA, ICH Steering Committee member,
E5 EWG member
Japan Mori Kazuhiko Director, Consultation Division 1, OPSR
Sato Daisaku Deputy Director, Evaluation and Licensing
Division, MHLW, ICH coordinator
bridging studies were the theme that Taiwan wanted to sell, and it said what its audience
wanted to hear.
On the other hand, symposium participants brought global visibility to Taiwan. Big
figures from the ICH occupied center stage at the meeting (for their names and
affiliations, see table 5.2). As the CDE recalled, "It was a milestone in Taiwan's endeavor
at the ICH, because it was the first time it had chance to interact with the ICH steering
meeting members, including those in the GCG" These people were a powerful magnet
that attracted Asian participation. The inner circle was comprised of officials from the
regulatory authorities. According to the APEC website, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia,
Thailand, and Korea sent representatives. As presenters, they had a chance to talk to the
ICH officials and exchange ideas. In fact, many of them returned to Taipei for the 2003
APEC meeting. The CDE reported, "This meeting was phenomenal; it opened up Taiwan
to a new era of the diplomacy through medical affairs" (ICH-Taiwan Bulletin, no.9).
Indeed, the 2001 APEC meeting was a victory for Taiwan, scientifically and politically.
Although this meeting presumed an "ICH central, Asia peripheral" view, this did not
bother Taiwan much, for this scene suggested a return to the "golden age" of public
health that its medical elites had long dreamt of.
But the CDE did not hold to this conference tightly. APEC decided to move the next
meeting to Tokyo and return to Taipei in 2003.3 5 Then it moved to Seoul for the 2004
meeting and is to return to Taipei in November 2005. "Why couldn't we keep this series
in Taiwan, as it was so successful? Did we fail to keep it with us?" I asked Chern
Herng-Der. "No," he answered. "We could keep it as long as we wished, since we are the
principal sponsor of this network." Chern explained the problems behind the illusion of
glory. For example, industrial people did not show up in great enough numbers. Lacking
international experience, few local people took the chance to speak to the global.
However, the most critical problem was politics. Taiwan could not win participation from
ASEAN members, Hong Kong, and the PRC. Chern said, "We have tried our best, but
you know the PRC, a place where politics is superior to everything. Besides, ASEAN
goes with it."
Chern knew clearly that any conference about East Asia that failed to have the
PRC's presence would fail. "Given such a difficult situation, if Taiwan hopes to be a real
leader of Asia-Pacific region, it has to give this meeting some freedom to travel around.
We will be much rewarded when it returns," he reminded me. In the interest of
35 Although people consider these conferences serial, in fact there are two kinds of conferences held by
the APEC network. The 2000 and 2002 meetings were workshops and not open to general public, and the
2001 and 2003 meetings were symposiums that allow public participation.
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broadening international participation, Chern asked Sato Daisaku if Japan could host the
next meeting, so the 2002 meeting was held in Tokyo. "You see, the PRC came, as well
as Singapore," Chern said. As for the 2004 meeting, Chern used his personal connections
with Shin Sang-Goo at National Seoul University, whom he had been acquainted with
since the DIA meeting in 1997. A convention was formed: the meetings would be held in
Taiwan one year and elsewhere in Asia the next. As with Taiwan's strategy on bridging
studies, the APEC meeting could not just be a meeting for Taiwan and Taiwan alone. It
had to link to somewhere else to ensure its continued existence. "This is the only way it
can survive and live well," Chern concluded.
Chern was right. The 2003 APEC meeting had the broad theme of"Regulatory
Communication," and the speakers were even more enticing than in 2001. In addition to
those present at the 2001 meeting, two key persons from the U.S. and EU drug authorities,
Murry M. Lumpkin, Principle Associate Commissioner of the FDA, and Thomas
Lonngren, Executive Director of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA), joined the show as part of the main cast. Of course, they would not fly
halfway around the world just for this conference, but since ICH6 was held in Osaka,
Japan, that year, the APEC meeting was intentionally arranged to directly follow it. When
I chatted with Elaine Esber during the meeting, she told me that this was her idea. As a
founder of the ICH who had served the organization for over ten years, Esber was
expressive about Chern. "This meeting would never have a chance to invite you without
Chem's effort," I said to her, and she agreed. Responding to my comment on his
aggressiveness in promoting Taiwan to the world, she smiled with understanding and
looked at me with her dark eyes. "Yet he is always polite, isn't he?" she said.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WEN-HUA KUO AS THE AUTHOR AND ACTOR
OF TAIWAN'S INSTUTIONAL VOICE
In the afternoon of July 11 2003, I stood at the corner of the alley leading from my
home in Taipei, waiting for a limousine sent by the CDE to take me to the airport. I was
to attend the ICH GCG meeting as an APEC expert. The car arrived on time. I opened the
door and saw Chem Herng-Der sitting inside. He told me that he had just found out that
my home was only few blocks away from his. "It is amazing that we live so close," Chern
greeted me. We had always met at the CDE or at conferences; this was the first time we
were alone in a non-public place. In the four short months since I had attended Chu
Mong-Ling's lecture "The Role of Regulatory Science in the Pharmaceutical Industry," I
had become an "expert" and "consultant" on the E5 issue, and I was to go with Chern to
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this conference. This had come so quickly for me, and when I tried to find words to
describe my feelings, I couldn't.
I remembered Chern's invitation the other day. He asked me if I could attend an
ICH business meeting with him, not as an observer, but as a participant. "You said you
are studying the E5 guideline and the ICH, thus you must see in person how it operates,
although it is a short meeting," Chern explained. "But, my understanding on globalization
is: do not work local viewpoints. Talk to the top and meet real key persons; they will save
you a lot of time. The door is open, but you do not need to reply now." This was too good
a chance to pass up, so I responded immediately that it would truly be my pleasure to go.
However, after hanging up, I stated thinking what this conference would mean to me, and
what I meant to Taiwan in this narrative. I did want to have access to the "inside" of this
conference, but I had never considered in what identity I would do this. I also had an
ethical concern based on my increasing knowledge of Taiwan's strategy of making itself
increasingly visible in the world-I would have to go and check whether what I had
heard and written was not exaggerated or distorted.
Let us summarize what we have learned up to here. This chapter consists of two
parts, or, retrospectively, two "modes." The first part deals with the "silent" mode. The
review of the pre-ICH experiences of Taiwan shows how a group of Taiwanese defined in
various ways as medical elites and technocrats tried to form an identity for their country
in response to the onset of globalization. Various strategies were identified; some resisted
the invasion of global capitalism while others welcomed the advanced science that
clinical trials brought. Some pointed out Taiwan's isolation and looked forward to the
future, while some hoped to return to the good old days of the country's former public
health achievements. Although these were vivid expressions, they were not the
institutional voices addressing the global.
In contrast to the "silent" mode, the second part of this chapter is a description of
the formation of Taiwan's institutional voice through the metaphor of bridging, which has
a manifold meaning. First, it bridging is the key concept of the E5 guideline that was
made to deal with the consideration of racial difference in accepting foreign clinical data.
But it had a different use in the case of Japan and Taiwan. While the West was trying to
use bridging as a means to make data from Caucasian trial subjects extrapolatable to the
Japanese, Japan considered it a way to separate itself from the rest of the world (so that a
"bridge" was required). That is the origin of all the confusion. Taiwan recognized racial
difference and welcomed bridging, because it granted Taiwan a weapon with which to
resist the pressure from PhRMA. More importantly, Taiwan took this deadlock as a
chance to get the attention from the global. As an Asian state, Taiwan claimed it could do
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what Japan could not. Second, bridging was the strategy by which Taiwan formed its
voice. As indicated in this section, the two processes went hand in hand all the way to the
formation of the CDE, the institute for the ICH. Taiwan hoped to be a center of
biotechnology and clinical trials, and this was the reason to form such an institute. The
formal process, as can be seen, resembles a regular policy-making process, or a "trail of
strength," as Bruno Latour would suggest (1993b). However, this ethnography shows the
process underlying the formal decisions, which provided the motivation needed to give
rise to Taiwan's voice. The personal connections among these medical elites, serving as
bridges linking them to one another, constituted a path-dependent trial by which the
formation of the institute could be worked out. Third and the last, Taiwan's institutional
voice did not exist independently. It must be made sense of in the context in which it was
situated. In this sense, what is at stake is not how loud this voice was when it was heard
by the world, but the "bridges" that it created as it communicated with others.
As this story came to an end, Chern's seductive invitation pushed me into a
dilemma about my role in it. At the beginning, I believed I was an ethnographer of the
ICH and a passive listener to Taiwan's story. However, I could not remain that way; my
nationality, social and cultural background, previous training, and research in Taiwan
have always pulled me into the expanding network that worked to produce Taiwan's
voice. I felt that I was working at the boundary between observation and the observed,
along the bridge of ICH GCG Where should I go? This dilemma had two aspects. First,
who was I in this narrative? Could I still pretend to have "objectivity" from my
standpoint of observation, claiming that I could separate myself into Wen-Hua Kuo, the
MIT-trained STS researcher, and Kuo Wen-Hua, a medical graduate who studies the ICH
and the E5 issue? Second, what would I do in this narrative? The traditional notion of
"disinterested" anthropologist was troubling, since I had moved far away from that
position. In order to achieve the best understanding on this topic, I traveled and
exchanged my knowledge with my expert informants. We traded information based on
the assumptions that I was a Taiwanese medical doctor and policy researcher from the
United States, while they were local scientists and policy makers. The more I learned, the
more I could trade for this knowledge. During this process, "the anthropologist" was
never my identity.
This dilemma is not new. Arthur Kleinman has mentioned his difficult position as
both a psychiatrist and an anthropologist in Writing at the Margin (Kleinman 1997). But
regarding my concerns about ethnographic voice, the CDE clearly intended to have me
involved, thus making this problem more difficult. Taiwan's project of voicing would not
be complete if no written material was generated. When Professor Chu invited me into
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his car, the interaction began and the CDE appeared in my network of knowledge, just as
I did in theirs. In Science in Action, Bruno Latour (1988) points out the way so-called
"scientific facts" are created by a lively process about how scientist "wrap up" ("black
box" in Latour's term) their work by means of narratives. In the case of bridging studies,
the CDE were the first people working on this topic, and I was the person who would
complete it. Of course, the CDE had not fabricating any scientific truth. Its desire, so to
speak, was always to "voice" itself. But just to voice is not enough-a voice needs a
witness, in the form of an academic study or a journalistic report, to turn it into a lasting
form of writing. The CDE was just trying to preserve this beautiful moment and make it
last forever. The DIA Journal mentioned earlier in this chapter is the interim product, and
this chapter is another one.
In any case, I decided to go to the meeting. Let me explain first why Taiwan was
invited at all. Through the Steering Committee meeting held in Tokyo in May 2001, it
knew that the E5 guideline would be discussed first within the ICH member states and
regions, and then a questionnaire would be distributed to non-ICH countries. Furthermore,
considering the good results achieved in the satellite meeting before ICH5, the GCG
decided to extend its meeting into a one-day conference held before ICH6, and it invited
four regional groups, including APEC, to join its preparatory meetings. The CDE would
definitely not miss this chance. The minutes of one CDE internal meeting read, "APEC
will recommend one representative to join the satellite session as either speaker or a
member of the preparatory committee. Taiwan will use its project [on bridging studies] to
earn this representativeship. We hope the result will single out Taiwan's leading position
in this region" (CDE 2002). Taiwan was awarded the position, and had two
representatives join the preparatory committee on behalf of APEC.
The meeting I attended was the second preparatory meeting. Because the other
invited organizations invited did not show enough interest in this issue, in the first
meeting the CDE had successfully bargained for two sessions at the ICH6 meeting about
the APEC Network of Pharmaceutical Regulatory Science and Taiwan's policy on
bridging studies. Chern even asked to attend the Implementation Working Party, which
was organized to solve the difficulties created by the E5 guideline (for details, see
Chapter 6, concluding remarks), as an observer. My participation thus gave me a chance
to witness these achievements.
However, what surprised me more were Chern's connections; they were too real to
deny. When we had breakfast with Rashmi Shah, an MHRA officer and a clinical
pharmacologist, Chern introduced me as an independent researcher on the ICH, and
discussed with Shah whether he could hold a training course at the CDE. During our
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conversation, Chem greeted people he knew that passed by, including Eric Abadie, the
EU representative and co-chair of the GCG, who later came and joined us. It seemed to be
a normal scene of the sort that occurred at all international conferences. People meet, eat,
drink, talk and catch up on what has happened since last meeting. Yet it had great
ethnographic significance. At the beginning of this chapter, I described Taiwan's failed
attempt to participate in the WHO; now I was witnessing this "illegal citizen" finding its
bridge to the world through Chern.
Taiwan was indeed smart and outstanding. Even in such a brief meeting, it grabbed
hold of every chance to promote itself. In his presentation, Chern carefully reviewed
every achievement Taiwan has made in drug regulation, rather like Chu's lectures I
attended. The story was supplemented by evidence: submissions of clinical trial protocols
increased after the foundation of the CDE, and its reviewing quality was good enough to
be accepted by the very picky FDA. Chem's talk was so compelling that anyone listening
would think Taiwan was the best place in Asia for clinical trials. This narrative was
important for the GCG, because Taiwan's firm support of bridging set a good example
about how this "politically" created guideline could be exercised "scientifically." Taiwan
nicely caught the rhythms of the capitalist dance between the ICH members and the rest
of the world. It was only in his last two slides that Chern even mentioned the APEC
network, and then only to promote the 2003 meeting to be held in Taiwan. The GCG
members, after listening, rewarded Chern's efforts by saying that they would suggest to
the Steering Committee that they offer one or two non-ICH observerships for some
working groups.36
When the meeting finished, I was deeply touched that I had been able to help
represent Taiwan. Hayashi Yoshikazu of the MHLW caught me at the lobby before the
dinner. He had been quiet at the meeting, but he wanted some information on Taiwan's
recent policy on bridging studies. As I talked to him about my opinions, Javroongrit
Yuppadee, the ASEAN representative, joined the conversation. She was interested in
Taiwan's next step after bridging studies and its possible impacts on South East Asia. It
was the first time Chem and I were not together, but these other officials seemed to have
waited for this moment, hoping that I could fill in what Chern had not said in the meeting.
Looking at their eager faces, I suddenly felt that I was no longer an outsider. They
considered me a colleague of Chern, a Taiwanese official, and knew the CDE's tricks
well. I had been placed in a position in their network of information, but they had no idea
36 The ICH has invited experts from the non-ICH counties to working groups for some issues. For
example, in the discussion on pharmacopoeias (Q4), the expert working group asked experts from India and
the PRC to join in.
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about their places in my network. Thus the information flow proceeded oddly. Although I
explained my identity as a policy analyst and APEC representative, they still believed that
I should know something about the CDE, which I did not quite understand. In turn, they
did not understand my inquiries because they were not sure of their political implications.
The dialogue was finally saved by the lobsters when we reached Les Crustaces, the
restaurant where the evening meal was being served.
Fig. 5.7 Left: Some GCG meeting participants at the restaurant. Right:
Portrait of Giovanni Arnolfini and His Wife (Arnolfini portrait), by Jan
van Eyck (1434).
Note: the Back Row: Caroline Loew of the PhRMA (left), Uwoi Tohru of
the JPMA (third to left), and Mike Ward of the Health Canada (fourth
to left). The Front Row: Hayashi Yoshikazu of the MHLW (left), Eric
Abadie of the EU (third to left), and Sabine Kopp-Kubel of the WHO
(fourth to left).
Source: Wen-Hua Kuo (photographer, left) and National Gallery of London
website, http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk (right).
Food changed the mood. Everyone seemed to forget their identities as government
officials for a moment. They chatted about cultural and racial differences while
discussing the menu like friends. Alex Giaquinto and Eric Abadie, the co-chairs of the
GCGQ were to resign after ICH6. "I am a scientist. I am so glad that I will not be bothered
by these politics," Abadie told me. The Japanese representatives, Uwoi Tohru of the
Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and Hayashi Yoshikazu, were to leave
the committee as well. Seeing this, I suggested that we have a group picture to celebrate
the achievements that GCG had made, and I took the photo (fig. 5.7, left). Until that
moment, I could not confirm my position. I would be leaving this field, too, and would no
longer consider myself part of this group. Thus I took up the camera, choosing to watch
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from a distance. Because of my position, I was allowed to take the picture. If this chapter
is the narrative I made, one could say that I was carefully hidden behind the lines. Even
so, in this section I emerged, just as I appeared as a reflection hidden behind the flash in
this photograph. Like reflection in the concave mirror in van Eyck's Amolfini portrait (fig.
5.7, right), my narrative and my photograph revealed the presence of the ethnographer
who narrates the story.
This also marks the narrative end of this chapter. Let me summarize three points
concerning the meaning of voice in ethnography. First, when globalization came, Japan
and Taiwan responded differently in crafting the means by which they voiced themselves.
In the case of Japan, although we read of some individuals, such as Doi Osamu, who
insisted on racial difference as a topic for discussion at the ICH, in general, individual
voices were repressed and hidden behind institutions. The MHLW was always the
mouthpiece for Japan's opinion, and its voice was consistent. It was the strength of the
institution, not an individual, that maintained this consistency; the person in a certain
position might change from time to time, but the voice was the same.
However, in Taiwan I found a totally different mechanism of voicing. It is hard to
tell which institution dominated the E5 policy in Taiwan, but individuals certainly played
a critical role. Because of Taiwan's awkward political status, its voice could not be heard
in any global scene for states. Therefore, even government officials had to alter their
individual identities. As a result, Taiwan's voice could only be presented as in terms of
personal politics; anyone who cared about Taiwan's statehood could stand for it. Even
though, as described in Part II of this chapter, Taiwan started to establish an instrument to
form an institutional voice, it was individuals who made this voice heard. The true
instrument for voicing, in this sense, is not any particular institute, but a group of people
who roughly shared the same idea. This chapter has named some figurers: Huang
Weng-Foung, Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu, Wu Shuh-min, C.K. Chen, Shaw T. Chen, Chu
Mong-Ling, Chern Herng-Der, Hisao Mei-Ling, Lin Marie, Chang Hong-Jen, and others.
Their endeavors constructed a path by which Taiwan's bridging study policy was shaped
and became known to the world.
Second, in the context of making an "objective" ethnography, this chapter shows a
complicated situation far beyond the old notions like "being there" and "witnessing" from
Bronislaw Malinowski, which assume the absence of the observer (or the observed) in the
making of ethnography, or like "deep description" from Clifford Geertz, which assumes
the conceptual division of an active observer and a passive observed. Concerning texts as
a form of voice in a broad sense, both the CDE and I are the authors of this ethnography.
In order to make a voice for Taiwan, the CDE used literary technology to create various
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forms of text. On the other hand, guided by my research interests, I was fascinated by the
information provided by the CDE (first lecture slides, and later notes, minutes, reports,
and interviews) and wrote it up as an ethnography. The challenge of this task is not
making the narrative "objective" by distinguishing my authorship from theirs, or making
it "disinterested" by separating my interests from theirs. The ethnography I can achieve is
what Stephen Tyler calls "the mutual, dialogical production of a discourse, of the story of
sorts" (1986: 126). After a certain amount of communication between speaker and
listener, recorder and informant, what emerges is a joint work of the ethnographer and his
narrative partners. As Tyler writes, "The ethnographic text is not only not an object, it is
not the object; it is instead a means, the meditative vehicle for a transcendence of time
and place that is not just transcendental but a transcendental return to time and place"
(129).
Third and last, concerning the representative power of voices, this chapter, which
portrays Taiwan as a "countermelody" in the fugato called "bridging," agrees with
Ranaj it Guha that this text should be considered an autonomous domain. It neither
accuses any historiography of lacking such a voice, nor argues for an ontological entity
that makes such a voice. Instead, this chapter tries to depict rhetorical identities that make
voices meaningful in this ethnographic text. For this reason, this chapter also agrees with
Stephen Tyler's understanding of ethnography: that it should no longer be cursed with the
task of representation, because "its meaning is not in it but in an understanding, of which
it is only a consumed fragment" (129). Evocation, as Tyler insists, is the key concept for
this understanding. This chapter, as the medium by which some voices are evoked, is
useful in many ways, contingent upon the context in which it was written, and how it will
be distributed and consumed.
I do not want to make this discussion too philosophical, but I would like to share an
anecdote here as this chapter ends. I remembered that on our way to the ICH meeting, in
a terminal lobby in the Vienna International Airport, Chern Herng-Der asked me to work
for the government after I completed my degree. It was early morning; we were waiting
for the connecting flight. He asked me persuasively, "Don't you think that it is exciting,
to attend international conferences and meet important people in the world? We are
physicians, and Taiwanese physicians should have a more broad vision. You see, I am an
M.D.-Ph.D., and you will have yours soon. If you choose this track, you may be able to
decide the future of our twenty-three million people like I do. Think of it: you can do it!"
Chern emphasized again and waited for my answer. At that moment, I could see the
figures mentioned in this chapter, their life stories, and Taiwan's political future; they
were all within me. I was overwhelmed. "I do not know, really."
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PART THREE
States Strike Back: Preserving National Values for the Future
On a summer afternoon in August 2004, I made an appointment with Professor M at
Kitasato University.
Located in Shirokane, a quiet area in Tokyo, which is home to many embassies and
parks, the university is also the historical site where Kitasato Shibasaburo (1852-1931), a
physician and one of the founders of modem bacteriology in Japan, established his
research institute that later became the archetype for this medical complex. Formerly one
of the most esteemed students of German bacteriologist Robert Koch, Kitasato had a
brilliant career inside and outside of Japan. Before returning to Japan from his studies in
Germany, he built an international reputation on the basis of his work on tetanus and
diphtheria bacilli; in 1894, almost simultaneously with French bacteriologist Alexandre
Yersin, his team discovered the Pasteurellapestis bacillus in Hong Kong. Under
Kitasato's leadership, the Institute formed a strong tradition in medical research that
continues toady.
Even so, I did not see any old buildings when I arrived. This campus had just
undergone a major renovation in 2001 and housed the University Hospital and School of
Pharmaceutical Science. Professor M shared a floor of the research building with another
faculty member. His secretary welcomed me when I knocked on the door of his
laboratory; the previous appointments were delayed. "Our professor is always busy," she
apologized. As I sat in the reception room, I had a chance to look at this laboratory.
Unlike the traditional classroom or laboratory, which is always dark and mysterious, it
was a bright, commodious room divided by several cubicles, each of which
accommodated a researcher or secretary. Facing the campus, the professor's work area
was at the end of this room. In another corner was a small library, with a good collection
of the latest journals stored on wheeled bookshelves. Except for the secretary, everyone
continued working after I arrived. My intrusion seemed not to bother them at all. If I had
not been informed about the place, I would have believed that it was a commercial
company.
After twenty minutes, Professor M's guest left and he came out to meet me. In his
mid forties, Professor M was still young and energetic. We shook hands and exchanged
cards, as one is taught in Japanese class, but following this we switched to an American
style of interaction. Professor M apologized to me again about the delay and guided me to
his office, which was decorated with his university photos, photos of graduate school, and
school souvenirs, all from an American city I was familiar with. "I did not know your
undergraduate degree was in the United States," I said. "Yes, my undergraduate and
graduate school were in the same city, as you see, just across the river, before I worked
for the FDA," he replied with a smile.
303
This was not the first time I have met Professor M. The first time I saw him was at a
conference on bridging studies in Taipei, where he presented a technical paper on Japan's
response to bridging studies. I introduced myself after the conference and we talked in
the corridor before he went dinner with other speakers. Unlike other Japanese scholars,
who are often shy with their English, Professor M is talkative and straightforward, with
perfect English. His attitude is not typically Japanese either. He did not dodge any of the
sensitive questions that I asked him. He explained his main points to me in
understandable terms, which surprised me. I wondered whether his theory would work if
Japan continued to insist on its racial uniqueness. He simply replied that he personally
did not think it was right and that I should not feel that it could not change. Regarding the
reason he had come to the conference, he just said, "Everyone knows that when talking
about bridging studies, they talk Taiwan. Besides, I have many friends here; they asked
me to come, so I did." I immediately begged him to allow me to visit his laboratory when
I went to Tokyo. I found his ideas interesting and wanted to know more, so I came to this
American-style laboratory oddly inserted into one of Japan's most traditional medical
schools.
We had a long talk and I grew to know Professor M's thoughts more clearly. He
was educated in the United States and had worked in United States for eight years. Like
what I heard from Americans, Professor M first told me that, in his opinion, racial
difference or the Japanese uniqueness was nothing but a temporary excuse used to protect
Japan's domestic industry, and he believed that it would not last forever. He was so
persuasive that I was almost convinced that the Japanese government would soon give up
its insistence. "But," I wondered, "Why doesn't Japan just simply accept the ICH
guideline or use the procedure suggested by Taiwan?" Pausing for a moment, Professor
M said that this was because the MHLW could not allow unsafe products to be imported
into Japan without any investigation. Then he started to explain to me about his project to
deal with racial difference, global drug development, target population categorization,
and extra studies for external factors on racial differences, all of which I had heard from
other Japanese scientists. I could not help but interject, "Wait a minute. If this is what you
think, what is different from your original plan? This is still based on the assumption that
you are different from others."
At this time I could see the Japanese spirit beneath Professor M's American
behavior. Whether he was aware of it or not, this racial assumption was so deeply rooted
in his mentality that it would never change. To waive the protection time was one thing,
but to subject Japanese bodily differences to a universal standard was quite another. What
was different were his words, which were new terms for interpreting this difference, a
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workable way of recognizing it, and a methodology for convincing others that it was
necessary to partially repeat clinical trials. I know it is not fair for Japan to accept a
U.S.-dominated standard, but Professor M knows better. He explained, "I have worked at
the FDA, and I know the situation. Think of it. If you replace the FDA with the OPSR,
what will they do? My experience tells me that the FDA would ask for more clinical trails
using U.S. subjects. I do not see why Japan cannot do what the United States practices."
It was at that point that I knew the reason he visited Taiwan. Facing the same pressure
from the United States, he was curious about how Taiwan would deal with them using
bridging studies.
Before ending the interview, I tested Professor M by asking him why he did not
share his opinions about the bridging study policy with his Taiwanese colleagues. "Well, I
discussed bridging studies with them. But we never talk about policy issues." He said.
"Don't you think that it is not our business to tell other governments what they should do
or what they should not do? We are scientists." When he said this, I saw his American
side return.
Looking back at his mysterious hint, I decided to look into the ways both Japan and
Taiwan wove their visions on racial difference in scientific language. This was another
starting point for this journey.
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Chapter 6
Sounding Genomics: Situating the Japanese Race in the Post-E5 Era
Only until the implementation of the E5 and E6 guidelines did the Japanese
have the self-awareness of being internationalized.
Naito Chikayukil
If it is agreed that the human species is one and that it consists of a group of
populations which, more or less, replace each other geographically or
ecologically and of which the neighboring ones integrate or hybridize
wherever they are in contact, or are potentially capable of doing so, then it
should be obvious that the task of the student interested in the character of
these populations must lie in the study of the frequency distribution of the




BACK TO THE ORIGIN: THE DEADLOCK OF BRIDGING STUDIES
Bridging into the New Era
In March 1998 the E5 guideline was approved by the International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use (ICH) Steering Committee with some corrections; it was then implemented by the
E.U. in March and by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September. As
for Japan, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW, later renamed the MHLW)
implemented it in August of that year (Notification No. 672 and PMSB Notification No.
739). Not knowing exactly what was behind the making of this guideline, the public
celebrated this achievement that would accomplish the dreamt-of bridge between Japan
and the global. In Yakujinippo (the Pharmaceutical News) on October 5, 1998, for
example, a number of articles addressed various concerns about implementation of this
guideline and the impacts of the ICH. It seemed that the E5 guideline was the indicator of
Senior Consultant of the Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and Research (OPSR), in interview.
2 "The Concept of Race in the Human Species in the Light of Genetics," in The Concept of Race (Free
Press, 1964).
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whether Japan would accept the ICH, and the ICH was the indicator of whether Japan
would accept globalization.
Of course, some worried about the possible impacts globalization would bring; but
on the surface their responses seemed calm. I reviewed the conversation between Doi
Osamu of the MHW and Dr. Muzishima Yutaka in Chapter 4, in which the ICH was
described as the "black ship" of international drug regulation. In fact, this long
conversation discussed other issues concerning the new Organization for Pharmaceutical
Safety and Research (OPSR), the reform of clinical trials, and new strategies of drug
development, all related to the ICH. Other articles described reactions to the introduction
of E5 and the other guidelines. For example, in the column "Today's topic," an article
entitled "Global approval: a dream expanding" recorded how difficult the passing of such
a guideline was. "The longest outstanding problem," it said, "was finally reached.... It is
expected that a great amount of foreign data will be introduced." Another article, however,
reported that in the near future, a spontaneous acceptance of clinical data would be
achieved among all ICH regions.
Some articles addressed the industry's immediate responses to the implementation.
Pfizer Japan, as noted, had submitted Viagra (sildenafil citrate) to the OPSR for approval
at the end of July 1998, at the same time as Eisai's Aricept (donepezil hydrochloride).
One article specifically mentioned the influence of bridging studies. It first interpreted
bridging studies as one requirement for reviewing products that contained clinical trial
data conducted in foreign countries. Although no one knew what standard the OPSR
would use in reviewing such cases, basically the article expressed a polite and cautious
optimism. If no bridging studies were required, it predicted, manufacturers would save a
lot of money and time.
All this sounded fine. Japan seemed to be moving smoothly into the era of
bio-globalization. Readers may remember Donna Haraway's observation of the three
configurations of bioscientific thinking, the categories of unities and differences that
constituted the human species discussed in Chapter 4 (table 4.1 and Haraway 1997:
219-229). Regardless of how much conflict the making of the E5 guideline had entailed,
its implementation completed the bioscientific configuration of discourses Haraway
describes as centered on the concept of population. With the conceptual algorithm of
bridging studies, populations, or as they say, gene frequencies, could be transformed and
interchanged in the world of proprietary drugs. The harmony of the ICH, though illusory,
seemed like it would be able to satisfy both the Japanese government and global industry
by stabilizing the configuration of bioscientific knowledge. However, this did not turn out
to be the case. Haraway describes the change of focus in the American scene from
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population to genome beginning in 1975 and continuing into the time of her writing in
the late 1990s, and in this thesis I will show that at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, the E5 guideline also attempted to make this move into genomics. Of course, as
Haraway points out, commercialization is one of the factors that can prompt such a move.
However, in the context of the ICH, the necessity of this move was instead embedded in
the cultural and conceptual assumptions about race as a collective category. In the rest of
this section I will describe the practical problems that made the discourse on racial
difference "incomplete" and why this move was necessary for Japan. The former subject
will be elaborated in the first part of this chapter and the latter in the second part.
To understand the practical reasons that bridging studies failed, we have to consider
the E6 guideline, which was implemented around the same time as the E5 guideline (PAB
Notification No.430, MHW Ordinance No.28). Titled "Good Clinical Practice (GCP),"
the E6 guideline was designed to clarify the responsibilities and expectations of all
participants in the conduct of clinical trials, covering aspects of trial monitoring,
reporting and archiving. Although this guideline seemed to be a simple requirement for
clinical trials quality, for Japan it was one of the most difficult guidelines to put into
practice.3 As I mentioned in Chapter 3, prior to the ICH, Japan conducted "Japanese
style" clinical trials with numerous sites, loose site management, and a hierarchal
structure based not on experimental methodology but on trust among investigators.
Therefore, after the implementation of the two guidelines, if Japan wanted to keep some
clinical trials in Japan, it would have to change its practices to conform with the
"Americanized" clinical trials mandated by the E6 guideline; if not, global industry could
waive any trial requirements with the help of the E5 guideline. This is what E5 veteran
Naito Chikayuki is referring to in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter. For Japan,
the guidelines were two "big bangs" as described in many presentations regarding the
ICH's impact on Japan (fig. 6.1).
The interrelationship of the E5 and E6 guidelines created dual dynamics-between
clinical trials and racial differences, as well as between industry, the FDA and the OPSR.
Let us consider the dynamic between the two guidelines first. Unlike the E5 guideline,
the making of which was painful and the results of which were a mess, the drafting of the
E6 guideline proceeded smoothly and without dispute. The problem was not how to
interpret what was good clinical practice, but how to actually implement it.
3 GCP is a term I often heard from people that I interviewed in Japan. Apparently it is another issue that
identified concerns about cultural conflicts between East and West in medical practices. Like the
acceptance of foreign data, the issue about the quality of clinical trials can be traced back to 1985, when the
MHW released regulations concerning good clinical practice. This issue deserves a study of its own and
will not be dealt with here.
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Fig. 6.1. Two "Big Bangs" For Clinical Trials in Japan: Acceptance of
Foreign Data (bottom) and Implementation of GCP (top)
Source: Sato Takeyuki's slide presentation at the 2002APEC Meeting,
Tokyo.
Leaving aside problems related to the hierarchy of the Japanese physicians who
were key in conducting clinical trials, there were many social and cultural concerns that
were difficult to resolve. For example, asking clinical trial participants for written and
signed informed consent seriously violates the patient-physician relationship in Japan,
where doctors are trained not to tell the diagnosis of a disease, if it is incurable, to the
patient themselves. Also, it was difficult to use placebos in clinical trials in Japan.
Previously, there had been only comparative studies, where the new compound was tested
against an existing one. In Japan it is recognized as unethical to treat patients, no matter
the purpose, with a substance that is known to be ineffective against their disease. Since
clinical trial subjects must be recruited on a voluntary basis, it would be hard for anyone
to carry out such trials in Japan until the social consensus was changed. As Etienne Labbe
of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA)
concluded, "The quality of Japanese studies is very poor, not scientific, and does not
[meet] our standards, particularly with regard to 'end-point' for assessment, and statistical
approach. If I may say, the preclinical part of the Japanese dossier was of good quality,
but the clinical part was at the stage of the middle ages." Thus, in practice, the dynamic
between the E5 and E6 guidelines is ambiguous. It was likely that in order to retain some
clinical trials, Japan would use its interpretation of bridging studies to force some trials to
be done in Japan because of concerns about racial difference.
This ambiguity relates to the strategic dynamics between industry and the OPSR.
The polarizing discourse of protectionism returned in industry's strategy to force the
OPSR, the regulatory authority, to accept their agenda that assumes the primary unity of
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human beings. On the one hand, multinational drug firms could continue the old
accusation that Japan wanted to protect its pharmaceutical industry by delaying the
importation of competing products. But upon the implementation of the E6 guideline,
they could add the emerging industry of Contracted Research Organizations (CROs) to
the list of guilty parties. In this extended discourse on protectionism, it was argued that
Japan was attempting to keep more clinical trials in its territory so that it could establish
its own CRO industry. These accusations, according my understanding, are
narrow-sighted, because they totally ignore the changes that globalization had made
during the introduction of the ICH. As I have pointed out in Chapter 3, Japan's
pharmaceutical industry had developed a "double structure" in which the top ten
companies behaved like their global competitors, while the small and medium-sized ones
remained the same. These big companies did not really need protection to help them sell
drugs overseas, and for the small and medium companies, the accusation of protectionism
was probably not valid because they targeted to different market. The criticism of the
CRO industry is possibly valid, but so far the Japanese government has not formed a
concrete plan for building up its own CRO industry.4 But no matter how problematic this
discourse might be, it was powerful enough to make people recall the historical image of
a protectionist Japan.
On the other hand, the OPSR did not feel that Japan was fairly treated. I heard some
accusations that the FDA discriminated against Japanese data, as drug applications using
these data failed to pass the excessively high GCP and Good Manufacturing Practice
(GMP) bars. Japan might know that their clinical trials environment was not that
"scientific"; however, the Japanese wanted to deal with these problems in their own way.
To achieve ICH-qualified clinical trials, the OPSR has organized workshops and
symposiums to explain this new system since 1997 and has conducted inspections of
clinical sites inside Japan. It has repeatedly asserted that the FDA usually rejected the
results of Japan's previous clinical trails based on their poor quality. However, under the
international standard agreed to by the ICH, Japanese clinical trials should be considered
qualified, no matter how they are done, but the FDA still accepts almost no Japanese data.
No matter which side is right, these accusations reflect the embarrassing but true fact that
the harmony of ICH rules did not bring peace to this situation. Instead, these guidelines
recalled old tensions and created new dynamics that complicated the situation, all of
which seemed to hinge on the basic concepts of human species and race. Apparently, the
4 Although this matter deserves further research, I hesitate to pursue it because of my deep concerns
about whether health care should be recognized as a "business" that needs promotion by government.
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bioscientific configuration based on population could not address these issues adequately
in this context.
From the point of view of scientific progress, there was, as a result, an attempt to
move to genomics at the ICH. However, STS research is concerned about the context in
which this move was made: who was responsible for it and for what reasons? This will be
the topic of the second part of this chapter. In order to achieve an understanding, I briefly
review what I have discussed earlier about the making of the E5 guideline. In Chapter 4 1
defined two modes of conversation about drugs and globalization. One was a bilateral
mode, in which Japan had to deal directly with the United States regarding requirements
for drug approval in the midst of trade frictions between the two countries. The other was
the global mode of the ICH, in which the E.U. joined the negotiation and the discussion
took place through the EWG, a body of experts and scientists. Obviously, Japan preferred
the latter mode.
This was when racial difference was introduced into the discussion and a guideline
needed to come out of it. During the discussion, the Japanese MHW was unable to keep
Japanese racial identity an independent category (which would have implied that the
Japanese should be dealt with separately), and it hesitantly agreed that all human beings
are biologically similar. Even so, Japan did not accept that the idea of a universal
standard by which all population differences could be accounted for by means of the
proper algorithms. Bridging studies were a compromise agenda that preserved this
assumption from attempts by European and American experts to "trivialize" the factors
claimed to make up the difference among races. As the product of such a context, the
guideline is both scientific and political. It does carry scientific meaning that should be
the starting point for further negotiations. However, it is also a product of political
compromise because it does not rule explicitly on how any racial sensitivities to drugs are
to be considered. Although bridging studies using local subjects were required for those
drugs for which racially distinct effects could not currently be estimated by algorithms,
local regulatory authorities such as the OPSR have the freedom to require every applicant
drug to undergo local clinical trials before being marketed.
From this description we can see the background for the genomic move at the ICH.
Having accepted the E5 and E6 guidelines as the legal basis for the acceptability of
foreign clinical trials, Japan and the United States could no longer refuse to use of foreign
data without acceptable reasons. When tensions arose among industry, the FDA and the
OPSR, the mode of conversation would switch back to the bilateral trade mode if no
scientific reasons were given for administrative blockades. This mode, as I have
mentioned in Chapter 4, did not favor Japan. Because of this, it was up to Japan to make
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any move, and the strategy was clear: if the MHW wanted to have a certain number of
Japanese subjects recruited into clinical trials, it had to return to the guideline and make
revisions; in order to make such revisions, it had to have a scientifically justified reason
This is the reason I cited Ashley Montagu at the beginning of this chapter. As we
know, Montagu work (1964) ended the bioscientific configuration of race by separating
scientific biological diversity from cultural implications. Population genetics was the
scientific tool of this new program, and it gave rise to the idea of population as the basis
for an alternative configuration. This does not mean that there was a total break between
the concepts of population and race, although many may see it as a paradigmatic shift. It
might be so in theory, but this was not quite true in reality-most of the time people used
these terms interchangeably. What was new was the idea of micro-changes in genetic
information that took place at the borders of neighboring populations, making population
a metamorphic collectivity rather than a fixed, unchangeable entity. Genomics should be
considered the same way. Many might have expectations about the changes it would
bring to the discussion of race, but this was not the case at the ICH. Genomics is a tool
for showing the biological characteristics of individuals, but this does not mean that it
would totally reject the collective unity of population. As Haraway observes (1997: 247),
"The human to be represented, then, has a particular kind of totality, or species of being,
as well as a specific kind of individuality. At whatever level of individuality or
collectivity, from a single gene region extracted from one sample through the whole
species genome, this human is itself an information structure." Scaling is not the point of
this change; the point is the way this genetic information is presented. As I will show
later in this chapter, in the context of racial difference, genomics was not introduced to
dissolve the identity of the Japanese race but to reconfirm its existence in the era of
globalization. This was achieved by providing the information needed to make race an
independent category in global clinical trials.
Here is the plan for the rest of this chapter. The "slow motion" ethnography featured
in Chapter 4 will be used in this chapter as well. The first part of the chapter is a sketch of
the situation after the implementation of the E5 guideline. I will describe the gap between
the ideal and the reality of the implementation of the E5 guideline. I will further analyze
the dynamics of voicing among industry, the FDA and the MHW. When the failure to
waive local clinical trials occurred, industry tried their best to push again through the
channel of the U.S.-Japan Market-oriented, Sector-selected Discussion (MOSS) meeting,
in which the U.S. government was dominant. While the FDA, which had made its own
standard into the world standard, did not show any interest in either the ICH or MOSS,
Japan also faced pressure from industry and the need to adjust this situation.
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In the second part of the chapter I will analyze Japan's responses to this pressure
from two perspectives with regard to voicing. First, the MHW attempted to formulate a
new scientific framework for clinical trials in which the Japanese would be recognized as
a separate category. As a more advanced science, genomics was called upon to serve this
purpose. Meanwhile, the MHW tried to promote this program. It redirected the pressure
from industry back to the global platform of the ICH, trying to revise the E5 guideline.
Meanwhile, it formed a dedicated channel with the FDA so that it could deal with issues
concerning this guideline without political intervention.
By the Guideline: The Ideal of Harmonization
Let us start with the scene when the E5 guideline was announced. Presented in the
panel "Planning a Global Clinical Development" at ICH4, it was extensively discussed
with high expectations; people thought that it would facilitate the global approval of
drugs. A huge amount of costs and patients that had previously been required would be
saved.5 The guideline would not be complicated to implement according to ICH
representatives' understanding. Etienne Labbe, for example, commented, "Surprisingly
this paper [the E5 guideline] does not provide the pharmaceutical industry and the
regulatory bodies with sophisticated procedures to extrapolate foreign clinical data to the
population of a new region and to accept these data as supportive for the assessment of a
new drug application" (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1998:346).
Indeed, as stated in its introduction, the guideline provides "guidance with respect
to regulatory and development strategies that will permit adequate evaluation of the
influence of ethnic factors while minimizing duplication of clinical studies and supplying
medicines expeditiously to patients for their benefit" (ICH 1998: 1). The flow chart
shown in fig. 6.2 indicates how drug applications should be assessed. To initiate an
application for registration using foreign data (question 1), a special data package is
requested that includes "characterization of pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics, dose
response, efficacy and safety in the population of the foreign region(s), and clinical trials
establishing dose response, efficacy and safety" (2). It also required additional studies,
so-called "studies for bridging," to meet new regions' regulatory requirements.6
5 Etienne Labbe estimated that at least 40 to 45 studies and 2,500 to 3,000 patients would be saved,
while the introduction of drugs could happen two or three years earlier in the United States and five to six
years earlier in Japan. See D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1998:349.
6 Some examples include, first, clinical trials in different subsets of the population, such as patients
with renal insufficiency, patients with hepatic dysfunction, etc; and, second, clinical trials using different
comparators at the new region's approved dosage and drug-drug interaction studies (E5 guideline:3).
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According to the guideline, bridging studies are required when a product is not granted a
waiver for clinical trials in the new region. 7 A bridging study is defined as "a
supplemental study performed in the new region to provide pharmacodynamic or clinical
data on efficacy, safety, dosage, and dose regimen in the new region that will allow
extrapolation of the foreign clinical data to the new region" (glossary 7). In addition, for
safety reasons, a pharmacokinetic study in the new region may be considered necessary
for products that need no bridging studies (4).
Fig. 6.2 Assessment of the Clinical Data Package for Acceptability
Assessment of the clinical data
package in the new region
Question 1 Question 2
Meets regulatory Extrapolation of foreign
requirements ? data appropriate ?
Further clinical studyfies)
needed for acceptability
by the new region
Question 3
Acceptability
in the new region ?
Question 4
=_ AdMtloniM A atudyle) M Wdgeig udYW-a)
Source: E5 guideline. Appendix B: 11.
When the regulatory authority is presented with the data, it will first request any
additional data that will be necessary to make judgments on whether bridging studies are
required (question 2 and 3). No exact criteria for whether a product is eligible for waiving
bridging studies are specified in the guideline, but the applicant is encouraged, where
possible, to consult with the regulatory authority "to determine what kind of bridging
study will be needed" (ICH 1998: section 3.2.2:4). Even so, looking at the positive side
of the guideline, these products are still "bridgeable" to the new region. As the guideline
7 It must be noted that though the product may not be granted a waiver for any part of its application to
the new region, data on it from a clinical trial done in the new region is still extrapolatable. In other words,
there are, in practice, no criteria for whether extrapolation is possible. The key is how many bridging





states, in cases in which bridging studies are required, the acceptance of foreign data
"may be achieved by generating 'bridging' data in order to extrapolate the safety and
efficacy data from the population in the foreign region(s) to the population" (summary:7).
This seems to assume that every product is bridgeable if it is possible to provide a smaller
scale clinical trial-that is, one with fewer subjects enrolled that would be conducted in
the name of establishing a "bridge." The size of such studies is another point. Although it
was agreed that generally only one trial study is enough, in practice the guideline
suggests that the sponsors do more than one in order to get approval (4).
The above procedure looks complicated, but its complexity should be assessed in
the context of the issue it deals with. Racial difference is so touchy an issue that everyone
should appreciate that this guideline overcomes the problems it poses at a small price.
The ICH, in fact, was very proud of it. In its brochure titled "The Value and Benefit of
ICH to Industry" (Nutley ed. 2000) the ICH listed the E5 guideline as its first and
foremost achievement, claiming that the "costly and time-consuming activity [of clinical
trials], frequently involving the repeat of long, resource-intensive Phase III clinical trials,
is obviated in most cases by the introduction of this guideline" (3). A dramatic case that
arose immediately after this assertion was the approval of Viagra by the MHW, which had
blocked the import of drugs of this kind for over 30 years. Pfizer applied to the MHW for
approval for Viagra at the same time that the E5 guideline was implemented, so it was an
indicator for this policy. The result pleased the industry. With the help of a bridging study,
it took less than a year to get the drug approved. John Nibliack, Executive Vice President
of Pfizer, confirmed the value of this guideline, stating that because of the E5 guideline,
"we did not have to repeat the Phase III trials in Japan" (3).8
The most cited case concerning racial difference and bridging studies is Aricept. It
was one of the early applicants for bridging studies; Eisai, the manufacturer of the drug,
followed all the steps suggested in the guideline, and the result was satisfactory. The
example of Aricept can help explain how the drug review process specified in the
guideline can be conducted. The following description is mainly based on a presentation
by Takayama Chihiro, Director of Aricept Department t the APEC 2002 workshop titled
"Impact on the Conduct and Outcome of Clinical Trials," and a paper about Aricept by
Homma et al. from 2000.
8 Pfizer was not the only company to benefit from this guideline. In April 2000, AstraZeneca submitted
a new drug application in Japan for its Triptan migraine treatment Zomig (zolmitriptan). It was the second
Japanese new drug application to be submitted by AstraZeneca based on the importation of Western data
using the E5 guideline. AstraZeneca was the first company to seek approval in Japan for the second
generation of Triptan compounds for migraine. For details and other successful cases, see Usui 2002 and
the special issue of Pharm Stage, vol.2 no.4.
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Aricept, an acetyl cholinesterase (AchE) inhibitor that offers symptom treatment for
Alzheimer's patients, was developed in the early 1990s. Despite its Japanese origin, the
primary market was to be the U.S., where a controlled clinical trial on over 900 subjects
was conducted. After FDA approval of the drug in December 1996, Aricept successfully
penetrated the major European markets. This was followed by quick approvals in Asia by
Thailand, Korea and the PRC. This called attention to an embarrassing situation.
Although Japan is a developed country that has many elderly people living with and
suffering from Alzheimer's, this "Japanese" drug had not been sold in its own market.
Therefore, when the E5 guideline was enacted, it was one of first products for which the
use of bridging studies was attempted.
According to Takayama, the process went smoothly. Eisai prepared the PK
comparison between healthy Japanese and Caucasian American subjects (phase I trial).
They claimed that the PK profiles of the two races did not show a "significant" difference
in Cmax and AUC under the same standard conditions of measurement. Thus when the
company first approached the OPSR, they confirmed that Aricept's behavior was the
same and bridging was thus feasible. For the second consultation with the OPSR on the
phase II trial, Eisai provided more information on responses to doses (lmg, 3 mg, and 5
mg per day for the Japanese) other than the two doses (10 mg and 5 mg for the Americans)
that were applied in original studies done in the United States, and the company decided
to use 5 mg as the dose for further evaluation.
Only at this point did Eisai enter a discussion on "bridging justification," which was
done at the company's third consultation with the OPSR. Upon the conclusion of the
second consultation, Eisai had designed an "incomplete" phase III study for safety and
efficacy, using Japanese subjects and a single administration of 5mg per day, but a
bridging study was still suggested by the OPSR. Testing two doses of 5mg and 10 mg,
this study was conducted in a setting equivalent to that of the original study in the United
States in order to claim that is was "identical" to the original and the data obtained thus
comparable or able to be "bridged." 9 The results were satisfactory. Based on the above
studies, the applicant claimed that analysis showed similarities in efficacy and safety in
the U.S. and the Japanese subjects; thus it was agreed that the Japanese study could
9 Eisai's research team applied DSM-IV and Hachinski ischemic score diagnostic criteria. In addition,
in accordance with the guideline, the study proposal covered possible factors that could involve intrinsic
and extrinsic racial differences, such as 1) similar trial conditions to the foreign tests were incorporated
based on the concept of bridging; 2) medical practices-the same diagnosis system was applied; 3)
therapeutic circumstances, such as concomitant medication; 4) criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of
subjects; 5) assessment criteria and assessment/analytical methods for primary endpoints-although the
bridging concept had not been intentionally described in the original protocol, a similar primary endpoint to
the foreign trial was employed; 6) treatment duration should be same for all subjects involved in the trial.
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bridge to the data of the U.S. study. In the fourth and last consultation, the OPSR
announced its approval of the drug. Aricept was finally imported into Japanese market in
1999.
The significance of the story of Aricept is that it demonstrated a standard procedure
for the evaluation of bridging studies. We can trace its review process in fig. 6.2.
Although after the consultation one bridging study was still requested, as seen in the
scenario that shows a "Yes" response to the first question but a "No" to the second (in the
second consultation), it recognized a racial difference by stating that a smaller does better
suited Japanese patients. In addition, this case shows Japan's willingness to create a
transparent environment for drug review. Unlike the old reviewing bureaucracy, which
was often criticized as corrupt and opaque, the OPSR is a science-oriented, independent
institution; its reputation was highlighted in its evaluation of the bridging study. As
Hayashi Yoshikazu of the Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau at the MHLW said, the
OPSR ensures "the consistency of, and adherence to during the review of application,
advice given in prior consultations provided by OPSR, which are based on MHLW
policy" (WGDA Japan 2000: 243).
The foundation of the OPSR created in industry the trust necessary to send their
applications to be evaluated for bridging studies, and the harmonization of clinical data
could thus be achieved by rigorous adherence to the concerns raised in the guideline.
According to the OPSR's statistical report (table 6.1), its performance seems good.
Between 1997 and 2002 it offered over 1,000 consultations, of which about 32 percent
were for bridging studies.
Table 6.1 Consultations Offered by the OPSR, 1997-2002
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
All cases 101 149 194 279 268 223 1214
Bridging studies 24 59 98 82 63 65 391
Source: Kazuhiko Mori's slide presentation at ICH6. http://ich.org.
Some might not be satisfied with the service offered, but, as I have argued
repeatedly, this achievement needs to be considered in the context of the making of the
E5 guideline and the debate over racial difference that it entailed. As one OPSR expert
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told me, "At least we have science. For me, it could not be better to have it in our
practice."
Where the Explanations End: The Reality of Bridging
Although the case of Aricept shows how bridging is possible, it also demonstrates
its restrictions by showing how difficult it is to attempt to "bridge" racial differences. Two
pieces of information need to be provided here. The first is an overview of how many
drugs have been approved via bridging since the implementation of the E5 guideline. Up
to October 2003, only 30 products had been approved out of about 230 NDA approvals,
approximately 14 percent of the total.10° The numbers speak for themselves; the reality is
that the approval rate is low. Many drugs on this list were granted approval just before
their patents were going to expire.
Let us take omeprazole as an example. Launched in 1988, this second-best-selling
drug in the world used for treating stomach ailments has earned AstraZeneca billions of
dollars since its American launch in 1988. With the help of patent term extensions or
Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) for this drug, its patent did not expire in the
United States until 2001. KUDCo/Schwarz Pharma launched its generic version of
omeprazole in 2002, the same year the MHLW granted approval to the company's
proprietary omeprazole, Losec. Although Japan granted Losec patent extensions, these
allowed only two years before their expiration in 2004.1 
Secondly, it is correct that during the consultation Aricept was requested to provide
only one new trial; but if we review this carefully, we can find that Eisai had already done
some local trials, such as the PK study comparing Japanese and Caucasians. These were
phase I and phase II trials, which were pivotal for bridging. We can agree that compared
to the previous system, which required that all trials be repeated, bridging studies did
' They are sildenafil citrate, donepezil hydrochloride (approved in 1999), fexofenadine hydrochloride,
anastrozole, oseltamivir phosphate (approved in 2000), zolmitriptan, sumatriptan succinate, sodium
alendronate, insulin aspart, imatinib mesilate (approved in 2001), palivizumab, sodium risedronate,
goserelin acetate, basiliximab, oseltamivir phosphate pediatric, eletriptan hydrobromide, omeprazole, three
combination drugs (for the eradication of H. pylori), exemestane, gefitinib, brinzolamide (approved in
2002), satriptan nasal spray, leflunomide, infliximab (RA), imatinib (GIST), rizatriptan,
tegaful+uracil+folinate (UFT), pramipexole, PEG-interferon a -2a, and verteporfin (approved in 2003).
' 1 Omeprazole is a proton pump inhibitor that has racially distinct effects on P450 metabolic enzymes;
and this had been noticed by the Japanese for a long time. In fact, in early 1990s Eisai had discovered this
mechanism and had its compound rabeprazole filed with the NDA in Japan. However, because of the
relatedness of the two compounds, Eisai was involved in a patent dispute with AstraZeneca when
attempting to develop its rabeprazole in the United States. For more discussions on racially specific effects
of this drug, see Chapter 7.
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save some time and energy, but this savings was quite limited. This trend became clear
from the OPSR's reviewing policy on bridging studies, as shown in fig. 6.3.
Fig. 6.3 OPSR's Interpretation of Bridging Studies
Data-package for bridging study
Japanese data I Foreign data
PK/PD study PK/PD study
Brid,_udnu llb S [or bridging
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Source: Kazuhiko Mori's slide presentation in the 2001 APEC meeting.
Figure 6.3 illustrates how many trials are in fact required in the scheme of bridging.
The essential data package for a bridging study, as indicated, includes not only the
original clinical data obtained in the foreign region; it has to have Japanese PK data as
well as some dose-response data and studies for bridging. Only when this information is
ready can a smaller phase III trial called a "bridging study" be conducted.
Even the so-called "bridging study" requires a large number of subjects, almost as
many as the original trials. Let us use Aricept again as an example. According to the
study by Eisai scientists S.L. Rogers and colleagues (1998), only 473 patients were
enrolled in the original Aricept trial done in the United States--162 subjects were given
placebos, 157 received 10 mg Aricept per day, and 154 received 5 mg per day. However,
in the Japanese study, which only included placebo and 5 mg per day groups, a total of
228 patients were recruited. In other words, all that Eisai really saved was the expense
required to test patients with 10 mg per day Aricept.
It was understandable that global industry was not able to accept this practice. They
seemed not to understand the underlying cultural division presented by this political
compromise; instead, they asked for explanations of the E5 guideline that might favor
their interests. As soon as the MHW implemented the guideline, it released a document in
both English and Japanese listing the most frequently asked questions about bridging
studies and answered industry questions one by one. However, industry was not satisfied.
As can be seen in table 6.1, there were 391 consultations between 1997 and 2002; most of
them were inquiries about how many trials could be waived based on bridging studies,
but the responses disappointed drug manufacturers. Most of the applications were not
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granted bridging studies waivers, and the scale of the bridging studies was so large and so
expensive that they were not worthwhile.
These frustrations can be seen in a recent survey on the acceptance of foreign data
using the E5 guideline reported by Masahiko Sato of DFPIA at ICH6. Although 40
percent of global companies use the E5 guideline in principle for all Japanese NDA
applications, the results were not pleasing. Thirty four out of 59 companies who
responded to this survey thought the MHW's performance was poor or very poor. They
blamed this assessment on the ministry's tough stance on the acceptance of foreign
standards and practices as well as its overstatement of the differences in clinical
environments. They also complained that there were no clear criteria for obtaining
scientific proof of the absence of racial effects, nor was there a clear way to harmonize
Japanese information with existing global data. All these points meant that industry was
in a difficult position: it needed to provide evidence of no ethnic differences in drug
effects and at the same time risk the uncertainty of being rejected by the regulators. Drug
companies doubted whether the MHW treated bridging studies scientifically; their
inquiries referred to Japan's cultural attitude toward racial difference.
On the basis of a belief in the primary unity of all human beings, many thought that
Japanese regulators had overstated the importance of racial variation in drug response.
The "classic" study on racial difference I mentioned in chapter 4 came up again. For
example, commenting on a hemophilia product awaiting approval in Japan, Neil Kirby of
Genetic Institute said, "On the whole, there are greater intraethnic differences than there
are interethnic differences" (as quoted in Hodgson and Marshall 1998: 14). Jean-Pierre
Isal clearly expressed the frustration at Japan's regulatory policy after the acceptance of
the E5 guideline by warning of two consequences. First, new drugs represent only 5
percent of total sales in Japan, compared to 57 percent in the U.S. and 25 percent in the
EU. Second, of 149 drugs approved in the US between 1992 and 1996, 51 percent were
not available to Japanese patients in 2000.
On the other hand, Japan had a different perception of the MHW's performance in
bridging study evaluation. Uwoi Tohru of Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical commented, for
example, that it was the idea of bridging studies rather than the MHW that should be
blamed for this result. Interestingly, he shares the same idea as global industry, namely,
that the concept of bridging studies is not scientific; however he has a different idea about
the goal of bridging. He claimed in the 2001 APEC meeting that bridging studies
represented "[the] wish to have immediate Japanese approval, and it leads to more
economical/political [dispute] than scientific [ones]." For Uwoi, since a bridging study
can be a political tool that connects one place to another, it could by the same token be
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used as a way to separate two places by controlling the traffic between them. In fact, in a
private speech to industry, Uwoi expressed this idea more directly. Predicting the fate of
this guideline at the beginning, he said, "Let me prepare here the conclusion in case I do
not have enough time:forget bridging studies!" (Uwoi 1998a, original emphasis). Those
acquainted with Japan could see the problem rushing toward them. Stephen Barker, a
senior pharmaceuticals stock analyst who has lived in Japan for over ten years, came to
the same conclusion. "When the guideline was announced, I was a medical journalist," he
said. "I went to Pfizer the next day, asking them whether this was what they expected.
They just replied to me, 'It will be tougher now.' The new guideline requires everything
repeated here; 'bridging' is an empty concept."
In the following let us focus on the aspects of bridging studies that are the sources
of all the confusion. Before getting to this analysis, however, I want to clarify that these
confusions did not result from translation. Although it is not unusual to make changes in
order to write guidelines into local regulations,' 2 this was not the case with the E5
guideline, which was an almost word-for-word translation, as confirmed to me by the
translator Tominaga Toshiyoshi. The same was the case for the MHW's E5 Q&A
document (1998c), which was also drafted by Tominaga. Although it is common in the
Japanese legal system to have a Q&A document as a supplement to clarify regulations, in
the case of E5 guideline it was intentionally published in two languages, showing concern
for the foreign audience and their possible inquiries into this domestic law. The confusion
over interpretations of the E5 guideline, I will argue, should not be considered as
"misunderstandings" of certain concepts between different cultures. It is also far from the
illusory dichotomy of a "scientific" West opposed to "unscientific" Asia. It should be
understood as an extension of the conceptual division that arose in dealing with racial
difference in a global setting. In order to resist a Western interpretation, the MHW's
strategy was to clarify some selected concepts while leaving others unexplained.
For instance, the concept of extrapolation is a term that needs more explanation.
According to the guideline, this is defined as "the generalization and application of the
12 The implementations of the ICH guidelines in Japan were not always direct translations of the
guidelines into Japanese. Sometimes the MHW added extra regulations for Japan because it considered the
guideline to be the minimum requirement. For example, in the Japanese version of the E6 guideline, the
MHW added an additional clause on patients' rights. However, in the case of the E5, the MHW was very
careful not to create any confusion about whether it was manipulating the guideline to add more
requirements. As Doi Osamu recalled (1999: 16), "The [Japanese] content of the E5 guideline has to very
clear so that no misunderstanding can be made on whether the MHW manipulated it in order to reject
foreign data. We want everyone know that it is a guideline agreed to by the all parties but not formed by the
MHW solely."
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safety, efficacy and dose response data generated in a population of a foreign region to
the population of the new region" (ICH 1998: 8). This may suit our ordinary imagination
of how a data set gathered in one region can be generalized to another; however, in
practice it makes no scientific sense. As statisticians Goto and Hamasaki point out, if the
foreign clinical data can be accepted as "bridgeable," it is not always necessary to
conduct a bridging study, and then the inference of the data may be completed based
upon the existing data alone. If the foreign data is not "bridgeable," meaning that it would
lead to an incorrect extrapolation in the new setting, it is necessary to check the
assumption to consider the sensitivity. It seems that the process of extrapolation is not
suitable to the use of the foreign clinical data (Goto and Hamasaki 2002: 371-372, also
see Liu 2003). Instead of openly rejecting this idea, however, the Q&A document chose
not to offer any explanations.
Also unclear is the concept of similarity in bridging studies. The guideline lays out
two instructions about the extrapolation of data generated from a bridging study. First,
data should show that "dose response, safety and efficacy in the new region are similar,"
and second, if data indicates that a different dose in the new region results in a safety and
efficacy profile that is "not substantially different from that derived in the original
region," it will often be possible to extrapolate the foreign data to the new region (ICH
1998: 4). However, again, while this might fit with ordinary imagination, it makes no
scientific sense. Technically speaking, Goto and Hamasaki have pointed out that the
concept of similarity is confusing because in statistics it can refer to non-inferiority,
equivalence, reproducibility, of no difference, or identicalness, which all have different
meanings. The MHW's document addressed this matter in question 10, which asked if
there existed a concrete standard to determine whether the dose-response, safety, efficacy,
etc. of a drug are "similar" or "not greatly different" between racially different
populations. However, instead of clarifying which standard it would use, the MHW only
said that "it is impossible to suggest concrete standards to judge whether the cited
features of a drug are 'similar' or 'not greatly different' across populations" (answer 10).
Meanwhile, on some points the MHW did make its attitude clear. First, it rejected
any attempt to generalize rules for bridging studies. It only accepted case consultations on
the basis of experience. The guideline states:
for regions with little experience with registration based on foreign clinical data, the
regulatory authorities may still request a bridging study for approval even for
compounds insensitive to ethnic factors. As experience with interregional
acceptance increases, there will be a better understanding of situations in which
bridging studies are needed. It is hoped that with experience, the need for bridging
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data will lessen. (ICH 1998: section 3.2.2:4)
The MHW explained this standpoint in more detail in the Q&A: it "has limited
experience of basing its new drug approvals mainly on the data of comparative clinical
studies conducted abroad. Conduct of a comparative study in Japan, therefore, should
often be necessary for the time being" (answer 21). Thus, we see a consistent attitude
toward all issues concerning bridging studies, such as criteria for additional trials
(question I 11) and considerations on extrinsic factors (question 15).
Second and more importantly, the OPSR rejected study protocols using a
retrospective method. Although not written in the Q&A, this was an open secret among
regulators and industrial people familiar with OPSR practice. On the surface, this was
done for a scientific reason that industry did not want to admit: if the original study was
met all requirements as a randomized, fixed dose, and dose-response trial, it was almost
impossible to make a smaller replica afterwards called a "bridging study." Yet in reality
the MHW silently protested industry's ignorance of the Japanese. It was not the OPSR's
responsibility to provide evidence of ethnic differences; instead, it should be industry's
job to show there were no such differences.
The E5 guideline again fell into deadlock. It led nowhere, as pharmacologist Helene
Dumitriu concludes: "Industry may deplore the fact that the guideline provides no true
harmonization of requirements" (142). As discussed in Chapter 4, the guideline
established a superficial harmony on racial difference; however, it could not be put into
practice until the underlying divisions were resolved. Although Japan could not openly
argue against this guideline, it has said what it can in its Q&A documents and
demonstrated its resistance in its actions. However, Japan did not always passively reject
the current rules. In the second part of this chapter, I will show an alternative approach by
which the MHLW is seeking to change this situation. However, industry could not wait
and tried its own way, which will be the theme of next section.
Regressive Negotiations: The Return to the Bilateral Mode
Industry was the first party that became impatient with deadlock. As described
earlier, while drug companies might know why the OPSR insisted on bridging studies,
the problem was that most of the products the industry hoped to sale to Japan had been
approved before the ICH guidelines were introduced. Thus it was impossible to expect
the clinical trial data used for the application in the original region some years ago to be
compatible with the bridging study requirements.
Industry started looking for evidence about the racially sensitive effects of
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pharmaceuticals. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
organized a working group consisting of clinical pharmacologists and led by Thorir D.
Bjornsson of Wyeth Research. They intensively reviewed all scientific papers in the
world literature on racial differences and their possible impact on drug effects. In this
large work, 339 papers, mainly published between 1970 and 2001, were reviewed
(Bjornsson et. al. 2003). The results of this study revealed nothing new; it just proved the
intuitive impression that "only a few examples of suspected ethnic differences in
pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamic effects were found" (943). However, from this
survey we learn the interesting fact that relatively few articles have mentioned ethnic
differences in the past decade (960). This "absence" of discussions in academic field, in
my opinion, should be understood together with the introduction of racial difference into
the ICH negotiations. While discussing this issue, industry, the biggest sponsor for
pharmaceutical research, wanted calm for the negotiations.
However, after few years of observation, the industry realized that the OPSR could
not change its practice. The accusatory discourse on Japanese protectionism rose again.
Elaine Esber, now working for industry, nicely summarized these open complaints in her
presentation at the 2003 APEC meeting: "E5 has resulted in a request for more studies,
rather than less," it was "a convenient excuse for requiring a local registration study and
calling it a bridging study." "requests are for data, country by country, not as a region,"
"there are ulterior motives for requesting that studies be done, e.g., protect local
industries," "E5 is being implemented as a trade barrier," "most companies are doing
studies just to not get into an argument," "governments are not being flexible," and many
other things.
It is thus understandable why racial difference was brought up as a topic of
discussion in the trade-oriented MOSS negotiations, which I discussed in part in Chapter
4. When the global ICH was founded, the MHW intentionally directed all discussions to
this platform and away from bilateral channels like MOSS. However, when the
discussion on the E5 guideline fell into deadlock, the industry returned to this old channel.
As shown in table 6.2, since September 1997, the acceptance of foreign data has returned
as a topic in MOSS follow-up meetings. Obviously, it has been listed at the request of
PhRMA, which hoped to put more pressure on the MHW via the USTR.
From this table we can see that industry resumed pressuring after the
implementation of the E5 guideline. This phenomenon supports my observation in
previous sections about the reality of bridging studies. It seemed that the industry could
not wait for slow "academic discussions" in the bi-annual steering meetings; they hoped
to intensify this pressure through this direct channel, which was more powerful.
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Table 6.2 MOSS Follow-up Meetings, 1997-2000.
Time/place Requesters Main topics discussed
February United Systematic reform of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau (PAB)
1997/ States National Health Insurance (NHI)
Washington Insurance reimbursement process
Price differences between Japan and abroad
Nutritional food supplements and hard gelatin capsules
September United Reduction in new drug application approval times
1997/ States Increased acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical
Tokyo devices
Increased liberalization of nutritional supplements
Review of government of Japan health care reform plans
Reimbursement system for medical devices
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Simplification of procedure of 510 k notification submission
Simplification of the data submitted to make IND
March United New drug application (NDA) process
1998/ States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Tokyo Review of government of Japan health care reform plans
Reimbursement system for medical devices
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Simplification of procedure of 510 k notification submission
Simplification of the data submitted to make IND
April 1998/ United New drug application (NDA) process
Washington States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Reimbursement system (by function) for medical devices
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Simplification of procedure of 510 k notification submission
Simplification of data submitted to make IND
October United New drug application (NDA) process
1998/ States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Tokyo Review of government of Japan health care reform plans
Reimbursement system for medical devices
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Separation of the service component from medical device reimbursement
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Simplification of procedure of 510 k notification submission
Simplification of the data submitted to make IND
January United New drug application (NDA) process
1999/ States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Washington Nutritional supplements
Review of government of Japan health care reform plans
Reimbursement system for medical devices
Separation of the service component from medical device reimbursement
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Simplification of procedure of 510 k notification submission
Simplification of the data submitted to make IND
Mutual recognition on GCP
September United Approval process for drugs and medical devices
1999/ States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Tokyo Nutritional supplements
Pharmaceutical pricing reform
Reimbursement system for medical devices
Separation of the service component from medical device reimbursement
Health care services deregulation
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Mutual recognition on GCP
Timing of stability data requirement for NDA
January United Approval process for drugs and medical devices
2000/ States Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Washington Nutritional supplements
Pharmaceutical pricing reform
Separation of the service component reform
Health insurance applicable reform
Health care services deregulation
Japan Mutual recognition on GMP
Mutual recognition on GCP
September United Health care reform
2000/ States Recognition on epoch-making reform (drug price reform and insurance
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Source: Adopted from The Working Group of Drug Administration, Japan
2000: 235-239. Emphases added by the author.
On receiving this pressure, the MHW tried to separate administrative issues from
cultural ones. For example, in the third U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation
and Competition Policy, the MHW explained the progress it had achieved in speeding up
new drug approval. It claimed that the whole NDA approval process time had been
decreased. However, concerning the acceptance of foreign clinical data, the OPSR's
formal response was always: "the government of Japan provides opportunities for
consultation with the Organization for Pharmaceutical Research (OPSR) and the like to
promote the facilitation of acceptance of foreign clinical data based on International
Conference on Harmonization (ICH) E5 guideline" (243). Obviously, Japan tries to push
all "non-scientific" disputes raised by the United States back to the ICH track, which is
supposed to be scientific and neutral.
On the other hand, the OPSR fought back with the mutual recognition of GCP and
GMP, which appeared on the list for negotiation almost at the same time as the
acceptance of foreign data. If we recall the "two big bangs" mentioned in the first section
of this part, we know that the MHW had no intention of protecting any industry; instead,
it tried to extend the "battlefield" to the regulatory sector, hoping to bargain on some
respects of its poor environment for clinical trials. The FDA's pickiness in clinical trials,
especially those conducted in Asia, 13 was an insult worse than any accusation for
Japanese regulators, because its national credibility is being bluntly challenged. One
13 Despite not being conducted in many countries, including some developed ones, it is a common
practice for the FDA to validate factories and manufacturers overseas. No product by producers that is
without proper validations can be imported into the United State. Although the FDA always claims that this
is essential to protect their people's health, it is often criticized that it badly interferes with other countries'
internal affairs.
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Washington medical supply reform)
Transparency
Health care services provided under health care reform
Approval process
Acceptance of foreign clinical data for drugs and medical devices
Post-marketing Surveillance for drugs
JIS (Japanese Industrial Standard)
Nutritional supplements
MHLW official concluded that it is the FDA that should be blamed, since "all rules have
been made at the ICH; what is left is only administrative work determined by the top of
both side (of Japan and the United States)." An OPSR consultant told me that Japan
cannot stand for not being trusted; he cried: "we cannot follow everything ordered by the
United States." If mutual recognition of GCP and GMP cannot be granted, bridging will
direct to nowhere.
Unfortunately, the FDA did not want to deal with these issues that the MHLW
brought up. In fact, it did not either care about the E5 guideline, since it was not its
business. As the most advanced country in drug regulation, the American standard led
almost all ICH guidelines. For them, what were left might be only administrative
problems, and from technical viewpoint they simply do not trust Japan's investigation.
Thus, concerning the GCP issue, it responds that "FDA will continue cooperative
activities regarding Good Clinical Practices (GCPs) especially in the ICH forum, and
FDA will continue to respond appropriately to foreign regulatory bodies' requests,
including MHLW's, for information regarding GCPs" (245). Like the MHLW does on the
E5 guideline, the FDA push all disputes back to the ICH, otherwise they are only
administrative problems. As a result, E5 and E6 could not be solved together in the
context of bilateral negotiation; the only consensus achieved is that both had to be solved,
and solved independently, in the global forum of the ICH. All things seemed to return to
the place where the dispute on racial difference started.
However, this does not mean that the industry and the MHLW did not learn
anything from this trip. The industry had known about the political orientation of this
guideline, and they learned more from its practice. Even so, through these pressuring
channels, they want to play safe in dealing with Japan. But, what we are concerned about
more is the MHLW. How can they create an independent category of the Japanese race in
clinical trials while escaping from the vicious circle where the same debates, the same
reasoning; the same misunderstandings and the same frustrations were repeated? In the
second part of this chapter, I will argue about how Japan intends achieve this goal by
making a scientific move to the genome.
PART II
MAKING THE GENOMIC RACE PART OF BIO-GLOBALIZATION
New Wine in the Old Bottle: Recurrence of Global Drug Development
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Let us start this part with the Japanese industry's perception of a bridging study. In
1997 the ICH Japan study group conducted a survey of Japan Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (JMPA) member companies on the E5 guideline. The result
shows that although they had all read this guideline, only a few fully understood the
meaning of the bridging study package and bridging studies (questions 13 and 14).
Moreover, they believed that, first, bridging studies have to be done in the new region,
supposedly Japan. Second, it would be impossible to grant waivers to foreign applications
without doing any studies (questions 16 and 17). This situation had not changed a lot as
shown in Masahiko Kato's survey in 2003. Japanese companies that would like to apply
the E5 guideline was still few; Japanese clinical data was used in some cases in the West
countries but this was still rare and not a core issue.
The above is surely not what the MHLW wanted to see when joining the ICH. As
written in Chapter 4, the MHLW officials had an ideal view of harmonization where
clinical data from the ICH regions can transfer mutually while each region remain to a
degree independent. However, the making of the E5 guideline reflected a cruel reality
that the flow of clinical data is in one-direction. A fear of being swallowed by the West
rose among experts on drugs. Professor Sakuma Akira of the Tokyo Medical and Dental
University described this anxiety. Using a metaphor of the myth of Kami Izumono, he
teased that the bridging study should be the kunihiki rope to "pull" a piece of foreign land
(data) to Japan nation. "But," Uwoi added: "the point is on which ground can the land be
pulled to come from, if you think of the tug of war between England and European
Continent" (Uwoi 1998a).
Concerning the MHLW's anxiety, Mori Kazuhiko of the OPSR used two analogies
to sum up past practice for bridging studies, which was widely cited on related occasions.
In the cartoons below (fig.6.4), the Japanese data was portrayed as either an ant on top of
the huge foreign data of an elephant or a baby turtle (bridging data to be born) on the
back of its mother (existing foreign data). These cartoons highlight two characteristics of
Japanese's perception of themselves in global studies. First, the importance of the
Japanese to the world, as seen in the sampling size, was extremely small. It is not
comparable with its expectation as one of the ICH regions (left).
The second characteristic has to do with the developmental order, or level of
advancement in medical research. Thus, only a mother can give birth to children; because
of the backwardness of Japan's clinical environment, Japan will have to wait for
advanced drugs until after they are available in Western countries (right). For Japan,
bridging studies were not what it expected from the ICH as a place for making harmony.
It is regional discrimination.
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Fig. 6.4. Echo of the Past: Impression of Japanese in Bridging Study
Echo of the past : Echo of the past :
An ant on an elephant Similar design as a child on a mother
Source: Mori Kazuhiko's presentation in the APEC 2003 meeting, Taipei.
Thus, based on the understanding of bridging studies, the MHLW's request on
racial difference is clear. Instead of exhausting all the characteristics that make a Japanese
"Japanese," they asked for enough recruitment of the Japanese subjects and for the same
trial design as conducted in the original region. According to their interpretation, there is
a two-stage transformation when dealing with racial difference, and bridging is the
product of the first stage. Though useful, bridging did not perfect the idea of
harmonization because it helps only those that have done clinical trials in one region,
supposedly the West, and considers only whether this data is acceptable to the new region,
supposedly Japan. In other words, it favors only a certain region but not all regions. Thus,
as bridging finished its mission, a better program was needed to achieve real
harmonization.
Fig. 6.5. Left: Proposal of Global Clinical Development: the "1-2-3;
Asian-Black-Caucasian" model; right: the "bridging to all" model.
Source: Adopted from IFPMA 1998:350, Figure 4.
The program the MHW proposed was global drug development. It was definitely
not a new idea. It origin can be traced back to ICH1. W. L. Thompson replied when asked
the role of multi-center, multi-national studies in assessing efficacy: "I think the goal
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should be to have a single protocol applied across all three cultures and that this is a
much more powerful design, that doing serial small studies and attempting to put them
together with a meta-analysis. Whether we can achieve enough harmony, to allow a
single protocol to be used, is a difficult question...." (D'Arcy and Harron eds. 1992:
416-417). At that time "global" is a rough substitute for "multisited." However, the later
developments about racial difference, including internal and external factors that may
affect this, complicated this ideal project. Along with the tiresome, frustrating discussion,
the nuance of the global had changed and split.
Based on ethnic diversity and the primary unity of human beings, European experts
provided its version of global drug development at the ICH4 as a next step to get rid all
national influences. As held in the ICH4, the panel on "planning a global clinical
development aimed to list philosophy and principles with regard to ethnic factors, as if all
would be easily overcome after bridging studies was applied (D'Arcy and Harron eds.
1998: 330-331 and 349-350). A rough principle was suggested for such a plan. In order to
obtain enough information to judge whether the New Drug Application (NDA) in
assessment is ethnic sensitive, it would possibly to have a requirement for different
phases. For the phase I, it would require the PK/PD to be done separately, as shown on
the left of fig. 6.5, or that there be one main PK plus a bridging study (right). For phase II,
it would require a comparative does-response analysis concerning at least two races (left),
or a main trial plus a bridging study for the local. The most innovative part is for phase
III, where it would require only a single trial either done on a race, if no ethnic sensitivity
was found, or done in a multi-ethnic, multi-center fashion (left), or, again, one main trial
plus a bridging study (right).
On the other hand, based on national difference, Japan has a different perception of
global drug development. The concept of globalization by the MHLW, as I mentioned, is
a status of mutuality where the Japanese are properly represented in a simultaneous
manner. It is a consistent standpoint stemming from a very early stage of the discussions
on racial difference. For example, at the ICH 2 Naito Chikayuki brought up the idea to
have phase III and/or II studies done at the same time, but this proposal was declined.
Later when the bridging approach was decided, Japan suggested prospective global drug
development as a separated option yet this was eventually declined (Uwoi 1998a).
Japan's attempt finally transformed into a vague section in the E5 guideline and this
was articulated in the form of bridging studies. In the section titled "developmental
strategies for global development," it states the possibility of conducting a main study
and bridging ones in parallel:
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Ideally, this characterization should be conducted during the early clinical phases of
drug development, i.e., human pharmacology and therapeutic exploratory studies.
In some cases, it may be useful to discuss bridging study designs with regulatory
agencies prior to completion of the clinical data package. However, analysis of the
data within the Complete Clinical Data Package will determine the need for, and
type of bridging study. (ICH 1998: section 4:6).
It is an interesting statement; the key to understand it is the timing of the consultation.
This is because it does not indicate an exact time point where it is best to consult the
regulatory agency and what should be required for this; it gives the regulatory authority
the freedom to lead the way that industry develops its clinical trials.'4 Thus, as Naito
recalled, "It is suggested, though in a very abstract form, that when a drug was being
developed, a multi country or multi site clinical trial can be conducted prospectively"
(Naito 1999: 5).
Let us see Japan's plan. On what to consider during the recruitment of local subjects,
the guideline mentions that for the global development, "studies should include
populations representative of the regions where the medicine is to be registered" (section
4:6-7). The Q&A provided by the MHW indicates the number required. When asked on
the number of subjects required for detecting adverse effects (question 24), it confirms
that three hundred patients are necessary if the safety profile of a drug is totally different
between the Japanese and the foreigners. It also added another condition when less
Japanese subjects are recruited before approval that "the applicant should supplement in
the post-marketing phase."
On the simultaneity of clinical trials, although Japan realized that the bridging study
approach presumes a sequential process of clinical trials in the world, it tried to
"synchronize" them. It did through both positive and negative approaches. On the
positive approach, the MHW strongly encouraged applicants to do the studies to be
bridged and the bridging studies in parallel. It writes: "it is possible, however, to conduct
clinical trials to construct a clinical data package to be bridged and a bridging study in
parallel" (answer 4). As discussed in the Chapter 4, bridging studies were originally
proposed as a way to judge whether further studies are required, yet it now in itself has
become a requirement for adding local data and a new platform on which a small scale of
"global clinical trial" is possible. The negative approach, as I have mentioned in previous
part, was to decline all bridging studies that applied a retrospective approach. It became
14 In the Q&A on the E5 guideline provided by the MHW, it was asked that whether it is possible to
give a concrete description of an appropriate bridging study, including its size, design, etc. (question 20).
Yet, the MHW hesitated to clarify this.
332
an open policy, as Naito Chikayuki claimed in 2003: "[s]o far, such retrospectively
created bridging data according to the lists have never succeeded in making a sound
bridging" (Naito 2003: 150S). It would be clearer if we consider the two ways together.
Hayashi Yoshikazu comment this way when reviewing OPSR's E5 review: "in general,
retrospective application of Japanese clinical data collected before the E5 guideline was
issued might not be successful for bridging purposes. We have observed, however, an
increase in the number of prospectively well-designed bridging studies" (Hayashi 2003:
134S). In his reasoning, bridging studies is always considered transitional. It is a process
to help the development of a drug and moves toward a "globally-synchronized"
development.
The domestic industry's attitude was ambiguous about the MHLW's attempt. Far
from hoping for government's protection, some JMPA member companies wanted to
know how to step out of Japan through bridging or global drug development. In the
beginning of the year 2001, an editorial of Yakujinippo entitled "spontaneous
development among Japan, United States, and Europe; the pharmaceutical industry in the
twenty-first century" record two different voices concerning the future of Japan's E5
policy (January 2 2001). On the one hand, the JPMA welcomed global drug development,
thinking one day it will be possible to conduct clinical trials in three regions with a single
protocol, and apply for marketing in each of them at the same time. On the other hand, it
complained that, so far, the mutual recognition of the GCP had yet to be achieved and this
impeded Japan's bridging study policy. It argued that although industry could understand
that bridging studies functioned like a requirement by the local authorities, yet "after near
two and half years of working by both regulatory and industry sides, no agreement has
achieved on the criteria by which foreign data can be judged similar enough with
Japanese data." For them, the global drug development approach will be a null promise if
no concrete steps are set.
The Necessity to Move to Genomics
So the MHW had the idea of global drug development, but the problem was how to
make it a workable project. What should they do? It needed to separate itself from the
European suggestion, which is based on ethnicity but not nationality. Furthermore, even
the division of ethnicity was problematic. Early discussion of the E5 topic (see Chapter 4)
had "proved" that individual variance is larger than interethnic difference. Although
under the scheme of populations, this difference is still meaningful using gene frequency.
This project needed to have a clear criterion to identity where global drug development
can be applied.
Unfortunately, the MHW did not yet have such a plan. In that Yakujinippo editorial
it reported that the expert's reply on this policy was that bridging studies were transitional.
However, he did not say more about future plans. He just said that if the interethnic
difference is smaller than individual variances within a race, it is possible to conduct a
global trial with a unified design; however, he did not show in what situation racial
difference is trivial and thus can be ignored. Uwoi Tohru has already predicted this
problem: "neither does the MHW nor the E5 guideline write anything on how a
prospective global drug development can be conducted" (Uwoi 1998a). Uwoi further
criticized that Japan needs a direction for this approach; otherwise it would fail to
convince anybody. He warned: "we want a real global strategy; it will be bad if it ends up
with strategies (such as bridging study) for enterprises."
At the beginning when the E5 guideline was implemented, the MHW really did not
know their direction. The long and tiresome debate in the making of the guideline had
legacies that could be used as the scientific foundation for their project, but they had no
idea which of these should be chosen. Two strategic trajectories, one named "cultural"
and the other "biological," present different concerns about this project. The cultural
trajectory followed from the discussion of extrinsic factors and has a clear focus on the
locality of the region. The MHW used this to qualify overseas Japanese, who might
possibly replace "true" Japanese as representatives of the Japanese race, in bridging
studies. In the Q&A on the E5 guideline, it states that overseas Japanese can be used in
clinical trials in principle "except where differences in diet and the environment are
expected to alter the drug's pharmacokinetic behavior" (answer 26). This trajectory can
go to an extreme, such as Naito Chikayuki's claim in interview that from medical point of
view, he would agree that naturalized Westerners can be regarded as native Japanese after
three generations, since "their life style and food would be the same as us, the Japanese."
Although the cultural trajectory was useful in defending the extrapolation of foreign
data into Japan and in showing the importance of locality, it failed to serve as an
approach to the new platform of global drug development. It did so for several reasons.
First, if the MHW insisted on it, it would be forced to list as many as possible cultural or
social factor that needed to be taken into account, and, when included, what weight
should be granted to each. It would face a technical muddle of numerous factors similar
to the situation of European experts when applying the triage or decision tree for
anchoring where racial difference resides. Second, if the MHW emphasized these factors
too much, it would make any unified global protocol impossible. The more local factors
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involved, the more limitations there would be when synthesizing them in a meaningful
statistical model. In other words, it would badly hurt Japan's wish to allow their clinical
data applicable in other countries. Third, the cultural trajectory would drag global drug
development away from the multi-ethnic frame into one that was multi-nation for
administrative purpose. It was not impossible, because the MHW had already done this as
part of its bridging study policy that requested "sufficient" recruitment of Japanese
subjects for every bridging study. However, it would face strong objections from Europe
and the United States if the MHW insisted that same number of local subjects were
required in global drug development, because it would be judged unscientific and would
not be acceptable.
The biological trajectory is an extension of the discussion about intrinsic differences
between foreigners and the Japanese. Of course, the MHW always insisted on this
difference, and Europe's global drug development project had also appreciated this
difference as a strategy to blot out the influence of any government. Thus, the point was
not whether people could recognize biological characteristics of Japanese, but how to
articulate it in a way that can relate these characteristics (Asian) to a nationally defined
group (the Japanese population), while making global clinical trials possible. It was upon
this concern that genomics was called in. It must be clarified that the MHW did not
intentionally develop genomics in order to solve solely the E5 problem. Basically, Japan's
decision to participate in the Human Genome Project was a complicated process, which
deserves independent research (for example, Fujimura 2000). Nonetheless, the official
promotion of this genomic study of the Japanese did have an identifiable effect on the
MHW's E5 policy, which became clear later in announcements on related occasions.
Let us briefly introduce genomics and its relationship to pharmaceutical industry.
Along with the completion of the Human Genome Project, pharmacogenomics was
claimed a concept that would refine the relationship between drugs and patients from a
group-to-group match to a promising one of individual-to-individual targeting. Through
this promising vision that the genomic claimed to give, there was a huge gap between the
present situation and the future dream. To explore specific gene variations is one thing, to
reflect them back to the genetic map is quite another. Donna Haraway has pointed out the
informational gaps that are present when the human genome databases are exhaustively
used to represent the species in totality as well as a specific form of individuality; this
worry led to the Human Genome Diversity Project, a project devoted to "save" some
useful information on extinct races from vanishing human gene pools (Haraway 1997:
247-250). But, along with such an endeavor there were other information gaps in the field
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of pharmaceutical research, such as how to identify the populations that have genes with
clinical meanings.
As was usual, the industry should be considered the pusher for this move, and the
ICH is not an exception. For this, journalists John Hodgson and Andrew Marshall
provided a nice report. According to them, Marisa Papaluca Amati of the European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) said that at present there are
no guidelines in Europe that spell out the requirements for pharmacogenomic data,
though as an ICH presenter she confirmed its importance in the consideration of ethnicity.
She says: "If exposures of patients to experimental drugs are much reduced, then that is a
good thing... I hope the effect of [harmonization under ICH] will be to reduce the
number of clinical trials of experimental drugs.... Pharmacogenomics will also save some
unnecessary exposure" (14). This attitude is also held by the FDA, according to Etienne
Labbe. He commented that any such document would be premature: "we have not
reached an agreement [under the ICH] on the basic rules for drug development" (14).
Apparently, both Europe and the United States were happy to endorse the value of
genomics, but they did not want to be the pusher. Amati said it frankly: "that is the realm
of drug developers." FDA's Collins responded in the same way: "This (genetic)
information is very useful to us. It is in companies' best interest to provide us with it."
The ICH did not seem to like this move, because, as Labbe concluded: "this topic would
complicate ICH harmonization" (14).
However, the Japanese government decided to take on this task and the MHW made
it part of its E5 policy. The Japanese involvement in genomics is through an unusual
inter-ministerial project called "Millennium". Starting from 2000, this five-year project
aims at the reformation of Japan's science, technology and society in the twenty-first
century and covers several fields such as a fiber-optic communications network
throughout Japan, monitoring system for environmental changes, and research on human
genome (Prime Minister, Japan 1999). As medical policy analyst Hiroi Yoshinori pointed
out, this was the first time the government had a clear policy frame to promote the quality
of its medical care from the basic research to bedside (Hiroi 1997, 1998). In addition, it
was regarded a project whose aim was to "speed-up the industrialization of
biotechnology."' 5
The informative framework about the Japanese genome was constructed by the two
'5 This strategy became explicit in the Outline of Biotechnology Strategy drafted by the biotechnology
strategy council led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The council had been discussing a national
strategy to develop biotechnology into a core industry by stimulating R&D activities in the pharmaceutics,
medical equipment, agriculture, food processing and microorganism sectors (Prime Minister, Japan 2003).
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projects. Since 2000 and with it planned to finish by 2004, the Japan Science and
Technology Corporation (JST) has conducted a multi-institutional project on the Japanese
genome. Using the symbol of Alice from Alice 's Adventure in Wonderland (fig.6.6), the
whole project of Advanced Life science Information System (ALIS) seems to represent
wandering Japanese who want to find herself in the world of the genome. As the diagram
shows, ALIS incorporates several fundamental projects, such as the international
collaboration on the human genome database (GDB Japan node and HGS), the structural
initial data library of amino acid residues (SILA), human organized whole genome
database (HOWDY), and database of Japanese Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (JSNP).
Each project involves three to five research institutes from industry and the academia in
Japan.
Fig. 6.8. English and Japanese Homepages of the ALIS Project
A-, HODY i Ad HOWDY / I
Source: http://www-alis.tokyo.jst.go.jp/index.html (left) andblhttp://www-alis.tokyo.jst.go d jp/indexd rja.html (right).
I will then focus on two projects, HOWDY and JSNP, which will demonstrate the
issues that we are concern. The work in the two areas was conducted by the
previous database on the human genome can be integrated and cross-referred. Or,desribing t in terms of internet accessing, HOWDY can be understood as a searching
engine for search engines that retrieve human genome data in public databases.
Furthermore, it has powerful design of object-oriented modeling. Not only the names or
the alias of nucleic acids can be keywords for searching; the sequences obtained can be
Japfurther analyzed a d corrected. The crucial function that HOWDY offers is a link-tSource: http ://www-a is.tokyo jst.goWjp/index.html ( ef  and
http://www-alis.tokyo.jst.go.jp/indexja.html (right).
I will then focus on two projects, HOWDY and JSNP, which will demonstrate the
.  
bioinformatics division of the JST. HOWDY was developed by the JST with the help of
Fujitsu lab and first released in July, 2000.16 It is a computational platform on which the
 t     e i te rate  and cross-referred. r,
describing it in terms of internet accessing, HOWDY can be understood as a searching
engine for search engines that retrieve human genome data in public databases.
Furthermore, it has powerful design of object-oriented modeling. Not only the names or
the alias of nucleic acids can be keywords for searching; the sequences obtained can be
further analyzed and corrected. The crucial function that HOWDY offers is a link
16 The source for the following introduction to HOWDY and JSNP is Hirakawa et al. 2002.
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between the realms of information and that of practice in life science research. It enables
life scientists to move their front to genomic studies, furthering leading their way into the
world of human genomics.
As a database open to the public, the usefulness of HOWDY has to be understood
through the JSNP. The JSNP is a repository of DNA polymorphism data for the
Japanese.'7 It began in 2000 and was supported by Millennium Project. Prior to this
project, the MITI had already received generous funding for cDNA and SNPs programs
as well as those by the Science and Technology Agency and the MHW (ATIP 1999: 4).
Yet under Millennium Project, the project was carried out by collaboration between the
Human Genome Center (HGC) in the Institute of Medical Science (IMS) at the
University of Tokyo and the JST.
The mission of this undertaking was to identify and collate up to 150,000 SNPs
from the Japanese population to construct a basic data set to identify relationships
between polymorphisms and common diseases or the reaction to drugs. As such,
emphasis has been placed on the identification of SNPs that lie in candidate regions that
may affect phenotype but which would not necessarily directly cause disease. In order to
construct an infrastructure for genome-wide association studies of common diseases or
drug sensitivities among the Japanese, the JSNP project has been systematically
exploring common variants by re-sequencing genomic regions containing candidate
genes in specific DNA samples.
According to Haga et al. (2002), JSNP database was formed by gene-based
screening; it is based on locus-specific PCR amplification. It can pin down specific
regions of interest and explore variation in areas such as promoter regions or coding
elements. Although more feasible than a genome-wide screening, this approach still
requires extensive genomic sequence information to cover the whole genome. Even so,
the researchers adopted it, because the HOWDY project can provide the necessary help.
Up to the year 2002, a total of 154 Mb, corresponding to approximately 5 percent of the
human genome, had been analyzed, and 174,269 SNPs and 16,293 insertion/deletion
polymorphisms within gene regions have been identified. As a pioneering experiment to
make racial difference visible, the JSNP project gained significant international attention.
However, we need to look at how the HOWDY and JSNP can be related to our
concerns about the ICH. Intended to be open to the public, both databases indicate
17 SNP is the most common form of DNA sequence variation. They are useful polymorphic markers to
investigate genes susceptible to diseases or those related to drug responsiveness. A small subset of SNPs
directly influences to the quality and/or quantity of the gene product, and produce severe side effects with
drugs. For a brief review on research on SNPs, see Shastry 2002.
338
Japan's ambition to redefine the Japanese race and to publicize it to the scientific
community. As Hirakawa Mika of the JST nicely concludes about this trend: "The SNPs
in JSNP will be the baseline data for Japanese medical and pharmaceutical research and
further development of the database will be continued" (Hirakawa et. al. 2002:161).
These efforts have clear implications for the MHW's E5 policy, because this genomic
race will be the basic unit for global drug development. Despite its original biological
determinism, this new racial definition can make the Japanese a distinct category in
global clinical trials.
This distinction has two meanings in the context of global drug development. First,
it is expressed at a higher standard that is undeniable even by the West. Nakamura Yusuke,
Professor at the Institute of Medical Science, University of Tokyo and the coordinator of
the JSNP, is perhaps the best person who can explain this. When asked about the
existence of the SNPs that can be found only in the Japanese, he answered that a full
survey has yet to be completed, but to his knowledge he thought from 20% to 30% of the
Japanese SNPs do not belongs to the Japanese exclusively. However, concerning the
importance of the JSNP study on drug development, Nakamura said: "we do know that
the Japanese have different enzymes for drug metabolism than the Americans and
Europeans. Even so, up to now we have called this difference a vague term taishitsu
(ethnic characteristics). To consider it scientifically as the genetic polymorphisms, we
have to clarity the SNPs that can only be found in the Japanese that are related to drugs"
(Nakamura 2002: 14-15).
The second meaning of the distinction between the Japanese genome and genomes
of other races is one that is practical. As Nakamura states, some SNPs do not belong to
the Japanese solely. However, as a population, the Japanese can be defined as the
collection of these SNPs found within this group of people. This is a "digitalized"
genomic definition of the population that moves away from an "analogical" description
of genetic frequencies. Thus, if global drug development has to be conducted upon the
ethnic diversity, the MHW will prefer a classification based on this definition, because so
far only the Japanese population is qualified to offer such information. In fact, at the
beginning of this project, some experts had predicted the possible use of this database
(Yakujinippo January 1 2001). Taniguchi Toshiichiro of Shinshu University, for example,
said that "still, for obtaining information useful for the Japanese it is necessary to create a
Japanese genome (while the United States is a reference)." Itakura Mizuo of the Genome
center, Tokushima University, and Takeshita Akira of Kyusho University, expressed the
same idea. Itakura said that it is important to study in themselves the polymorphisms
among the Japanese, so that the target population of "common diseases" can be explicitly
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identified. Tekeshita claimed that a database has to be established for the Japanese
exclusively.
Thus, notwithstanding cultural concerns, the MHW was ahead of other countries in
its move into genomics. Not waiting for the completion of the JSNP project, one of its
officials claimed convincingly: "from now on the intrinsic factors of racial difference can
be replaced by the genome."
New Tool and New Channel
Although the MHLW (renamed from MHW) pursued a new definition of Japanese
race, there were at least two problems they had to solve. The first was how to make this
new standard fit into their project of global drug development. As I have mentioned at the
beginning of this chapter, genomics could be a vision too far from the industry. The
MHLW had to show the variability of some possibilities that make this genomic race
sound real in clinical trials. Second, the MHLW had to persuade other ICH parties to
accept this standard. As we read in last section, the Europe and United States seemed not
to be enthusiastic about its early application and the ICH seemed not want to tackle it
soon. 18 This section will describe the how the MHLW tried to solve the above problems
together. As we will see in the following discussions, Japan on the one hand developed a
theoretical framework that served to make global drug development possible as it wished.
Meanwhile, through some personal connections, it established an informal channel with
the FDA to negotiate the technical issues about this project.
Let us deal with the scientific framework first. Technically speaking, in order to
conduct a global clinical trial, the MHLW required a theoretical toll to transform the
genomic information into meaningful variants and factors that were countable and
reproducible. It has not yet had any formal name for this statistical method created to
serve this need, though some called it "statistics for the post-genomic era" or "genetic
statistics" (Kamakura 2001). In order to clarify my argument on the drug development, in
the following I will call it genomic biostatistics. Of course, statistics is not a new area in
terms of global drug development. In Chapter 2 I had discussed its role in the current
practice of clinical trials, and the concerns of statistical methods have remained an
important topic at the ICH since its beginning. For example, the E9 guideline was formed
18 This was until ICH6, where this conference started dealing with some issues about biological
products and gene therapy.
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to establish a methodological guideline for clinical trials that recruit subjects from more
than one site;' 9 some concerns also appeared in the E6 guideline with regard to how
good clinical trials should be conducted.
However, compared to the mainstream discussion about the conflicts raised in
statistical methods used in "Japanese style" clinical trials, only few Japanese statisticians
pursued the approach that the MHLW favored. Among these scientists Takeuchi Masahiro,
Professor of the Division of Biostatistics, Kitasato University, was the youngest and most
promising. He seemed to be the "Mr. Right" of the moment. Before returning to Japan at
the request of the MHW, Takeuchi had very few connections with statisticians in Japan.
He was educated at Boston University and earned his Ph.D. degree in biostatistics at
Harvard University. After that he was recommended to work at the FDA as a statistical
reviewer of anti-cancer drugs. His American personality and working experience made
him the best "post-E5" expert to help the MHLW get away of the deadlock of bridging.
Thus, although originally he was interested in a medical university located in Western
Japan, the MHLW asked him to work in Tokyo so that he could visit the MHLW
frequently. "I am highly involved in this institution," he admitted.
Takeuchi has a different viewpoint on the ICH. His American training told him that
to insist on "Japanese style" of clinical trial would not work. Quality, instead, is the term
he would like to emphasize. Unlike other statisticians who related the E9 with the E6
guidelines, he insisted that it was the E5 guideline that should be discussion with the E9
guidelines; the former gave a chance to exchange qualified data, and, the latter, as the
perquisite, guides how to produce the data (Takeuchi 2001). After his return in 1998, the
Symposium on Global Drug Development Techniques (hereafter the Kitasato-Harvard
Symposium) was the place where Takeuchi gradually realized his attempt to combine
genomics and global drug development; it was, too, a new and informal channel for the
MHLW that allowed them to talk about this new idea with their American colleagues.20
Although this symposium later received sponsorship from the MHLW, these serial
symposiums were initiated through Takeuchi's personal connections with his advisor and
colleagues in the United States.2 When asked, he put it in a Japanese way: "when I was
thinking whether I should return to Japan, I called up my pals at Harvard. They
19 Although this guideline is important for making a multi-sited clinical trial, which is related to the
global drug development project, in order to keep my argument flow moving smoothly, I will leave more
discussions about this guideline to Chapter 7.
20 These symposiums have been all held, all at ANA Hotel, Tokyo, from October 5-6, 2000, October
22-23, 2001, October 2-3, 2002, October 28-29, 2003 and October 25-26, 2004.
21 The proceedings of the first three symposiums have been published (English with Japanese
translation) as Bridging Strategies (2001), Bridging Strategies and Pharmacogenomics (2002), and
Simultaneous, Wforldwvide Development Strategies (2003). All are published by Dizitaru puresu, Tokyo.
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encouraged me to go and promised to back me up wherever I was. And this is what they
promised." He kept in touch with Steven W. Lagakos, Professor of the Department of
Biostatistics, Harvard School of Public Health, after his return, and the first symposium
was held in 2000 with sponsorship by the Pfizer Health Research Foundation.
I pointed out that the Kitasato-Harvard Symposium is a defacto Japan-U.S. channel
to solve the deadlock of bridging between the MHLW and the FDA, and Takeuchi did not
deny it. "It is not specifically for the FDA; it's for many people, industry, for example,"
he replied: "but, in this symposium we do release some information that would be
improper for the MHLW to speak out." It is safe to claim that this symposium functions
as an arena for technical discussions on behalf of their governments. In each symposium
there were open seminars and close meetings, which satisfied everyone's needs. The
former acclaimed possible changes in the MHLW's policy on the E5 guideline and the
future of drug development; the latter provided a chance for these experts to exchange
information in a more private atmosphere, which was neither the multi-national ICH nor
trade-driven MOSS.
Four symposiums from 2000 to 2003 witness the gradual formation of the global
drug development program. As written in the welcome note addressed by two organizers,
the initiation of this symposium was a response to the impacts that the new issued E5
guideline would introduce:
The adoption by countries of recommendations from the International
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) has set the stage for important advances
in drug evaluation worldwide. In particular, the E5 guidelines, issued in August
1998, allow data resulting from clinical studies done in the West to be used by
regulators in other parts of the world, including Japan, for consideration in the
approval of drugs in their own countries.
Nonetheless, the symposium hoped to shift the research body to global drug trials, as
interpreted by the ICH in the following way: "The ICH recommendations raise the
specter of global clinical trials in which one or more international studies could be used
for registration of a pharmaceutical in multiple nations." Arguing against the "west-center;
east-peripheral" structure of globalization I mentioned in Chapter 4, in which clinical
information flows through a one way canal from the West (Caucasians) to the East
(Japanese), this symposium nicely echoed the MHLW's vision of globalization where
every nation (race) can be equally treated and respected.
Even with this ambition, this symposium took its steps slowly. The following table
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can give us a broad sense about the trends at this symposium, showing the movement
from bridging studies to the genomic approach and global drug development. In the
following let us trace this trend year by year (table 6.3).
Table 6.3 Themes and Goals Presented in the Kitasato-Harvard Symposium,
2000-2003
Theme Sessions Goals
First bridging l.global harmonization Discussions on technical
symposium study 2. ethnic differences issues on bridging study
(2000) 3. bridging strategies
4. future strategies and challenges
Second Bridging I.bridging strategies: overview Discussions on
symposium strategies and 2.bridging strategies: the west important issues: ICH
(2001) pharmaco- experience with bridging E5 and implementation
genomics 3.regional/global clinical trial in individual Asian
4.ICH: practical implementation of E5 countries, EU's regional
guidelines implementation,
5.pharmacogenomics: advances in explaining ethnic and
understanding other factors, statistical
6.pharmacogenomics: impacts--clinical challenges, genomics:
and regulatory its understanding and
use in drug evaluation
process
Third simultaneous, I .simultaneous/worldwide development simultaneous/worldwide
symposium worldwide strategies: overview development strategies
(2002) development 2. simultaneous/worldwide strategies:
and pharmaco- new challenges
genomics 3. simultaneous/worldwide strategies:
ICH-E5
4. more concrete plan and actions based
on ICH agreement, APEC report and
today's discussion
5. pharmacogenomics: drug discovery
and drug development based on the
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* It has a satellite meeting
before the formal program.
regarding QT prolongation effect titled "QT symposium"
Source: Adopted from the Kitasato-Harvard Symposium website.
http://www.pharm.kitasato-u.ac.jp/biostatis/Khsympomain.html.
The symposium of the year 2000 presents a conventional format. As its subtitle
"bridging study" shows, sessions were organized in a fashion covering issues regarding
the overview of the ICH and the possible impacts of the E5 guideline, especially the
bridging approach. Also covered were the problems created by the bridging study
strategy and its coming challenges, but there is nothing surprising. They seemed to know
the ultimate goal but they had no idea how to get there. No sessions, even papers,
concentrate either on genomics or global drug development. Indeed, as claimed in the
preface of the meeting, the mission of this symposium was modest to "address a variety
of topics relating to bridging strategies." Yet this statement had a clear explanation of the
dual orientation of this occasion: "[B]ecause of the global nature of the issues to be
discussed, it was felt to be important the both Eastern and Western perspectives are
elucidated" (Takeuchi and Lagakos 2000). Obviously, in this situation Japan represented
the East and the United States played the Western counterpart; their experience sharing
about bridging studies would lead to more harmonious global drug development by
means of biostatistics.
Some threads can be found in the second symposium about the shift to global drug
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genetic analysis.
6. implementation of global
development programs.
Fourth advance global 1. global program: is there a reality? Advance global drug
Symposium drug 2. regulatory updates and clinical trends development by
(2003)* development 3. practical use of ICH guidelines for discussion of emerging
bridging/global clinical trials trends, technology
4. OMICS: genomics, proteomics and updates, and novel
metabolomics-how can they be used paradigms
to enhance product approval
5. other novel technology update:
modeling technique, biomarkers,
disease Surrogates, data mining
development. On the part of bridging studies, we see a shift of the discussion from basic
research to the sharing experience of the reviewing process. Meanwhile, the way of
discussing the E5 guideline changed. They started seeking other factors, such as genetic
variations, that were able to explain more precisely and convincingly intrinsic racial
differences, namely, the genomic move. On the other hand, global drug development
appeared in the sections on "multi country trials" or "global clinical trials." In order to
carry out meaningful global trials, there were discussions about how statistics could help.
Another theme that appeared is pharmacogenomics. Apparently it was too new to discuss
the practical applications at that point, but participants felt that it was a necessary field in
order to make global drug development realizable. Although these signals were too weak
to call huge attention, there was a move towards global drug development. In their
welcome Takeuchi and Lagakos wrote: "the E5 guideline ... enables the extrapolation of
Western clinical data to new regions of the world. In addition, the availability of
pharmacogenomics information is likely to play a prominent role in future new drug
development... The two concepts can lead to profound effect of drug development
programs worldwide. It is therefore very important to create a forum for discussing the
multiple issues surrounding these concepts." In fact, this statement became the theme
statement for following symposiums.
As Takeuchi pointed out, the direction toward global drug development and
genomics became clear at the third symposium. Flagging its theme as "Advancing Global
Drug Development Techniques: Simultaneous, Worldwide Development and
Pharmacogenomics," this symposium achieved following two agendas. First, it confirmed
the "two-stage" evolution of clinical trials from a bridging study to a global drug
development. Lagakos pointed out this shift clearly in his presentation slides. He
compared bridging studies and global trials and indicated the distinctions that the former
was serial and, evaluated and expanded existing information to create an evaluation of the
risks/benefits of a drug in a new region, while the latter are concurrent studies and
presumably all regions will benefit from each study and thus there is potential to shorten
time needed for worldwide availability of effective new drugs. Thus, Lagakos concludes:
"bridging studies are by their nature imply a sequential versus simultaneous
development/evaluation strategy. Whenever possible, simultaneous studies will produce
information more quickly and be beneficial to a broader audience since bridging studies
really only intended to help the new region."
Meanwhile, pharmacogenomics eventually became one of the main topics of this
symposium. Seeming to echo the completion of HOWDY and JSNP, these sections were
designed to test whether genomics can serve as a scientific base for global clinical trials.
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Although the discussion was limited by the progress in this area of science, we can feel
the optimism from the presentations. Lagakos also pointed out the potential of
pharmacogenomics as "apparent associations (e.g., ethnicity) at a more causal level;
identifying patient subgroups who are more/less likely to benefit from treatment;" thus,
the next step for this approach would be to "combine genetic information with other
information to see if apparent associations between ethnicity and outcome variables were
explainable by the genetic information."
The above agendas were fully developed at the 2003 symposium. In fact, almost no
paper solely on bridging studies was presented; on the other hand, the sections about
global clinical trials and pharmacogenomics had grown. Practical procedures were
proposed as well as the possible scientific approaches, genomics, proteomics and
metabolomics, and other new techniques such as biomarkers, disease surrogates, for
example, were discussed.
What is perhaps more explicitly about this trend is the re-interpretation of bridging
studies. Unlike an alternative approach where they were compared with the global drug
development, it is portrayed a transitional process toward global drug trials. In Takeuchi's
presentation titled "lessons learned from three global clinical trials," he reasoned why
bridging is needed and why it is transitional:
The main purpose of the bridging study is to show a similar profile of a tested
drug in new regions to the one derived from the foreign data ...... The concept
of the bridging strategy simultaneously, makes global drug development
possible. The bridging strategy is just a 'one-way process' and we can extend
the idea to the 'two-way process'. The global drug development can adopt the
'both way process' simultaneously and show no difference in the two factors
among regions.
The first half of the above message was not new; it reiterates that bridging studies were
proposed to solve the problems of ethnic differences. What was interesting was the
second half. It was the first time that the statistical relationship between bridging studies
and global drug development was clarified. Takeuchi claimed that global drug
development was nothing other than "simultaneously" bridging studies. In this manner, a
presumed "center-peripheral" worldview was carefully questioned by highlighting its
primitive, one-way nature, and for this reason it must be "upgraded" to a more advanced,
both-way approach of global drug development.
It seemed like Takeuchi and the MHLW had figured out a workable plan using these
symposiums. Statistics was the new tool; and the Kitasato-Harvard symposium was the
new channel. They shared the same vision and both agreed that it has to be achieved by a
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scientific program that first, has Japan as the Asian representative in all clinical trials of a
global scale, and, second, retained as much visibility for the Japanese as possible. In the
next section, I will further discussion in detail how this discourse works.
Seeing Race in Genomics: What Science Has and Has Not Yet Said
Although the approach of genomic statistics is pervasive, we do not yet know in
detail how it is to be applied to clinical trials. In the following I will take Takeuchi's
presentation at the 2003 APEC meeting as an example allow such an explanation. At first
glance, the main goal of this study is to build two statistical models that can estimate
more clearly the dosage-efficacy effect in a mixed target population. The PA model is
applied to a population when individual variance (or random effects) can be ignored,
while SS model is applied to a population when variability among individuals exists.
Since SS model requires more mathematical assumptions and hypotheses to correct
possible biases, the conclusion suggests that the PA model be more appealing in a clinical
trial setting. Like many papers in this field, the presentation involved complicated
differential equations and functions. However, if we paid more attention to the logic of
why these questions are raised and the assumption made, we are able to read some
implications between the lines.
Fig. 6.7. Subgroups of Diffuse Large-B-Cell Lymphoma According to
Gene-Expression Profiles
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Source: Rosenwald et. al. 2002:1939, Figure 1.
The key thing to understand in this paper is the E5 guideline, through which we see
concern about racial difference all the way from the beginning. In the introduction section,
Takeuchi briefly reviewed the ICH, the E5 guideline, global drug development and
intrinsic and extrinsic factors that define the racial difference. He then posted the research
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question: does a mixture of different groups make the pharmacokinetic study data
inadequate? Of course, in a sense, every person is different. What is new in this study is
to point out how to sort out, to give these differences an order. For this reason Takeuchi
introduced the idea of "molecular profiling" from a recent research in the New England
Journal of Medicine,22 pointing out that the genetic profiling can provide the material
base required to explain these differences.
This figure, which is often used in Takeuchi's recent presentations, shows the
gene-expression profiles of three subgroups of diffuse large-B-cell lymphoma. According
to original study, the subgroups were formed from 240 patients with the disease by a
hierarchical-clustering algorithm that groups the lymphomas according to the expression
of 100 genes that distinguished between germinal-center-B-cell-like, activated B-cell-like,
and type three diffuse large-B-cell lymphomas. Fig. 6.7 shows the Kaplan-Meier
estimates of overall survival after chemotherapy among these patients, according to the
gene-expression subgroup. In other words, there is a correlation between genetic
expressions and cancers as well as that between with gene expression and their clinical
outcomes.
It is an amazing study combining basic research and clinical investigation; however,
while citing this figure in his genomic biostatical agenda, Takeuchi silently reversed its
logic in terms of the relations between group and individuals. As we know, in this study,
the subgroups were sorted from unrelated individuals by similar expressions in selected
genes (as indicators). By PCR processing, they were grouped for scientific reasons as to
show possible statistical meanings in the research. If we borrow anthropologist Paul
Rabinow's concept of "biosociality" (1996, Chapter 5), the logic of this research nicely
demonstrates this transition where individuals are unified in some biological ways but
still remain independent and free in social situations. However, Rabinow also reminds us
that the older forms of bio-identity, such as race, have not disappeared (103), and this can
be well seen in Takeuchi's agenda. When using the result of this study to explain the
genomic differences among races, Takeuchi has assumed a pre-existing cultural category
of race in which every member must share some similarities with others in his/her
genomic expressions. Takeuchi's thought reflects a primary distinction of race, which
should be dealt with before that of the individual. This distinction also matches the
MHLW's scheme of global drug development, which consisting of distinct groups of
populations in the world.
22 Rosenwald et. al, "The Use of Molecular Profiling to Predict Survival After Chemotherapy for
Diffuse Large-B-Cell Lymphoma," NEngl JMed, Volume 346(25), June 20, 2002: 1937-1947.
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Holding this assumption, Tekeuchi goes ambiguously back and forth between
individual genome and population genetics. According to his statistical models, he
differentiates groups of similar gene expression and then to build a statistical model that
combines the data generated. According to his presentation, the problem of racial
difference can be solved if the target populations grouped by their gene expression are
well defined. Only with adequate treatment of each target group can more specific results
be achieved. In the end, an argument about how the "clearly defined population" helps to
leads his discussion to the conclusion, Takeuchi reverses the result again by saying these
studies can make sense of the genomic expression in a population. As the slide reads:
"PK, PD and PPK study play an important role to investigate the relationship between
dosage and efficacy, dosage and adverse event, and possibly clearly defined target
population" (my emphasis). Although the above sentence looks confusing, I would
suggest that the statistical tool Takeuchi formulates has, in fact, its cultural use; it
provides a way to identify a "target group" by looking at its responses to a certain agent.
Knowing which genomic information should be chosen from the group becomes
important, since it will be the indicator to reduce the statistically individual differences
and then the PA model becomes applicable. Coincidently, it was exactly the goal of the
Japanese genome project.
Fig. 6.8 Idea of Tailor Made Medicine with SNP Studies
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It is not until we reach this point do we realize the strategic position genomics nowhas in the discourse on global drug development. As anthropologist Joan Fujimura's
precedent study on the rise of Japan's Human Genome Project suggests (2000), culture
should be considered in a particular practice at a particular time and space, in which it is
"both a heuristic device for discussing local and global actions and movements and a
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"both a heuristic device for discussing local and global actions and movements and a
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concept that is being continuously produced through actions and discourses about these
actions" (84). Even so, unlike Fujimura's observation where Japanese scientists inject a
specific set of Japanese value on life into this transnational project, in our story about
drug regulation, the cultural importance of genomics should be understood in two
contexts. First, by using a burgeoning genomics, the MHLW draws a beautiful vision that
centers on "tailor made medicine," "customized medicine," or "order made medicine." It
is a latest trend that nobody will openly deny. In fact, Japan promotes this vision widely
on many public occasions as well as in official reports, such as that of Millennium Project
and the Outline of Biotechnology Strategy (fig. 6.8). Although promising, this goal
cannot be achieved without going through a group approach on the human genome. On
the other hand, the language in population genetics shows its limitations. The frequency
of individual genetic traits is not enough to catch the complicated phenomenon of disease
as well as the diversity of human beings. In order to make sense of the racial difference as
a sum, researchers realized the need to have a broader knowledge of the expression of all
genes, namely, genome.
A new "two-stage" transition is scientifically completed. Takeuchi and Lagakos
claimed in the welcome note of the 2001 Kitasato-Harvard symposium that "the
availability of pharmacogenomics information is likely to play a prominent role in future
new drug development, especially as regards individualized, or tailor-made medicine."
However, this goal has to be achieved through the traditional understandings of
population genetics and, thus requires a national project for study the gene expression in
a population. Race becomes a necessary existence for this transition.
So the following is what the MHLW said about its scientific concerns on the drug
development in the future. Takeuchi shared with me his vision on how racial difference
should be dealt in clinical trials: racial difference must be identified at phase I, in which
twenty subjects from each major race should be recruited. According to their genetic
profile, different protocols will be applied and conducted in each region in the phase II
study. With this dataset, a simultaneous global phase III can be performed. He concluded:
"to be honest, in this coming fall (2004) we are expecting to form a guideline scientific
and clear. We are about to be ready."
Even so, there are some technical problems that need to be solved. The first is the
problem of external factors, those that cannot be reduced by genomics. For this, the
MHLW has no solution but local trials. Narikawa Mamoru, the former MHLW officer on
international affairs commented in the 2001 Kitasato-Harvard Symposium while
introducing the Japanese gnome, that extrinsic factors still have to be analyzed in each
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region where the drug is to be marketed (Yakujinippo October 29 2001). His opinion was
supported by Sato Daisaku, the current representative on the E5 policy. Regarding this
problem, Takeuchi has formed a solution by applying "true bridging." What he provided
to me was a combination of one main study and several "bridging" studies. In order to
consider possible racial differences, the main study is a simultaneous global clinical trial,
which has to include every genomic group, such as Caucasians, blacks and Asians, and
should be conducted in a form of a dose finding trial, that is, a phase II study. In order to
confirm the possible influence of extrinsic factors, some "bridging" studies can be
arranged in the region (country) where the product is to be marketed. "Only through this
way we can leave the touchy extrinsic factors on the back burner."
Another problem is the amount of Japanese subjects who can be recruited for the
global drug development. Takeuchi left this open. "I know industry do not like our
current practice on bridging study, which recruits too many Japanese subjects. To be
honest, I do not really care the number of subjects (of course it has to have some); instead,
I will argue for the quality of the trials. Japan cannot keep clinical trials done in Japan
without improving its environment." "But, do you worry, as many MHLW officials have
told me, that the results of trials done in Japan fails to show statistical significance?" I
checked. Takeuchi replied that Japan has to face the global era. "I work with many
industries and know that we cannot block the flow of business," he said. "We have to
realize our current position so that we know how to start from there." In fact, the MHLW
has been preparing as well. At the Kitasato-Harvard 2001 Symposium, the MHLW
claimed that in response to the acceptance of foreign data, it would be more and more
important to build a monitoring system, that is, phase IV trials (Yakujinippo October 19
2001). With the help of the information technology and the national health insurance, this
system has developed into a mandatory process for drugs that may have side effects on
the Japanese. "It is asked that, say, the first five thousand people who use this drug have
to report to the MHLW their reactions," Takeuchi explained.
Perhaps it is not mature enough to form a solid guideline, but so far; so good.
However, I still wonder why the MHLW is willing to abandon its insistence on the
recruitment of the Japanese race. Because, according to the above agenda, it has almost
accepted the original plan that the EFPIA proposed at ICH4, an agenda that based on
ethnicity not on nationality. What Takeuchi proposes is a total deregulation of the
Japanese race. Does the MHLW forget its mission to preserve the largest presence
possible of the Japanese race in these trials?
The answer is a certainly "no". There is, in fact, something that the MHLW does not
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say. Donna Haraway has noticed that genomics is a way to define human species, which
has moved away from the traditional category of individuality and collectivity. However,
she has not yet elaborated on what is really happening under this cultural promise. Daniel
Cohen, chief genomics officer at Genset, proposes a new and ambitious approach to
mapping disease and drug response genes. "It is clear that familial studies and positional
cloning is not the way forward in unraveling complex disease," says Cohen. "[What] you
need [is] a systematic genome-wide mapping effort that will enable the dissection of
complex gene pathways involved in drug responses and disease" (quoted from Andrew
Marshall 1998:8). Cohen is right to expand on this possibility, yet what he does not say is
that except for industries that can smell the profit generated from this map, who else
would dare to spend such an amount of money just to set up a database?
Japan does. This country is willing to spend as much money as needed to prove
their racial solidarity in the global era. For example, Nakamura Yusuke mentioned the
European study on SNPs, which included Caucasians, Blacks, and Asians, eight subjects
of each group, criticizing that no polymorphisms can be found because of the "noise."
The Japanese SNP study, instead, carefully chose twenty-four Japanese grouped into
eight samples so that every sample can be identified. Through this way the SNPs can be
found (Nakamura 2002: 14-15). Unlike the traditional approach where individual
variance is analyzed with a reference to interethnic difference, the genomic version we
have introduced, the SNP database, groups the ethnic and individual differences together.
As I have written repeatedly, scaling is not the point in the use of genomics in
pharmaceutical studies; the point is that no individual difference can be found without
any reference, and vise versa.
Returning to the case of racial difference. Pharmacogenomics is certainly a science
that does not belong to Japan exclusively. However, almost no country would be able to
afford this information, especially Asian countries. Thus, although this framework does
not indicate which population group should be chosen to represent Asians, in reality there
is only Japan, the only Asian ICH country such an advanced technology, which is
qualified for this task. This is why Takeuchi can remove the bar of cultural
"protectionism," since scientific genomics will replace it. Benefited from its advance life
science, Japan does not worry to compete with other Asian races in the global era.23
23 In fact, the cost of making such a genomic data is not that large. The commitment is. In Taiwan's
case, if it was willing to, it could afford this approach across a wide range of ethnic groups. However, no
such a commitment was made among these genomic scientists. Thanks to Professor Ralph Kirby at
National Yang-Ming University for discussions on this point.
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Perhaps we cannot easily ignore the power of the state, and Japan's attitude on race
represents the most salient example.24 Etienne Labbe, who has been working a long time
with the Japanese as the E.U. representative on E5, teased the Japanese that "they are still
convinced that Japanese have a 'pure genome' compared to other populations (they live
on an island and do not 'mix' with any foreign populations!)." Labbe's comment maybe
right; yet, what he does not know is that the Japanese really mean it and have turned it
into both a scientific discourse and a business program. When I reminded Professor
Takeuchi that in his explanation of global clinical trials that he always uses "Japanese" is
where he should have used "Asians," he gave me a charming smile and said: "well, yes.
But do you think it will make any difference ifI do?"
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WATCHING GENOMICS MOVE IN THE ICH
At this point, we can draw some conclusions concerning Japan in the post-E5 era.
These can be divided into two sets of problems, one theoretical and other practical. The
theoretical questions stem from Donna Haraway's three-configuration description of how
the human species is conceived in the past and the present. As I have written in Chapter 4,
this notion is useful as a frame of reference to capture the main social and cultural
concerns of an episteme and the scientific tools developed to serve this need. However, as
an interpretive framework this frame does not show us the mechanisms by which one
configuration changes to another, and in what field the paradigm shifts take place. This is
especially the case when we apply Haraway's observations to a specialized field, such as
the world of proprietary drugs, and to a global setting for the making of this paradigm,
the ICH. From this viewpoint, this chapter, along with Chapter 4, represents a detailed
"slow-motion" ethnography that supports Haraway's argument on one hand, and
indicates the limitations of its implications on the other.
The first theoretical conclusion we can draw from this chapter is the ambiguous
"delay" between the time that of public expectation or imaginings about science and its
actual application. Haraway has argued that in the development of modem biopolitics,
there is not always a one-way diffusion from science to society; in its diffusion to society,
scientific knowledge is constructed and reproduced with metaphors outside of its own
language and epistemology, giving rise to a mutually constitutive relationship of political
24 Another recent case concerning the complicated aspects in the relationship between the state and
race can be seen in Iceland, a country also proud of its pure racial composition, which attempted to
"capitalize" the genomic information of its nationals with the help of a biotech company. For an
anthropological analysis of this project, see PAlsson and Rabinow 1999.
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economy, symbols and science (Haraway 1989: Chapter 10). Although in a simplified
vision of science and society, it is possible to assume an interactive situation where the
two move hand in hand, this ethnographic study of pharmaceuticals shows that the
construction of ideas about science does not translate into immediate application, because
scientific ideas belong to different apparatuses of reproduction. It is true that the promise
of genomics may evoke a political economy of science that will result in more funds
being invested in research and research facilities; nonetheless, this does not mean that the
industry will simply immediately apply this concept to drug production. The
pharmaceutical industry is already a monopoly business, and it has no reason to risk its
current profits just for the advancement of science.
Second, this chapter shows the cultural and social reasons for a move to the
genomic. These reasons have often been ignored by some researchers, who fail to address
them from a non-historical, anti-cultural viewpoint. Considering the move to genomics
rather than a total shift or Kuhnian switch of worldviews, this chapter identifies the
locality for the move in the field of the ICH. The necessity of "breaking" the drug
approval requirements consensus, as I have discussed, is not always commercial-it can
also be cultural and political, the result of active participation or of passive resistance, as
in Japan's insistence on its racial difference. As described in this chapter, the MHLW did
not only create a scientific program that could serve its cultural concerns; it tried to make
this program a reality in order to solve the deadlock on bridging studies. Some attempts,
though still only a few, have been made in the name of establishing global clinical trials
(kokusaikyodochiken), such as for the AT1 antagonist for type II diabetes (RENAAL test)
and the ACE blocker for preventing recurrent strokes. Meanwhile, more pressure has
come from the other side of world. Shimatani Katsuyoshi of Pfizer, for example,
indicated that despite their own ethnic diversity, the United States and the EU have
recently tried trials that used a unified protocol and gave reasonable weight to ethnic
factors; thus he warned that it is possible that Japan will be excluded from the global drug
program because there is no visible effort to decrease the number of repeated clinical
trials (2002: 71 1). All of this reveals a complicated reality that cannot be reduced into a
mechanical image of the world.
As far as practical problems are concerned, this chapter has brought a clear
ethnographic focus to how and in what way Japan's voice can be properly heard. I not
only analyze the content of what the MHLW said, but give equal attention to the way
Japan's voice is expressed. I stated in Chapter 4 that the MHLW intended to use the
science-oriented, global ICH as the place to deal with the problem of racial difference.
Following this argument, the first part of this chapter described the dynamics of a
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dialogue in which the industry tried to force Japan back to the bilateral MOSS trade
negotiation forum. Paralleling these channels, the second part of the chapter singled out
an informal "express" channel between experts at the MHLW and the FDA for the project
of global drug development.
Even so, looking at the practical aspects of this move, all disputes have to return to
the global forum of the ICH, and genomics was not encouraged as a way to solve the
deadlock. The West had its own ways of dealing with this problem. In the Steering
Committee meeting of May 2001, both industry and the MHLW were concerned about
the clarity of bridging studies. An informal expert working group on "Ethnic Factors in
the Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data" was formed in February 2002 to discuss
issues on the guideline and its implementation. There were two reasons to open this
discussion, as Robert O'Nell of the FDA pointed out: first, "general agreement that
misunderstanding and confusion still exists regarding the intent of and advice in E5 and
its implementation," and second, "general sense among industry sponsors that their
experiences support the position that E5 is not being adhered to." In order to fix this
problem, questions and answers about the E5 guideline were needed to "identify key
questions and topics for which consensus answers can be provided to all regions." The
purpose of these efforts was "to clarify the situation and help move us forward"
(O'Neill's slide presentation at ICH6, see the conference website at http://ich.org).
Japan perceived this discussion differently. It seemed that the MHLW could not
wait for the genomic frame to arrive.25 On the one hand, Japan wanted to avoid being
excluded from the trend of integrated clinical trials in the West. On the other, it hoped to
form a policy to allow the products to be developed after the implementation of the E5
guideline, and it was expected that a bridging study approach would not be suitable for
this. To fulfill these goals, the MHLW had to have a guideline backed up by the ICH. Of
course, another concern about the timing had to do with patents. An OPSR consultant
said to me, "Don't you think that it is time for promoting global drug development?
Indeed we had troubles in asking industries to make bridging studies for the products that
have been approved a long time ago, but it will be gone soon. You know that most of the
patents are about to be expired." This assumed that the industry would support this
change.
As discussed above, the MHLW planned to propose a revision of the guideline in
25 Naito Chikayuki also mentioned the pressure from the industry side (Naito 2002: 94). However,
according to the discussion of this chapter, I don't think industry was a crucial factor in the idea of global
drug development. It is worth noting at this point, though, since it confirms again one of this thesis' main
arguments: the MHW had different concerns than industry.
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the Steering Committee meeting in Tokyo in 2001, specifically requiring simultaneous
phase III clinical trials that recruited enough Japanese subjects. Naito Chikayuki
summarized the need for revision (2003a). He wrote that the goal of the E5 guideline was
to efficiently introduce new medicines which were already approved in other regions. The
guideline had only described in principle how data could be extrapolated from one region
to another. Even so, "It would be seem possible and efficient to assess potential regional
differences as part of a global development program, i.e., for development of data to
occur simultaneously in various regions, rather than sequentially" (152S).
In the proposal on global drug development, as Naito said to O'Nell personally in
the meeting, what was important was that global drug development be "appropriately
conducted with a single protocol and with a sufficient number of trial subjects in each
region"(152S). Three possible scenarios for global drug development were received and
listed by the OPSR (Naito 2003b: 93). Naito's comments on each proposal are shown in
table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Scenarios on Global Drug Development
Source: Adopted from Naito 2003:93, Table 1.
The first and second scenarios were turned down, Naito claimed, because they
totally ignore ethnic factors and regional differences and thus could not be accepted. As
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Scenarios
1 Conducting different phase studies in each of the 3 ICH regions. For
example, phase I in Japan, phase II in Europe, and phase III in the United
States.
2 Conducting phase III trials in three ICH regions, recruiting the necessary
numbers of cases in total, but only a few in Japan. For example, a trial
that recruited 100 subjects among which only three were Japanese.
3 Conducting phase III studies in three ICH regions, with enough subjects in
total and enough analyzable cases in Japan.
Two scenarios follow:
A: Having already conducted dose-response test in Japan.
B: No full does-response test done in Japan, but instead a test based on the
dosage applied overseas.
for the third approach, although it was potentially acceptable, one condition needed to be
added: the Japanese sample size must be "large enough to allow clinical analysis done
solely by them, since it is the only way to consider the regional difference" (94). Further
more, on the dose-response test, Naito suggested that the B scenario was more adequate
because in some cases the Japanese PD data is not consistent with foreign data, and thus a
single does test is not sufficient. From this comment we can see that the MHLW preferred
a type of global drug development that satisfied two conditions: enough Japanese subjects
enrolled and a separate does-response test done in Japan. The former was the bottom line
and the latter was strongly argued, but all were negotiable.2 6
Two meetings were held, as O'Nell recalls,2 7 and the issues of the acceptance of
clinical trials from non-ICH regions and global drug development were discussed. At the
first meeting the participants recognized the contribution of the E5 guideline and asked
each regulatory authority, especially the MHLW, which had the most data, to report on its
experiences of bridging studies. But the touchiest issue discussed was whether clinical
data received from Asian states other than Japan (for example, Taiwan or Korea) could be
accepted. It was proposed by O'Nell, since he had clearly indicated that the spirit of the
E5 guideline was "intended to permit the requesting of one 'confirmatory' phase III
clinical trial (bridge study) in the region (not specifically defined, nor meant as 'country')
if needed or if necessary to extrapolate" (ICH6 presentation, emphasis mine). He wanted
to separate nation from race, but Japan rebuffed this effort by claiming that it was
"beyond the scope of the ICH." The reason for this objection, as Naito explains elsewhere,
is that the ICH guideline was formed for the exclusive purpose of dealing with
regulations among the United States, Europe, and Japan; thus a data package created
outside of the area should be considered independently by the regulatory authorities
through which the product is seeking to be for marketed (2003a: 149S-150S).28
This situation continued when Japan proposed the discussion of global drug
26 For example, elsewhere Naito emphasized that the sample size had to be large enough to allow an
assessment of the impact of racial difference, but this did not mean that the sample size should be very
large for statistical analysis. Besides, if a separate Japanese dose-response trial was impossible, an
alternative would be to have a simultaneous "global" does-response trial, like the global Phase III trial, to
determine whether Japanese patients would need a different dose regimen. See Naito 2003.
27 The first meeting was held in Brussels on February 6-7, 2002, and the second was in Washington,
D.C., on September 10-11, 2002. According to Uesaka Hiroyuki, one more meeting, a teleconference, was
held on July 21, 2003. It was held to confirm the content of the Q&A by three regulatory bodies with the
participation of the industry.
28 I was heard at the 2003 APEC meeting that Japan is considering the acceptance of clinical trial data
using Korean and Hong Kong subjects. However, I confirmed later from the officials, it turned out the use
of non-Western "foreign data", thus Japanese data is still required. Even so, for the GCP concerns, these
data are subjected to the site-inspection by the MHLW and are judged on a case-by-case base.
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development. It expected a guideline that could be made to ensure sensitivity to Japanese
racial uniqueness. But the FDA that turned this proposal down, claiming that it was
"potentially beyond our scope" (Naito 2003b: 93). It was suggested that instead Japan's
proposal be added along with bridging studies as a drug development strategy option.
These compromises resemble what Naito had first proposed ten years earlier. After all,
the West did not understand what Japan had insisted so strongly on. In 1993 the rejection
of this proposal led to the endless entanglement over racial differences that gave birth to
the ambiguous guideline. Ten years had passed-the same scenario was happening again
and it was not clear what consequences would be. As I argue repeatedly in this thesis, it is
an anthropological problem. When the ultimate hope of making Japan, the United States
and the E.U. equal partners was rejected, it was impossible to expect Japan to
compromise its state and national integrity. As a result, only a simple Q&A document was
agreed upon. The second meeting determined that the regulatory bodies-the MHLW,
FDA, and EMEA-would be responsible for developing this document. The final
document was signed off on October 15, 2003, and reported to the Steering Committee at
ICH6.
We can see misunderstandings, or, I would argue, quarrels, in this Q&A document
as it was first released at ICH6 in Osaka in November 2003. It was accompanied by an
implementation working group assigned at the second meeting in September, and only
ten questions were listed. Japan's request was written into the first question as "I am
planning to develop my new drug globally. Does E5 provide guidance for this approach?"
And the answer is a long one. The first part includes all the requirements that Japan asked
for. Unfortunately, however, it is not a guideline, as the FDA and other participants did
not back this approach. As we see in the second and third paragraphs, complicated
concerns about ethnic difference are mentioned, and there is a recommendation to discuss
these with the local authority for any specific requirements, but none of this differs
significantly from the original guideline.
Next, O'Nell's requests, along with those of global industry, are listed (questions 4,
5, and 10). They usually start with the phrase "I believe that my drug is insensitive to
ethnic factors and that there are no significant relevant differences in extrinsic factors,"
and the answers are the same as the ones provided in the MHLW version of the Q&A:
polite, encouraging, but making no concrete promises. The last question clearly states this
problem: "E5 expresses the principle that, as experience with interregional acceptance of
foreign clinical data increases, there will be a better understanding of situations in which
bridging studies are needed and that it is hoped that, with these experiences, the need for
bridging data will lessen. Is this principle still valid?" The answer is as follows: "Yes, this
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is the expectation. The accumulation of experience by each region with implementation
of the E5 guidance continues to add to our understanding of situations in which a
bridging study would be considered necessary by a new region. The expectation
continues to be that, with this experience, the need for a bridging study will lessen."
Nobody was satisfied with this compromise, but it was all they could achieve. It
seemed to reach the point where science could not provide decisive answers. It could
only complicate the social landscape in which it was just one of the ways that the parties
involved expressed their concerns. Even the experts did not have any idea why things go
this way. They were lost, as Naito frankly concluded in his report on the MHLW's current
standpoint on the acceptance of foreign data, which is still the same and has the "three
repeats" specified in the original law back in 1985 (for details, see Chapter 4, n.25). He
writes, "The 3-B scenario was thought [to constitute] no change [from] the 1985
amendment. However, standing on the same side as our nationals, we consider only the
drug's efficacy and safety in terms of their interest. For this thinking the guideline has to
fall in that direction" (2003b: 94). Recording the attempts made to move to genomics, I
do not think that nothing has been achieved since 1985. I will argue, however, that what
remains unchanged is the mentality of such attempts. For good or for ill, Japan will be the
last nation-state in this global world.
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Chapter 7
Composing Our Voice by Biostatistics: Anchoring Taiwan on the Global Networks
If we are global, there will be no need for bridge[s].
John Lim1
Unfortunately, pharmaceutical biotechnology is not a traditional industry. It
requires vast investment, an integrated system of policy regulation system on
pharmaceuticals and close cooperation among government, academy and
industry. Taiwan seems has everything required; and everyone in charge is elite.
However, their efforts are antagonistic when they work together-even worse
than a tray of loose sand (yipan sansha).
Shaw T. Chen and Keith Chan2
PART I
SAVING BRIDING, SAVING THE STATE
Voice and Fasheng (Voicing) in the Bio-Global Era
This chapter intends follow up Chapters 5 and 6 on the subject of voice and voicing
in the global era. It will follow from Chapter 5's analysis of how the Center of Drug
Evaluation (CDE) made Taiwan an institutional voice in discussions on racial difference
and drug regulation. In order to make this voice heard, it created a global network
through which to articulate its policy on bridging studies. This chapter will also follow
from the description in Chapter 6 of the failed attempts by the Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare (MHLW) to replace bridging studies with global drug development. The
deadlock on bridging studies, in this sense, made Taiwan's voicing possible; its strategy
was to separate race and the state, and this influenced the post-E5 negotiations between
the United States and Japan.
All these issues can be seen in the discussion of U.S.-Japan Market-oriented,
Sector-selected Discussion (MOSS) follow-up meeting of April 2001. At this meeting, the
United States requested a reconsideration of the definition of "Asian" data (Yakujinippo
[Pharmaceutical News] April 6 2001). Although the MHLW interpreted the use of the
word "Asians" in the E5 guideline as referring to the Japanese since Japan was the only
In the slide presentation at the 2001 APEC meeting, Taipei, May 25 and 26, 2001.
In "Taiwan Senjiyaoye Menrin Weiji: Fajan Tingzi Buchien; Jingjengri Liushi" (Taiwan's
pharmaceutical biotechnology facing crisis: development ceases; competitive power loses), p.2.
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Asian country invited to the ICH, the United State hoped to reconfirm the definition of
"Asians," extending it to apply to the people of other East Asian counties. In making this
request the U.S. had in mind Taiwan and Korea, two states implementing the E5
guideline at almost the same time as Japan.
However, these two states had different concerns about racial difference. Like
Taiwan before the introduction of the ICH guidelines, Korea required a low-standard but
mandatory phase III study with a certain amount of local subjects for every new drug to
be imported. Furthermore, medical institutions there were not allowed to participate in
multinational trials. However, efforts were being made to improve its review standard. In
1998, it had raised its drug regulation agency from a headquarters to an administration
known as the Korean Food and Drug Administration (KFDA). This new institution soon
adopted the ICH guidelines, mainly the E5 and E6 guidelines, and put them into practice.
According to Kim Hoon-Kyo's presentation at the 2001 APEC meeting, this
implementation was considered an important reform, for it accepted the concept of
bridging studies and permitted national-level trials. Three more guidelines were adopted
in 1999 indicating the material required to apply for waivers of local clinical trials. Even
so, Western industry was most concerned with was KFDA's policy on Asian racial
difference. The E5 guideline glossary indicates that the complete data package should
contain "clinical data that fulfills the regulatory requirements of the new region and
pharmacokinetic data relevant to the population in the new region" (7). The crucial point
is how to define relevance in terms of race. We know that the MHLW defines this data as
produced from studies on Japanese living in Japan. Korea, at this point, had the same
stance. Although the KFDA accepted data from studies done with oversea Koreans,
basically it recognized only Koreans for "Asian" data.
Apparently, when global industry started dealing with East Asian countries other
than Japan, Korea was presented as an example of what they would not like to see. It was
argued in the MOSS meeting that if all Asian countries improved the standards of their
review policy while insisting on local clinical trials, this would create serious problems.
The total number of subjects required would increase, as would the time for marketing.
Korea was thus blamed for this rigidity on the subject of racial difference. Although it
was one of big Asian markets able to afford advanced medicines, it was threatened with
abandonment if it insisted too much on racial difference.
In contrast to Korea, Taiwan presents another kind of example, an example of how
the "politically constructed" guideline could still work. The "scientific" foundation of the
CDE's policy on bridging studies, as introduced in Chapter 5, is a "politically motivated"
paper that identifies the genetic relationships among races in East Asia. Even so, the CDE
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incorporated it into its discourse on the scientific evaluation of bridging studies and
included it in its policy. We can assume that PhRMA would like to use this policy to
balance out the "conservative" practices of Japan and Korea.
Just as Chapter 5 starts with an evaluation of Taiwan's voice to the world, this
chapter briefly evaluates its voicing, orfasheng, in a local political context. Although the
CDE now has an institutional voice heard by the global, there are at least three limitations
in terms of voicing. First and foremost, the agency of voicing is problematic. As analyzed
in Chapter 5, we cannot identify any distinct voice that could be heard before the
foundation of ICH-Taiwan. However, even after Taiwan had founded the ICH-Taiwan
committee and later a semi-governmental institute, the CDE, there was still no clear
agency for voicing. This is a situation in which, to borrow from feminism, "the personal
is political." As a state policy, drug regulation is commonly the business of a government
department, such as the MHLW or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, it
is problematic to assume that the CDE is representative of the Taiwanese government, for
two obvious reasons. First, the Taiwanese government it is supposed to represent does not
represent anything from the viewpoint of global politics. Even in APEC, which the CDE
used as a global stage, Taiwan is identified by the non-governmental name "Chinese
Taipei." Second, because Taiwan has failed to win global recognition as a state, on some
occasions the CDE's claim does not truly reflect the result of discussions within the
government, but an opinion strategically formed in order to make a voice heard.
Second, Taiwan's voicing is limited to certain conversational contexts. Although the
CDE successfully makes an effective claim about racial difference and bridging studies,
which were one of the most "troublesome" concepts in the ICH guidelines, there are still
many important drug regulation guidelines, such as E6, E9, S3, S4, Ml, M2, and many
others. Even so, in addition to the E5 guideline and bridging studies, there has been
almost no chance to hear from the CDE in global settings.3 Taiwan's voicing to the ICH
was in fact exceptional; it happened only when the Western countries and global industry
failed to make an agreement with Japan. Even so, its voicing was limited to restricted
conversational contexts, like an actor who has only few lines in a play, no matter how
important they are. Let us use an example from drama: if Tom Stoppard had not written
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1963), how many people could remember the
two friends of Prince Hamlet who have no lines in Shakespeare's famous play?
3 However, Taiwan presents as a loud, important voice on the subject of the E5 guideline and bridging
studies. It has even been a regular guest in the Kitasato-Harvard Symposium series since its beginning. In
addition, as I will introduce in the second part of this chapter, Taiwan developed a new field of statistical
methods for multi-sited studies that is now also globally recognized.
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The third limitation concerning Taiwan's voicing is the temporality of the conflict
on the E5 guideline, the only stage that the CDE is able to use. Though it was feasible, it
was not the CDE's proposal that made the ICH decide to keep bridging studies. They
were kept because they considered the ultimate solution to disagreements about global
drug development. Although up to ICH6 this problem had not been solved, it is about to
lose its importance, because, as Naito Chikayuki has pointed out, all the drugs that need
bridging studies to combine existing data with data required for the new regions will soon
lose their patents. Because of Japan's insistence on racial difference, firms developing
drugs after the implementation of the E5 guideline have noted the importance of
recruiting Japanese or at least Asian subjects for clinical trials. Thus, it seems likely that
in a few years bridging studies will be history.
Even so, this does not mean that bridging studies will be of no use to the world. In
the following I will briefly introduce the dynamics of the bridging study policy with
regard to both ICH and non-ICH regions. As described previously, global drug
development will be the solution to problems of racial difference for ICH regions.
Although no agreement has been reached about how global trials should be conducted,
there is a consensus that a certain amount of Asian clinical trial subjects will be required
due to concerns about racial difference. Then the problem will be which Asians have the
potential to be used in these trials. The Japanese, based on the MHLW's insistence,
should have first priority. However, as introduced in Chapter 6, Japan still has problems
conducting trials that meet the requirements of the E6 guideline. It will also cost a lot of
money and time to recruit enough subjects to satisfy a globally acceptable trial. Therefore,
as long as Japan cannot adjust its clinical trials system, an opportunity is available for
other Asian states that can offer both the environment and subjects required.
This is what Shaw T. Chen, a senior reviewer at the FDA who has long been
involved in Taiwan's ICH initiatives, and Keith Chan, a veteran of the pharmaceutical
industry, argued to their nation in the article quoted at the beginning of this chapter. There
is a substantial need for Asian subjects and there are many states that have shown an
interest in the burgeoning business. On the other hand, bridging studies are still useful for
non-ICH states that want to keep some local clinical trials or clinical data on local
subjects. In this sense, Korea is the best example. Unlike Japan, which is still
conservative about conducting Western-style clinical trials, Korea quickly did away with
restrictive regulations on clinical trials. For example, in order to keep more local trials, it
even allows different phases of clinical trials (for example, phase II and phase III) to be
conducted at the same time. As long as this need exists, bridging studies are a necessary
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framework.4
However, among these non-ICH countries, not everyone is capable of or interested
in addressing the topic of racial difference. Not many countries are rich enough to afford
these advanced drugs. Even among those that are able to pay for them, their markets are
often too small for them to be able to bargain for more trials. The global industry's
attitude toward these states is clear: no more clinical trials should be requested or they
will give up these markets. One PhRMA person told me in private that although the ICH
may have the mission of improving world public health, basically they do not want their
guidelines to apply to all countries, because this would slow drug sales. This poses a
tricky problem for Asian regulatory authorities, because they need to decide whether
racial difference should be taken into consideration, and, if so, how it can be dealt with.
Obviously, depending on whether or not the county decides to adopt the ICH guidelines,
we see different responses to the problem of racial difference. In fact, except for Korea
and Taiwan, almost no countries take it into account. Most member states of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), even the richest such as Malaysia and
Thailand, say clearly that they cannot maintain such a high standard, and they worry
about the possible loss of accessibility to the latest drugs.
Meanwhile, two other countries in this region that are able to afford these drugs,
Singapore and Australia, remain uninteresdted in this topic, despite the fact that one's
population is over 80 percent Han Chinese and the other's over 30 percent Asian. The
reason for this decision, on the surface, seems to be simple: as stated by John Lim,
Singapore's Director of Center for Pharmaceutical Administration, "if we are global,
there will be no need for bridge[s]." But underlying this claim is the complicated racial
composition of these countries. Singapore, for example, has three major ethnic
groups-Han Chinese, Malays, Indians-along with various others, all of whom are quite
different one from another. Once the government decides to deal with racial difference,
they will have to do so for all differences. However, current research is limited. Some
ethnic differences in drug effects have been discovered for the Han Chinese and the
Japanese. However, as yet, very few differences in drug effects have been found for either
Malays or Indians.
After a brief evaluation of Taiwan's voicing in the ICH and a general survey of the
issue of bridging studies inside and outside of the ICH regions, it should be clear what is
4 However, this does not mean that Koean insdutry is ready to catch up with such a high standard. To
my understanding, Korea does not have any strong pharmaceutical firms due to its weak foundation for
clinical research and development. After the introduction of these guidelines, most companies were unable
to manage their their production as they suffered from heavy penalties ordered by the government.
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important about the change in Taiwan's clinical environment after its adoption of the E5
guideline and the CDE's efforts to "save" bridging studies. The first part of this chapter
will focus on the dynamics of the introduction of bridging studies. The immediate
trade-off, as we will see, is the possible loss of local trials because of the extrapolation of
foreign clinical data. There exists a possibility that Taiwan could gain more local trials as
part of the global development trials for Asian subjects. However, a painful
transformation might be experienced in the change from local trials to racial trials.
With this understanding, the second part of this chapter will deal the CDE's two
actions in response to international dynamics surrounding bridging studies. The CDE
would like to create more collaborative conversations-in addition to the existing APEC
platform-with the hope of discussing issues other than the E5 guideline. The two actions
are interrelated; the former is an attempt to win Taiwan more global attention by
amplifying the use of bridging studies in non-ICH regions, and the latter can be seen as a
desire to establish an administrative network of regulatory authorities in which Taiwan
could be recognized as an integral entity. These actions cannot be purely political pursuits;
the ICH guidelines have given the CDE a framework by which to speak. Thus any agenda
provided by the CDE has to have scientific meaning and must also be of strategic use in
order to be attractive to other countries. As we will see, biostatistics is the tool that makes
this vision possible.
Making Bridging Studies Workable: Taiwan as Exemplary
Let us look at Taiwan's E5 policy first. Aware of the possible impacts on the
accessibility of advanced drugs, four years of transition were planned. A three-year grace
period was given after the "double twelve" announcement on bridging studies in 2000. As
bridging study evaluation became mandatory for every product that was seeking a market
in Taiwan in 2003, one more year was given during which bridging studies remained
optional but only if the applications were not granted waivers.
However, what makes Taiwan globally known is the CDE's attitude toward
bridging studies. The CDE has claimed to global companies repeatedly that it would
never be an unconditional requirement. An early report shows that 60% of the first
twenty applications were judged ethnically acceptable (Lin et al. 2003). The
updated results on the bridging cases in Taiwan are as follows: among sixty-two
cases that sought for evaluation between January 2001 and August 2003, forty-nine
were granted waivers for further clicnial trials (Yi-jin Chou's slide presentation at
the 2003 Kitasato-Harvard Symposium).
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The key to the above result is the independent consideration of race. For a
state that has no formal recognition, the only way to build its credibility is to have a
universally acceptable standard such as science. The CDE has always claimed its
technical orientation, emphasizing a neutral standpoint on processing the NDAs. Its
high percentage of waivers gives a clear sign to pharmaceutical industry and ICH
guideline makers that no "non-scientific" concerns are involved and there will be no
applications that require extra clinical trials due to such factors. In fact, the CDE
follows closely the rules of the game set by Europe and the United States; the high
rate for waiver is just one example, for it fits the FDA's previous survey on drugs
that may have racial effects. It shows how the E5 guideline can be "scientifically"
realized.
For example, using the ideas put forward during the discussion that failed to be
added to the text of the guideline,5 the CDE designed a flow chart and a checking list for
applicants, helping them to know its policy and the criteria for judging ethnic sensitivity
(Hsiao et al. 2003). Concerning the process, the rational of the "algorithm" is clear and
can be characterized by four steps, and it is also transparent. First, is the question of
whether the drug is eligible for waiving bridging studies with reference to DOH
announcements on waiving clinical trials? If the NDAs falls within the category that
requires submission of information proving no existence of ethnic differences, it should
be evaluated by following steps. Secondly, the quality of data is tested; any submitted
data package that fails to meet the regulatory requirement is advised that amendment is
required.
The third step and the most important concerns ethnic sensitivity. A bridging study
will not be required under the following conditions: 1) sensitive on neither extrinsic or
intrinsic factors; 2) Taiwanese subjects have been enrolled in a multi-center trial; and 3)
no racial differences are found between Asians and foreigners in terms of the
dose-response reactions and the efficacy/safety profile (that is, the foreign data is
extrapolable to Asian region). The fourth and last step is applied when a MDA is judged
ethnically sensitive or considered to have safety concerns. In this case, a local clinical
trial is required. It can be a PK and/or PD study or any clinical study that can demonstrate
the efficacy and safety of the medicine, and its protocol should be created in consultation
with the CDE before it is conducted.
The checking list is a reference for product sponsors so that they can know the
5 They are mentioned as an appendix to the E5 guideline. For the discussion of these thoughts on racial
difference, see the part II of Chapter 4.
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rationale of the regulatory agency on judging whether a product is deemed to need a
bridging study. Again, it is transparent and open to consultation. There are two kinds of
concerns in the list. The first is administrative in order to provide information about
current application status of the product, such as whether this product is applying to other
states, whether clinical studies have done with Asian subjects, and whether post-market
surveillance data is available if it has been marketed. The second concerns are scientific
to order to self-evaluate the characteristics of the product. Twelve items are asked on
whether the product being applied for is possibly ethnically sensitive, such as non-leaner
PK performance, steep PD curve, narrow therapeutic dose range, high potential of
drug-drug reaction, metabolized by enzymes known to be a site showing genetic
polymorphisms, specific bioavailability profile (drug use, dietary habits), disease
epidemiology, and other important factors (medical practice). In order to make the
reviews more efficient, the CDE requires the documents submitted to indicate the
paragraphs or sections containing important information, such as the comparison between
different races. Furthermore, each item asked for should have a descriptive summary or
brief description of enclosed information according to the checking list.
On the other hand, the CDE provide clear explanation for those that fail to waive
bridging studies. In fact, this is another aspect that needs to be considered, namely, the
integrity and fairness of its practice. Between 2000 and 2003, fifteen products were
requested to have bridging studies (two products withdrew during evaluation); everyone
was given good reasons for the judgment.6 Chu Mong-Ling, Director of the CDE,
provided an explicit description of the criteria, which consist of five kinds of problems: 1)
efficacy concerns, such as the abuse of antibiotics; 2) safety concerns, such as extremely
high dosage difference between United States and Asia; 3) a lack of familiarity on the
Asian market, such as new drugs with a narrow therapeutic range; 4) sensitive PK/PD
characteristics; and 5) inadequate data to meet Taiwan's regulatory requirements. For the
CDE, bridging study evaluation is a purely technical problem.
A case often cited for the CDE's E5 policy is omeprazole, which I have introduced
in Chapter 6. Despite there being no adverse effects reported, it is race sensitive. Study
shows that poor metabolizers of omeprazole, who are classified as CYP2C19 genotypes,
have a higher plasma concentration of omeprazole and thus a higher efficacy for
6 According to Yi-jin Chou's presentation at the 2003 Kitasato-Harvard Symposium, the reasons
include the followings: malqualifeid pharmacokinetics (PK) studies, differnce found in PK data, non-leaner
PK-patterns, lack of Asian data, potential drug-drug interactions, insufficient dose-response information,
suspected differences due to medical practice (such as antibiotics abuse), and unclear metabolisms.
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anti-Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori) therapy.7 It has been revealed as racially sensitive
among Asians. The incidence of poor metabolizers is reported between 15% and 25% in
Asian populations compared to the 2% to 5% found in the Caucasian and
African-American populations. Moreover, the Asian population has a higher percentage
of H. pylori infections than does the Caucasian population (but not African Africans,
which it is endemic due to poor water supplies).
Taiwan, particularly Chern Hemg-Der and his colleagues, has taken up the topic of
CPY2C 19 since 1998. According to one of their preliminary studies, the prevalence rate
of CYP2C 19 poor metabolizers in Taiwan is about 15%. Further, the efficacy of dual
therapy with omeprazole and amoxicillin was significantly higher in CYP2C19 poor
metabolizers than in extensive metabolizers (Yang, Chern and Chen, 1998). As the Mey
Wang of the CDE summarized at the 2003 Symposium on Statistical Methodology for
Evaluation of Bridging Evidence, omeprazole is characterized as the most salient
example due to its non-leaner PK behavior above 40mg, low oral bio-availability of 30%
to 40%, high bound rate to plasma protein at 95-96%, extensive metabolism by CYP2C19
(where the AUC in Asians is two to four times than of Caucasians) and rather flat
pharmacodynamic (PD) curve and does-response curve.
Even though the racial effects of omeprazole are clear, the CDE does not follow the
OPSR in making a quick conclusion that omeprazole requires a bridging study. Mey
Wang presents the reasons for its waiver. Using simulative approaches, she points out that
an operational criterion for bridging study evaluation is possible (Wang et al. 2003). In
order to make the simulation resemble reality, Wang introduces variables, including not
only factors such as racial differences but also many others, such as minimal effective
concentration (Cmin), maximum effective concentration without adverse effect (Cmax),
therapeutic index (Cmax/Cmin, TI), and treatment success rate (P). All are considered
important to the therapeutic dynamics.
The simulation is conducted with considerations of efficacy and safety, testing
examining how other variables changes while fixing one variable. The results suggested
as follows: considering efficacy, when TI of an applicant is wide (for example, from 4 to
8), there will be no need for a bridging study if the interethnic and intraethnic variations
are within a reasonable limit (for example, interethnic variation smaller than 2.5% or
intraethnic variation smaller than 0.8%). In addition, efficacy would not be a concern
7 Belonging to the P450 family, CYP2CI9 is a genetic polymorphism that has been widely studied
since the 1990s. In addition to its effects on omeprazole, it is responsible for metabolisms of
S-mephenytoin, methylphenobarbital, phenytoin, diazepam and its active metabolite desmethyldiazepam,
warfarin, phenytoin, lorsortan, tolbutamide and several non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, and many
others.
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when the proportion of poor metabolizer and interethnic variation falls within a
reasonable limit (for example, interethnic variation within 3% and 10% and/or poor
metabolizers are within 1% and 15% in a certain population). As for safety, whether a
bridging study is required depends on the following factors: therapeutic index,
seriousness of an adverse event, the rareness of that event, and total prescriptions.
In summary, guided by a biostatistical approach, it is suggested that applicants
supply more "key parameters" in order to achieve a better bridging evaluation. As for the
case of omeprazole, Wang shows how it could be waived a bridging study on the above
principles. Given the fact that omeprazole has no serious adverse effects (only headache,
abdominal pain, and some minor complains), the CDE made a decision based on the
following considerations. First, because the drugs estimated therapeutic index is as high
as 12, no bridging study is required regarding to safety problems. Second, because the
value of interethnic variation and intraethnic variations falls within a reasonable range
(10% and 0.3%, respectively), efficacy would not be a concern.
Although its decision is still controversial, the CDE's attitude toward bridging
studies is clear. The industry certainly appreciates this approach, for an Asian state, it hits
at the Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and Research (OPSR) for its
"non-scientific" practice. The European and American experts appreciate the CDE, for it
shows how the method they proposed for racial difference is workable. Elaine Esber, one
of the ICH founders, openly praised Taiwan at the 2003 APEC meeting based on the
waivers reported. She pointed out that the CDE has revealed why it is important to
strengthen the regulatory capability and how much this can change and increase
acceptance under the E5 guideline. Chern Herng-Der buttonholed me with this
confidence: "good policy needs a solid scientific base; we are proud of the transparency
of our bridging policy." As a state that as yet gains no general international recognition,
the CDE seems to consider the ICH as a global stage for those who pay respect to science
and other universal virtues.
Trade-Offs for Bridging: Dislocated Government and Fragmented Policy
The CDE wins itself and Taiwan a global visibility, but this was not achieved
without any cost. The pay-offs for the CDE's high waiving rate for bridging studies, as I
have just introduced, are multi-fold. First of all, while following industry's expectation, it
risks the possible loss of local trials that were originally requested by the administration.
Furthermore, if the CDE can waive most bridging studies and welcome other Asian
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clinical data, industry will naturally apply to Taiwan with the clinical data they have from
other Asian counties that have requested local studies.
Among those who do not agree with the CDE, Professor Hu Oliver Yoa-Pu at
National Defense Medical Center is typical. Serving as the chairman of the Advisory
Committee on Pharmaceuticals (ACP), Hu openly expresses his disappointment with the
CDE's high waiver rate. As a government technocrat, Hu insists that more stringent
criteria should be applied for bridging study evaluations. He admitted that there is no
evidence showing the need for bridging studies in the cases being waived; however, he
reminds me: "there is no evidence either to let these applicants waive bridging studies."
As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a cultural division between Japan and the Western
countries in terms of racial difference, but in Hu's opinion, this is a gray area in which the
government should play a more active and strategic role in order to keep more clinical
trials in Taiwan. He suggests, for example, an "unarticulated" percentage, by which
Taiwan decides that applicants required bridging studies, should be set by the advisory
committee, while leaving the CDE more scientific-oriented. "In this sense, the advisory
committee should not be an administrative 'appendix' to the business of drug regualtion;
instead, it should be the ultimate safe valve for Taiwan's drug regulation," Hu adds. A
relatively high inconsistence rate between the CDE and the advisory committee on
pharmaceutical affairs seems to support this comment.8
Hu's opinion reveals the "non-scientific" function of that regulatory authority as
means of protecting the domestic industry. As discussed in Chapter 6, the OPSR is often
perceived by industry as the source of a "non-tariff barrier'" for foreign products. From
this point of view, the CDE seems to have "abandoned" the hope of strengthening its
domestic industry,9 and they have already felt this pressure. They argued that the
government's welcome attitude toward the ICH would shift the whole impact directly on
to the burgeoning pharmaceutical companies, which are too small and need time and
tariff protection to grow. Chang Hsiu-Gang, president of Purzer pharmaceutical, Inc.,
compares the difference between Taiwan and Japan in terms of their policy on drug
development and regulation (ICH-Taiwan Bulletin 3). Chang pointed out that the
8 This thesis notices, yet will not deal with, the conflicts between the advisory committee and the CDE.
This committee is a quasi-administrative-quasi-academic institute on drug regulations that is commonly
seen in Asia. Thus, after a professional technical agency like the CDE is introduced, every government
faces the problem of how to treat two organizations of the same function. In the case of Japan and Taiwan,
they tend to leave the both in parallel. Applications have to be approved first by the CDE and later the
advisory committee, and sometimes their opinions are not consistent. A recent estimation of this percentage
of disagreement in Japan was about 5%, while in Taiwan it is much higher at 20% to 30%.
9 Here it is noted that the industry refers to proprietary drugs, which are, in fact, the minority of this
sector.
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Japanese government has successfully delayed the rapid import of Western
pharmaceuticals by slowing down the adjustment of its regulations as taken from the ICH
negotiations. It is what he calls the "Japan model": the MHLW grows together with the
industry. It provides the time necessary for companies to modify their production system
from copying to research and development intensive. Meanwhile, the MHLW has learned
how to achieve scientific, high quality regulations of drugs.
However, the CDE did not follow this model. It chose to let industry confront the
world of harsh global competition. "From the viewpoint of industrial development,"
writes Chang: "it is like forcing local athletes to reach immediately the standard of the
Olympic Games." According to Chang, this policy has had limited impacts on Taiwan's
drug industry up to now, since it just beginning to develop products other than generic
drugs. However, it effect will be seen in a long run. Taiwan is at risking of having no
local pharmaceutical company in the future. Even so, Chang does not blame the
government too much. Using C.K. Yang and Chi Cheng, two legendary Taiwanese
athletes that won medals in the Olympic Games, as goals, he expects a few, but not many,
companies will survive this tough challenge. "We have no time to argue for the chances
we have lost," he concludes, "chances will be given to those who work hard."
Chang's comment reveals a subtle inconsistency, if not contradiction, about
Taiwan's promotion of its biotechnology industry. Like Japan's Millenuim project,
Taiwan's "two-billion; two star" plan, a national plan for globalization, featured newly
emerging fields, information technology and biotechnology/pharmaceutical, as two
promising sectors to establish. Under the Executive Yuan's Biotechnology Industry
Promotion Program, some initiatives have been taken. 0° Certainly, the CDE is
incorporated into this program. By only looking at this side, many may be happy with the
government's effort to establish a state-sponsored industry based on high technology.
However, the establishment of institutes and programs will mean little if no integrated
effort is taken. Also, it is not an all or nothing situation; bridging studies are a salient
example to show how manipulation of policy is necessary. It is absolutely correct for a
government to create better regulations on drugs in order to protect the nation's health,
but fine adjustments are required in deciding when and how much they should be
introduced given there is a goal of also protecting domestic industry. Unfortunately, it
'0 These interministral projects include the Biomedical Research Center established by the Industrial
Technology Research Institute, the National Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and
Pharmaceuticals by the National Science Council, and the Executive Yuan's One-Stop-Service Office for
Biotechnology Industry.
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seems to have missed the right timing and the pressure is on.
This inconsistency is more obvious in Taiwan's policy on the CRO industry."l As I
have written previously, the deregulation of administrative clinical trials in Asian
countries will force them into tough competitions where the number of clinical trials done
in one country is not decided either by its population, its market size, or how "odd" its
racial composition is. As a newly established business, the number of local clinical trials
is based on the state's ability to recruit enough human subjects in a short period of time,
the ability to execute qualified experiments, the ability to review protocols for clinical
trials and the ability to provide advisement during trials. Apparently, the CDE has showed
this ability and its E5 policy is a declaration of the liberation of clinical trials. Although
the high waiver rate provides Taiwan with a way to import more drugs in a timely fashion,
a potential risk could rise from this too early welcoming of the pharmaceutical industry. If
Taiwan minimizes the number of local clinical trials, it may lose the potential to build up
its own CRO industry.
Considering the advancement of medicine in Taiwan, CRO seems to be a promising
industry to try. However, was it too early for the CDE to open this gate to competition?
With respect to this criticism, Chern Herng-Der thinks that the CDE should not be the one
blamed. Concerning a policy that waives bridging studies for these drugs and how this
will make influence Taiwan's clinical trial environment, Chem (2002) defends: "the
CDE ... found that in 2000 the DoH received about 85 applications, but up to November
2001 it has received 122. Thus, the number is increasing." Furthermore, Chern pointed
out the improvement in the quality of clinical trials because these, include more pre-phase
IIla trials and multi-national trials. He concludes, "While insisting on a policy that
promotes necessary bridging studies and waives unnecessary trials, this has not resulted
in decrease in the quality and quantity of local clinical trials."
Does a bridging study create a "win-win" situation for Taiwan and global industry?
Because the CDE extended the grace period to the end of 2003, it is hard to reach a
11 As an element in the value production chain of pharmaceuticals, the history of CRO in Taiwan is
fairly short. It was not until 1997 that Taiwan had formed a market able to attract the long term investment
of some international companies, though the famous Panlabs Taiwan Ltd., which was an addition to
Panlabs Seattle, was founded in 1970. Later some local companies join this battlefield, yet almost no one
could balance their deficit after few years of operation. For example, the first CRO in Taiwan has been
claimed to be, More Biomedical, which was founded in 1994. Yet it could not attract enough local cases
and was acquired by Quintile 1998. According to a report made in 2001 (Chiu 201: 136), only 10 to 20
percent of local CROs have entered the global market fully. Most of the studies are post-marketing trials
and for registration use, presenting a weak and depressed infrastructure for this sector. I thank Professor
Ralph Kirby at National Yang-Ming University for the history of Panlabs Taiwan and the CRO industry.
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conclusion on this trend at this moment. Even so, we can see some clues in terms of the
number of clinical trials and their content. In terms of the amount of INDs and NDAs,
according to Kuo Benjamin Ing-Tiau, the executive secretary of the Joint Institutional
Review Board (JIRB), the number of trial has decreasing to about two third in 2004, the
true "first year of bridging studies" (table 7.1). Chern Herng-Der confirmed this to me: at
the time point of September, only seventy or so applications have sent for reviews
compared to one hundred in the past. Worse, the fact that the local companies have
almost disappeared is most worrying.
Table 7.1 Clinical Trial Reviews in Taiwan, 1998-2004
Year/cases 1998* 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004**
IND 12 42 90 131 102 134 49
NDA 9 18 24 34 60 67 38
*start at the quarter 4. ** up to the second quarter.
Source: the CDE website at http://www.cde.org.tw.
However, Kuo reminds us about which type of clinical trials have contributed to
this decrease. In the past over the half clinical trials conducted were trials on
bioavailability and bioequivalence, which did not have much academic value. What is
crucial for bridging study policy should be the number of phase III studies, which is
considered to be more meaningful. 12 Judging by this standard, the numbers do not
decrease as critically. Although Chern and Kuo have different understandings of this
number; Chem thinks it is slightly decreases but Kuo thinks such trials are gradually
increasing; but both agree that Taiwan has chosen to transit from a "meaningless"
registration or listing trials to "meaningful" global trials. Kuo showed to me the number
of cases that have applied to the JIRB, Taiwan. "Since the application fee is expensive,
thus only global trials can afford this," Kuo explained; we see that the number of phase
III trial applications has increased, as a trend, from 2000 to 2003.
According to Kuo, it is what Taiwan needs. "You cannot ask for the same number of
meaningful trials in Taiwan as a site. It needs time and requires more improvements in the
12 There are many factors by which to judge whether a study is meaningful, such as the number of
hospitals involved and the quality of the trial sites, how many patient are enrolled, the methodology used,
and whether it has international participations. Thus is hard to give an exact number of how many trials are
considered "meaningful." Yet, according to Chern, about half the trials can be said meaningful to the CDE.
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environment. More importantly, before all tasks are taken, our government has to be clear
about whether it would like to consider clinical trials a 'business'," Kuo pointed out.
Indeed, the CDE's E5 policy does contribute to competition with other Asian countries
and to the transformation of clinical trials from tests for administrative uses to those that
have an academic contribution and a business value. Unlike the pharmaceutical industry,
which has to make its own products, what CROs sell are various services from basic
research to clinical applications. Since this is so, even Taiwan cannot have its own brand
that can still build up by itself into a strong business, like the semi-conducting industry of
twenty years ago.
Thus, what is at stake may not be the timing of this decision but whether the
Taiwanese government was prepared for this transformation. Unfortunately, it has not
been ready. Kuo recalled a public debate about whether Taiwan should include the CROs
into its promotion program. In 2004 the advisory board of Taiwan's "two-billion; two
star" plan decided to add the CROs into the main industry to promote them.l3 Concering
the strategies for the biotechnology industry, adviors noted that the island was falling
behind regional competitors such as Korea and Singapore. They recommended that an
independent body was needed to steer the future direction of life sciences in Taiwan,
namely, a "Biotech Industry Strategy Consulting Committee," in order to consolidate and
integrate often overlapping government biotech promotion organizations and research
institutes. Furthermore, this committee should be set up and headed by a strong and
influential industry leader.'4
However, some government officials disagreed. Wang Hui-Po, then the Director
General of Pharmaceutical Affairs, openly criticized this policy in a newspaper
(Zhongguo Sibao [China Times], May 24 2004). Entitled "All People become Guinea
Pigs?" Wang claimed that Taiwan is too small to be self-contained, thus importing drugs
is evitable. It is the government's responsibility to introduce a global standard to guard
the safety of the drugs imported. However, "to have good regulations on clinical trials" is
not "to promote the industry of clinical trials." A small state like Taiwan needs not risk its
people by testing the most advanced products on them. Furthermore, any industry based
on human's bodies is unethical and inhumane. "It will be an international joke if we are
proud of this kind of industry," she warned. Although Wang has gained support from
13 For the conclusions and suggestions from this meeting, see http://www.stag.gov.tw/content/
application/stag/freeformat/guest-cnt-browse.php?ico=4&cnt_id=327.
14 In fact, it has been listed as an issue for discussion at the SRB since 1999. Yet not enough actions has
been taken to form a robust economic body like other regional competitors.
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some medical authorities, 5 most people expressed their disagreements.
At the case of clinical trial, the Taiwanese government's attitude is disoriented. Not
only it has the double-checking system of the CDE and the ACP, there are three checking
points for each clinical trial application. After consulting the JIRB, it has to be re-checked
by the CDE, and, before it is conducted, each hospital that conducts trials reserves the
right to review clinical trial applications. All these repetitive works badly weaken
Taiwan's competitiveness. This self-conflicted situation has not improved as I write this
thesis. Kuo replied when asked whether the E5 guideline or bridging study policy is an
issue in the development of Taiwan's clinical trials: "I do not think bridging studies
themselves are a crucial factor. In fact, it helped us to earn some meaningful studies,
which I appreciate. Let me put it this way: if our bureaucratic environment shows no
improvement, we are about to meet the limitation of the trials we can take."
Kuo's warning exactly touched the fundamental problem of Taiwan's governance,
which explains both the CDE's success and its "failure" to build Taiwan as a place to hold
clinical trials. Policy analysts tend to separate one policy from another, estimating the
results and the influences by each of them. However, this functionalist viewpoint assumes
two things that do not fit into Taiwan's situation. First, despite its existence as a
well-functioned polity, Taiwan is not a formally recognized by the world as as state. It
cannot join any formal organizations of states as well as hold official dialogue with most
countries of the world. Since this is so, at most global occasions, the individuals who can
be accepted are considered to speak on behalf of this state. Thus, unlike Japan's
bureaucracy where every bureau is independent yet contained by other bureaus, Taiwan's
political situation grants technocrats flexibilities in dealing with international affairs.
Sometimes personal creativity can even circumvent any systemic agreement. Due to the
lack of the integrity of the national identity, the Taiwanese government does not have an
institutional mechanism to check every policy it has made a decision on. In order to make
Taiwan visible, sometimes it has to leave the person in charge to make the decisions. If
readers still remember what I mentioned in Chapter 5, it was these individuals who
"institutionalize" their arguments and gave Taiwan a robust voice.
The second problem concerning Taiwan's situation is the fragmented nature of its
policymaking. This is why the CDE alone has failed to give birth to a good environment
for clinical trials. Of course, this is not unusual for some huge bureaucracies, such as that
of the United States; however, for a small state like Taiwan it is a serious problem. Since
'5 See, for example, the article by Andrew T. Huang, president of KFSYS Cancer Center in Zhongguo
Sibao, May 26 2004. Like Japan, Taiwan has its problems with the ICH GCP standards. However, I would
like to leave these discussions to future studies.
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individuals can have their own opinions on global affairs from their perspectives, these
may be contradicting with each other and problems arise when these people try to realize
them through the bureaucratic system. Each policy may be creative and excellent, but as a
whole they just cannot work together as an integrated agenda. Shaw T. Chen and Keith
Chan, senior consultants of the CDE, expressed their frustrations in a recent article about
this problem and point out the necessity of a light, responsive government (Chen and
Chan 2005). The point is not whether clinical trials, or in a broader sense, drugs should be
considered a business; instead, what at stake is whether Taiwan can form an integrated
policy that is comprehensive and robust enough to put together all parts toward an
achievable goal. They point out that while new institutes, such as the CDE, are pushing
Taiwan to move forward, other institutes pull it back. They cry: "Please give up the
burden of old system as soon as we can and form a small yet flexible one that fit Taiwan
as a vibrant island."
Yet, these are far beyond the control of any single institute, such as the CDE. Chern
Herng-Der, who forwarded the above article to me, did not tell me his intention. He only
said: "We cannot wait for others anyway." As one of the aspects to present Taiwan to the
global, the CDE seemed to insist on what it thinks is best for the state, and to achieve this
goal it would like to keep moving forward alone.
Unstable Voicing: Two Challenges from Outside
Even if the CDE can get rid of the factions within the domestic realm and focus
only on its international relations on behalf of Taiwan, it has problems in terms of its
voicing ability. In the first section of this part I have introduced three limitations on
Taiwan's voice in the world of the ICH, here I shall point two direct challenges that will
destroy the CDE's previous achievements.
One challenge, as I have discussed in Chapter 6, comes from Japan's ambitious
promotion of global drug development. Unlike Taiwan, the MHLW has a full presence at
the ICH. It can lead the discussions, draft new guidelines and form a working scheme that
favors its cultural agenda. When Japan insists on its "mandatory bridging for all" policy,
asking future products for perspective, the global data package in which the Japanese
presence is necessary, the CDE is losing. As described previously, drugs have about five
years on average of marketing time before their patents expire. Thus, when almost all the
drugs in question have lost their patents, there will be of no point in applying for bridging
evaluation. Although the MHLW has participated in every meeting of the APEC network
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since its beginning and collects information about Taiwan's E5 policy, there has, in fact,
been limited communications between Japan and other non-ICH country states. The main
field for negotiation, for the MHLW, is always the global ICH and not regional meetings.
In addition, its market is large enough to allow bargaining on these issues alone. As one
Japanese professor involved in the MHLW's E5 policy told me, the MHLW has no
interest to interfere in other countries' E5 policy.
Meanwhile, global industry is tired of this discussion. Since the CDE has shown
that bridging studies are a scientific, workable agenda, and Japan already known this,
they do not need it anymore. Some of them might assume that the APEC meeting is a
place where Taiwan's experience can embarrass Japan to change, but apparently this
strategy does not work. Along with the rise of global drug development, they wonder
whether the APEC meeting is a worthwhile conference to attend. I witnessed a blunt
question at the ICH GCG meeting in 2003. After the CDE's announcement of the coming
APEC meeting, one EFPIA member asked: "Putting aside of the E5 guideline and
bridging studies, can you just tell us what is new in this meeting?" Of course, the
deadlock about the revision of the E5 guideline gives the CDE some time, but the signs
are clear that it must create new agendas otherwise the APEC meeting that will attract
people.
The other challenge to bridging studies comes from the non-ICH region, of which
Singapore is exemplary. Singapore was relatively behind in following the development of
the ICH, whose guidelines were not introduced, along with the foundation of an
administrative authority on drug regualtion, until the new mellenium arrived.' 6 It did not
only miss the debate over the E5 issue, which Japan was hugely involved in the early
1990s, it also missed the chance to form a professional and independent institute, like
Taiwan did in the late 1990s.
Even so, this does not mean that Singapore has no way to catch up with other
countries. In fact, Singapore has not followed the way Japan and Taiwan. Its strategy is to
ignore racial difference so that it can "skip" the dispute over bridging studies. It considers
clinical trials nothing but strictly business. It welcomed the E5 guideline and does not
reject global drug development. As a country consisting of various ethnic groups,
Singapore claims to provide the best site for clinical trials to study Asian people, but does
16 Singapore did not introduce drug registration until the Medical Act of 1987. According to this law,
new drugs could only be registered if they had been already been approved in major developed countries,
and this administrative system remained the same until 1998 when a center for drug evaluation was
established. This center later became one of eight professional centers of the Health Science Authority
(HSA), but still remained small.
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not apply the results to its nationals.
I have argued elsewhere that Singapore presents itself as a business "node" in the
global network of proprietary drugs and it seems to want to be a global state with no local
characteristics. The network exists and therefore the state lives (Kuo 2004). The above
vision refers to a contrasting image about that state compared to Taiwan in terms of its
spatial imagination of the world. As discussed in previous section, Taiwan maintains a
relatively huge and inconsistent bureaucracy on drug regulation. Considering Taiwan as a
land hosting many people rather than a global business point, the CDE's main mission is
to improve its medical standards and public health but not to make CRO an attractive
business. It might be hard for Taiwan to accept Singapore's view on the state. However,
Singapore's stance is a threat that other Asian countries cannot ignore, especially
countries that genuinely insist on the racial difference of their nationals.
Let me briefly introduce Singapore's strategy on drug regulation, whose mission is
"to develop the Republic into a regional medical and life science hub" (Wong and Lim
2003: 17S). In one way, it follows closely the leading countries and organizations. As part
of the second-tier drug approval system, Singapore is hoping to be able to accept the
results made by these authorities in order to shorten the time to drug accessibility from
the primary reviewers. To achieve this goal, Singapore sets a high standard for its dossier
format and review requirements comparable to that of the ICH. More importantly, it
designs an "express" route of review process, which claimed in its presentation, for the
submissions of drugs that have been approved by the HSA's benchmark regulatory
agencies. 17 The aim is clear: since it is hard for Singapore to be a primary reviewer in the
world, it hopes to the first country in East Asia that has access to the latest drugs
marketed in the most advanced countries.
On the other hand, Singapore has enhanced its connections with other Asian
counties through regional organizations, especially ASEAN. Even ahead of the ICH
regions, the recent involvement of the ASEAN common technical document (ACTD)
enables it to have an administrative platform on which drugs can be freely registered
within its member states. When the ASEAN Implementation Working Group on ACTD
was formed in 2002, Singapore was appointed the chair, leading the realization of the
ACTD implementation. This group has achieved a firm timeframe for full
implementation, twining system programs allowing information exchange for specific
areas. One cannot say that Singapore is the only player to make this happen. However,
17 These agencies are the FDA, Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, Therapeutic
Goods Administration, Australia, European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, and Canadian
Health Canada.
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the only thing we can be sure of is that Singapore will definitely benefit from this
homogenous market of pharmaceuticals if we think together of the strategic position for
the state's global industries. It deregulates all requirements, including those on racial
difference, so that it can have the most advanced products available as soon as the West.
In addition, it engages in regional networks, such as the APEC and ASEAN, to make
"pathways" through which these products can be sold in other Asian states.
There are cultural reasons why Singapore's proposal is a threat to Taiwan. For
global industry, Singapore is one of the two entry points (other than Hong Kong) into
East Asia. This is not only because it used to be a part of the United Kingdom, but
because the English environment helps Singapore to maintain its ties with the former
motherland and her ex-colonies. In fact, the English language is itself a tool that makes
the Westerners comfortable. When asked about the company's recent strategy in Asia
where it absorbed an independent firm in Singapore, a CRO person told me: "Westerners
still feel more comfortable talking in English. Think of this, if a yellow face can speak
fluent English with an Oxford accent, this gives our customers more confidence." If
Singapore decides to give up all racial concerns and focuses only on clinical trials
management and R&D, such as its famous "biopolis," it will be attractive to all CRO
companies and a tough competitor for Taiwan.
We have seen some signs of this trend. In 1998 Taiwan signed up to an agreement
with the world's second largest CRO company Covance, asking it to help Taiwan to build
up a CRO industry. Some training courses were arranged after this project was included
in the five-year plan for the development of biotechnology in 1999. Yet, this cooperation
seems to have ceased, and Covance has moved its Asian base to Singapore. In addition to
Covance, Taiwan also signed with Quintile as strategic partners in 1999, yet no further
steps have been seen since then. It wants to catch all, but fails to do anything. Meanwhile,
Singapore, a semi-democratic state, shows a surprisingly high efficiency in maximizing
its ability for competition. Its stance of ignoring bridging studies also demonstrates a
feasible way to dealt with racial difference.
What will the CDE do? It cannot be like Singapore and dismiss all requirements on
racial difference, since they are required and it cannot go back. The bridging study
agenda, though workable, will be soon replaced by Japan's global drug development. If
the CDE cannot solve these problems, its voicing ability will soon be gone.
PART II VISIONING THE STATE; VISIONING BIO-GLOBLIZAITON
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At the Frontier of Bio-Globalizing World: "Regionalizing" Bridging Studies
The previous part of this chapter asked a question at its end of the CDE: while
Japan and Singapore propose their worldview concerning racial difference and drug
regulation, what will Taiwan do after bridging studies? Before analyzing the CDE's
project to respond these challenges, let me first summarize two characteristics of the
bridging study agenda.
The first characteristic is about its underlying concern on racial difference.
Originated from Japan's sensitivity to their bodies, bridging studies should be applied to
countries that sincerely consider themselves to have a relatively homogenous racial
composition and having strong awareness of their difference from other regions. Even so,
except for Korea and Taiwan, not many Asain counties qualify the above provision for
political concerns. To use Singapore as example, although the Chinese are in an absolute
majority in this country, some policies are imposed to achieve harmony with the other
three major ethnic groups. Surrounded by counties dominated by different races,
Singapore has to eliminate all possible friction in the name of racial discrimination. Of
course, for this reason, bridging studies are not on its agenda.
The second characteristic of bridging studies, which also originated from Japan, has
to do with its administrative function. In the case of Japan, it is practiced like an
administrative requirement when applying foreign data into a new region where this
product is seeking to market, thus indicates a dichotomous view that divides the world
into "the local" and "the foreign." Apparently, no one likes this view, including Japan, for
different reasons. As discussed in Chapter 6, while the industry hopes to penetrate this
administrative barrier by global trials, Japan attempts to achieve a true world harmony by
providing simultaneous global drug development that keeps every race, especially the
Japanese, distinct. No matter for what reasons, they all agree that bridge studies are
bilateral thus should be transitional in order to achieve globalization.
With an understanding of the above characteristics, the CDE's strategy for the
global challenges is clear. When questioned about topics other than bridging studies in
the 2003 APEC meeting, Chern Herng-Der replied confidently that regional
harmonization on regulatory science would be the theme for the coming meeting and for
the future ones. Based on Taiwan's success on bridging study evaluations, the CDE tries
to extend its use from single countries to a region. The reputation that the CDE has
earned on bridging studies has given it a token by which to make such a claim; thus to
promote this "Taiwan experience" to other state is its immediate mission. In other words,
it wants to "regionalize" bridging studies.
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The paper "Reinventing drug regulation in the Asia Pacific Region: Taiwan's
experience and a vision for the region" explains in more detail about how a regional
platform on drug regulation can be founded by individual agencies (Jao et al. 2003). For
understanding exactly Taiwan's strategy, we should pay equal attention to the paper's
content as well as to the way it is narrated. The first half of this paper reviews the
initiatives taken by Taiwan to establish a high-quality environment for drug regulation,
and the second half brings up a proposal to promote harmonization and cooperation in the
Asia Pacific Region. Although these reforms have been discussed in Chapter 5, it is
worthwhile to note how they are narrated in this paper. Quite far from describing a series
of contingent actions taken through personal connections, this paper uses a formal yet
positive tone, giving readers a sense that all is well thought out and planned, the concept
being achievable by a strong and effective government.
This impression can be easily seen in its description of the CDE. In the section of
the introduction on the CDE, it describes that it was modeled after the FDA, the best of
the best in the world and thus is capable of providing full-time expertise in both
preclinical and clinical reviews with a transparent, reliable and authoritative approach. As
a regulator, it has to hold to a global class standard to facilitate participation of global
clinical trials. In addition, it is both an educator of the public and the leader that guides
pharmaceutical research by examining the need for special regulatory requirements. It is
proud of the highly qualified staffs it has recruited, which includes "fourteen physicians,
eighteen professionals with Ph.D.s, and twenty-one professionals with bachelor's degrees
and other backgrounds" (Jao et. al. 2003:43S). It is an outstanding team that cannot be
seen in Asian countries outside of Japan.
This paper then uses another important characteristic of Taiwan's CDE to persuade
its readers, the in-house reviewing system, which not so many countries can afford. It
copies the FI)A's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), where a substantial
group of professionals are maintained to provide a responsive, high-quality service.
Though it is expensive to maintain such a group of professionals, it is insisted, according
to its deputy director Chern Herng-Der, that this is necessary in order to improve the
ability of the regulatory agency. "No one is born a professional in this business; so we
have to train these personals ourselves," Dr. Chern said: "through proper trainings these
reviewers can build up their expertise in two years."
The full range of the service that the CDE provides reflects its ambitions. Except for
the "routine" works of the new drug application (NDA) reviews and consultations, it
offers protocol reviews of the clinical trials similar to the FDA. Other major tasks include
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cooperation on the clinical trial adverse drug reaction evaluation (the phase IV study)
with National Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Center, that of the national genomic
project (gene therapy) with the National Health Research Institute (NHRI), and that of
traditional Chinese medicine project (the guideline on the evaluation system of Chinese
herbal medicine) with the Department of Health's Committee on Chinese Medicine and
Pharmacy. The CDE seems to be the research and development department of Taiwan's
pharmaceutical industry; it has done through the reforms of the regulatory science.
Except for reviewing the CDE's achievements, the above introduction part of this
narrative has its strategic use. By reorganizing these historical events and facts, it tries
give an impression that a strong regulatory agency is the key to boosting a country's
medical research and drug industry. Following this argument, this paper describes the
CDE's relationships with first-tier reviewers. In order to catch up with the first-tier
reviewers, this paper write, some efforts have to be taken to exchange updated
information and reviewing experience. Like Sigapore, it is claimed that the CDE has
established partnerships with the FDA, EMEA, MHRA, OPSR, TGA, and Medical
Products Agency in Sweden.
Again, the above description is not quite new as discussed in Chapter 5. However,
what should be noticed is the way that it is narrated. Unlike Singapore's reliance on its
administrative or informative ties with these benchmark agencies, the CDE provides
another global vision about international liaison based on scientific knowledge. In fact,
this view was emphasized more in my interviews with the CDE officials, such as its
director Chu Mong-Ling and deputy director Chern Herng-Der. They believe that only by
forming a strong and responsible agency can a true partnership can be established with
these institutes, and they tried their best to make the CDE such an agency. Chern once
told me: "you have to be strong first so that you can win true respects from Western
countries. You have to have some information made on your own so that you can
exchange it for more information. It is our perspective to the world of regulation."
So far we have gone through the "Taiwanese experience" part of this paper. Its
overly positive tone may not be normal to some readers but is familiar to those who
understand Taiwan public heath in the 1960s. As I have argued elsewhere (Kuo 2005), it
is a nostalgic narrative on the "golden age" where many similarities can be found in the
tone of these achievements in public health, such as the international cooperation and
exemplary success. However, here this tone has a function other than "self-bragging." As
a part of the narrative technology, a positive tone is necessary, because it gives an
example of how a country that has a weak environment for pharmaceutical industry and
biotechnology can achieve success, and this success will become a foundation for a
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making a regional strategic alliance.
In the second half of the paper, readers are told the CDE's proposal to extend its
influence, forming an alliance of regulatory authorities based on a development model.
On the surface this model resembles the one Eruopean Union attempted back to the late
1980s; yet, the underlying reason it holds is different. The need to cooperate, as indicated,
is to increase bargaining power while negotiating with industry: It is reasoned: "the Asia
Pacific Region represents an immense and highly populated area, but it is also a region
with small individual markets, weak regulatory authorities, primitive local drug industries,
and poor infrastructures for clinical studies. Thus, except for Japan, the region has been
excluded from the ICH and has no independent voice in the global drug evaluation
process; the region's local needs are often ignored during new drug development" (Jao et
al. 2003: 47S). In order to clarify serious misunderstandings by other "more advanced
authorities"'8 and to express their needs, the regional economies must form a unified
market for new drugs, and a strong, harmonized regulatory system would facilitate its
formation. It is expected that it will "account for population differences in drug response,
promote local drug industries and meet regional needs for new drugs" (47S).
From the above description, we can easily identify that the ASEAN states and Asian
member states of the APEC are the paper's expecting audience. Contrasting Singapore's
imagination of an "unpeopled" state, the CDE continuously reminds these countries about
the realities of their populations and health of their citizens. Meanwhile, by bring back
the old notion of populations, it rejects Japan's too-quick move to genomics. According to
the CDE's vision, a certain number of clinical trials are necessary to provide information
for the use in public health and there is also a chance to be equal with these ICH countries
by improving the standard of local industries. It writes: "if the Asia Pacific region is
inspired to be an equal partner with the current ICH members, scaling up is the only way
to achieve regional harmonization. The benefits will outweigh the risks" (Jao et. al. 2003:
48S).
The CDE then shows how the cooperation among regulatory authorities can be
achieved. In short, it should be achieved by a sort of the division of labor. Limited by
budget and resources, the paper points out that it is hard for each agency to maintain a
high review quality while offering consultations covering all specialties. Therefore, the
18 It is said that these counties are not able to conduct reliable reviews and consultations. For example,
in a questionnaire re to the global industry about their interactions with regulatory authorities in East Asia,
it was reported that companies gave poor overall reports on Korea and Taiwan, though the quality and
clarity of the advice from Taiwan should be noted. See Anderson et. al. 2003:11 I S.
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aim of the cooperation would be to pool the resources and collaborate. The harmonization
of the "non-ICH" Asian states can be achieved by following steps. The first step is
certainly to recognize racial difference and negotiate issues related to bridging study
policy, in which Taiwan's experience can be help. Based on their experience with
bridging studies, various collaborations can be conducted, such as the exchange of
reviews (for examples, Taiwan for the reviews of drugs on gastrointestinal diseases,
Singapore for those on hematological diseases), collaboration on inspections (for example,
the Good Clinical Practice inspection), joint review of NDAs, and consistent
postmarketing monitoring. Only after these are done, it should be possible to mutually
recognition drug approval, the final step of harmonization. The ultimate goal, it claims, is
an agency similar to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products in
the European Union. 19
Perhaps we should stop here and clarify some issues about our concerns on racial
difference and bridging studies. In fact, we see some interesting points in this vision. First,
as we have read in Chapter 5, Europe was the first region that noticed the problem of
racial differences in drug regulation and tried to provide a solution by administrative
recognition across the member states. Basically the CDE's idea for this regional approach
shares the same concept that the harmonization must be an administrative one so that
every agency can share the work load and enjoy a certain independent existence.
However, what is different from Europe's proposal is the introduction of bridging studies.
Every agency that wants to join this "bridging study" alliance has to commit the clinical
significance of racial difference but do not overact it.
Second, I have written at the beginning of this section on the two characteristics of
bridging study developed in the context of the ICH. However, the CDE carefully avoids
them in its proposal. For example, although it recognizes racial difference, it underlines
local factors (for example, extrinsic factors) when encouraging mutual recognition of
reviews among these countries. Furthermore, although working like a pure administrative
recognition, this alliance emphasizes a division of labor based on the local conditions and
specialties of each agency, which can be said to be racial concerns. In short, the CDE tries
to build a network through bridging studies, but within this alliance there will be no need
for bridging.
The ideal vision thus goes as follows: the Asian countries that have the potential to
'9 In fact, the CDE proposed a change of name from the APEC Joint Research Project on Bridging
Studies to the APEC Network on Pharmaceutical Regulatory Science in 2004.
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offer high quality reviews on drug regulations will work together while maintaining the
integrity of each individual agency as specialists in certain fields. Based on mutual
recognitions, the harmonized regulations will lead the Asia Pacific region to an EU-like
market large enough to bargain with global industries, allowing them to minimize the
clinical trials done especially for this area. Also, the performance of these regulators
empowers them to be qualified reviewers, granting the possibility of dialogue with the
most advanced countries, Japan, United States and the EU. Where should Taiwan be?
Obviously, it is supposed to be one of the leaders of this regional network, a position
somewhat like it currently occupies in the APEC network.
Here we see the full display of this interesting vision. If Japan, as discussed in
Chapter 6, tries to provide a new scientific standard to preserve its imagination of the
nation-state, the science provided by the CDE equips Taiwan with a political vision of
globalization; it is all about the politics offasheng. The proposal by the CDE is one of
multiple goals. At a practical level, it can be understood as an attempt to improve the
bargaining power of the non-ICH states when asking for more clinical trials from global
pharmaceutical industry. However, this multi-nation collaboration, again, confirms
Taiwan's existence as a defacto state. We should read carefully that in this proposal the
CDE not only asks for cooperation on the racially sensitive drugs issue related to the E5
guideline; instead, it is pursuing an "EU-like" organization where every member is
equally treated as an independent entity. Finally, after entering into the stage of the ICH,
the CDE does not want to be treated just as an "exemplar" of the E5 guideline; it wants to
be an "equal partner" of the first-tier countries. For this purpose, it has to amplify its
voice by gathering more countries that are in the same situation. It seems not to care
much about whether other countries are able to spend such money; its robust economy
pushes it to insist on the equality with the most advanced reviewers.
Bridging studies are a chance, probably the only chance that the CDE cannot miss.
It is fully aware that Taiwan is standing at the frontier where the global ICH starts
"formatting" the world. Within the tensions inside the ICH and between the ICH
members and non-ICH regions, it has to grab this flexible position and do something
before all is settled. The regional network based on bridging studies is what it can offer.
In fact, the scene is much like a repeat of history, where Taiwan was both the frontier of
the falling Qing Empire and that of the rising Japanese Empire. Reading the CDE's
proposal, we seem to find a twenty-first century version of the announcement of the
Taiwan Cultural Association in the 1920s, which claimed that Taiwan was a "central
station of the world." Unlike Japan's attempts to preserve the distinctiveness of its race,
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Taiwan focuses on its statehood, trying to preserve its integrity by projecting itself into a
network. That is the ultimate goal of the CDE while it embraces globalization.
The Necessity of Biostatistics
The CDE's proposal to make an Asian regulatory platform is interesting, yet one
thing needs to be clarified about the reality of clinical trials if we take the Asia-Pacific
region as a whole. As pointed out by Suchart Chongprasert of the Thai FDA at the 2002
APEC meeting, "Participating more in all phases of global clinical drug development
should minimize the need for bridging studies, but Asia must be more united." In other
words, although the regulatory routines can be done through mutual recognition among
individual agencies, clinical trials have to be done in a collaborative manner.
This is why biostatistics became the solution to the above problems. It meets the
CDE's need for three reasons as they concern the functionality, availability and strategic
meaning of Taiwan. In the rest of this section I will introduce them one by one. The first
reason, as we have read previously, is simple that in Asia-Pacific region there exists a
wide range of states that differ in terms of their development status and health needs.
Thus, except for applying a unified, globally accepted standard to collect the data
required, the product sponsors have to provide a cross-sectional framework to incorporate
the data from the various sources. Obviously, biostatistics is designed for serving this
need.
The second and third reasons why biostatistics was chosen are more complicated
and require more pages to explain. The second reason concerns the reality of the ICH
negotiation. As I have written in previous chapters, the ICH is a monopolist, hierarchal
conference in the name of "globalization." The decisions and information goes only one
direction from the ICH members to non-ICH regions in order to make sure they will not
be changed. Thus, unlike the ICH member Japan that can employs new sources, such as
genomics, to support its project, the CDE has to find its tools in the existing guidelines.
Fortunately, biostatistics is one of them.
In fact, as the main place that addresses biostatistical concerns in clinical trials is
the E9 guideline. Its importance, as I mentioned in Chapter 2 and 6, refers to its position
in the development of modern clinical trials and the increasing need for a large scale trial
that crosses the traditional boundaries of hospitals and centers, cities and regions, and
even states and populations. A background about the discussions concerning the E9
guideline should be provided here. Entitled "Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials," this
386
guideline was drafted from a note for the guidance of"biostatistical methodology in
clinical trials in applications for marketing authorisations for medicinal products" in 1994.
Like the E5 guideline, the E9 guideline also has its MOSS origin (for details about this
negotiation, see Chapter 4) and this is found in two documents entitled "guidelines on the
statistical analysis of clinical studies" (drafted in March 1992) and "guideline for the
format and content of the clinical and statistical sections of a new drug application"
(drafted in July 1988). Even so, under the context of the disputes over racial differences,
the E9 guideline can be understood as a new theoretical frame that makes international
participation in clinical trials possible.
Let me introduce two issues about this guideline related to our concerns. The first is
the concept of "multiple centers." Traditionally, this approach was desirable for it can
make trials more efficient. But, considering the generalization of the results to Asia, this
concept provides a base to incorporate Asian subjects that were originally excluded from
global trials. The E9 guideline points out two reasons for doing multicenter trials:
Firstly, a multicentre trial is an accepted way of evaluating a new medication
more efficiently; ... Secondly, a trial may be designed as a multicentre (and
multi-investigator) trial primarily to provide a better basis for the subsequent
generalisation of its findings. This arises from the possibility of recruiting the
subjects from a wider population and of administering the medication in a broader
range of clinical settings, thus presenting an experimental situation that is more
typical of future use (Section 3.2:12)
According to the above description, an internationally participating trial is workable.
Although it would create possible biases due to the various medical settings of the sites
for the clinical trials, the guideline allows this approach with restrictions. The only
requirement for a multicenter trial is that it has to be conducted by a single protocol
(section 3.2: 13 and glossary: 34).
Even so, it was able to announce the settlement only after the following two
problems were solved. First, although racial difference is recognized and a method is
provided for this, it still requires experience to know whether it should be considered a
variable in the trial, or as an adjustable factor that belongs to the sites. For example; the
intrinsic factors (for these factors, see fig. 4.3 and table 4.9) are relatively well defined
and more likely to be variables in the study. Yet, the extrinsic factors, which are closely
related to the environment where a trial is conducted, have yet to be identified for
measurement. In other words, rooted both in the biological characters and social matrix,
racial difference cannot be easily extracted from the "background noise" of the centers.
The second problem, which is related to the first, arises from a poor definition of
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what is a center and how they should be considered a multicenter trial. As each
investigator should be responsible for the subjects recruited, a "center" is naturally
defined by either investigator or a medical institute, and based on this, the statistical
protocol is designed for measuring the center effects. However, the situation is more
complex in multicenter trials, where the subjects are recruited from several hospitals
located in different cities and states. One investigator may recruit subjects from several
hospitals; one investigator may represent a team of clinicians who all recruit subjects
from their own clinics at several hospitals. Excluding individual factors (for example,
investigators), there are also institutional factors, such as the medical environment and
the local habits, which are ambiguous and easily mistaken with the "extrinsic factors" of
racial difference. Among those that should be taken into account as characteristics inside
of a center, but which variables are inconsistent from one center to another are
problematic. Any attempt to tell apart the former from the latter will challenge the
definition of what the basic unit of clinical trial is.
The second issue concerning the E9 guideline is the number of samples required for
such a trial. It is especially a concern for the industry because of the high cost of adding
subjects in clinical trials; they want to know the minimum number of subjects that is
considered sufficient. According to the guideline, no additional subjects are required
theoretically to perform a multicenter trial, as no site effects are noted. It only rules that
the total number of the subjects recruited should be large enough to provide a reliable
answer, thus it ought to be determined mainly by the primary objective of the trial
(section 3.2: 16-18).20 When the appropriate sum is assessed, several statistical items
have to be specified in the protocol.2 '
Compared to regulations on the total number of subjects, few are written on how
many subjects each center needs in a multicenter trial. It only addresses the following
concerns from the quality perspective, namely, the need to show meaningful information
and the effect due to the center chosen (section 3.2:13-14). For example, the sample size
should large enough so that the differences between compared treatments are unbiased
estimates. Further, a limited numbers of subjects per center will make it impracticable to
include the center effects in the statistical design. Also advised is the need to avoid
excessive variation in the numbers of subjects across the centers, since if it is found
20 It is noted that when the sample size is determined on other basis, the safety of drug, for example, it
has to be made clear and justified. See Section 3.2:17.
21 These concerns include a primary variable, the test statistic, the null hypothesis, the alternative
hypothesis at the chosen dose, the type I and II errors, and the approach to dealing with treatment
withdrawals and protocol violations. In addition, assumptions and factors that would affect the power of the
statistical results have to be taken into account.
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necessary to take this into account, there will be heterogeneity of the treatment effect
from center to center. This heterogeneity, as it writes, "may be identified by graphical
display of the results of individual centres or by analytical methods, such as a
significance test of the treatment-by-centre interaction. ... In the presence of true
heterogeneity of treatment effects, the interpretation of the main treatment effect is
controversial."
For the people who only read this guideline, it may not be necessary anything
immediately concerning international clinical trial. Hinted from chapter 6, we know this
guideline is originally a product to "correct" the Japanese style of clinical trials. Even so,
it intends to avoid over-interpretations that can be used like the controversial E5 guideline.
As is written in its introduction, "the focus of this guidance is on statistical principles. It
does not address the use of specific statistical procedures or methods. Specific procedural
steps to ensure that principles are implemented properly are the responsibility of the
sponsor." It leaves a gray area for interpretation and presents a good source for the CDE
to formulate its multi-state project. As the guideline suggests: "such a trial would be a
confirmatory trial in the later phases of drug development... It might sometimes be
conducted in a number of different countries in order to facilitate generalisability"
(section 3.2:12). As the MHLW's attempt to wrap up all factors related to the Japanese
using a genomic categorization of race as part of its global drug development agenda, the
CDE can also wrap up all the local factors into a functional category of "state" in order to
"facilitate generalisability."
Although the E9 guideline provides a good source for the CDE, it still requires
qualified scientists to work these interpretations out. This requirement leads to the third
reason got the use by the CDE of biostatistics. It did so for strategic reasons. The
credential to serve as a multicenter trial, as the guideline rules, is as follows: "the actual
responsibility for all statistical work associated with clinical trials will lie with an
appropriately qualified and experienced statistician" (section 1.2:2). In addition, the
statistician should have "a combination of education/training and experience sufficient to
implement the principles in this guidance and who is responsible for the statistical aspects
of the trial" (glossary: 39). Even so, compared to discussions about other guidelines,
Japan, as well as other ICH members, does not work much on this arena. According to
my personal survey in the PubMed database about papers about the E5 and E9 guidelines,
only handful papers are available between the foundation of the ICH and 2004, most of
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which are not academic papers but reports and letters.22
The above background provided us with some sense of Taiwan's advantage, which
I will introduce in the following. As a new and small branch, biostatistics requires two
kinds of training and experience, statistics and clinical research. Thus, as there are very
few jobs on offer, there were few statisticians capable of conducting clinical trials in East
Asia when it encountered the ICH. In the case of Japan and Taiwan, some statisticians are
teaching in Department of Statistics and some in the schools of public health, but there
are few and only less experienced persons working for industry. However, they are
different from other Asian states concerning the pool of global intelligence; both have
recourses overseas, especially in the United States.
In Chapter 2 I have mentioned the urgent need for statisticians by both the
regulators and the industry, which in fact facilitated the stay of Asian scientists. In the late
1970s or early 1980s, after receiving their bachelor degrees, which may have been in
mathematics or statistics, these scientists left Asia, moving to the U.S. to earn their Ph.Ds.
After that, they chose to stay in the United States, and many chose the regulatory agency
and pharmaceutical industry. Of course, not many of them knew clearly what biostatistics
was, as one Taiwan-born FDA official admitted when interviewed. He reminded me that
there was an economic regression and it was hard for foreign Ph.D.s to find jobs. For him,
after earning a doctoral degree in chemical engineering, it was suggested to him that he
pursue a M.D. degree in order to find a better job. "Otherwise I had to leave this country."
Another medical scientist joked: "the Americans assume that Asian are good at
mathematics, thus we can do these repeating, trivial, and boring jobs that few Americans
are willing to do." These PhDs thus started their new careers in the United States.
For Taiwan, it is a significant pool of intelligence. Shaw T. Chen has done a
personal survey on the Asian-American staff at the FDA and other national health
institutes while serving as the president of Parklawn Asian Pacific American Community,
a social group for Asian scientists in the East coast. He told me that Korea, India and
Taiwan are the three countries where most of these scientists come from. As table 7.2
shows, these so-called "overseas scholars" (haiwai xueren) filled in the fields of academy,
industry, and government.23 Some are senior professors at leading universities and some
22 Before the implementation of the E5 and E9 guidelines in 1998, only nine papers were published
concerning the ICH. Even after 1998 there were only eight with the keywords of"E5" and "ICH," eight
with "E9" and "ICH," and four with "ICH" and "bridging studies" shown in either the title or in the
abstract.
23 The names and affiliation of the statisticians mentioned are basically from the publications of the
ICSA. Because not every ICSA member is from Taiwan, I only listed the people identifiable by the spelling
of their names, their biographical profiles, and other related sources.
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are in the FDA or the NIH. More importantly, there is an increasing population working
for big pharmaceutical companies. They seemed to be clearly aware of their identities as
immigrants and minorities working in a small field.
The International Chinese Statistical Association (ICSA) is the realization of this
identity. It is a small yet firm society officially founded at the 1987 Joint Statistical
Meetings in San Francisco. Although with the term "Chinese" in its name, this
Taiwanese-dominated association is open to all individuals and organizations in all
statistics-related areas in the world. As declared in its constitution, the ICSA is dedicated
to educational, charitable and scientific purposes. In addition to general meetings and
workshops, every year since it was founded, it has organized symposiums on applied
statistics, which later developed into the section on biometrics.
Table 7.2 Taiwan-born Statisticians and Medical Experts Mentioned in ICSA
















Deputy Office Director for Science, Office of Clinical
Pharmacology and Biopharmaceutics CDER, FDA
Division of Biometrics II, Office of Biostatistics, CDER,
FDA
Associate Director for Special Product Review-Botanical
Drug Products, CDER, FDA
Office of Biostatistics, CDER, FDA
Division of Biometrics I, Office of Biostatistics, CDER,
FDA
Mathematical Statistician, Division of Biometry and
Risk Assessment, National Center for Toxicological
Research, FDA
National Institute of Child Health and Development,
NIH
National Institute of Child Health and Development,
NIH
Senior Pharmacologist (Principal Investigator),
Laboratory of Clinical Science, NIH























Professor and Graduate Program Director, Dept. of
Biostatistics, Johns Hopkins University
Associate Professor, Department of Medicine Johns
Hopkins Asthma and Allergy Center Unit
Harvard Clinical Research Institute
Medical College, University of Wisconsin
Director of Bioinformatics, National Biomedical
Research Foundation, Georgetown University Medical
Center
School of Business and Management, Temple University
Department of Statistics, North Carolina State University
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey
Statistics Department, University of Wisconsin
President, U.S. Operation at StatPlus, Inc.
Director, Clinical Discovery Biostatistics and Data
Management, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
Senior Research Scientist, Central Research Division,
Pfizer Inc.
Aventis Pharmaceutical Inc.
Director, Respiratory Section, Biostatistics and
Programming, RTP, GlaxoSmithKline





The ICSA became an important resource when Taiwan's environment improved.
For these scientists, the reason for this return is far more complicated than just a
"go-home" calling. A Taiwanese FDA official reasoned the calling it a "returning home"
phenomenon "can give the wrong impression." Nonetheless, it goes something like this:
"We all know that there is an invisible ceiling for Asians in the United States. I know that
I would not be promoted to any higher position, for which I think I am more qualified
than many persons born in America and I am still young and productive. Since the U.S.






Now I have reviewed the reasons for the necessity for the CDE to use biostatistics.
It is a tool for large-scale trials and the existing guideline that has space for interpretation.
Moreover, Taiwan happens to have a pool of knowledge available to fill this need. In the
following two sections I will describe how these statistical models were formed and
through what channel they can be heard.
Making Bridges; Saving Bridging: The APEC Statistical Symposium
In a similar way that the Kitasato-Harvard Symposium functions as an informal
channel between the MHLW and the FDA, the CDE establish a scientific symposium
attached to the APEC meeting for its proposal (Symposium on Statistical Methodology
for Evaluation of Bridging Evidence, hereafter the APEC statistical symposium).
However, we should be clear that this symposium cannot be considered a "second
channel" between the CDE and the FDA or a "direct channel" between the CDE and the
ICH, because commonly neither the FDA or the ICH need to talk to Taiwan. The
U.S.-Taiwan trade negotiations seldom touch issues on standards thus for the FDA there
is no need to go through issues with the CDE. In addition, the ICH has claimed that it
does not deal with issues with a single country outside of the ICH regions.
Even so, a symposium was achieved and I witnessed some exchanges of
information and ideas among experts from the United States, Japan and Taiwan. In this
section I will analyze why this channel could be established and how it works to save
bridging studies. Let us discuss first the interactions between statisticians in Taiwan and
Taiwanese statisticians in the United States, which, in my opinion, can explain the
establishment of the APEC statistical symposium. In last section I have mentioned a
phenomenon where many Taiwanese scientists chose to work in the United States after
earning their degrees, but we cannot forget the people who decided to return after
graduation, which started in the late 1970s. When qualified Ph.D.s had few positions
being offered, some people chose to return to Taiwan and develop their career as
educators and pioneers in new fields. This generation is crucial for two reasons. First,
they have no difficulties with English and maintain more or less connections with the
United States. Second, when biotechnology became a focus of Taiwan's science and
technology policy in the 1980s, they became major experts and researchers. When the
ICSA was founded, most of them joined and formed an international network of
knowledge.
The contacts intensified. When Taiwan was able to afford travel grants for attending
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international conferences and to organize conferences, these people reunited. Along with
the preparation of the NHRI in the 1990s, the Biometrics Section of the ICSA was
approved during the 1993 ICSA Board Meeting and formally established in January
1994.24 With the increasing importance of biotechnology, the purpose of this section was
to pursue the objectives of the ICSA with special interest in biostatistics,
biopharmaceutical statistics and their applications. In addition to publishing newsletters,
reporting meeting, announcements, activities and other events within the section, its U.S.
members often tour to East Asia, helping local industries and regulatory agencies. These
tours shows the hierarchical nature of this network where the information pours from the
United State, the center, to peripheral Taiwan through personal connections. The
"overseas scholars" are invited to Taiwan as keynote speakers or supervisors and the
professors and researchers working in Taiwan go to the United States to update their
knowledge. Anyway, this network is vitalized by these activities.
The ICSA served as a center making contacts between the experts from the United
States and Taiwan. This is true not only of the early symposiums and conferences of the
ICSA, which were held at the FDA and the NIH, since 2000 it has held some symposiums
on biomedical technology, inviting researchers and professors to Taiwan.25 Although
Taiwan still has no strong environment for clinical trials and research, the network of
biostatistics has equipped it with an excellent tool to develop its strategies. Immediately
after the time when the APEC networking initiated, Taiwan was granted an opportunity to
join the biostatistical discussions between Japan and United Stated and later formed its
own forum.
The first meeting was the 2000 Kitasato-Harvard symposium. As introduced in the
Chapter 6, it was an informal channel between the MHLW and the FDA, thus is not open
to the public. However, because Robert O'Neil, the director of the Office of Biostatistics,
FDA, could not present the statistical concerns on bridging study,26 L.J. Wei, one of the
founders of the ICSA and a member of the preparatory committee of the symposium,
suggested Taiwan's Jen-pei Liu of National Cheng-Kung University as a replacement. As
a veteran statistician with more than sixteen years experiences of clinical research and
24 Before then they organized panels included drug stability and management in the pharmaceutical
industry as the first applied statistics symposium held in 1990 and collected papers on biostatistics in the
first issue of the ICSA's journal Statistica Sinica in 1993.
25 In fact, biostatistics becomes one of the most "productive" disciplines among pure science in Taiwan.
As reported in the APEC statistical symposium, a professor of bio-statistics he knows well contributed
numerous of SCI papers that count one seventh of what his university produced last year.
26 As the FDA representative to the E5 EWG, O'Neil had been involved in the drafting of the E5
guideline. For his activities in the EWG and the ICH6, see Chapter 4 and 6.
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development, Liu is proficiency in statistical computer software and has a
well-established publication record in bioequivalence study. More importantly, however,
he has closely followed the E5 guideline and been involved in CDE's statistical reviews
since its establishment. Not only has he made some presentations on bridging studies, he
was requested to write entries for the Encyclopedia of Biopharmaceutical Statistics
(Marcel Dekker 2000; revised edition 2003), one of the first ever on this field. Liu
became the only presenter not from either the United Sates or from Japan.
In addition to Liu's presenatation, Wei used his personal connections to reserve for
Taiwan five seats at this symposium. An observation group led by CDE's Chern
Herng-Der attended the symposium and knew the organizer of this symposium Takeuchi
Masahiro, who became a regular presenter at the APEC statistical symposiums.27
Through watching this channel worked, evryone learned. As for Professor Liu, he was
impressed by the OPSR's explanation of its bridging policy, which had not been yet
openly claimed: the same protocol, the same quality, more subjects recruited (Liu 2000).
Also he found that statistics might be a point where Taiwan could cut through. He wrote:
"all have discussed for what goals which bridging studies should be requested and the
ways to evaluate their effects. However, there is no convincing study on the sample size
and data assessment. The United States and Japan have large different ideas on bridging
studies from Taiwan, showing a huge space for development. Besides of listing explicitly
the bridging studies required, we have to speed up to complete the methods of data
assessment."
Liu's idea gained realization in the series of the APEC statistical symposiums.
Sponsored by the ICSA and the CDE, and hosted by the NHRI, the first symposium was
held on May 23 2001 as an annex of the 2001 APEC meeting. Its goal was to solve the
technical problems associated with the evaluation of bridging studies. It was a small,
focused, workshop-like symposium, since they believed that statistics was the only
science able to clarify all the disputes about the E5 guideline. Except for L. J. Wei as
commentator and Professor Hsiung Chao, Director of the Division of biostatistics, NHRI,
as host, six speakers were invited: James H.M. Hung at FDA, Professor W.J. Shih from
University of Medicine and Dentistry, Sheng-Chung Chow from StatPlus Inc., Professor
Masahiro Takeuchi at Kitasato University, Mey Wang at CDE, and Jen-pei Liu. Depite its
size, the aim that this symposium wanted to achieve was large. It tried to be like the
Kitasato-Harvard symposium. It not only provided an international forum in which
27 This group consists of Lee Pao-Jen of the DoH, Section Director Mao Pei-Ling from the CDE, two
reviewers Wang Mey and Lee Jung-Jin on statistics and pharmaceutical kinetics.
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regulators, scientists, and industry could meet, but the speakers were highly selected and
the discussion was no doubt in the first rank of quality.28
In this symposium, two themes concerning bridging study, sample size and the
evaluation of similarity, were discussed from Jen-pei Liu's E5 interpretation; based on
these topics some strategies could be formed to keep as many clinical trials and as many
local subjects for recipient states. From a statistical viewpoint, Liu thinks that a
conclusion on whether a drug can bridge its trial data to a new region is made in the form
of a two-step decision. The first step is to decide whether bridging studies are needed by
evaluating the bridging evidence included in the Complete Clinical Data Package
(CCDP), namely, bridging study justification. The second is to conduct proper bridging
studies as defined by the ICH guideline providing clinical data on efficacy, safety, dosage
and dose regimen in the new region, namely, studies that are statistically validated. Since
the CDE has settled its interpretation on racial difference (see Chapter 5 and the part I of
this chapter), they do not say much about bridging study justification. They focus more
on what bridging should be done in order to provide necessary data for evaluating racial
difference. Liu argues, because bridging studies are defined as "supplemental," it is
almost impossible to reverse the result obtained from the original region; even if the
result is completely opposite. Thus, two issues should be the concern of conducting
bridging studies: optimal design and sample size for similarity with original regions, and
the evaluation of similarity between the results of a bridging study in the new region and
those of the trials in the original region.
In order to highlight their distinctions instead of similarities, in the rest of this
section I will introduce three groups of arguments regarding the above concerns. The first
is argued by Mey Wang of the CDE, who presents, more or less, the standpoint on current
policy that features the minimum requirement of sample size for bridging studies. Since I
have discussed intensively the CDE's E5 policy in previous chapters, here I shall focus
only on her main point and the statistical methods offered to solve the problems created
(Wang and Chern 2001).
Wang's argument has points concerning the nature of bridging study. First, as a
study for evaluation but not an administrative requirement, the ethnic concerns should be
defined completely either by "citizenship" or by "race." Thus, a full scale phase III study
using local subjects is unnecessary and unscientific. Related to the first, the second point
28 Having experience of both the FDA and the MHLW, Professor Takeuchi Masahiro did not reserve his
praise of the Taiwan's biostatistics. He said that Taiwan may not have an advanced pharmaceutical industry,
yet its statistical research absolutely is one of the best in terms of its delicacy and well-thoughtness.
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is related to the role that drug characteristics and indications play in the designing of
bridging studies. From this practical perspective she proposes that the two fundamental
elements can help regulators to decide the minimum sample size required for such
studies.
Based on this idea, some statistical models are suggested to reduce the sample size.
They do so by comparing to a full-reprititon of original trial. Using p-value distribution
under alternative hypothesis, Wang proposed a rule with a flexible significance level to
assess the required sample size needed to achieve a minimum tolerable power on the
effect size of the observed original foreign pivotal. In this method a positive drug effect
in Asian population is considered sufficient as sample size justification and its result is
used as a factor to decide how many subjects should be used in bridging study only
considering protection against type I error. After displaying several simulations, Wang
claims that, in terms of significance level and power used in computing the required
sample size, the one-sided alpha level could be relaxed with an upper bound of 10%.
How many subjects can be eliminated from an equivalent full-scale repetition depends on
the power that this trial is designed for. As for this value, it is deemed the sponsor's
responsibility.
The second group of arguments contrasts the current policy by showing no
convenient "bridges" that exist; even such a study requires an almost equally large
recruitment to achieve meaningful results. Among the people who provided these
arguments, Oliver Yoa-Pu Hu of the NDMC was the most notable. Hu argued that the
Taiwanese population should be considered as sovereign in clinical trials, whose integrity
has been preserved by the regulatory authority. In his opinion, Taiwan cannot be simply
ignore or easily "downgrade" the requirements for local clinical trials. Using statistical
model, these researchers tried to provide a working agendas for the CDE to practice this
idea (Chow, Shao and Hu 2002). 29
According to this study, they proposed a two-step strategy as to whether bridging
studies are needed and they suggest the sample size that is required. The assumption
behind this strategy is to treat the original region (e.g. the United States) and the new
region (e.g., an Asian-Pacific state) equally, as they are the controlled group and a group
to be tested in a clinical trial. If the given data can satisfy the reproducibility and
sensitivity Index, an index concerning population differences and the probability of
generalizability, there will be no need for bridging. Even so, it should be noted that the
29 Although Hu is not a statistician by training, he contributed to this paper the idea of applying
reproducibility probability to bridging studies and a real case for analysis. For more statistical consideration
on reproducibility probability, see Shao and Chow 2002.
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probability of generalizability is a decreasing function of the sensitivity index and the
value of sensitivity is usually unknown. This leaves regulators with room for adjustment
based on policy needs, as they can set out how the requirement works: "An example of
such a requirement is that the estimated reproducibility probability is higher than a
percentage (which is determined by a regulatory agent, e.g., 90%) of the reproducibility
probability for the original region. If the estimated reproducibility probability fails to
meet regulatory requirement, then move to the next step to prepare for a bridging
study"(emphasis mine).
If the given evidence cannot satisfy the reproducibility of sensitivity index, bridging
studies are needed. The question then is what kind of bridging studies are required to
meet the criteria of "similarity." Judged by a desired power for the bridging study30 and
sensitivity index selected by regulatory authority, the bridging studies have to be
conducted with the necessary amount of samples. A series of numbers of sensitivity index,
reproducibility probability, and the cases required can be obtained by a Bayesian
approach. Using simulations, the authors showed the extremes for the sample size
required. To just take one example, if the original trial is designed to compare a tested
compound and a total of sixty patients (thirtty per treatment group) were recruited,
formula, an acceptable bridng study may require up to sixty-eight local subject upon Hu's
estimation. In short, in opposition to Wang's formula, Hu's proposal shows a high bar
close to Japan's on bridging policy. In fact, Hu even suggests a small PK study, like the
MHLW does, may be necessary to for provide information regarding the changes in
population mean and standard deviation between regions.
The third group of arguments, led by Jen-pei Liu, shares Hu's argument by
criticizing the current policy: "No quantitative method is applied to evaluate the risk of
waiving bridging studies required to be conducted in Taiwan." Even so, he tries to work
out a solution in the middle of the above two. He does so by mapping out the problems of
bridging study consideration and sorting out the methodological repertory that the local
agency can use to keep more studies and more local subjects.
The concept that Liu and his colleagues pick for arguing is "similarity." In brief,
they argue that every bridging study has to be a meaningful study, namely, a study on the
similarity of dose response, efficacy and safety between the new and original regions.3'
In the following I will summarize their points from three papers; two by Liu and Chow
30 This power is the reproducibility probability of this study, such as 60 or 70 pecent.
31 Yet, please note that the use of the term "similarity" or "equivalence" does not mean that the authors
misunderstand the ICH E5 guideline, in which it is stated that the safety and efficacy profile resulted from
the trial in the new region has to be "not substantially different from that derived in the original region"
(section 3.2.2, emphasis mine).
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Hsien-Chung (Liu and Chow 2002) and one by Liu with Hueymin Hsueh and James J.
Chen (Liu, Hsueh and Chen 2002).32 Unlike Wang and Hu's emphases on the drug effect,
basically Liu provides pure statistical thinking where he tries to set the criteria for a valid
bridging study (non-inferiority, superiority, equivalence, for example).
About the necessity of bridging study, Liu and Chow do not differ much from Hu.33
What Liu and Chow spend more effort on was a comparison of bridging studies and
studies done in original region, arguing how many subjects were necessary to achieve a
meaningful study. Although they do not give evaluation or comparison of the methods for
estimating the number of subjects required,34 some attempts are made by another paper
(Liu, Hsueh and Chen 2002). In order to complicate the operation by adding the variables
of dose response, safety and efficacy that Chow, Shao and Hu fail to do, this paper
provides two strategies for estimating the necessary sample size. One is to consider an
imaginative clinical trial consisting of the original trial and bridging study, assuming that
it uses a target population stratified by ethnic factors (north American and Asian Pacific,
for example). The other is to apply a hierarchical model, which considers together the
treatment effect of the tested compound, the cases recruited in original regions, and the
acceptance limit in a new region, to evaluate the sample size required for the analysis of
bridging study.
Of course, the above strategies are far to complicated to discuss in detail. In his
latest paper (Liu 2003), Liu simulates more strategies, looking at whether a balance can
exist between the possible similarity and the objective of minimizing duplication of
32 In a presentation at the 2001 Kitasato-Harvard Symposium, for example, Liu reviewed
methodological issues in the evaluation of bridging study, some of which were developed into a paper with
Shein-Chung Chow titled "Bridging studies in clinical development." The most recent paper was published
in Drug Information Journal in 2003.
33 The only thing Liu and Chow add is a quantified approach to a five-point evaluating system for
ethnic sensitivity developed from the U.S. Drug Master File. Based on these data, Liu and Chow claim an
instrument consisting of three domains to determine the degree to which ethnic factors matter and thus the
necessity of bridging studies can be determined. The first domain includes the critical properties of the
compound. The second domain and third domain, each consists of the intrinsic and extrinsic factors
discussed in the ICH E5 guideline. Within each domain, a scoring scheme can be designed to characterize
the degree of the impact on efficacy, safety, dose, and dose regimen. For example, a possible scoring
scheme could be a 5-point system such as I for no, 2 for mild, 3 for moderate, 4 for strong, and 5 for
complete. An algorithm can then be developed to provide a summary index for an overall assessment of the
impact on the efficacy, safety, dosage, and dose regimen of the study medicine. In practice, the database of
these compounds can be divided into two data sets, namely, a training set and a validation set. Based on the
summary indices computed from the medicine in the training set, a threshold can be determined to classify
these medicines into two groups. One group consists of medicines that are insensitive to ethnic factors and
hence do not require bridging studies. The other group contains medicines that are ethnic sensitive and
hence require bridging studies.
34 They are the two studies, or so-called between-study analysis, and different methods of population
similarity, consistency among studies, hierarchical model and Bayesian approach are reviewed.
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clinical data. It is not an easy task and the results do not please drug sponsors. Although
in some approaches the sample size pursued is not as large as that calculated by Hu's
formula, but they are still quite huge. After paralleling six strategies with four approaches
to interpret similarity (for details, see 92S-94S), Liu addresses two conclusions. First,
reproducing statistically significant results in this new region also requires a larger
sample size than the original region. The reduction of sample size will inevitably sacrifice
its validity. Second, using the empirical Bayesian approach for bridging studies, the result
achieved is overwhelmingly dominated by the result from the origin region. It is
supplemental to the result of the origin and can hardly reverse it. All these seem to
display a standpoint that once the frame of bridging exists, a substantial amount of
patients have to be recruited.
I have reviewed the three groups of arguments that try both to make
communications with global industry on the one hand and to "save" more bridging
studies for the state on the other. Although they have different standpoints, they share
much in terms of intentions. Let me use two analogies, one secular and one philosophical,
to summarize this strategy. To use the analogy of bargaining, the CDE's policy is the
bottom price a seller offers to attract buyers to ask. Yet, contrast this policy with Hu's
argument that insists on the highest price for the bargaining. Liu's summary, in this sense,
presents a seemingly sympathetic third party voice (scientist) that offers an analytical
overview of the problems and persuades buyers to compromise somehow with the sellers.
This intention will be clearer if we use Imre Lakatos' research program from the
philosophy of science, my second analogy. Considering the CDE's bridging study policy
as a research program, these arguments function like an "extended belt," which works to
protect the core of the program, the theory and assumptions by which the formulas and
interpretations are formed; in addition, it formulates possible ways along which the
program can be stretched. The core of this research program, as I have described
repeatedly, is to save the state from world.
To sum up. Using the guideline on multiple center studies, the CDE had survived its
voicing by providing interpretations to save bridging studies. Not only making it a
workable agenda, these statistical strategies provide a necessary repertory for other
regulatory authorities to deal with foreign clinical data. Like the MHLW does with
genomics, the CDE owns statistics that was contingently nurtured in the United States
and which can serve both as a tool and a channel between Taiwan and the ICH experts.
As we will see, its role became more crucial as global drug development rises. In the next
section, I will describe how these statisticians responded to this project by making a
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transition from bridging studies to the multi-state platform.
Seeing State in Bio-Globalization: Making Bridging Studies Global
In Chapter 6 I have discussed how global drug development became a strong
paradigm backed up by Japan, and how it claims it will replace "imperfect" bridging
studies soon. Thus, it is crucial that the CDE responded to this trend. The field I am
looking at is the 2003 APEC statistical symposium held on November 15, but it should be
located in a broader context. As a key technologie in clinical trials that earns increasing
attention, biostatistics has become a much-discussed topic in Asia. And this trend made it
much siutable for the MHRI and the CDE to host again this symposium.35
Of course, bridging studies were still its main mission, as written in its objective:
"since statistical methodology plays an important role on the design and analysis for
evaluation of the bridging evidence, we feel that necessity of holding the 2003 SSMEB
(APEC statistical symposium) before the APEC meeting."
Table 7.3 Speakers and Paper Presented
Symposium.
at the 2003 APEC Statistical
35 There was no statistical symposium in 2002. Since the APEC 2002 meeting was held in Tokyo, the
MHLW hosted another side meeting under the series of the Drug Information Association Conference on
Pharmaceutical evolution in Asia (DIA in Asia) at the University of Tokyo on September 18 and 19, dealing
with the possibilities to achieve regional harmonization.
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Name Position/Affiliation Title of presentation
Chao A. Hsiung* Director, division of Opening remarks
biostatistics and
bioinformatics, MHRI




Gordon Lan Aventis pharmaceuticals, The use of prior information in drug
Inc., USA development
Weichung Shih University of Medicine Evaluation of clinical trials for
Dentistry of New Jersey, cross-country drug development:
USA three scenarios
Chin-Fu Hsiao NHRI, Taiwan A group sequential approach to
evaluation of bridging studies
Mey Wang CDE, Taiwan Clinical relevance of ethnic factor: a
simulation study
Jen-pei Liu Professor, National Cheng A comparison of statistical methods
Kung University and for evaluation bridging studies
NHRI, Taiwan
Sue-Jane Wang** FDA, USA Cross trial statistical inference:
bridging vs. non-inferiority scenarios
H. M. James FDA, USA Statistical issues with design and
Hung*** analysis of bridging clinical trials
Masahiro Takeuchi Kitasato University, Japan Variance components in mixed effects
Fumiaki Takahashi models in bridging studies
* Originally Liang Kung-Yee, vice president of the MHRI and professor at
Johns Hopkins University, was arranged as the speaker.
**because of a snowstorm on the East Coast, her presentation was postponed to
November 17 and rearranged at the MHRI..
*** because of a snowstorm in the East Coast, his slides were read and
commented on by Weichung Shih.
Source: Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Statistical Methodologyfor
Evaluation of Bridging Study.
The speakers are almost the same as the first meeting except for some new faces,
such as Sue-Jane Wang from the FDA and Chin-Fu Hsiao from the NHRI (table 7.3).
When watching their interactions, I felt that these speakers had formed an intimate
community through these activities, and the field, as Liu Jen-pei describes, is "well
attended and discussion was intensive but constructive" (Liu 2004).
However, this intimate atmosphere does not mean that they agreed with each other.
In Chapter 6 1 have reviewed Takeuchi Masahiro's presentation, which addresses a
genomic project on global drug development. Apparently, it is an agenda distinct from
bridging studies. However, even researchers who insist on bridging studies have different
strategies to respond to global drug development. In the following I will introduce three
strategies presented at this symposium, which I will call "group sequential,"
"weighted/discounted," and "multi-center/hierarchical; these represent the cutting-edge
ideas for this transition.
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The first strategy was the group sequential method proposed by Hsiao Chin-Fu and
his colleagues. It is not a new idea, as it had been previously applied to the assessment of
grouped subject outcomes at periodic intervals. Using the approach of simultaneous drug
development, namely, "synchronized" trials, the group sequential method facilitates a
practical approach that allows a timely gap between the original trial and the new
regional trial. This approach therefore has three key points when applied to a bridging
study. First, the inclusion of patients from the new region as a part of the recruitment of
the whole study for the submission to the original region; that is, the bridging study is
considered a sub-study of a "whole" trial. Second, it allows the new region to join the
whole trial as a group, thus the bridging study should be a group sequence that enrolls
patients from the new region subsequently to the original region. Third, because the new
and original regions are treated equally as group sequences, the bridging study should be
conducted in the same way as the study in the original region using the same protocol
except for the order of region and the order of patients' enrollment. The data generated is
thus internally valid.
The sequential method is conducted by following steps. At beginning, the statistical
method should be fully specified in advance of the availability of information on
treatment outcomes and subject treatment assignments. Because the primary objective of
this trial is for submission to the original region, most of the type I error rate
measurement should be spent on the interim analysis based on the results from the
original region. The interim analysis is performed when the recruitment of patients in the
original region is completed. After the interim analysis, the recruitment of the patients in
the new region, or the so-called "bridging study," starts. As a sub-study under the group
sequential scheme, the study in the new region should be pre-specified to have the same
protocol, with the same inclusion/exclusion criteria, the same study design, the same
controls, the same doses, the same method of evaluation and the same efficacy/safety
endpoints. Only after the second recruitment is completed can the final analysis be
performed with the newly added data. If the interim analysis and the final one show
similar results, that is, a similar significance level to meet the requirement of crossing the
boundary values, then the results of the new region can be declared to have similarity to
the original region.
The main concern about this approach is the sample size. In order to cross the
boundary to terminate the recruitment of cases, a substantial number of samples are
required for both the original region as well as the new one. This approach adjusts the
sample size required by comparing the original trial (interim analysis) and the final one
403
(complete analysis), making the sample size a dynamic sum of cases in the original and
the new region. In other words, though "additional", the study conducted in the new
region, that is, the bridging study, in fact plays a more crucial role than before. This is
because it can be equally as important as the study in the original region. On the other
hand, although this approach "downgrades" the influences of the study in the original
region, this approach leaves two manually adjustable preset factors, namely, the total
information of the original region and the conditional power adjustment factor. These
determine the necessary sample size. In short, the sample size in the new region is no
longer a decision made by one party. It is affected by, first, the conditional power given to
the interim results and this is related to the treatment effect of the tested product. Second,
the required boundary for the final analysis can also affect the sample size required. Both
are negotiable.
The second strategy can be called "the weighted/discounted approach." It was
proposed by Gordon Lan and is derived from the traditional Z-test method. It is argued
that while conducting a clinical trial, which is supposedly a study in the new region or the
"bridging study," the prior information obtained from the study in the original region will
hugely affect the partition of sample space of the new study. For example, it would
increase the type I error from the standard 0.025 to 0.30. This effect will be the same, in
this case, when using different approaches like traditional hypothesis testing or Bayesian
argument. Approaches are thus applied to correct the drift of the value of Z or the type I
error in order to maintain its power.
Like Hsiao's strategy, Lan assumes a trial that consists of the new study (bridging
study) and a prior study, making them two "stages" in a global drug development. Thus,
the Z value of this trial can be basically presented as the sum of the Z values of the two
independent studies. Because the conditions of the trials in the original and new regions
are different, their Z values have to be re-adjusted or "weighted" in order to achieve a
satisfactory result. In contrast, a discounted factor is taken into account when considering
the sample size required. Unlike the strategy one introduced previously, the discounted
factor is defined as the degree by which the amount of samples used in the replication of
a full trial can be deducted. Apparently, the more samples that are deducted, the more the
type I error increases.
However, it is not a zero-sum game, because what is lost in sample size may be
recovered in the weight factor. Thus, the choice of weighted and discounted factors
depends on "the degree of belief in variability of treatment effects between regions."
Related to this are many non-statistical issues such as product characteristics, disease area
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and status, PD/PK and dose response data, therapeutic dose and effects, quality and
strength of evidence from the body of knowledge in the clinical data package,
pharmacological effects in a foreign region with a comparable population to the new
region, experience with other members of the same drug class in the new region, intrinsic
factors and extrinsic factors of the population (see table 4.7) that the drug hope to
marketed in.
Many may suggest that this approach does not solve the question. However, I would
say that under the new situation of global drug development, the novelty of this approach
resides in the attempt to reduce the scientific question back to that "non-scientific" one.
Putting aside the "pure" statistical concerns, this approach implies that the solution for
the bridging studies under the scheme of global drug development can be found only in
the "non-statistical" issues, which are negotiable. It is a reality that Taiwan cannot
provide as many cases as before for global drug development, thus, it is necessary to
make a return to non-regulation so that new rules can start to be determined.
As in a statistical framework, Lan's idea of "weighted/discounted" factors is much
clearer in Shih Wei-Chung's named "multi-center/ hierarchical," which marks the third
strategy I want to introduce in this section. It is an approach that confirms the need for
global drug development, and has possible advantages for Asian-Pacific countries. Shih
pointed out that, under the frame of bridging studies, no real equality can be achieved,
because in reality every country wants to have as many samples as possible in each trial.
Thus, no matter how close the bridging studies are to the original study, if the bridging
study is done retrospectively, they just cannot be considered equal. Shih suggests: "Now
is the time for Asia-Pacific countries to persuade the international companies to accept
this strategy (global drug development) and this is what the revised E5 guideline should
also address." According to Shih, global drug development is another name for
multi-national or multi-center trials. Thus, his method is to construct a multi-national trial
in which each participating country is considered to be a part of a "bridging study" while
the drug sponsor, viewing the whole, sees it as a global trial.
The problem with this approach will be to decide what a fair share for every nation
is. Shih persuades us that it is no more problematic to define a nation than to define a
center; however, the definition of a nation seems to be the key concept that needs more
explanation. Except for considering a nation as a collection of centers or an
administrative body including sites of clinical trials, Shih insists that a nation preserves a
necessary specific effect that has to be taken into consideration. On the other side, what
we take for granted as a "nation" is also problematic. Taking the United States as an
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example, he claims that in fact every state has its own policy toward new drugs; no drug
so far is allowed to be marketed through out the whole country. Thus, a multi-state policy
should be applied to the U.S. so that its heterogeneous nature can be protected. To address
the above concerns, Shih proposed a hierarchical or multiple-level statistical frame,
inserting more levels, such as nation/state and region, between the clinical trial centers
and the world.
Under this frame, a bridging-study, like a global drug trial, is conducted though an
application of the hierarchical Bayesian model. Clinical trials being performed in the
centers of a nation/state (supposedly "bridging studies") are compared with what has
already been completed in other places (the prior information). Like other approaches,
there are factors that determine the posterior distribution of study in the new region, such
as the relevance of the observed data, the prior information and the induced priors that
gives weight to the prior information. Basically it is safe to consider this model a more
complicated structured system in which data obtained from the different regions (or
centers/states/nations) are given different weights when incorporating the new data. It is
clear that the sample size required in new region has a rough positive correlation with the
centers involved before as well as the variability of the observed data, but how to obtain
this size is a complex and hard to evaluate.
We do not yet know the importance of the nation or state. So far this experimental
approach shows only a weighed evaluation system, though complicated, such that a
bridging study can be done as a multi-center trial. For this, at very end of his presentation,
Shih proposed a nation/center reaction (Rx) effect, which is more related to the local data
observed than to the "overall" reaction. Because the nation specific effect is a total
evaluation considering all factors that can produce local differences, it can thus only be
pursued by empirical studies. Up to this point, it was not clear what Shih wants to save
under his scheme of global drug development. He tries to preserve the nation, the basic
unit for doing bridging studies.
Shih does so by pointing out two issues concerning the characteristics of a
nation/state. First, he wants to preserve the state as a country. For example, in the case of
the United States, Shih challenges its homogeneity on drug approval. According to him,
only a few states would allow FDA approved drugs to be marketed immediately. In this
sense, the U.S. has already been practicing multi-national trials and fails to make its
"centralized" approval the final one. Thus, Shih believes that his approach is correct in
that "combines" data from different regions, improving each nation/state's ability to
estimate while preserving their uniqueness. Second and more importantly, Shih wants to
save nations whose markets are too small to bargain for a trial that recruits a fair number
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of patients from their citizens. Although bridging studies promises the nation a temporary
"protection" for its citizens' bodies and health, it will soon be replaced by global drug
development, in which only big nations/markets are selected for attention. Thus, he
insists national reaction plays a more important role in his approach. He does not hide its
administrative goal: since "[t]here won't be a 'global registration'; hence,
nation/region-specific Rx effects (assuming these to be properly estimated) are more
relevant than the 'overall' Rx effect."
I have introduced these strategies and despite the differences in methodologies and
abstractions, their goals are consistent, namely, to restore as many as possible clinical
trials, to extend the life of bridging studies and to preserve Taiwan's presence in global
drug development. These strategies convincingly show the ability of bridging studies to
extend its use from bilateral relationships to a global network. They are scientific and can
be used anywhere that appreciates bridging studies. Above all, they match well the CDE's
vision of "regionalizing" bridging studies. Unlike the MHLW's worldview that consists
of distinct genomic populations, the CDE's one is a multi-layered network; on each level
every state is linked to others by bridging. They bridge clinical data, bridging reviews,
and they bridge markets and vision, all based on the real and vitally alive statehood.
Fig. 7.1. Title slide of Shih's presentation (left), on Which Two ROC
National Flags (larger image is shown on the right) Are at Lower
Corners.
Evaluation of Clinical Trials for
Cross-Country Drug Development:
Three Scenarls
Welchung Joe Shlh, Ph.D.
DMsion of dIomeulcs,
Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry of
N.
November 1S,
ympoiern , en Stcsdkadi Meheodtey fo
vL lurnda odd; Ai Evldence, T4e00
Source: Shih's slide presentation in the 2003 APEC Statistical
Symposium.
Only with this understanding can we see the Taiwan state in the globalization. I
remember one scene when Shih Wei-Chung started his slide show, in which he displays
two national flags of the ROC (Taiwan) waving at the comers (fig. 7.1), everyone in the
audience laughed except foreigners. They did not do this because of its unrelatedness or
because it was out of context. They laughed because they know the implicit meaning of
this symposium and Shih did not hide this true intention, he made his homeland visible.
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In fact, one more semiotic footnote can be added about this flag. As an emblem of a
decaying authoritarian regime, the Republic of China (ROC), only a few people sincerely
relate to this "blue sky-white sun-red ground" totem as Taiwan's national flag.
Nonetheless, in the global context the message Shih hopes to deliver is well taken. No
matter how many names Taiwan is forced to call itself;36 its robust statehood should be
preserved. Here an over-simplified Shakespearean answer seems not to be proper to this
complicated problem that if Taiwan had any other name than the ROC, it would not be
living as it is now. Instead, I want to call attention to the fact that in Taiwan's case, the
quarrels over its names usually cover up the real needs of the people living on this island.
The name of the Taiwan state may not be important, but the Taiwanese know very well
what a proper identification of its defacto status can bring to them in terms of
globalization. To be seen is just the first step in their efforts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: LIMITED SCIENCE, STRETCHED
CONNECTIONS
Echoing some general arguments in the fields of STS and cultural studies, three
conclusions can be drawn from this chapter, and I will introduce them one by one.
Concerning the difference between the CDE and the MHLW, the first conclusion that can
be easily ascertained from the philosophy of science is that bridging studies and global
drug development can be considered two research programs within the same paradigm of
drug regulation.
From this viewpoint, both projects share similarities characteristic of Thomas
Kuhn's classical definition of normal science (Kuhn 1962: Chapters 2-4). First of all, they
have a worldview called "racial difference." Only when the differences are real for these
scholars can methods and solutions can be provided. Second, there is a "puzzle" or
guiding problem called "bridging studies." Any project to resolve racial differences has to
refer to either the E5 or E9 guideline. Through the rules and tools of statistics, it is
possible to produce paradigmatic knowledge.
Even under their shared paradigm, bridging studies and global drug development
are research programs that compete with each other (Lakatos 1970). Chapter 6 and this
chapter have described the theoretical interactions between them. While Japan presumes
the essential uniqueness of the Japanese race as its core, Taiwan, as I have described,
36 According to an unofficial sourse, the Taiwanese government has used at least twenty-nine names for
its country in different international organizations and countries across the world.
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made its basis the existence of the state. Thus, the roles bridging studies play in each
program are different. In Taiwan's program, bridging is a "positive heuristic," as it directs
scientists toward fruitful avenues of enquiry. However, when Japan's program started
using global drug development as a positive heuristic, bridging studies became a
"negative heuristic" that would delay the move toward the avenues of simultaneous
global clinical trials. Even so, both retained the term "bridging study" in their programs
because it had been defined in the E5 guideline.
This thesis has no intention to identifying which program will finally win, since no
result can be recognized until after the competition is complete, and paradigmatic shifts
should be invisible. Even so, with regard to the world of the ICH that we are studying, the
solution can be reached through a revision of the ICH guidelines and standards. After all,
a theoretical competition between bridging studies and global drug development might
not happen in the real world. Backed up by its huge market, it is doubtless that Japan's
program will be easier to write into the guideline if the FDA does not intervene.
Nonetheless, Taiwan is different. No matter how excellent a program it constructs, it has
no ability to modify guidelines; it is always acted upon. Therefore, in reality, the two
research programs move in parallel; sometimes they might meet, but most of the time
each follows its own track. While Japan is pressured by the bridging approach in
negotiations with the FDA, Taiwan worries about the disappearance of the state's
integrity. Using the existing tools, Taiwan has to find a solution before the problem is
settled.
From this observation we depart from a non-historical, non-anthropological
comparison of two schools of thought and enter into an overall appreciation of voice and
voicing in the world of proprietary drugs via science and society. Obviously, Japan and
Taiwan have different concerns and paths for developing dialogues and conversations
with the global. I have discussed Japan's part in Chapters 4 and 6, and I explained the
making of Taiwan's voice in Chapter 5. Now I think this interdisciplinary, international
investigation can be completed with a discussion of voicing.
Let me start again with subaltern studies. In Chapter 5 I discussed some issues
concerning the representation of voices raised by Ranajit Guha. In addition, my own
unexpected involvement in the writing project of Taiwan's voicing strategy represents a
unique anthropological experience in which the ethnographer's voice and the voices of
the observed have synthesized somehow and are presented in a unique form-this
dissertation--in order to evoke circulations of ethnographic actions through reading. In
view of the scientific material used in this chapter, most of which is not intended to be
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read in this field, my second conclusion is a meta-analytical reflection of this chapter that
brings in some arguments from Gayatri Chakreavorty Spivak's reading on early subaltern
studies (Spivak 1988).
First of all, although Guha claims the voice of the subaltern is an independent and
autonomous one, Spivak reveals its use in tracking the "successful cognitive failures" of
previous historiographies of the history of colonial India (6-7). In the process, however,
early subaltern studies failed to engage the discursive context in which the heterogeneous
nature of Indian peasants' voices had to disappear into a single voice, articulated as if
from a single agency, in order to forge an effective practice. Agreeing with this
observation but not pursuing it further in the deconstructionist direction, I would like to
turn this slipperiness of discourse into an ethnographic question of voicing. Instead of
asking whether a "Taiwan consciousness" exists ontologically, this chapter tries to
explore how voicing is possible through the logical (science), discursive (ICH and
capitalism in a restricted sense), and social (global politics) mechanisms of networking
that form our conception of the world of proprietary drugs. Thus while Spivak gives a
theoretical answer about subaltern consciousness as a discursive existence strategically
adhering to the essentialist notion of consciousness (15), 1 seek this existence by an
analytical evaluation of the dynamic relationship of Taiwan's voices with the global in all
its limitations and possibilities. The generalization of this thesis is thus not a theory of
consciousness as subaltern studies is said to offer; what I want to contribute is an
ethnographic understanding of voicing, the way to appreciate such voice and its dynamics
in the modern world.
At the beginning of this chapter I evaluated Taiwan'sfasheng status; I will do the
same here from three perspectives. The first is about the right to revise ICH guidelines. I
discussed in Chapter 6 how Japan's resistance to bridging studies is based on its unilateral
interpretation of the E5 guideline. However, this situation cannot occur with Taiwan.
Every attempt to argue for the similarity between clinical trials done in secondary and
primary regions presumes that a meaningful bridging study should in some way be an
exploratory trial. However, from global industry's viewpoint, bridging studies can only be
confirmatory trials "intended to provide firm evidence in support of claims" (E9
guideline: 4). Second, considering the discursive field of the ICH, Japan would not
readily accept bridging studies, since it hopes to have enough Japanese subjects in every
trial. Even the United States, which respects the spirit of science, would show a negative
attitude to this approach, because it is an "Asian problem." Indeed, in the near future, the
FDA will still be the primary reviewer, making bridging studies unnecessary. Once this
happens, it is very likely that the FDA will insist on full clinical trials, or at least
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substantial trials on local subjects, for all applications. As Shih Wei-Chung's presentation
points out, an "FDA" idea that suggests a large amount of local subjects for either
bridging studies or global trials is not practical for small countries like Taiwan. The third
and last aspect concerns responses from other Asian countries. Although the CDE's
proposal of"regionalizing bridging"seems convincing, Singapore insists on its project,
and the ASEAN countries remain cold toward Taiwan. One principle investigator shared
with me somewhat cynical comment on bridging studies: "It is a bad game created by
Japan. And now only its former colonies [Taiwan and Korea] follow. You ask whether it
is useful for other Asian countries, and my answer will be a simple NO."
It seems likely that the CDE's attempt will not go well. However, echoing Spivak's
reading of subaltern studies, I do not want to be pessimistic. I have two points to make
here. First, as a voice that can be continuously heard, the CDE's bridging study proposal
has earned responses in the discussions among ICH regions. As Spivak would say, it is a
typical use of subaltern voices to displace the discursive field (1988: 9). In fact, she gives
a good example of this effect by analyzing the use of rumor in subaltern studies (21-26).
As both a verbal expression and a communicative tool among Indian peasants, rumors
worked by accumulating social weight so that the colonizers start to report them and put
them in written form for discussion. We see the same effect in the bridging study project.
Although it is not formal in the sense that it cannot be recorded or accepted as part of the
discursive achievements of the ICH and its voicing channel is scattered, its fragments
have infiltrated discourses within the ICH, especially in the context of the E5 guideline
and the relations between Japan and the other members.
Second, Taiwan's voicing ability might not be improving, as we read, but it is not
declining either. Pointing out the heterogeneity of subalterns, Spivak reminds scholars
that women, who have presented a vague, faceless, and fragmented figure in previous
studies, should be considered in this discipline as a starting point for demystifying the
discourse of subaltern studies, in which "the continuity of community or history is
produced on the dissimulation of her discontinuity, on the repeated emptying of her
meaning as instrument" (1988: 31). Reading her point into my ethnography, I will say
that the CDE's continuous voicing constitutes an existence that is persistently challenging
the superficial harmony created by the ICH and by global political organizations such as
the WHO.37
37 1 thank Professor Joe Dumit for providing this point. In fact, in his unpusblished work "Symptomic,
Ill and Structually Damned" (1998), Dumit points out the discursive skills (such as the use of new media
and scientific language) used by emerging social movements around illnesses that are ignored by current
medical practice. As a "non-state" in global politics, Taiwan's voicing stragey shares this approach. More
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Even so, the problem of voicing agency will remain, which leads to the third and
last conclusion of this chapter. In this chapter I treat the CDE and Taiwan exchangeably,
as if they refer to a single entity that makes a single voice. Yes, it is true that if possible
the CDE would like to use the name "Taiwan," but neither the CDE nor the Taiwanese
state is the agency that produces this voice in the context of the ICH. In this ethnography
Taiwan or the CDE is a writerly agency that cannot exist without others, such as the FDA,
the MHLW, and many of the individuals mentioned in this thesis. Echoing Stephen
Tyler's notion of postmodern ethnography (1986), what we can conceive are voices and
voices alone. This distinction is crucial, because once Taiwan is recognized as a state or is
invited to attend the ICH as such, thisfasheng may disappear or change. This chapter
precisely shows this distinction by analyzing the CDE's strategies for bridging studies. It
is Taiwan's "absence" that stimulates the actions offasheng. Instead of making a voice
for this state alone, thesefasheng strategies always relate Taiwan to other counties, and
only voices that present it this way can be heard by the global. If subaltern studies wanted
to seek missing voices in the making of India's colonial past, this thesis hopes to achieve
an ethnographic understanding of Taiwan's voice andfasheng through an appreciation of
the history of brding studies, the ICH, Taiwan, East Asia, and the world of
pharmaceuticals.
Here let me follow up on this voice. The 2004 APEC meeting was held in Seoul in
November, and discussions on bridging occupied one section. What was new at this
meeting was that APEC started inviting the ASEAN countries, looking for the possibility
to make connections. For example, the CDE hosted an informal banquet for all the guests
during the meeting. "Korea missed this chance to make friends and connections, but we
will never let this happens to us," Chern Herng-Der said to me. Meanwhile, to many
people's surprise, the CDE tried to sell the "Taiwan experience" to Japan and Korea. In a
recent conversation, Chern confirmed this fact. "In fact, Japan asked us for help," he said.
He recalled that during an earlier visit to Tokyo, Naito Chikayuki, now the senior
consultant at the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Evaluation Center (originally
OPSR), had asked Chern to provide the CDE's bridging evaluation review documents, for
he wanted to compare how close the Japanese were to other Asian people. In addition, the
CDE director Chu Mong-Ling told me that in a regulatory affairs meeting held in Tokyo,
412
discussions concerning Taiwan's voicing status in reference to Victor Turner's concept of liminality can be
found in Chapter 8, part III.
the Korean FDA showed interest in Marie Lin's work on racial differences in Asia and
asked Chu to send a copy (for more about this paper, see part II of Chapter 5). The CDE
seems eager to voice, even to those who are unlikely to accept its agenda. Chem
concluded enthusiastically, "If we can have Japan and Korea on our side, the network is
large enough to bargain with the United States and Europe."
While making new connections, the CDE also attempts to strengthen existing
networks. I heard from the GCG meeting in 2003 that APEC might be suggested as a
regular member of the ICH-GCG Ideally, if Taiwan can remain active and creative in
APEC, it might be possible for it to attend the ICH through APEC.38 Nonetheless, there
are impediments to reaching these goals. More regional networks are formed, but Taiwan
is excluded, which Chem, in a recent article (2005), called a "crisis." For example,
ASEAN has decided to form a single drug market by 2005. Singapore and Thailand are
proceeding with a free trade treaty with the United States in which pharmaceuticals are an
important item for discussion. The PRC, meanwhile, is organizing a six-state network for
harmonizing regulations on herbal medicines. None of these networks include Taiwan. If
we read Chern's statement carefully, we can see that the crisis is not about Taiwan's being
marginalized or ignored by the world, since it already is. The anxiety, instead, is whether
its voice will be covered by these networks.
Even though no body knows the future of Taiwan as well as the CDE, it has no
choice but to keep moving forward. Chern's remark nicely shows this desire: "It is a long
journey for Taiwan and for me: the SRB [Strategic Review Board] meeting in 1997, the
foundation of the CDE in 1998, its proposal for the APEC network on bridging studies in
1999, the ICH presentation in 2000, the interactions at ICH6 and ICH-GCG in 2003, and
for now the participation of the LSIF [Life Science Innovation Forum]. Despite various
pressures brought by the political reality, we walk high and shine. What we witness just
reflects two proverbs: 'step by step with care' [liboji kain] and 'trails must be left after
we walk' [fan zoguo bi liuxia heni]. I shall share with you these two proverbs for our
future journey" (Chern 2005).
But I should save this for another ethnography.
38 In fact, the situation has become more complicated, since a newly founded network, LSIF, was later
assigned to be the APEC representative for the ICH-GCG. Sponsored by PhRMA and dominated by the
United States and Thailand, this forum was proposed in 2003 and attempted to replace the original APEC
network. So far it is too early to estimate how this will affect the APEC network, and Taiwan has chosen to
join this forum; however, whether Taiwan can keep active and gain delegacy at the GCG is still a question.
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PART FOUR
The Interactive Transformation of State and Race: Taiwan and Japan
One day in late March 2005, when I was in the throes of the present work, I
received a telephone call from Chern Herng-Der, the deputy director of Taiwan's Center
for Drug Evaluation. After a bit of chitchat, he asked me whether I had heard about Lee
Teng-Hui's new formulation, "new era Taiwanese" (xin shidai Taiwanren).
I hadn't. Of course, I was familiar the notion of "new Taiwanese" (xin Taiwanren), a
phrase first used in the 1998 Taipei mayoral election 1998 by Lee, then the chairman of
the KMT, to recommended its candidate Ma Ying-jeou, a so-called mainlander. Many saw
the phrase "new Taiwanese" as an attempt to incorporate those who had immigrated to
Taiwan fairly recently into the category of Taiwanese, previously used only to refer to the
descendants of Han Chinese who had moved to Taiwan from China hundreds of years ago.
Some political critics even believed that this shrewd linguistic innovation had been the
decisive factor in Ma's eventual victory. Two presidential elections later, when the KMT
eventually lost what had been a political monopoly over the island's government, "new
Taiwanese" felt a bit shoddy. Lee was ignominiously dropped from the KMT roster by
his successor and the racial concept "pure Chinese" replaced "new Taiwanese" as the
ideology of the so-called nationalists, that is, the KMT and its returning allies People
First Party and Chinese New Party.
Even so, I had no clue about what Chern would tell me. "That is because you are
interested in racial differences and our attitude toward it," he replied. He told me that
earlier that month he had been invited to attend the honorary degree ceremony of Taiwan
Theological College and Seminary, where Lee Teng-Hui had received a doctor of divinity
degree for his meritorious contributions toward Taiwan's democratization. Invited to say
a few words, Lee delivered his recent thoughts on deliberate distortion of his phrase "new
Taiwanese" and proposed a new locution. "For me, Lee said exactly what Taiwanese
means, I mean, in terms of the ICH and of the E5 guideline." And Chern offered me some
advice: "You should read his speech and write about it in your thesis."
Two weeks after the phone call I got a transcript of the speech from Chern.
Published along with articles commenting the uproar surrounding the current KMT
chairman's trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is a beautifully written speech,
clear and to the point. Abandoning all recourse to race, Lee clearly defined "new era
Taiwanese" as those whose identity is based on a consciousness of democratic
community. The obvious model is America: "We no longer need Taiwanese nationalism,
not to mention fictitious Chinese nationalism. We can only imagine this identity in an
organic society like America's, which is free, pluralistic, and open. [. . .] Our unity is
based on a common belief in democracy, not on blood ties" (Lee 2005:61-62). Based
neither on an essentialist notion of"Taiwanese race" nor on narrow patriotism, the idea of
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a "new era Taiwanese" grew out of the awakening of Taiwan's subjectivity. I could
almost hear the calls for a spiritual revolution.
I was familiar with the CDE's state-centric strategy and its political vision, which are
consistent with my understanding of Lee's invention of this identity. But I fear that this
discourse will not be able to escape misinterpretations emerging from racial politics. All
nationalisms must be built around spiritual cores, but I wonder whether Lee can
successfully build on the idea of new era Taiwanese. To be precise, I wonder whether
people might worry that once Taiwan is independent it might rise up the tension in this
area and give Japan an excuse to return to militant nationalism that proved so disastrous
for it in the 1940s.
Taiwanese people, particularly those with anti-Japanese prejudices, often bemoan
Lee's ambiguous connections with Japan. Lee was born and educated under Japanese
colonialism. An outspoken critic of the discrimination that was rampant during this
imperialist period, Lee has also pointed out important contributions the colonial
government made to Taiwan. Moreover, he adores traditional Japanese culture and
remains close to old Japanese friends, most of whom are right-wingers. These attributes
and others have made Lee a controversial figure in both Taiwan and Japan. In Taiwan he
is the leader who brought true democracy to Taiwan, as much as he is a champion of
Taiwanese independence. In Japan he is praised as a foreigner who truly understands the
Japanese spirit.
To understand Lee's relationship with Japanese culture, let us consider his thinking
about the traditional thinking and behavior of the Japanese warrior, known as bushido. In
his book Bushido kaidai [interpreting bushido: the meaning of noblesse oblige] (Lee
2003), Lee Teng-Hui recalled what he had learned from this tradition and expressed the
hope that contemporary Japanese and Taiwanese might embrace once again the values
they had forgotten. In his history of the idea of bushido, Lee explained that the author of
an important book on the subject, Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933), a true "international man,"
had chosen to write his analysis of bushido in English. Nitobe had wanted to introduce
what he considered the essence of Japanese culture to the foreign world at a time when
Japan's identity was threatened by its growing involvement in the international
community. Lee, too, is keenly alert to the significance of globalization. In an interview
that appeared in the Taipei Times on January 25 2005, Lee said, "the stronger Japan
becomes, the more helpful it is to regional stability in Asia. [.. .] Only when Japan
normalizes as a country is it helpful for Taiwan." When Lee's book was originally
published in Japanese in 2003, it soon became a bestseller and has since been reprinted
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eight times. In a comment left on the Japanese website for Amazon.com, a reader even
expressed the wish that Lee might become Japan's prime minister.
The Taiwanese edition aroused responses far from praises. Having claimed in the
book that bushido could awaken Taiwan's "latent spirit," enabling it to cope with the
difficulties it faced in global politics (Xinlang Wang [Sina News], January 5 2004), Lee
turned his cultural argument into a political one only a month before the presidential
election of 2004. He affirmed that Japan should stand firmly against the PRC; he
supported Prime Minister Koizumi's decision to honor Japanese war dead by worshipping
at the Yasukuni Shrine. Similarly, Lee recommended that Taiwan hold a plebiscite to
determine its future and he encouraged the Taiwanese people to join a political
demonstration to be held on February 28 to protest China's recent anti-Taiwanese
legislation. "Don't be afraid of the PRC," he commented: "Taiwan, Japan, and the United
States are the three powers in East Asia. If we are united, is there anyone we must fear?"
(Ziyu Shibao [Liberty Times], February 18 2004).
Like his formulation "new Taiwanese," Lee's book failed to achieve what he had
hoped, largely as a result of anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese emotions. A book that
proposes to solve Taiwan's problems by adopting a Japanese spirit is not likely to make
many converts in Taiwan, where opposing political parties occupy increasingly polarized
positions vis-d-vis Japan. For example, in 2005 the new chairman of Taiwan's Solidarity
Union Party, an organization for which Lee Teng-Hui's opinions are gospel, visited the
Yasukuni Shrine to honor the twenty-eight thousand Taiwanese soldiers who died while
fighting in the Japanese army, opening a new round of acrimonious political arguments.
I am not sure how to evaluate the concept of"new era Taiwanese," but I do know
that in the current context of global politics, where the words "Japanese nationalism" and
"Taiwanese independence" are taboo, the destinies of Taiwan and Japan are inextricably
linked. In this sense, the ICH is a microcosm of global politics. Neither Japan's insistence
on its racial uniqueness nor Taiwan's proposal based on its practical statehood matches
the conventional scenarios approved by the United States and the PRC. These "odd"
behaviors are the story I have told in this dissertation and Chern has indicated that I might
extend my findings to a broader context.
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Chapter 8
Cry to Be Normal: Govern-Mentality in Globalization
To give a simple definition, it [i.e., healthy nationalism] is when a race or
group of people who share a common destiny are aware that they share a
common destiny and make every effort to enable the country to grow and
prosper politically, economically, and culturally. It is when they have their
own identity, or sense of self, in the world politically, economically,
culturally, and otherwise and co-operate to contribute to that identity.
Without this, there is no way that a nation will be able to stand on its own
two feet.
Nakasone Yasuhiro l
The problem Taiwan faces today is not whether it should be independent




The Meaning of "Normal" and "Pathological" in Globalization
As mentioned in the introductory essay to this part, this chapter stands as a thematic
elaboration of my observation about the debate over racial difference in the International
Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). Although for some readers this chapter may feel
like an aberration, for three reasons I am convinced of its necessity. As part of my effort
to capture a particular moment when global capitalism was marching into Asia, I want to
see whether what I learned about the ICH can be applied to a broader cultural and social
picture of how Japan and Taiwan imagine themselves in the world. That is my first reason.
My second reason is that the story told in previous chapters - the unbending insistence
of Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) on the racial uniqueness of
Nakasone Yasuhiro, My Political Philosophy (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic Party, 1987), quoted in
Hood 1999: 6.
2 Comments at the meet-the-author conference held on the occasion of the publication of Xin shidai
Taiwanren (new era Taiwanese, Lee 2005) at the Grand Hotel, Taipei, May 1 2005.
418
the Japanese and the wish of Taiwan's Center for Drug Evaluation (CDE), often repeated,
that Taiwan might achieve global visibility - provides insights into a cultural and social
mentality. The third reason for this chapter is the need to convey some implications of
this case study for global politics and nationalism. In my study, viewpoint has been
treated as no less important than actions, so it would be difficult to summarize my
findings about international negotiations over drug testing without an account of Japan
and Taiwan's changing attitudes toward race and the state.
Nakasone Yasuhiro and Lee Teng-Hui, whose words are quoted above, share a
number of traits. Both were in power at critical moments in their states' recent history,
with Nakasone facing internationalization and Lee democratization. Despite their less
than overwhelming mandates, both chose to confront these challenges, staking out clear
agendas for the future of Japan and Taiwan. And the comments of both on national
culture have led to confusion and controversy. Their comments have been very different,
always in keeping with Japan's and Taiwan's behavior inside and outside of the ICH.
Here I will briefly introduce their agendas and their shared concerns about the
transformation of Japan and Taiwan in the era of globalization, and in the following
section I will explain how my dissertation findings illuminate this topic.
As historian Christopher Hood has pointed out (1999), Nakasone Yasuhiro is
famous for his seemingly contradictory beliefs in the value of internationalism and
nationalism. From 1982 to 1987, he improved Japan's relations with neighboring
countries, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). And he
was the first Japanese prime minister since World War II to make a state visit to Korea.
Nakasone also maintained close relations with United States President Ronald Reagan;
indeed, a photograph from the 1980s that has a strong resonance for many Japanese
shows Nakasone standing at the center of the group of G7 leaders - previously Japanese
prime ministers tended to be found on the margins of the group (fig. 8.1, left).
Even so, Nakasone was also known for his nationalism. In 1985, for instance, he
became the first Japanese prime minister to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.
Meanwhile, he initiated educational reforms that some considered nationalistic, such as
the use of the emperor's song and the flag emblazoned with rising sun in official
ceremonies. He also strongly believed that Japan should take greater responsibility for
patrolling its own waters. In one infamous episode described in Chapter 4, Nakasone's
nationalism crossed the line into what many considered outright racism: he proclaimed
that Japan's brilliant successes had been won because it did not have ethnic minorities,
like the United States. For this comment he was vilified both by the various non-Japanese
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ethnic groups in Japan, particularly the sizeable Korean minority, and the United States.
Fig. 8.1. Left, Group Picture of World Leaders at the Williamsburg
Summit, with Prime Minister Nakasone Standing between American
President Reagan and United Kingdom Prime Minister Thatcher; Right,
Cover of Lee Teng-Hui's Xin shidai Taiwanren (New Era Taiwanese)
1 q
Sources: Nakasone 1999, 214 (left); Lee 2005 (right).
What was Nakasone's real agenda for Japan's national identity? Many have
commented on the prime minister's dual nature: he was, by turns, hawk and weathercock
(kazamidori): the hawk was the nationalist who advocated such things as constitutional
reform, increased defense spending, and support for the emperor; the weathercock was
the great political opportunist. These descriptions appeared to annoy Nakasone. He once
said: "When I first came onto the political scene the press took me to task for being a
political opportunist or a hawk and wrote about me without realizing that I had
progressive ideas" (quoted from Hood 1997). He wanted the public to know that although
he had won his position by political strategy, this did not mean that he was a shortsighted
politician or someone's puppet: his vision for Japan was clear and long-term.
What, then, were his progressive ideas? The core of Nakasone's vision for Japan
was the racial concept of "healthy nationalism" (kenzenna nashonarizumu). Explained at
a Liberal Democratic Party seminar in 1987, the essence of this concept was that the
identity of the Japanese nation was based on the biological connections between every
member of the polity, which ensured a common destiny. Describing Japan's wartime
nationalism as "unhealthy," Nakasone hoped that a better understanding of Japan would
improve relations with other countries. He routinely visited states involved in disputes
with Japan, and he also set up the International Research Center for Japanese Studies, an
institute located in Kyoto that facilitates foreign study in Japan, especially the work of
foreign scholars who look at Japan's culture from an international perspective.
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II I ~
Nakasone also believed in cultural reform through education. He often repeated that
"power must serve culture," and he believed that this was a key to facing globalization.
While it would take longer than one generation to accomplish, only cultural reforms
would bring further political change, including the revision of Japan's constitution. The
healthy nationalism Nakasone had in mind depended on the coexistence of
internationalization and the formation of national identity. The more Japan was exposed
to the world, the more tightly it would cling to its national integrity. The solution was to
remain in touch with that national character while acquainting one's fellow countrymen
and the rest of the world with it.
Preserving Japan's national identity in the era of globalization, according to
Nakasone, means sailing the ship of state on an international voyage. The world changes
as Japan changes its relation to the world. Up to the beginning of the twentieth century,
Japan had dramatically opened its ports to the rest of the world in two different periods;
the late twentieth century, said Nakasone, marked the "third opening" and he declared
that "the path that Japan follows internationally will determine her destiny." The leaders
of Japan, he insisted, "must be sure at all times to explain to its people where the ship of
state is on its international voyage and what the prevailing weather conditions are. [...]
At the same time, they must secure co-operation and alleviate international unease by
telling the world clearly where Japan is heading" (Nakasone 1999: 219).
Lee Teng-Hui came to power in the late 1980s. An agricultural economist, he
followed a wandering career path, from technocrat to chairman of the Kuomintang
(Chinese Nationalist Party KMT), and finally president of Taiwan. Unlike his
authoritarian predecessor, Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo, who had served as
unelected president for life, Lee was Taiwan-born and, in due course, democratically
elected: he remained in office from 1988 to 2000. During his presidency, Taiwan's
political system was completely reformed and democratized. He put an end to the
one-party dictatorship of the KMT. His prestige reached its peak during Taiwan's first
direct presidential election in 1996, which Lee won with 55% of the vote. For his
achievements, Lee was praised by news outlets worldwide as "Mr. Democracy."
Many who admire Lee's record of domestic reforms cannot accept Lee's approach
to foreign relations, particularly his strong advocacy of Taiwanese independence and de
jure statehood, clear contradictions of longstanding KMT policy. The KMT holds that the
territory presently governed by the PRC, combined with Mongolia and Taiwan, make up
a country called the Republic of China (ROC), whose legitimate government is the KMT.
Though it seized control over Taiwan when it was surrendered by the Japanese in 1945
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and lost control of all other lands four years later, the KMT regime has steadfastly refused
to recognize either the PRC or the Mongolian People's Republic. Nonetheless, during his
second term Lee Teng-Hui tried to distinguish Taiwan from the ROC, setting out to
resume diplomatic relations with Mongolia and proposing a special state-to-state
relationship with the PRC. In addition, Lee's attitude toward the United States and Japan
is ambiguous. His education and his statements have suggested to many that he is
politically allied with the United States and culturally with Japan. As chairman of the
KMT, Lee was dogged by persistent suspicions that he secretly supported his political
opposites and was intentionally sabotaging the party he was leading. The defeat of the
KMT in the 2000 presidential election resulted in a disgraceful expulsion of Lee from the
party.
Lee Teng-Hui's policy of "resisting China" has been considered racially essentialist
since Taiwan cannot avoid being assimilated into the PRC unless its people develop a
unified non-Chinese identity which, some argue, may be based on biological difference
(e.g., Lin et al. 2001). Such Taiwanese nationalism is often criticized as calculating and
discriminatory to those who believe that they are Han Chinese.3 When people talk about
"authentic" Taiwanese, they mean always the Holos, who make up a majority of Taiwan's
population. Some have complained that by seeking to turn their history into the central
trunk rather than an appendage, the Holos forced other ethnic groups into the margins.
For example, it is said that the so-called mainlanders can be considered Taiwanese in
Lee's nationalist scheme only if they accept the additional identity of "new Taiwanese."
For all of these reasons, Lee is by turns vilified and praised, especially since becoming
the guiding force behind the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union.
Although Lee's political career looks complicated, his agenda has been rather
consistent. Like Nakasone, Lee may be an opportunist, but his determination to make
Taiwan a globally recognized democratic state has never wavered. According to New Era
Taiwanese, Lee is determined to situate Taiwan's path to survival in an international
3 Here is provided the island's ethnic geography. Except for the aborigines, who are Austronesians,
three of the four main ethnic groups in Taiwan, the Holos, the Hakkas, and the so-called mainlanders, are
considered biologically alike (see Chem Herng-Der's interpretation on Lin et al 2001 in Chapter 5, Part 2).
Though each has its own language, all can be called Han Chinese or huaren. The largest group, accounting
for about 67% of the population, is the Holo, who are the descendants of migrants from nearby Fujian
Province. Often they are simply referred to as Taiwanese. The Hakka, who make up around 15% of the
population, have a long history of moving from place to place in China and Hakka communities are found
in may places in south China today. They have a culture and language quite distinct from any other Chinese
group. Mainlanders, a cultural hodgepodge, are the descendants of the soldiers and refugees who
immigrated to Taiwan between 1948 and 1953, and they make up about 10% of the population. There has
been so much intermarriage that these groups are all hard to delineate, especially in the case of the
mainlanders. Usually, anyone whose patrilineal line has recent roots in mainland China is called a
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context. Occupied over time by various groups and now a part of the Asian security
network, Taiwan neither belongs to any other country nor can it be isolated from the rest
of the world. This means that Taiwan's political status has to be determined by
international trends. Since it has not yet been recognized by large international
organizations, Taiwan must construct a statehood acceptable to the rest of the world,
namely, democracy. This means extending the domestic reforms for which Lee was
lauded and distinguishing Taiwan from the PRC by standing with the globe's democratic
countries. The most important characteristic of Lee's vision is the "deracialization" of
Taiwanese nationalism. Although Taiwan exhibits less ethnic diversity than the United
States, it has chosen to imagine its statehood this way in order to avoid unnecessary
factionalism. This idea is nicely echoed by the cover of Lee's book, which is simply a
face of a baby of fairly minimal phenotypic distinctiveness that cannot register as having
a specific group identity (fig. 8.1, right). The Taiwanese of the new era, according to this
vision, are simply those who have commitments to a specific political entity.
Despite the differences in Lee's and Nakasone's strategies for dealing with
globalization, both hoped for "normal" countries. For example, Nakasone claimed that
Japanese lacked the important experience of drawing up a constitution. While the Meiji
constitution was drawn up under orders from the emperor, Japan's current constitution
was largely sketched by the Western powers during the postwar occupation of Japan
(Nakasone 1999: 223). Taiwan is in a similar position: its constitution was drawn up with
the government of all of China in mind. Modifying this document would, as Lee writes,
"put an end to a fiction, reviving reality and truth and making us confront our situation.
There exists only one truth: Taiwan is just what it is" (Lee 2005: 71). Both Lee and
Nakasone feel that making Taiwan and Japan "normal" countries will involve recasting
the image of the two entities in the world.
But their programs led to problems. Nakasone was aware that his nationalist
arguments could easily be misunderstood (Nakasone 1999:219), and indeed many have
lumped him with such right-wingers as Ishihara Shintaro and Ishikawa Akira (mentioned
in Chapters 3 and 4), who have long demanded that Japan be allowed to chart its own
course and fight its own wars. Similarly, although Lee's wish to cast Taiwan as a normal
country implies soothing the military tensions across the Taiwan Straits through
diplomatic negotiations, few world powers appreciate this idea. Those who assert
Taiwan's political agency are demonized as "Taiwan independence fundamentalists" or
waishengren, literally "outside the province person."
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"troublemakers." The message is clear: "Do as you are told."
I do not want to make any moral judgments here about who should be responsible
for this situation. Instead I would like to speak of the normal and the pathological. In his
historical study of medical knowledge, Georges Canguilhem (1991) argued that the
creation of standards about bodily conditions shaped our understanding of pathology. In
the same manner, the modem world creates a grid that defines which state should be seen
as normal and which as pathological. Still, Japan and Taiwan do look like normal states,
and this created a gray area where problems arose. 4 This is the starting point of my
ethnographic investigation.
Asian States and Govern-Mentality
Given Nakasone's and Lee's ambitions to "normalize" Japan and Taiwan, the
importance of a conference devoted to establishing universal standards becomes clear.
The ICH is no ordinary global meeting, but a primal one: it determines rules concerning
what will be considered normal in drug regulation and what will not. It establishes
standards for what is "normal." If these two states are trying to be normal, why can't they
just simply accept these rules and become "normal"?
Our ethnographic journey started with a simple yet demanding mission: examining
a debate among the members of the ICH over racial differences to gain insight into
Japan's and Taiwan's efforts to advance their national projects in the nexus of capitalism,
globalization, and the international pharmaceutical industry. However, over the course of
long and intensive fieldwork in these places, I switched from studying health issues to
focusing on the state. For Asian countries, the ICH is not a purely scientific forum, and
explaining some of its actions requires the use of historiographic and anthropological
theories. Specifically, explanations often depend on careful examination of what goes on
in individual member states.
That is why I have presented both a story of two Asian states encountering the ICH
and a parallel ethnographic investigation of how they present their distinctiveness while
coping with globalization. Public health may be the main concern driving their
negotiating postures at the ICH, but that is not all that determines their behavior.
4 As a further discussion, we know in Canguilhem's historical thesis it was the existence of
pathological that helped scientists make sense of what the normal should be. In other words, what is at
stake is not which part of the world is treated badly but the action to divide these parts by a set of medical
knowledge that shapes our imagination and practice about body and life. Similarly, the present thesis
challenges the norm of modem state by bringing up the "pathological" reactions of Japan and Taiwan when
encountering globalization.
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Throughout the discussion of racial difference we have seen innumerable interventions
that have far less to do with science than with politics. While the practical goal of the
ICH is consistently the elimination of redundant clinical trials, each state acts according
to its needs. The process is dynamic and interactive. It is dynamic because the two states
encountered the ICH in various situations and at different times. Even after long and
exhausting negotiations by the expert working group, the implementation of the E5
guideline did not mark the end of this story, since Taiwan then seized the chance to speak
for itself. In reviewing this story, we find that the discussion of racial difference is never a
simple bilateral business negotiation. While the global pharmaceutical industry attempted
to "capture" Japan in the bilateral Market-Oriented, Sector-Selected Discussion (MOSS)
talks, Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) silently retreated to the global ICH.
Although the E5 guideline includes two interpretations of clinical trials and racial
difference, the CDE's bridging policy brought lights to this situation. It did so by showing
that even when different parties were deadlocked over it, the guideline still worked. Of
course, Taiwan's embrace of globalization has several goals. To overcome a lack of
global recognition, it is trying to weave a broad web to link the global and the regional.
Along with this development, new global actors, such as Singapore, join the game,
ensuring that parallel historical and ethnographic inquiries can continue endlessly.
While tracing the vision of the state in this process, I need to distance my approach
from two misleading interpretations of Asian states. In Chapter 4 I took on the view that
these states simply practice "protectionism under the disguise of cultural essentialism"
Because they view questions about drugs almost exclusively in terms of profits, the
industry people I interviewed tended to interpret failed attempts to get Japan to waive all
local trials as the predictable result of the country's refusal to relinquish protective tariffs.
Japan's unique culture is considered nothing but an improper attitude toward business.
What is wrong with this line of reasoning? Unwittingly it separates culture from modem
institutions. Westerners can appreciate exotic customs and culture, but at the institutional
level the Western-dominated industry does not enjoy cultural diversity. From its
mechanical viewpoint, the world has only one standard and every institution should obey
the same logic.
From this perspective, the process of E5 negotiation is typical of the vicious circle
of "making and breaking" rules that I have described in Chapter 4. Japan seems to be the
only state that dares to disobey the rules of globalization. Through the construction of
cultural uniqueness, it casts itself as an exception to all rules, permitting others to depict it
as the player that unilaterally ignores rules. In the case of the E5 guidelines, race is a
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disguise: a competitive Japanese state is the goal. Since there is no way to escape from
this cycle, the only solution was more rules (for example, the Q&A on the E5 guideline)
or a greater emphasis on science, which would, it was hoped, force Japan to clarify every
word of the rule. As this thesis shows, these attempts failed.
The second faulty interpretation of Asian states and the expansion of medical
institutions relies on ideas about global hierarchy. As readers may have noticed, this topic
is little discussed in the previous chapters. Even so, humanities researchers, particularly
those who are acquainted with anthropology and cultural studies, tend to conceive of
Asian countries and the ICH in terms of a hierarchy. In a study of the introduction of the
remarkable new group of antidepressants called SSRIs (selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors) to Japan, Kalman Applbaum (2005) connected the truly global construction of
depression with a huge growth in the treatment of depression. The various actors in
Applbaum's study, from industry representative to researcher, borrow frames and theories
from evolutionary globalism, which stands for progress and political, scientific, and
moral enlightenment.
The problem with this fascinating approach is its unequal treatment of the agents
involved. To construct a coherent narrative about this top-down expansion of marketing
from the United States to non-Western regions, only those who can present this agenda
are mentioned. Thus, in an ethnography of Japan, we hear few local voices and many
foreign voices commenting on Japan. For example, in his section on clinical trials in
Japan, Applbaum notes the harsh criticisms offered by foreign industry representatives
but says nothing about local reactions to them. The same is true of his discussion of the
pricing system, where the agent of the MHLW, the policy maker, is simply absent. In
addition, this study commits the unpardonable sin of failing to mention the ethnographic
potential of the ICH. Although Applbaum notes the role regulatory authorities play in the
global expansion of the market, he merely casts the ICH as an instrument through which
this capitalist wish is fulfilled. As the present thesis has demonstrated, the ethnographic
pitfalls in this theoretical construction are sizable.
Applbaum's hierarchical insights could also be called the story of global
governmentality. It is not necessary to provide a detailed review of Michel Foucault's
famous study: my interest is in three characteristics Foucault assigns to governmentality
(Foucault 1991:102-3). First, it is a specific and complex form of power exercised
through various institutions and practices. Second, its institutional preeminence produces
a series of governmental apparatuses and a whole complex of ideology. Third, this
institutional production is itself gradually "governmentalized," performed in a more
disciplined, regulated way. But does this description apply to intergovernmental
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institutional development?
Akhil Gupta's Postcolonial Developments (1998) helps answer this question. In a
critique of the discourse of underdevelopment, Gupta shows how being drawn into the
global politico-economy - what he calls "global governmentality" - becomes a
dilemma for the Indian state. In this study, the sovereignty of the nation-state depends on
"the recognition of other nation-states, of other units that are different in their culture,
history, and even 'temperament' but alike in their constitutive modality" (318).
Sovereignty is not a solitary fact but a relation to the rest of the world presented as
self-sufficiency. In other words, when non-Western countries are examined through the
lens of "hierarchical governmentality," the assessment of their relationship with the
global tends to be pessimistic. The state, according to Gupta as the nation's governance,
fuses in the grandiose world web and conducts unambiguously the control form the
governmentality on the world scale (314).
Although I do not reject this worldview completely, over the course of the present
thesis I have presented some alternatives or exceptions in which the state was neither a
neutral instrument that passively transformed global governmentality, nor a nexus of
politico-economic apparatuses that served only capitalism. We have to be careful in
extending Foucault's description of governmentality from the nation to the world. In my
opinion, those who borrow this idea and consider the world as thoroughly hierarchical
fails to address, first, the possible ideological conflicts between the state and the world. If
Foucault is right in saying that "local" governmentality is the result of a complex of
ideologies compatible with state apparatuses, we are compelled to ask whether the
encounter between state governmentality and global governmentality yields conflicts.
Also, such an approach fails to address the possible conflicts during the formation of
global governmentality. If Foucault was right about the governmentalization of
governmentality, i.e., the international governmentality has to be achieved by a
formalized, regulated way, we have to ask in what governmentalized ways the global
governmentality is formed, and in what ways local governmentalities work together.
Let me take Taiwan as a rather extreme challenge to this approach. As described in
Chapter 1, Taiwan has been a de facto self-sufficient state since the end of World War II
but has a truly awful diplomatic record. Thus, when Taiwan encounters globalization the
results are rather complicated. For example, while the ICH is officially an
intergovernmental organization dedicated to facilitating a single, global market, Taiwan
sees it as a channel through which its governmentality can be secured. As I have shown,
in order to be incorporated into this global governmentality, the CDE tries its best to
make itself heard by the rest of the world. Instead of a weapon that strong powers can
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wield to repress the weak in the name of globalization, the ICH may well serve the
voiceless in their negotiations with the rule makers. The CDE's decision to adopt
bridging studies can be said to please global industry; however we cannot forget that if no
"global" standard existed, the Taiwanese government would have lost all tools of
resistance to the pressure to give up its clinical trials. In global governmentality some
states will be somehow "defaced," but Taiwan does not even have a nose yet.
In combining Foucauldian governmentality with ethnographic attention to local
concerns and perspectives, I have developed an approach to statehood in the era of
globalization that I refer to as "govern-mentality." I emphasize three points. First, echoing
Nakasone and Lee's visions of making their states "normal," this chapter will treat these
cultural agendas sympathetically. Unlike scholars of international relations, who exclude
cultural factors from their evaluation of policy making, I consider them necessary parts
that contribute to the integrity of a state. In other words, I will not judge whether these
ideologies are fictitious; instead, taking together these ideological factors (i.e., Japanese
racial uniqueness and Taiwanese state solidarity), I hope to offer an appraisal of how
Japan and Taiwan think about survival in the globalizing world.
The second aspect of the state's govern-mentality has to do with the governmental
construction of global governmentality. Race and the state, the two cornerstones of
nationalism, are treated very differently in Taiwan's and Japan's governmentalities. Why?
Third, I want to emphasize Japan's and Taiwan's different paths toward
globalization. As Akhil Gupta points out, the notion of the nation is perpetually in flux;
this is also true of the ICH. While I certainly accept that there are some essential
differences between Japan and Taiwan concerning racial difference and the state, I would
like to emphasize their divergent reactions to globalization. As we will see in the main
body of this chapter, Japan presents a kind of "double helix" model, where its concerns
about race and the state are always entangled. Meanwhile, isolated from and ignored by
the world, Taiwan presents a territorial model. In domestic politics, Taiwan has to treat
race as a prominent issue, but while facing the world it treats the state as its most
important concern.
PART II
DOUBLE HELIX OF STATE AND RACE: JAPAN IN GLOBLIZATION
From Bilateral to Global: Two Modes of Kokusaika
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In this part I trace Japan's transformation via two seemingly divergent concepts,
internationalization (kokusaika) and race (minzoku). 5 While these Japanese terms were
created to translate Western words, their meaning has since become subtly but
unmistakably specific to Japan. I mentioned in Chapter 1 that minzoku refers to a group
identified by shared biological characteristics and cultural values; it can be translated as
ethnicity, people, or nation (see Chapter 1). And the meaning of kokusaika and minzoku
has changed with time, making it difficult to discuss them in English.





















Source: Adapted from Hoshino 1994, fig. 1-4.
Describing the Japanese people's feverish excitement about their country's growing
role in global affairs, Sawada Akio declared in 1990 that it left many "unable to sleep at
night" (1). Though the term kokusaika was only rarely used before the end of World War
II, this does not mean that there was no contact between Japan and the rest of the world
before then. Reviewing Japan's relationship with other countries, Hoshino Akiyoshi laid
out four periods, each of which has a specific dynamic of interaction, as shown in figure
8.2 (1994: 23-25). My understanding is that these dynamics imply two modes of
kokusaika that emerged after the long period of Japan's isolation. It originally conveyed
bilateral interactions and later came to refer to participation in global affairs.
5 For a brief review of different definitions of kokusaika, see Sawada and Kadowaki 1990:48-64.
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The bilateral mode consisted of three dynamics up to the beginning of postwar
period. An early dynamic was "becoming European" (saioka). Japan treated Western
Europe, whose agents frequently visited Japan on mercantile and diplomatic vessels, as
the very embodiment of modernity. The second dynamic of kokusaika presented it as
"becoming Japanese" (nihonka). By the 1930s much had been done to transform Japan
into a modern state, so when it offered the idea of a "greater East Asian economic sphere"
as the ideological justification for a massive imperialist adventure, the rulers of Japan
imagined that there could hardly be anything more modem than their industrialized and
economically thriving state.
The third dynamic, which might be called dominant-subordinate kokusaika or
parallel kokusaika, can be understood as a combination of the first two dynamics. It
presents a unidirectional diffusion of cultural and political influence from Europe or the
United States to Japan and from Japan to other Asian countries. This dynamic can be
traced from the first postwar appearance of kokusaika, which, according to Kitamura
Kazuyuki (1990), was in an article entitled "Internationalization of Domestic Policy" that
appeared in Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japanese economic news) on November 8, 1961:
The economies of every country in the world are now closely related to each other,
so domestic policy must take into account foreign policy issues. [...] In the past,
when those charged with shaping foreign policy made critical comments about
domestic policy, this was seen as intervening in internal affairs - such comments
could not be accepted. But the recent tendency - reflecting broadly shared
thinking - is to think of domestic policy as connected to international
negotiations. [...] The point that attracts our attention is that when it comes to
economic policy the boundary between the domestic and the international
becomes attenuated. (quoted from Kitamura 1990: 29, emphasis mine)
The above quotation conveys the connection between economics and kokusaika. It was
economic issues that first convinced the Japanese that putting an end to the embargo on
foreign trade was inevitable (29-30) and initially the term kokusaika was used
exclusively in the field of economics. It did not show up in major newspapers until the
early 1970s, by which time the Japanese were well on their way to full
internationalization. The Japanese government both led the actions and promoted the
term kokusaika. In 1955 Japan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; in
1963 it lifted the restrictions on imports from its member states; and in 1964 it eliminated
controls over currency flow to eight International Monetary Foundation member states. In
that same year, Japan joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development and arranged to reduce its tariffs. Over the ensuing years a series of
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government studies appeared: An Economic Plan for the Fifth Decade of the Showa
Period (1967), Energy Problems in the Age of Internationalism (1969), and A New Plan
for the Development of Economic Society (1970). Taken as a whole, these identified the
steps Japan would have to take to enter the world economy. And so the Western world
gradually infiltrated every aspect of Japanese life.
Let us take a closer look at this dynamic. It is built upon a hierarchical world system,
with Europe and America at the center and East Asia at the periphery. In this picture,
Japan is not part of Asia and stands somewhere between the West and the East, a crucial
node in the flow of influence from the center to the periphery. Of course, some view this
system as problematic, but that is not the point I want to discuss here.6 What I want to
point out is the bilateral nature of this worldview. As the use of kokusaika in the above
quotation of Nihon Keizai Shinbun suggests, Japan saw itself as a nation apart,
fundamentally different from both Asia and the West. Ignoring interactions among other
countries, the models in fig. 8.2. show only what Japan learned from the West and what
Japan taught to other Asian countries. This is a "Japan-centric" world. The familiar
and racially charged - image is that of a boiled egg, its perfectly spherical and
impervious Japanese yolk surrounded by the foreign white (Hoshino 1994: 14).
Putting aide the "Asian side" of kokusaika, namely Japan's relationship with other
Asian countries, many Japanese viewed the Western part of kokusaika as a threat, the
possibility of rich material rewards for surrendering the purity of one's culture.7 For
example, occupying the conservative position, Sawada Akio said that "the trade friction
(due to the blame of protectionism), after all, is the result of a cultural problem.
Internationalization means changing our traditional customs, in other words, our culture;
we absolutely cannot accept this kind of internationalization" (1990: 4). But Japan cannot
resist change forever.
In Chapter 4 described an instance of the sort of bilateral negotiations between the
United States and Japan that can emerge from this understanding, and the Japanese did
not like the setting of communication. Still, for different reasons, some experts on Japan,
such as Karel G van Wolferen, have failed to come to terms with the Japanese worldview.
Wolferen stated that Japan's refusal to open its markets to the world while taking full
6 Critics of the dominant-subordinate discourse appeared in the early 1970s, but only really attracted
public attention in the late 1980s when Japan's bubble economy was teetering and its ODA policy was in
question. A typical criticism is Toba Kinichiro's The Japanese Who Have Two Faces (1973).
7 Apparently, influences from other Asian countries were not taken into consideration, since Japanese
assumed that those countries on the receiving end of the flow of influence from Japan would have no
reciprocal effect on Japan.
431
advantage of other countries' open markets was simply unfair (1986: 299). He accused
Japan of cultural relativism and described the so-called understanding between Japan and
the West as a form of bargaining. In the Japanese language, he explained, the term
"understanding" (wakaru) refers to acceptance or tolerance: "You show true
understanding of people or things by accepting them the way they are if you are not
strong enough to challenge them. If you have strength, the other party will show
understanding by a certain degree of adaptation to your wishes" (300).
Hoshino (1994) basically admitted this observation, but he did not admit that
Japan's approach to negotiation led inevitably to a zero-sum outcome. He presented a
structured process: the more contact there is between two cultures, the more complex
their encounter becomes (11). The only way for Japan to survive in a globalized world,
according to Hoshino, is to approach what he called "enforced internationalization"
(shikatanashi kokusaika) warily and very calculatingly. This supports my previous
observation about the quick resolution of the issue of foreign clinical data at the MOSS
negotiations. (Recall that while the construction of Japanese race was challenged during
these talks, the MHW eventually chose to retreat.)
However, the above dynamic was not what Hoshino wanted to see. The fourth
dynamic of kokusaika (fig. 8.2, boxes at the bottom), which he called interdependency,
differs from previous models by portraying a harmonious world to which the West and
Japan contribute equally. This can be well-explained by Japan's attitude toward a
multilateral relationship to the world. As Hoshino explained, this dynamic insists on fair
and equal relations among states and on a degree of flexibility about one's own traditions
and those of others. For example, Western societies must respect some Asian values,
while Japan must make some changes in the name of internationalism. This does not
mean that Japan has to open its markets or change its cultural values. Although Hoshino
spoke of the need for interdisciplinary research on kokusaika and expressed concern
about the negative influence of Japan's xenophobic society, the whole point of the
research was to prevent deeper foreign infiltration of Japan so that its social system
would suffer no changes (11).8
For Japan, kokusaika is still a process of bargaining; as Hoshino pointed out, Japan
"acts as a member of the international community, and the Japanese social system, which
clings to its characteristics, engages in some exchanges with other states" ( 11). This is a
8 Hoshino reported on two projects conducted by Japan's Asia University between 1990 and 1992. The
first project was meant to assess Japan's achievements since the introduction of kokusaika, while the second
was to study potential future problems.
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sort of ecological worldview: the world resembles an ecosystem in which every
nation-state has its own niche. Harmony is achieved by preserving each one as a distinct
"species." Only from this viewpoint can we understand the MHW's attitude toward racial
difference in the ICH. While Western experts believe that the differences among human
beings are essentially cultural and not biological, the MHW experts never even viewed
this as a possibility.
In fact, underlying the interdependent dynamic is a unilateral attempt to preserve
Japan's integrity while becoming part of a globalizing world. This is consistent with
Nakasone's sailing metaphor and with the first project on kokusaika conducted by the
Professors World Peace Academy, Japan.9 The goal of this interdisciplinary study was to
formulate an integrated strategy for Japan in the era of globalization. Over two thousand
scholars contributed, from the fields of civilization, religion, politics, national security,
economics, technological innovation, and education. Their results were presented at the
International Conference on World Peace in 1978, which was attended by fifty-nine
scholars from twelve Asia-Pacific countries, and were subsequently published in a
700-page report entitled Japan and the International Era.
The report is centrally concerned with determining Japan's "national goal" in the
global era, and the analogy of sailing turns up in the preface: "Based on these studies and
experiences [we hope] to draft at least a precise admiralty map to ensure the Nihonmaru
[Japanese ship of state] safe sailing and then to draft precise guidelines for it"
(PWPA-Japan 1979: 70). The report set the goal of restoring Japan's national essence,
which had almost been lost as a result of rapid economic development. "As Japan's
traditional educational system decayed," wrote the report's authors, "the racial spirit also
declined. Japanese were no longer proud to be citizens of an independent nation-state.
Instead they directed their efforts to industrial and technological development; economic
growth became their goal" (70-71).
Factors that might deflect the great Japanese ship of state from its course included
external pressures (gaiatu) and internal pressures (naiatu). To be truly independent, Japan
had to consider its strategic position in global politics and international relations. At the
same time, it had to protect its citizens from poverty and infirmity. But in addition to
concerns about politics and the economy, policymakers were quite concerned about
national consciousness and hoped to cultivate reflections on the beauty of the Japanese
9 The Professors World Peace Academy was founded in Seoul in 1973 by 168 Japanese and Korean
professors and researchers under the supervision of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World
Christianity. The Japanese branch of the Professors World Peace Academy was founded in 1974 by
Professor Matsushita Masatoshi, the former president of Rikkyo University. He is also the leader of the
International Era and Japan Project.
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and of Japanese traditions. This did not mean a return to imperialism, the report clarified,
but the revival of an ethical code that could unify Japanese society, "rebuilding a racial
ethics in response to the international community" (648-49).
This ideological view helps us understand the MHLW's post-E5 strategy. In spite of
external pressures from foreign companies and internal pressure from patients' groups, it
rejected a proposed bridging study and insisted on global drug development. As I
repeatedly argue in the present thesis, global drug development must not be
misinterpreted as one more kind of Japanese protectionism: if we want to understand
Japan's actions on the international stage, we had better study the cultural and social roots
of Japan's kokusaika.
Immigrants and Minzoku: Multiethnic Japan
This section deals with the changing idea of minzoku. I will point out challenges
brought by kokusaika that pushed Japan to ponder the meaning of its nation. For this
purpose, I will treat minzoku as a verbal reflection of the Japanese self-image, the sum of
citizenship, race, culture, and spirit, and a working reference for coming changes.
Unlike the prewar and interwar periods, after World War II there were countless
public discussions of the nature of the Japanese minzoku. 10 Tsukishima Kenzo (2000)
pointed out that during the Meiji and Taisho periods the image of the simple Meiji no hito
(Meiji person) captured Japan as a modem nation. But Japan's defeat and the following
occupation started an inevitable institutional change, engaging anthropologists,
philosophers, historians, literati, economists, psychologists, linguists, psychiatrists, and
even entrepreneurs and businessmen (309-37).
Within a comparative study of Japan's postwar society, language, mentality, and
culture, Tsukishima singled out for attention the burgeoning material contributed by
ordinary persons' international experiences, such as overseas trips and foreign study. But
such records do not deal directly with what the Japanese are and individual self-portraits
are both fragmentary and desultory (2000: 332). The divergence of academic and popular
discourses is my starting point. The transformation of the Japanese minzoku was not
initiated by academic pursuits; instead, it was achieved by the accumulation of
interactions between the Japanese people and the outside world.1' As we will see in the
10 In his huge, well-documented book (1998), Oguma Eiji criticizes the cultural construction of
Japanese minzoku before the coming of kokusaika. It did so by tracing the relationship of Japan with
"non-Japanese" territories, such as Okinawa, Hokkaido, Formosa (Taiwan), and Chosen (Korea).
] I For example, in his study on the discourses on what is Japan and the Japanese, Oguma Eiji points out
that to consider Japan as a nation state made up by a single race is not a native concept (1995). For example,
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rest of this section, the construction of a homogenous minzoku is continuously challenged
by the new situations brought by exposure to the foreign world.
Under the bilateral mode of kokusaika, minzoku occupies a crucial position. In a
famous book, Wagatsuma Hiroshi and Yoneyama Toshinao (1967) pinpointed the
different understandings of minzoku held by Japan and the United States. When the
Japanese picture Americans, they see only white people, much as they see a homogenous
Japanese minzoku. On the other hand, the image they associated with the claim "We are
all Americans" was a heterogeneous assortment of ethnic groups (146-47). Divergent
American and Japanese conceptions of race resulted in a misunderstanding when
representatives of the two countries discussed racial difference during the MOSS
negotiation. The MHW thought that the United States would appreciate its commitment
to protecting its people's health; this is clear from a comment made by Naito Chikayuki,
the E5 expert. As discussed in Chapter 4, Naito not only divided racial difference into
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, which corresponded to the categories ofjinshu and shudan,
he explained this difference by comparing Japanese and Caucasians, assuming the
homogeneity of each population. Proposing a bridging study involves just such an
assumption. Although Western scientists claimed that mathematical algorithms can
translate the clinical data derived from a study of one race to another, the very need for
bridging is a result not of racial differences among populations, but of territorial
differences.
The meaning of minzoku shifts readily from citizenship, to race, to culture. Think of
how the term is used in discussions of discrimination against buraku, Korean-Japanese,
Ainu, and immigrants from former colonies.12 After Japan signed a Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1963, it worked to make
minority voices heard. 13 Even so, kokusaika played the leading role in making this
problem visible, not always in a positive way. For example, as social activist Tanaka
Hiroshi (1991) pointed out, Japanese law does not recognize ethnic schools (minzoku
gakko) as part of its formal educational system; graduates of the Tokyo Kangoku
it was harshly rebutted by the government declarations in the wartime. It was not consolidated until the
postwar period after the Japanese Empire was forced to forsake all its colonies. For detail, see Oguma 1995,
Chapters 16 and 17.
12 Discrimination against members of the buraku group - descendants of those who belonged to
despised occupational categories - is the oldest form of racial discrimination in Japan, dating back to the
Meiji period. According to a government survey, there were about 1.2 million buraku people living in 4,442
buraku communities nationwide; other sources estimate that the number of communities is roughly six
thousand and the total number of buraku men and women surpassed three million.
13 For a brief introduction to and analysis of the CERD, see Shin 1997.
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Gakuyen high school for Korean Japanese, for instance, are not qualified to take the
university entrance examination. Revealingly, the recent kokusaika policy encouraging
foreign students to attend college in Japan means that if a Korean boy or girl comes to
Japan with his or her businessman father and spends the final year of high school at an
ethnic school in Tokyo, he or she is ineligible to attend college in Japan, whereas
classmates who remained in Seoul are eligible (164-66).
The direct effects of kokusaika have forced Japan to clarify its ambiguous ideas
about minzoku. When many foreign workers immigrated to Japan in the 1980s and early
1990s, they contributed to what sociologist John Lie calls "the Second Opening of Japan"
(Lie 2004). Newsweek magazine has predicted that by 2030 Japan will be a major
destination for immigrants (fig. 8.3). Already urban Japanese see foreigners everywhere:
they prepare food and wait tables at cafes and restaurants; they work on countless
construction sites; they stand in line at the supermarket. And many of these foreigners are
of Japanese descent.
Fig. 8.3. Left, Cover of Newsweek Magazine's Special Issue, "2030:
Japan, a Great Immigrant Nation"; Right, Page from the Special Issue
Showing a Brazilian Taxi Driver in Tokyo Awaiting a Fare
$6 2033*45M
Source: Newsweek (Japanese edition), August 6, 2003.
Japan is no longer a static nation. People come and go. Due to Japan's low birth rate,
if its labor force is to be maintained, the United Nations has estimated that Japan will
have to accept 610,000 immigrants annually. Japanese may not embrace these newcomers,
but their long-term recession has forced them to accept them. Figures from 2003 show
that there are 1.78 million foreign laborers working in Japan, half of whom work in
occupations considered unappealing by Japanese. Another phenomenon is that of
"non-Japanese Japanese," citizens whose attitudes differ from those of traditional
Japanese because of long periods spent abroad. Many emigrants have recently returned
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from abroad; for example, now there are 33,000 Brazilian-Japanese living in Japan. And
while some who are conventionally thought of as foreign, such as Japanese-born
Taiwanese and Koreans, have been granted Japanese citizenship, few view them as
authentic Japanese. These recent changes have undermined traditional ideas of what the
minzoku is.
A recent case suggests how complicated the situation has become. Since 1996 a sign
reading "Japanese Only" has hung outside a public bath in Otaru (Lazio 2000). 14 The
bath is privately owned and the owner claims that the sign was placed to accommodate
Japanese guests who do not want to share a bathtub with a foreigner. On November 1,
2000, a Caucasian male who is a naturalized Japanese citizen came to that bath with
documents proving his nationality, hoping to use the facilities - he was turned away. The
owner explained his concern that Japanese guests would leave because of the white man's
"foreign appearance." Local authorities tried to bring the bath house into agreement with
government policies requiring equal treatment of all Japanese citizens, but in vain. "The
irony," the report comments, "is that in Otaru the bathhouses that reject foreigners are the
most popular" (10).
If kokusaika calls attention to the Japan's changing demographic landscape, it has
also created an increasingly visible group that throws into question the boundaries created
by the concept of a Japanese minzoku. Somewhat surprisingly, Japan has a fairly long
history of multiethnic marriages. Some emigrants to the United States and Brazil, as well
as those who participated in the imperialist expansion into Manchuria and East Asia in
the first three decades of the twentieth century, married local people, complicating
Japan's biological complexion. i Between World War II and the Vietnam War, many
American soldiers mated with Japanese women. 16 The number of marriages between
men from Japan and women from the PRC or Southeast Asia and between Japanese
14 The group that issued a report on this situation, Issho, is a Japan-based, nonprofit, nongovernmental
organization established in 1992. The goal of Issho (the word means "together") is the achievement of a
truly multiethnic Japan, and the group monitors issues related to human diversity, language, culture, and
coexistence worldwide, striving to facilitate a greater recognition and understanding of these issues, both in
Japan and abroad.
l5 According to statistics collected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the end of World War II there
were 4,258 Japanese emigrants residing in North America, 91,063 in Central and South America, 180,534
in Manchuria, and 25,740 in South East Asia (Tanaka 1991. 189). Although this does not tell us how much
intermarriage took place at the time, it gives us some sense of the scale and breadth of Japanese emigration.
16 According to Murphy-Shigematsu (2001), more than 80,000 Japanese-American couples have come
to the United States since 1945, and the number of orphans abandoned as a result of Japanese-American
reproduction has been significant. The stationing of troops in Japan led to the birth of many children
fathered by Americans both in and out of marriage. This phenomenon is referred to in Japan as the
konketsuji boomu.
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women and Western men has been increasing since the 1970s. According to statistics
collected by the MHW, in 1990 there are 25,626 cases of international marriage in Japan,
a 350% increase over 1980; the number has exceeded 25,000 each year since then. By
1994 international marriages comprised approximately 3.5% of all marriages in Japan. In
1997 these numbers reaches 28,251 and 3.6%, accounting for one in every twenty-eight
marriages. In some metropolitan areas, such as greater Tokyo, this number is as high as
one in fourteen.' 7 Still, it remains difficult to assess this trend with any degree of
precision because the Japanese government has no intention of identifying its citizens by
ethnicity.
Given unflattering labels, such as ainoko (built-up child), konketsuji (mixed blood),
hafu (a transliteration of the English word half, meaning half-Japanese), and, more
recently, daburu ("double") and kokusaiji (international child), these multiethnic people
are trying to find an identity and a voice. Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, a scholar and the
daughter of Japanese and American parents, described some of the challenges (2001):
A person who is thought to look like a Japanese is assumed to be Japanese. [...]
[T]hose who can pass as majority Japanese are encouraged and permitted to do so
because their phenotype enables the majority to regard them as if they were
majority Japanese. Those whose phenotype is considered non-Japanese are still
seen as different and not Japanese. [...] Those who do not look like a Japanese
are not only assumed to be foreign but are also expected to act like a foreigner.
So what is the "in-between"? Thanks to kokusaika, his situation is better than in the past.
Although he will not blend into mainstream Japanese society any time soon, the stories of
these individuals are becoming widely known both in Japan and abroad. They are
exploding minzoku from within.
By considering the impact of kokusaika, we get an idea of the "breakdown" of
minzoku. Toyota Yukio (1994) has explained that there is no absolute definition of
minzoku. Instead, it should be identified by its four components: culture (bunka),
nationality (kokuseki), descent (shujji), and abidance (kyojyu) (fig. 8.4). As I pointed out
at the beginning of this section, these are overlapping components. However, kokusaika
complicates this situation. Some Japanese do not live in Japan and some foreigners have
Japanese nationality. Even the question of culture is problematic. To take language as an
example,
What if someone not a Japanese by right of race [.. .] does manage to acquire
some proficiency in the Japanese language? Well, in that case, the system
17 According to a survey by the MHW, in 1987 only 1,010 children were registered as children of
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literally makes no intellectual provision at all for his or her very existence. Such
a person is a nonperson within the terms and definitions of Japanese social order.
(quoted from Fallows 1986: 40)
Looking back to the 1980s, the period this quotation is taken from, one sees that language
fluency was a conventional yet artificial boundary Japan applied to separate itself politely
from the rest of the world. However, thanks to kokusaika, more and more Westerners now
speak Japanese as fluently as do Japanese, and they are too obvious to be ignored
(Morris-Suzuki 1998; Douglass and Roberts 2000; Lie 2004).
Fig. 8.4. Four Components of Minzoku (Clockwise from Top): Culture,
Abidance, Descent, and Nationality
Source: Adapted from Toyota 1994: 206, fig. 6-1.
Toyota's hoped to solve this problem. Separating four components that determine
Japanese minzoku, he claimed that there was more than one standard for assessing
whether a person were authentically Japanese: all standards were applied and then
depending on how the individual fared overall, he or she would be called Japanese. The
more overlap there was between the regions, the darker the intersection became, the more
Japanese she or he had to be. However, the shift in Japan's immigration and marriage
patterns shows the inadequacy of this definition. Theoretically it is fine to call immigrants
from overseas Japanese, but in practice Toyota's scheme fails to explain why those who
look Japanese but have adopted foreign cultural attributes are treated as more
authentically Japanese than those who fulfill every criterion but have blond hair and blue
eyes. Worse, this scheme fails to deal with multiethnic populations, who would appear to
be neither Japanese nor foreign.
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Japanese-(Han) Chinese couples; by 2002 this number had risen to 38,927.
___,._ .~1._~ __ I
In the era of globalization, Japan's government may be able to switch its
relationship with the world from a bilateral view contrasting self and other to a more
integrated view of "Japan in the world," but the cultural image of minzoku is hard to
change. Even in Toyota's approach, the "perfect" Japanese stands at one end of the scale
and at the other stand those who have no relation with Japan at all. In between are
subgroups such as "fairly Japanese" (kanari nihonjin) and "only a little Japanese"
(sukoshidake nihonjin). But the swelling multiethnic population has produced a
breakdown from within: their biological strangeness cannot be measured on Toyota's
scale.
From Genetics to Genomics: Creating a Japanese Nation Suitable for Globalization
The previous sections suggest parallels with Japan's involvement in the ICH and the
problems it encountered in presenting its views on racial difference. As I explained in
Chapter 4, the MHW shifted from bilateral negotiations at the MOSS to multilateral
negotiations at the ICH. This made sense for several reasons: not only was the issue a
truly global question but the change of venue reflected the image of Japan as a nihonmaru
sailing confidently in the ocean of globalization.
Still, the issue of racial difference challenged everything that the Japanese took for
granted about race and was subjected to tremendous scrutiny. Since the MHW did not
officially contest the Western belief in the basic unity of human beings, it was not going
to be easy to construct an argument for Japanese exceptionalism. The process proved
highly irritating and nobody liked it. As one European expert said to me, "You know, we
were the ones who first proposed the issue of racial difference, yet it was Japan that
turned it into an infamous problem and made solving it impossible. Unless they separate
race from the state, there will be no solution to this problem. Every solution is a political
one." His frustration is understandable, but really the problem is neither political nor
commercial: it is a cultural problem. For Japan, race and the state are inseparable. The
nihonmaru cannot sail under any flag but the yamato tamashi (Japanese soul), and the
minzoku has to run up this flag.
And there is much to be learned from the debate that so frustrated both sides. It is
clear that when the MHLW mentions the word minzoku it sincerely imagines a group of
ideal Japanese men and women, culturally pure and biologically homogenous. This does
not necessarily imply racist thinking, such as the superiority of the Japanese race to other
Asian races, but when I asked an Organization for Pharmaceutical Safety and Research
(OPSR) officer about multiethnic Japanese, whom the current E5 policy would by
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definition fail to address, he was quite confounded by the question. "I have to admit that
we did not think of them when making this guideline."
We also learned that in the discussion of racial difference the traditional criteria for
defining a given minzoku, such as living in the same area, sharing a common culture and
historical experience, and having a consciousness as a community, were irrelevant. In
addition, although extrinsic factors were numerous and more complicated than intrinsic
ones, they proved less important in determining membership in the Japanese race. The
MHLW treated biological characteristics as the most basic features. This is strikingly
different from academic discussions about ethnicity among Western humanities scholars,
who tend to focus on the cultural and social aspects of ethnicity. But while the MHLW
proved willing to sacrifice the spiritual components of its definition, and was willing to
reduce social and cultural factors into variables, it would not budge on bodily
characteristics.
The MHLW's approach to defining minzoku resembles the metaphor
anthropologists Wagatsuma and Yoneyama (1967) borrowed from the German botanist
Justus von Liebig (1803-73), who explained the essential nutrients needed by plants in
terms of a barrel whose staves each stood for one type of nutrient - one missing or
inadequate stave and the barrel was useless. For the two anthropologists, identifying a
person as Japanese meant determining that all of the critical staves were in place (see fig.
8.6, right). Wagatsuma and Yoneyama identified the following criteria (from left to right,
front row first): holding Japanese citizenship, following Japanese etiquette, speaking
Japanese, having Japanese bodily characteristics, having been born in Japan,
understanding naniwabushi (a traditional Japanese story), living in Japan, eating sashimi
(sliced raw fish), and miscellaneous other Japanese traits. Although each of these criteria
is essential, they are of varying importance. A glance at the illustration immediately
reveals that the level of the water is only as high as the shortest stave, which corresponds
to the most crucial qualification, in this case bodily characteristics. Physical appearance is
the dominant factor leading others to consider a person Japanese.
Of course, according to Wagatsuma and Yoneyama (1967: 158), these biological
characteristics can be explained by the theory of genetics: "The [above] argument about
Japanese minzoku would run into serious problems if it failed to verify what its biological
base was." To replace the ideal image of a perfect Japanese, they proposed a "pattern
theory" based on the characteristics of the entire Japanese population, assigning it the
term "genetic group" (yidenshishudan). This approach ranked the relative importance of
characteristics by their significance in the gene pool, and the homogeneity of this pool
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could be explained historically, by Japan's long isolation from other groups. All seemed
to be perfect.
Fig. 8.5. Left, Von Liebig's Barrel, Representing Plant Growth
Factors; Right, Wagatsuma and Yoneyama's Barrel Chart of
Japanese Traits
Sources: Organic Gardener's Composting, chapter 2. http://www.
soilandhealth.org/03sov/0302hsted/030202/03020202.html (left);
Wagatsuma and Yoneyama 1967: 147.
However, if we compare Japan's changing conception of minzoku with Donna
Haraway's three configurations of race, population, and the genome (1991: Chapter 6, see
a brief summary in the table 4.1 of this thesis), their divergence become apparent. When
Wagatsuma and Yoneyama apply population genetics to the problem of explaining the
Japanese minzoku, they still stick to the old configuration of race. Rejecting the term
population in favor of the more neutral - and more Japanese - term group, they failed
to explain whether the boundary surrounding the minzoku was open or sealed. While they
noted an increasing foreign influence on this gene pool (through interracial marriages, for
instance), Wagatsuma and Yoneyama were confident of the "internal circulation" of
genetic information, which was Japanese. "It is very subtle, like a Zen dialogue," they
commented obscurely (158-59). In other words, nothing has changed: they were just
using a new lexicon to talk about Japanese race.
Does this shed light on the MHLW's "scientific" problem at the ICH? The ICH
deals with human beings in terms of populations, but this does not guarantee that all of
the conference's experts are talking about the same thing. In an article on the unresolved
debate between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes on the existence of the vacuum,
Daiwie Fu (1995) has shown why communication broke down. According to Fu, the
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question was not who was more truly scientific or who was more objective - the real
problem resided in an incommensurability between two proposals based on different
configurations (or taxonomies) of nature. The E5 guidelines and bridging study illustrate
just such an incommensurability. While the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
thought they were dealing with questions related to races found in different populations,
the MHLW cared only about the Japanese race and population. The former assumed a
fixed race and a mobile, open population, while the latter assumed that both were fixed
and could not change.
While Paul Gilroy (2000) may present genomics as the ultimate solution to the
age-old problem of racial discrimination, as STS researchers we have to suspend
judgment. The MHLW's move to genomics was, I have emphasized, a strategic move that
did not match up with Haraway's time frame. In effect, what the MHLW proposed was
nothing but a genomic version of"genetic group" oryidenshishudan. Although the group
relied on the most advanced technology, this neither led to the new forums Haraway
identified, such as the Human Genome Diversity Project, nor did it update old issues
related to population, such as the shift in the frequency of certain traits in a genetic pool.
Race - more exactly, minzoku - remains the core of this proposal.
Let me explain the above point via the HapMap Project. The HapMap is a catalog
of common genetic variants that occur in human beings. It provides information about
these variants, the places where they occur, and their distribution among different
populations. Thus, it can be considered an extension of the Japan SNP project (mentioned
in Chapter 6) to the global level.'8 Because of its previous achievements in genetic
research, Japan has played an important role in this project. Unlike the controversial
Human Genome Diversity Project, the HapMap looks ahead: its goal is the creation of a
resource that can be used in future studies of health and disease. 19 Instead of collecting
18 The International HapMap Project is designed to provide information that researchers can use to link
genetic variants to the risk for specific illnesses; it is hoped that this will lead to new methods of preventing,
diagnosing, and treating disease.
19 According to "Background on Ethical and Sampling Issues Raised by the International HapMap
Project" (International HapMap Project's website), the purpose of the HapMap differs from the Human
Genome Diversity Project. The latter is an anthropologically oriented effort proposed more than a decade
ago that was designed to learn about human population history and the biological relationships among
human populations. The point was "to see if, for example, the Irish are more closely related to the
Spaniards or to the Swedes," according to the project website. A number of groups representing indigenous
peoples were concerned that the project would exploit vulnerable individuals and populations. They also
objected to the project's potential intrusion into cultural beliefs about population origins. Ultimately, and in
large measure because of the criticisms, the Human Genome Diversity Project was never completed.
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genetic material from small, isolated populations to show how races are different, the
HapMap project aims at major populations to ensure the bio-products produced by those
who rely on the HapMap findings suit those populations. Fine. But I would like to know
what criteria have been used to designate certain populations as the racial standard of the
future. The answer might be complicated for some, but not for the people of Japan: they
know that those who care most about the survival of their race should be represented. The
Japanese would fight to be chosen for this global project. The consequences are
predictable. As the Japanese are one of only two races making up the Asian contingent in
the HapMap study, research will be aimed at identifying genetic difference between the
Japanese and other populations. The more we know, the more we know how different
they are. New drugs have to be designed in accordance with these differences, as the
information offered is the scientific standard for racial difference.
On the other hand, we cannot forget the ultimate goal of the Human Genome
Project and the HapMap Project. Both use discrete populations to develop a range of
individualized, customized medicines. The claim is that the HapMap "promises to
accelerate medical research around the globe in many different ways. Not only will it lead
to the identification of genes related to disease, it should help to pinpoint genes that
influence how individuals react to various medications, discoveries that could improve
drug design and lead to the development of diagnostic tools aimed at preventing adverse
drug reactions" (International HapMap Project's website). In his argument for stemming
new forms of eugenics in the age of genomics, Paul Rabinow said, "Perhaps some
researchers should keep their data banks open to the possibility of looking for and
discovering individual genetic variation" (1996: 127). If Rabinow is right, we are
compelled to ask whether the trend toward individualized medicine will be the same in
Japan and other parts of the world.
The answer is yes and no. Yes, because Japan has taken part in the Millennium
Project, and this information is helpful in finding different genomic composition among
individuals. Several diseases specific to Japan's aging society have been given first
priority, and it is expected that in the near future more and more Japanese patient
populations will be identified by genomic information. Even so, the answer is also no,
because no such change would be possible without relying on the category of race. I have
previously mentioned that the JSNP project is so expensive that no industry can afford it;
even so, the Japanese government is willing to support it because it will help define the
Japanese race. There is little likelihood that Japan will invest soon in any project that
does not directly affect its own population.
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Therefore, while moving toward genomics, Japan may not follow the path Haraway
has predicted for the United States. Instead of developing a universal genome that
describes all potential human beings, the Japanese genomic yidenshishudan will identify
various clusters with similar genomic compositions. After all, the landscape of the
Japanese minzoku overlaps with the territory of the Japanese state. As Wakatsuma and
Yoneyama claim: "To preserve that which is of greatest concern, our minzoku, all sources
of variation - identities, locations, and occupations - should be sacrificed to the
concept of unity" (1967: 160). For unity, read state.
Although genomics is a promising source of solutions to current problems regarding
the minzoku and hence a valuable tool for preserving the Japan state, it is far from
guaranteeing the revival of the nation state. Perhaps Japan's engagement with
globalization is ultimately driven by the determination to resist being "globalized" and
"defaced" -- all in the name of minzoku. Sawada (1990: 3) summed this up accurately
fifteen years ago:
In any debate about kokusaika it must be clearly stated from the outset that
before the international must come the national, that is, minzoku. Therefore,
before kokusaika the consciousness of the minzoku must be improved.
For Japan, the nation may never be distinguishable from race. In the era of globalization,
it has chosen to construct its identity as a new nation-state in terms of Japanese genomics.
Its govern-mentality has been endowed with the regulatory power needed to maintain this
frame.
PART III
ETHNICITY AND THE STATE IN PARALLEL: TAIWAN AND
GLOBALIZATION
Toward Democratization and Ethnic Controversies: The Taiwanese Experience
Revisited
Taiwan's transformation over the course of its efforts to win a place at the table of
nations has been an important theme in studies of Taiwan.20 Even so, the state
20 Since the mid-1980s, many have asked how the country's peaceful revolution took place. A series of
works, from Robert Wade's Governing the Market (1995) to Thomas Gold's State and Society in the Taiwan
Miracle (1986) and Stephane Corcuff's edited volume Memories of the Future. National Identity Issues and
the Search for a New Taiwan (2002) have examined the process of democratization and political
development; in addition, a special issue of the American Journalfor Chinese Studies devoted to these
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transformation I will outline here will be set in two contexts derived from my
observations of Taiwan at the ICH. One context is that of race. In contrast to the MHLW's
hesitation to accept foreign clinical data, the CDE has shown a more open attitude to
racial difference. Might this be revealing of a more widespread Taiwanese attitude toward
race? The other context in which I situate Taiwan's transformation is state sovereignty.
While the CDE's E5 policy implies a consistent strategy to make Taiwan visible to the
world, this does not necessarily imply a determination to build the nation.
In my study, race and sovereignty belong to a larger concern about the "normal" and
"pathological" situation of nation-states. Having dealt with Japan's wish to be a "normal"
country in the previous part, I would like to return to Nakasone Yasuhiro's view on Japan
as an introduction to my discussion of Taiwan. The term "ordinary nation" is often used
to describe the role Japan hopes to play in world politics, but this should not be taken
either as a conventional expression of Japanese modesty or a sign for the revival of
military nationalism. Like Nakasone, many Japanese are concerned that Japan is not yet a
sovereign state. As a "semi-sovereign state" (hanshuken kokka), it has been economically
threatened by the United States and for a long time it did not occupy a political role in the
international community commensurate with its economic power.
The same was true of Taiwan in the 1980s. After its seat at the United Nations was
taken by the PRC in 1972, Taiwan's political relations with other states began to wither
away. Increasingly isolated, even Taiwan's formal name, the Republic of China, was
confusing for most people. Its stated ambition of reclaiming mainland China could only
be treated as a joke: it earned no support from the United States once relations with the
People's Republic had been normalized and certainly was no threat to its Communist
neighbor.
Like Japan in the late 1980s, Taiwan gradually revealed the role it wanted to play in
the world. Beginning in 1976, President Chiang Ching-Kuo, the son of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-Shek, took steps that indirectly contributed to Taiwan's liberalization and
democratization. In 1987, Chiang put an end to the state of martial law that had existed
since 1949. According to his eventual successor, Lee Teng-Hui, Chiang realized that the
KMT, a political entity grafted violently onto Taiwan in the wake of Communist victory
in China, would never replace the PRC; without Chiang's policy of indigenization
(bentuhua), the KMT would have been doomed. Chiang made a point of traveling to
different areas in Taiwan, presenting himself as close to the people. Not long before his
issues will be published in 2005.
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death, Chiang made the ultimate ethnic claim: "Having lived here for over forty years, I
am Taiwanese too [wo ye shi Taiwanren]" (Lee 1987).
Chiang died in 1988. His proposals for political reform were followed by Lee
Teng-Hui, the first Taiwan-born chairman of the KMT and president of the Republic of
China. Chiang's professed Taiwanese identity looked less convincing once Lee took
office, since he was, by any standards, a "real" Taiwanese. Here I feel obliged to briefly
describe the ethnic politics in Taiwan. Taiwan has three major groups: Holo, Hakka, and
mainlanders (waishengren). Although mainlanders are the smallest, they long
monopolized prominent positions as government officials, bureaucrats, intellectuals,
military officers, and, less prominently, soldiers. They are generally considered more
"Chinese" than other groups and thus better suited to the task of leading the "Republic of
China." But while he is an educated man and an intellectual by any standard, Lee
Teng-Hui does not belong to this group and his leadership has been strongly criticized by
Nationalists. When he proved a highly popular leader, they grew even more concerned
that his evident preoccupation with specifically Taiwanese affairs might divert the KMT
from its primary mission - defeating the PRC.
Let us take a step backward to reconsider what Chiang Ching-Kuo meant when he
said "I am Taiwanese too." As ambiguous as the English translation, Chiang's Chinese
sentence could well have meant that he was both Chinese and Taiwanese. Some might
think this statement is meaningless, since according to the KMT's logic all Taiwanese are
Chinese. But if we are to appreciate the nuance of this sentence we must consider its
political context. Given that he was officially the leader of the ROC and claimed
sovereignty over a far larger area than Taiwan's 14,000 square miles, why mention
Taiwan in particular here? Perhaps he wanted to avoid the vague, unrealistic claim that
"we are all Chinese." Such a claim would not help the KMT win any support and could
conceivably provide an excuse for the PRC to "liberate" the last territory that the KMT
controlled. Chiang's statement served two functions, providing a bridge between the
KMT and the people of Taiwan and separating the Republic of China from the People's
Republic of China. But since Chiang never made these implications explicit, terms such
as "citizenship" (shimin), "nationality" (guoji), "ethnicity" (zuchun), and "race" (ongzu)
were all touchy issues for Taiwan on the way to democratization.
The controversy over ethnicity and nationality is clearest in Taiwan's elections.
Since 1994 Taiwan has held national or local elections almost every year (table 8.1).
Since candidates are allowed to campaign for sixty days prior to any election, it is safe to
say that over the past decade elections have been a regular topic of discussion for many
Taiwanese.
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Table 8.1. Elections Held in Taiwan, 1994-2005
Year Elections Scale
Taiwan's first direct gubernatorial election Local
Taipei's first direct mayoral election Local
1994 Kaohsiung's first direct mayoral election Local
Election of Taipei city councilors Local
Election of Kaohsiung city councilors Local
Election of Taiwan's provincial assembly Local
1995 Election of legislators National
1996 First direct presidential election National
Election of national assembly members National
1997 Election of county magistrates and provincial municipality Local
mayors
Election of legislators National
Election of Taipei mayor Local
Election of Kaohsiung mayor Local
1998 Election of Taipei city councilors Local
Election of Kaohsiung city councilors Local
Election of county and city council members Local
Election of township magistrates Local
2000 Taiwan's second direct presidential election National
Election of legislators National
2001 Election of county magistrates and provincial mayors Local
Election of Taipei city mayor Local
Election of Kaohsiung city mayor Local
2002 Election of Taipei city councilors Local
Election of Kaohsiung city councilors Local
Election of county and city council members Local
Election of township magistrates Local
2004 Taiwan's third direct presidential election National
Election of legislators National
2005 Election of national assembly members National
Election of Taipei mayor Local
Election of Kaohsiung mayor Local
Election of county magistrates and provincial mayors Local
Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, http://
www2.nccu.edu.tw/-sO00/.
21 Officially the term national refers to the City of Taipei, and the City of Kaohsiung, and the
Taiwan-Fujian Region (which is all of Taiwan except for the two biggest cities). Local is just one of the
three. But in reality there is almost no difference, since Taiwan-Fujian Province accounts for over 95% of
Taiwan's land, and Taipei and Kaohsiung host over one-sixth of Taiwan's total population. Although the
relevant posts are of very different importance and power, there is no difference between local and national
elections in terms of their effectiveness as a topic for discussion among Taiwanese.
448
Whether on television or the radio, candidates and issues are ceaselessly
discussed and candidates appear again and again on hugely popular television talk
shows. In southern Taiwan housewives and retirees are exposed to the torrent of
political talk throughout the daytime as well. As the critic Chen Sheng (2004)
commented, the Taiwanese have been largely "kidnapped" by these media.
Taiwan's mass media constructs an intensive discursive matrix on which the
elections mark periodical festivals; discussions of race and national identity serve to fill
in the intervals. This network has a connection to the real world; the result of every
election feeds back into people's thoughts about themselves and the future of their
country. Businesses are created to serve people's craving for information: polling
companies, companies that run election campaigns, public relations companies, political
analysts, and, of course, talk shows.
Though it remains somewhat ambiguous, the people of Taiwan evidently are
shifting their identification from "Chinese" to "Taiwanese" or "both Chinese and
Taiwanese." As shown in figure 8.6, identifying as Taiwanese has risen dramatically from
17.3% in 1992 to 40.6% in 2004. Meanwhile, the percentage identifying themselves as
Chinese has declined from 26.2% to 6.3%. Still, fifteen years after Chiang's declaration,
almost half of the inhabitants of Taiwan have not settled on a clear identity.
Fig. 8.6. Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1992-2004
Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys
by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2004)
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Of course, the conventional explanation of this trend is that ethnic politics is being
used to manipulate the populace; candidates rely on emotional slogans, appealing to
ethnic identity, national identity, or nationalist politics to mobilize specific ethnic groups.
According to this interpretation, repeated mobilizations have polarized the Taiwanese
people into two opposed camps: the Holos seek clear-cut Taiwanese independence, while
the mainlanders hope to merge with the PRC. But then why do nearly half of Taiwan's
voters identify as "both Taiwanese and Chinese," as Chiang Ching-kuo did eighteen years
ago?
If we apply Japan's experience of kokusaika to Taiwan, perhaps we can figure this
out. As I have explained previously, Japan's kokusaika exposed existing racial problems
and challenged the old definition of minzoku. During recent decades, the people of
Taiwan have had increased exposure to foreign ignorance and curiosity about their
country. These experiences, as Wang Horng-luen (2004) pointed out, have forced them to
clarify their identity. Frequently mistaken for citizens of the PRC (the words Republic of
China on a passport look a lot like People 's Republic of China), Taiwanese have assumed
a dual identity. Culturally they are Huaren (Han-Chinese), but politically they are
Taiwanren (Taiwanese).
While Taiwan has enjoyed remarkable political stability during a period of
democratization, tensions about race do occasionally burst out as open quarrels,
especially during election campaigns. While mobilizing their supporters, candidates link
their positions to specific ethnic groups. So far, this domestic political divisiveness has
not led Taiwan to deviate from its course in the realm of international politics.
Taiwan, Quo Vadis? A Reading of the 2004 Presidential Election
The 2004 presidential election marked the climax of a long debate over race and
state.22 Led by the KMT chairman Lien Chan and the People First Party chairman James
Soong, Pan-Blue lost to the incumbent president and vice president, Chen Shui-bian and
Annette Lu, by a mere 29,518 votes out of nearly 14 million. The 0.228% margin was
surely a disappointing loss and led to a week of protests that climaxed with a protest
attended by 450,000 people demanding a recount. As with the 2000 United States
22 Pan-Blue was a coalition made up of the KMT and its two offshoots, the People First Party and the
Chinese New Party. Basically their political attitude toward the PRC was conciliatory. Pan-Green was a
coalition made up of the ruling Democratic People's Party and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, an offshoot of
the KMT devoted to promoting Taiwan's values and the right to self-determination.
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presidential election, the debate will never be resolved. Among other claims, the
protesters accused Chen of using dirty tricks to influence the election.23 My interest in all
this is how racial metaphors were deployed over the course of the campaign.
It was Lien Chan who opened the quarrel on race. During a pre-election visit to the
United States in 2002, Lien was interviewed in Washington, D.C., by some Taiwanese
journalists. While his exact words remain in dispute, all agree that during the interview
Lien expressed pride in being a pure Chinese. And in a public speech at the National
Press Club which was published later under the title "Taiwan and the KMT, Quo Vadis?"
Lien (2002) repudiated the "Taiwanese versus mainlander" construction in favor of the
larger Chinese category, noting that "no matter what those who agitate for Taiwan
independence tell you, the fact remains that more than 98% of the people on Taiwan are
ethnically Chinese, speak one or another Chinese dialect, and remain indelibly stamped
by Chinese culture" (2). For him, this racial fact implied a need for political unification.
Since all Taiwanese are Chinese, Taiwan should be a part of a unified China (the
Republic of China, Lien insists). Overlooking the multiethnic nature of the PRC (the state
officially claims fifty-five ethnic groups), Lien argued that ethnic and linguistic affinities,
along with existing connections between the PRC and Taiwan, militated for a revival of
the unspoken agreement the two parties reached in 1992: "One China, interpreted
differently by each side," an arrangement that did nothing to alleviate the problems
caused by the ambiguity of Taiwan's political status.
Chen Shui-Bian, president of Taiwan since 2000, differs from Lien Chan in many
ways. Born and raised in a rural town in southern Taiwan, Chen has always emphasized
his Taiwanese identity. Speaking to Holos, Chen is fond of making racist claims that
Taiwan has to belong exclusively to the Taiwanese. When visiting Hakka towns, he likes
to claim that although his family has resided in Taiwan for one hundred years, he is
related to Hakkas as well. "My home town is the Hakka town Shao-An; I am a Hakka,"
Chen once confirmed. Yeh Chu-Lan, the former chairwoman of Taiwan's Council for
Hakka Affairs, once said, "We Hakkas always treasure the bonds within our group; for
this reason, we must support our Hakka candidate, Chen Shui-Bian" (Taiwan Ribao
[Taiwan Daily], December 8, 2003). When meeting mainlanders, Chen emphasizes his
ties with mainland China. Chen might, for instance, speak of his family's ancestral home
in Fujian Province, expressing the hope that some day he might go for a visit (Dongsen
23 These accusations include the following: Chen faked an attempted assassination just one day prior to
the election; Chen was involved in fraudulent voting; Chen used the faked assassination to heighten
national security, which kept Pan-Blue supporters from voting. For details, see Bulletgate (KMT 2004).
451
Xinwenwang [ET Online News], April 25, 2002). Despite all of these conflicting claims,
Chen does not hesitate to advocate a united Taiwanese polity. "Like America," he has said,
"Taiwan is an immigrant country. [...] We came here at different times, for different
reasons, but we all love the place where we live. Taiwan is the place that links us;
everyone who loves Taiwan is Taiwanese" (ibid.). In this passage, Taiwanese identity
floats unmoored from a racial quality to a cultural identity, finally anchoring on
patriotism.
Although neither Chen nor Lien has explicitly linked Taiwan's political future to its
racial base, they like to accuse each other of racially-based nationalism. For example,
since Lien contends that the preponderance of Han Chinese in Taiwan necessitates setting
aside ambitions for national sovereignty for the sake of an uncertain unification, he is
criticized for "Greater Chinese nationalism" (da Zhongguo zhuyi). Among Chen's weak
points is his vulnerability to being attacked as a "Holo-centric Taiwanese nationalist"
(Fulaosawen zhuyi zhe). In short, while Lien's racial plan is criticized for its political
implications, Chen's practical plan is liable to attacks for its racist implications.
Fig. 8.7. Left, a Poster Indicating That a Vote for Candidate Number 1 Is
a Vote for a "Taiwanese Person" (Below the Number 1 is the Word
Taiwanren in the Traditional Chinese Characters Used in Taiwan),
While a Vote for Candidate Number 2 Is a Vote for a "Chinese Person"
(Below the Number 2 is the Word Zhongguoren in the Simplified
Chinese Characters Used in the PRC); Right, a Pan-Blue Campaign
Advertisement That Compares Chen Shui-Bian's "Dictatorship" with
That of Hitler
I7




As the campaign heated up, things took on an increasingly racist tone. It was
suggested by some of Chen's supporters that he was the Taiwanese candidate and Lien
was the Chinese (read, Communist) candidate (fig. 8.7, left). Some from the Pan-Blue
camp took off their gloves and drew up a full-page newspaper advertisement whose
headline - "Get rid of the president - end A Bian's [i.e., Chen Shui-Bian's]
dictatorship" - accompanied a photograph of Adolf Hitler, accusing him of being not a
peacemaker but a dictator (fig. 8.8, right). The accompanying text reads, in part, "Only a
dictator equates himself and his country. A Bian thinks he is a symbol of democracy, but
he is hostile to those who oppose him, treating them like enemies."
Upon the publication of this advertisement, Taiwan's Jewish community promptly
condemned it for implying that Chen planned to "cleanse" Taiwan by sending all
mainlanders to mainland China. Rumors spread. Some said, "Chen considers us 'Chinese
pigs' and will sink us in the Taiwan Straits if he wins." KMT spokesman Justin Chou's
remarkable comment that the advertisement "only tried to emphasize a certain aspect of A
Bian's personality" did not placate the Jewish critics. Ephraim Einhorn, Taiwan's only
rabbi, called on the KMT to apologize, saying he was "shocked and disturbed" that Chen
could be compared to a man who had ordered the murder of six million Jews. He said, "I
am sick to my innermost being. It's a terrible thing to have done" (Taipei News, March 13
2004).
In another racist gambit, a KMT spokesman named Tsai Chen-Yuan claimed that of
all the candidates to run in a Taiwanese presidential election, only Lien was a "pure
Taiwanese" (ET Online News, June 19, 2003). He reasoned that since Sun Yat-Sen (who
founded the Republic of China), Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian (the first and second
Taiwan-born presidents of the ROC) were all originally Hakkas, and Chiang Kai-Shek
and his son Chiang Ching-kuo were born in southern China, Lien was the only one of the
bunch who had been born into an authentically Taiwanese Holo family and hence was the
only candidate qualified to serve as Taiwan's president.24 Though insulting, this was
hardly the worst part of Tsai's comments. To the Hakka community in Shao-An, home
town of both Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-Bian, Tsai applied the pejorative label
"shabby Hakkas" (ao ke).
Naturally Chen responded to the attacks from the Pan-Blue camp. He asked Lien in
public debate on February 21 to clarify what he meant by "pure Chinese." Tactically
assuming Lien's Chinese nationalism and his unwillingness to answer this question, Chen
misleadingly suggested the alternative category "pure Taiwanese" in an attempt to get
24 Lien liked to say that his family was among Taiwan's oldest. One of his television advertisements
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Lien to admit that he was a "pro-PRC" Chinese. Rejecting this accusation, Lien called
this question "a new McCarthyism" and declared that he had never been to the PRC.
Chen coldly replied that there was little doubt that the PRC would embrace any candidate
who called himself"pure Chinese" (PBS on-line broadcasting at
http://www.pts.org.tw/-webO 1 /debates/).
The outcome of the election pleased no one. Elected by the slenderest majority,
Chen saw his mandate slip even lower during the demonstrations mounted by the
Pan-Blue camp in front of the presidential palace. Both sides were blamed for "tearing
Taiwan apart with their racist accusations" (zuchunsirie). Those who hoped for
reconciliation turned to bodily metaphors to counter all of the racist slogans tossed about
during the campaigns. A group of students in Taipei collected the tears of ten thousand
men and women to "wash away" all discrimination and injustice. A local artist announced
a four-year project for world peace called "Actions of Blood Mixing": inspired by the
election, he planned to collect blood samples from ten thousand people in ten places
around the world, starting with racially divided Taiwan (Dongsen Xinwenwang, April 24,
2004). He said, "I hope that everyone will embrace each other by mixing blood. We are
all one family. We want no more war, no more hatred, and we will only bleed more if we
resist mixing our blood"
The foregoing passage might lead some readers to worry about Taiwan's future.
Indeed, looking at local events, many wonder whether Taiwan can uphold its democratic
integrity while entering the global sphere and they fear that it may fall apart because of
conflicts among ethnic groups. But when we move shift the scale from the domestic to
the international, we will find that a totally different image of Taiwan and a different set
of questions emerge. They may be important, but race and ethnicity belong to the vulgar
realm of domestic politics. At the global level, Taiwan is relevant to one question alone:
that of the state.
If so, why has the issue of ethnic identity continuously dominated Taiwan's public
sphere in every election? The answer may be an understanding on the island's ethnic
politics in practice. Race is indeed an issue that mobilizes voters, but it is not about to
precipitate a crisis.25 In many situations, these quarrels are nothing but a response to
was set in his home town, Tainan, said to be one of the first Han Chinese settlements on the island.
25 Over fifty years after the KMT immigrated to Taiwan, the distinctions among the various ethnic
groups are blurring. The new generation of mainlanders, many of whom have one Taiwanese parent, live
lives essentially indistinguishable from those of any other Taiwanese. And many of the Hakkas and Holos
born and raised in Taiwan under the KMT regime speak Mandarin as their first language and are as well
versed in Chinese history as any mainlander. The old ethnic differences have been replaced by regional and
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emotional electioneering rhetoric. As an editorial in Yi Zhokan (the Next Magazine)
pointed out after the election, "Our world is built from empty language. [.. .] The same
language, the same world. But from the point where this world is conceived lives develop
along quite different lines" (May 27, 2004).
Moving onto the global scene, political analysts have pointed out many external
threats to Taiwan's future, and there is no space specifically for ethnic politics. The
thorniest threat lies to the west: the PRC. Although it employs the racial slogan "Chinese
do not beat Chinese" (Zhongguoren bu da Zhongguoren) to support its proposal of
acquisition, the increasing military threat proves that Beijing's ultimate goal is to grab
this land even if that means destroying all of its political institutions. The United States
hopes that Taiwan will remain an ambiguous entity, not at all influenced by the PRC. A
Taiwanese government friendly to America can balance the expansion of communist
power in the western Pacific region. For the Taiwanese government, any attempt to
clarify its status would be interpreted as a move in the direction of independence, and this
violation of the political picture drawn by the two powers would reinforce the global
consensus that Taiwan is a troublemaker.
This reminds us that the CDE, the state, rather than the question of race, functions
as both the motor and the vehicle in the creation of a voice. In Chapter 5 I showed that in
order to make a bridging study workable the CDE introduced a paper asserting the
existence of a Taiwanese race distinct from the Han Chinese to shore up its claim that
Asian races are biologically similar. And in Chapter 7 I mentioned that at the 2003 APEC
statistical symposium Professor Shih intentionally included the national flag of the ROC
in his presentation. What sort of nationalism do these different events signify?
I remember a conversation I had with a Taiwanese official from the Department of
Health after last year's presidential election. I raised the subject of nationalism.
"Nationalism? Using that word is a luxury!" she cynically replied. A longtime observer of
Taiwan's campaign to join the World Health Organization, she is keenly aware of how
difficult the IPRC makes it for Taiwan to be seen and heard. She told me, "There will be
no nationalism if we cannot survive in this world as a state." Ignoring the discursive
context that social scientists have constructed so that Taiwanese nationality is inextricably
bound up with race and nationalism, this official thinks of statehood simply and
empirically in terms of being seen and fitting into the global network. Through this vision
I see an intermediate matrix between the individual and the world, which I call practical
statehood. From a global perspective, the existence of a practical state is legitimized by
class differences.
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its ability to render visible a certain population by regulating its relations with other
populations. In the case of the ICH, the CDE projects this kind of statehood in two ways.
The bridging study allows it to relate the Taiwanese racially to other Asians. And its take
on Asian regulatory authorities permits it to distinguish Taiwan from other entities.
Only from this perspective can we grasp Taiwan's real relation to nationalism and
state building. Conventional sources of legitimacy - Benedict Anderson's "imagined
community" and Pierre Bourdieu's powerful bureaucracy - do not apply to Taiwan. Nor
is political autonomy the issue, since Taiwan has enjoyed that for more than a half century.
The problem is that unlawful repression has deprived it of political rights in the world.
This is a tricky situation. Clearly, any nationalistic attempt to change Taiwan's status -
whether by achieving the full status of a nation-state or by becoming a special territory
under the control of the PRC - is not favored by a majority of the population. But the
people do not seem to favor the status quo either, since globalization has brought home to
everyone the disadvantages of international political isolation. This is the reason why the
CDE's efforts are appreciated by all of the people I interviewed, no matter their political
preference.
Performative Statehood in a Global Panorama: The Welcoming Banquet at the 2003
APEC Meeting
Taiwan's failure to gain formal recognition as a state means that we must think of it
in a new way, that is, as an entity whose statehood exists performatively. In Chapters 5
and 7 I described Taiwan's appearance on the global stage. The voice that I examined
there first emerged from various individuals and in time became a unified and
institutional voice. Even so, when we talk about voices, the question of agency is fraught,
since a voice cannot be recognized alone.
Performativity, a concept the cultural anthropologist Victor Turner developed in his
study of liminality (1969), is indebted to Arnold Van Gennep's concept of rites of passage.
According to Turner, liminal entities exist between structures: they are "neither here nor
there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom,
convention, and ceremonial" (95). Taiwan is such a liminal entity, trapped between the
Cold War and the New World Order (for a historical study of a population control
program, see Kuo 2002); its statehood was assumed and defended by the United States
during the former but is now despised and rejected thanks to the dawning of the latter.
But is this true statehood? Turner suggested another sort of grouping, a society
"unstructured or rudimentarily structured [with] a relatively undifferentiated
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communitatus, community, or even communion of equal individuals who submit together
to the general authority of the ritual elders" (Turner 1969: 96). Apparently, the world of
proprietary drugs is a communitatus. The ICH is trying to give it a structure but it is not
yet stable. Only at this inchoate moment does Taiwan's statehood perform, and this
performative statehood cannot to be easily transferred to other fields.
Taiwanese statehood, which I consider in the context of the discussions of E5
guideline on racial difference, can only be seen during rehearsed performances on a
global stage. These performances take place at welcoming receptions, cultural nights, and
city tours. Ancillary to the conference's main activities, these activities are important
rituals that create connections between host and participant. Since Taiwan has been
denied access to the formal channels through which interstate connections are made, it
places special emphasis on these ancillary events, another place where its voice can be
heard.
I observed the welcoming banquet for the 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
meeting on Bridging Study (the APEC meeting hereafter) held in Taipei on November 17,
2003. This banquet, along with the cocktail reception that preceded it, reminded me of
Yoshimi Shunya's description (1992) of world exhibitions and the display of modernity.
Originating in the nineteenth century, these great expositions served as both platforms for
the flow of capital and displays of empire in the process of modernization. In the APEC
microcosm of the global and the local, I was both a participant and an observer. As
representatives of industry, government authorities, and scientists greeted one another,
exchanged cards, and traded information, I observed their interactions, occasionally
joining a conversation as a researcher or a local helper.
I started with participants from the FDA and Europe. The former, few in number,
occupied the center of the hall, attracting people like a magnet. Some people from a
European company haled an EFPIA official, chatting in their own language until I briefly
joined their conversation on the pharmaceutical industry in Southeast Asia, which they
viewed as a new market to be conquered. Compared to the Western participants I had
been observing, the Japanese and Koreans seemed reluctant to step out of their circles.
Some Japanese bureaucrats and professors briefly exchanged ideas with colleagues and
their Taiwanese branch mangers, while others discussed domestic issues in Japanese. One
Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA) representative I knew
recognized me, but he only nodded politely without saying anything. From his serious
demeanor, it was hard to believe that just a few months earlier he had treated me to dinner
at a restaurant in Tokyo, joking to the waitress that the two of us were going to drink
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ourselves to death. Spotting some Southeast Asians off by themselves, I could not help
thinking that they looked lost and helpless. An exception was John Lim, the director of
Singapore's Centre for Drug Evaluation, who moved from group to group like a busy bee.
I looked back at the group from Taiwan. The locals certainly made up an absolute
majority, but they were hardly taking the lead on this occasion. While the leading officials
of the CDE and some Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs (BPA) officials greeted people
around the reception hall, the rest formed immobile and impermeable circles against the
wall. Roughly grouped by affiliation, most spoke in Taiwanese or Mandarin about their
current work. I noted few interactions between the Taiwan-born FDA statisticians and
local scientists, who had all participated in a special meeting just the day before.26 Some
research fellows of the BPA reached out, chatting with participants they had met
elsewhere, but most simply stood mutely, looking as though they were waiting for
instructions. When I passed by, I overheard one or two complaints about the purpose of
this "international" meeting.
At such modem "panoramas" one sees the two faces of a state in the throes of
globalization. In a scientific meeting one face shows the opinions and arguments
presented by high officials and technocrats. The more important they are in their fields,
the more attention they attract to their state. The other face shows the state in general. Its
visibility coincides with its power in the world. This key permits us to explain the
behavior of the different groups I surveyed at the reception - with the exception of the
Taiwanese. Although hosting the meeting implied that the CDE had achieved a certain
visibility, this did not mean that all of the Taiwanese men and women standing around the
lobby understood what was going on. Their apparent disorientation bespoke Taiwan's
long isolation from the world and revealed a conceptual gap in the crafting of Taiwan's
statehood. While the government strives to attract the world's attention, most of its people
simply take it for granted. The international aspect of this statehood, unlike that of
Singapore, exists only at the governmental level and is restricted to certain fields.
The performative nature of Taiwan's statehood was well captured later, during the
banquet proper. When Japan held a world exhibition in 1877, Yoshimi pointed out (1992),
it was based on the European imperialist model and presented visualizations of the lands
Japan then occupied. In 1970, nearly a century later, a rather different Japan mounted an
exhibition in Osaka (Chapter 6). No longer a panoramic translation of the host's
subjective worldview, the 1970 fair was a celebration of capitalism, advertising dreams of
26 It is the 2003 APEC Statistical Meeting. For more about the meaning of this meeting and the people
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the future. Though the United States seems to have lost interest in world exhibitions (the
latest one was held in New Orleans in 1984), developing Asia is still fond of them - the
Brisbane Expo in 1988, Tsukuba Expo in 1985, Daejeon Expo in 1993, Aichi Expo in
2005, and Shanghai Expo in 2010. They are the best way to propagate a state by
celebrating its participation in the world. Although nowadays the host country cannot be
the main focus that former empires were, it still seizes the opportunity to promote itself to
the world.
The logic of organizing a global conference is driven by similar concerns. In
Chapter 5 I conveyed how difficult it is for a "nonstate" like Taiwan to host such a
meeting, so I am interested in how Taiwan makes the best of such events. While the
guests ate, a local band performed songs from around the world. From my distant seat, I
could only make out the end of a song by the applause that followed, so it was with some
surprise that I discovered that the event was in fact karaoke. As far back as the 1920s,
Taiwanese businessmen held banquets in entertainment districts or hot springs sites and
hired live bands (nakasi) to entertain their guests. After a couple of songs by professional
singers, the host, and then every guest in turn, would contribute a song or two. There
exists an ethnographic meaning in this activity. In a group, everyone is asked to "voice"
him/herself by the pieces they choose and how they are performed. It is one of the ways
Taiwanese make friends. Something like karaoke has, as a result, existed in Taiwan for a
long time.
For some Westerners who had never been to East Asia, karaoke was clearly a novel
experience, and many were immediate converts. A Swiss pharmaceutical representative
chose a ballad from the Alps and an EFPIA representative went with a French chanson.
As two Filipinos sang, I saw how this custom neatly served to bridge the local and the
global. As a modest host, Taiwan yielded the stage to its international guests, much as it
would do over the course of the conference. But as with the bridging study procedure, the
setting was Taiwanese and people were asked to project their customs into peculiarly
Taiwanese (or East Asian, anyway) settings. The localness can be operationally defined as
a territory where an indigenous style is appreciated. This is the key to understanding
Taiwan's approach to the bridging study as well. Without emphasizing its distinctness, the
atmosphere conveyed the place people were visiting.
I was curious to see what the locals would do when their turn came. Then twenty
people stepped onto the stage. The CDE's executive director, Chu Mong-Ling,
announced the first song: "Story from a Small Town" (Xiaochenggushi). It was an
who attended it, see Chapter 7, part 2.
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inspired choice, originally sung in the movie of the same name by the legendry singer
Teresa Teng (1953-95), who was hugely popular throughout East Asia even after her
sudden death. Although the movie was filmed in 1978 in a small, old-fashioned town in
central Taiwan, there is nothing particularly Taiwanese about the song. Written by Huang
Ho, the lyrics are as follows:
There are many stories in a small town, full of joy and happiness;
If you visit this place, you will reap rich rewards.
Looks like a picture, sounds like a song,
Here is included all of the truth, virtue, and beauty in life.
Chatting, talking, small-town stories are really good.
Please invite your friends to come, and we will treat them as our guests in
our small town.
This simple song suggests a range of associations. At the simplest level, it is a sweet
homage to the good old days. Insistently referred to not by name but by a vague
description, the small town of the title is anyone's home town. The conference hosts,
known as "Chinese Taipei" at the APEC meeting, also suffered from a sort of nominal
amnesia. The song, which of course could not be understood by many of its foreign
auditors, conveyed a welcome, a humility, and a decidedly accommodating attitude
toward the question of Taiwanese sovereignty.
The song's most profound meaning appears only in retrospect, as we reflect on the
context in which the Taiwanese contingent sang. The lyrics neatly echoed Taiwan's
performative statehood that emerged in the process of networking. To borrow Roland
Barthes's comment about the subway station in Tokyo (1983: 38-40), Taiwan's statehood
can be understood as an empty spot in a complex nexus. It is a center without a name,
through which enormous volumes of information travel every day. Its importance, if it
has any, does not reside in the place itself but in the amount of information that goes
through. Let us read the messages the song delivered bit by bit. The reason given at the
outset for visiting the small town (i.e., Taiwan) is its many stories (i.e., information). This
is followed by the gently seductive suggestion that only if you visit can you be rewarded.
Then we are told how "useful" these stories are: they can induce a highly spiritual
experience unavailable through other means, because they are stories shared by all
precious guests. Thus, it is not enough for people just to come and hear; they must bring
460
friends to make their visit to this town meaningful.
At the 2003 APEC meeting the song suggested a "decentered" network of
information with Taiwan at one of the nodes. Consider how people relate to their
destination when they embark on a pilgrimage: for them it is a sacred place where people
can congregate. Of course, this song explains the utility of fulfilling these needs and
answering these questions, but it is not merely a question of making a pilgrimage to
Taiwan. Taiwan is not a place of worship; no god dwells there. It is simply a meeting
point and could be anywhere. But then, the value of the global network is not evenly
distributed over all of its points. Like an oasis in a desert, the importance of the "small
town" is assigned by its visitors, not by anything within. People visit not to admire a
certain spiritual existence but to meet others, to hear their stories. All of the people
assembled there share their stories - this is what I mean by placedness. Taiwan's
performative statehood has to go along with this dynamic process.
The CDE had one more song for its guests. Would it be a Mandarin pop tune or a
Taiwanese ballad? I was thrilled to hear the familiar prelude to "High Green Mountain."
Again, the choice was inspired. The theme song to the movie A Mount Ali Story (1949),
generally considered the first postwar Mandarin drama, it is among the few Mandarin
songs that has achieved a crossover popularity among Holos and mainlanders. In addition,
because the movie set its story among the Tsoas, an Austronesian tribe inhabiting
southern Taiwan, this song is rich in local color, including an interlude sung in the Tsoa
language. Many consider this a Taiwanese folksong honoring the island's small
indigenous population. Rather than an image of a nation based on a uniform culture and
ethnicity, it presents a mixed cultural identity which truthfully reflects Taiwan's current
situation.
More importantly, this song delivered a political message: gently but clearly, it
announced that Taiwan was not a part of the PRC. In this sense, the Austronesian tone is
an alternative means of emphasizing Taiwan's non-Han character. Of course,
Austronesians are not the majority on this island; in fact, they make up the smallest and
weakest ethnic group. So we might consider the use of this song a cultural tactic
revealing Taiwan's placedness. It should not be interpreted either as a cheap exploitation
of Taiwanese "exotic" culture or a facile and nationalistic demonstration of the essential
differences between Taiwan and the PRC. From an anthropological viewpoint, this song
is a cultural window through which Taiwanese society can be appreciated. I was
reminded of the lecture where I first heard about the CDE (for more about this lecture,
see Chapter 5, Part 2). The first slide shown by speaker Chu Mong-Ling to illustrate
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Taiwan's bridging policy was a close-up photograph of the face of an old Taiwanese
aborigine (fig. 8.8). Later I learned that this slide is shown in many presentations made by
the CDE; the surprise of seeing a definitely non-Han face and being told that this is a
Taiwanese person never fails to arouse people's curiosity.
Fig. 8.8. Slide Entitled "Taiwan Formosa," Showing an Old Taiwanese
Aborigine
1 iwvan Formosa
Source: Chu Mong-Ling's slide presentation at National Yang-Ming
University, March 22, 2003.
But as I watched CDE staff members doing their best to mimic the Tsoa ritual dance,
I grew keenly aware of the limitations of this statehood. After all, the life and language of
the Tsoas are still strange to these Han Chinese. Taiwan is not ready to "live out" the
multiethnic or international characteristics it claims. As I had seen at the reception, few of
those involved in the performance understood the meaning of this meeting and the role
they were supposed to play in it. Thus, Taiwan's statehood is neither actual nor
fictitious - it is performative and only performative. I was reminded of Clifford Geertz's
comments about Balinese cockfighting (1973). Drawing on the insights of structuralism,
Geertz conveyed the profound logic behind this performance through thick description.
But as I continued to watch the performance of statehood, my thoughts also traveled in
another direction. I wondered whether there might be no cultural logic at work at all; was
it possible that this was nothing but a song and dance? Postponing the nihilistic
conclusion that the nation is an empty concept, I would like to call performative
statehood an intentional construction in the global era. Taiwanese nationalism, if we can
find it, should reside solely in this intention. Unlike Japan's determination to make the
rest of the world recognize its distinctive racial attributes, Taiwan simply wants to escape
from its isolation. It may not be ready to launch itself as a nation, but the desire to be seen
and heard is present in every Taiwanese man, woman, Holo, Hakka, mainlander, and
Tsoa.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: TRACING THE STATE WITHIN
GLOBALIZAITON
After reviewing Japan's and Taiwan's distinctive responses to globalization, it is
time to return to the quotations from Nakasone Yasuhiro and Lee Teng-Hui cited at the
beginning of this chapter. If we extract their comments about "normal countries" from
their original contexts, the speakers sound strangely old-fashioned, stubborn
conservatives in an era of globalization. Almost universally, foreigners reject the
suggestion that Japan and Taiwan are not states. While distinctively East Asian, they look
like any other country. People around the world use their products and treat the words
Taiwan and Japan as they would France or Brazil. This argument obtains support by
comparing the two states to regimes such as Iran, Cuba, or the Palestinian Authority,
whose religious fundamentalism, retrograde ideology, and history of political struggle
have divided them almost completely from the norm of the state. After all, Taiwan and
Japan have almost everything that constitutes a state. Moreover, they are practicing
democracy in one way or another.
Some read Nakasone and Lee as commenters on the development of nationalism in
Asia. Assuming Japan and Taiwan to be normal states, these readers, such as cultural
critics in Japan or political opposites in Taiwan, project their words onto a larger political
project. The process can be understood as follows: along with increasing their economic
power, Japan and Taiwan are trying to expand their political influence, which some
consider out of proportion to their current status. For example, because Japan was
defeated in World War II, its pursuit of a permanent seat on the Security Council of the
United Nations strikes some as improper. Similarly, comments by Lee Teng-Hui and
Chen Shui-Bian about Taiwanese independence are considered outrageous by those
aligned with the PRC. These political projects are seen as dangerous because they create
tensions among "normal" countries. Japan's ambition is read as a revival of military
nationalism, and Taiwan's quasi-diplomatic maneuvers have earned it the name of
troublemaker in the western Pacific.
Why are Nakasone and Lee unsatisfied with the current status of their counties?
Why do Japan and Taiwan still want to be "normal countries," if not because of
overweening nationalism? To grasp the instrumental aspect of the formation of the state,
Pierre Bourdieu's pioneering works are of great importance. According to Bourdieu
(1998: Chapter 3), the state emerges as the accumulation of a process of concentration of
different capitals, such as the "capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army,
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police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital"
(41). This is a bureaucratic field that functions as both a central bank where various
capitals are exchanged and cashed and a generator that exercises these capitals. Since it is
so, the state possesses a territoriality: when entering a state, everything is interrelated in
one way or another. More importantly, people take on a habitus, a set of internalized and
largely unconscious responses to specific social interactions, that blinds them to the logic
by which the state is actually run: they simply think of the state as a combination of
universal apparatuses. Through this reason of state, legitimacy is acquired to exercise
physical and symbolic violence (58). Of course, Foucault's notion of governmentality,
which I discussed earlier in this chapter, is based on a similar view.
While these scholars did not extrapolate their arguments to a global level, they did
not rule it out. As I explained earlier, Foucault noted the governmentalized process of
state transformation. Unlike historical states that may emerge through contingent
processes, Foucault wrote, modern states are transformed in a more regulated way (1991:
102). Echoing this point, I argued that as an effort to create a single market for
proprietary drugs, the ICH could be understood as a global platform created as part of the
process of governmentalization. From a different perspective, Bourdieu emphasized
(1998: 59) the interesting relation between the monopoly of the state and the
monopolization of the universal: "The relative unification and universalization associated
with the emergence of the state has for counterpart the monopolization by the few of the
universal resources that it produces and procures." This observation can be applied to the
formation of the ICH discussed in Chapter 2. The FDA's practice was extended into the
global realm through the ICH, an institution that turns local rules into universal standards.
Capitalism, as expected, plays a critical role in promoting this process, as Bourdieu
pointed out:
The profit of universalization is undoubtedly one of the historical engines of the
progress of the universal. This is because it favors the creation of universes where
universal values are at least verbally recognized and wherein operates a circular
process of mutual reinforcement of the strategies of universalization seeking to
obtain the profits associated with conformity to universal rules and to the
structures of those universes officially devoted to the universal. (60)
In the case of drugs, science provides the universal standard. Through guidelines, it erects
a stage where industry can accumulate more profits while the states involved present
themselves as modern and progressive. The success of the ICH in harmonizing drug
regulations is, in this sense, an opus operatum that looks like a fait accompli.
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This is my starting point for thinking about the national problems of Japan and
Taiwan. I believe that they should be understood beyond their borders and should be
traced by distinguishing the modus operandi from the conventional discourse of opus
operatum (Bourdieu 1973). Thus, what Nakasone and Lee mean by "normal country" is
"country that enjoys normal relations with the world." In previous chapters, I provided a
thick ethnography describing the actions that the MHLW and the CDE performed inside
and outside of the ICH; in the present chapter, the end of my story, I provide a
comprehensive account of their actions in globalization. (Note that my study is not a
substitute for regional studies, which are of great value.)
Working from Bourdieu's idea of the state as a bureaucratic field, Horng-luen Wang
(table 1.1) insisted on an institutional approach to the nation-state that took into
consideration its interactions with other states: analysis of the nation-state must not, he
emphasized. be limited to the political field. In other words, there is no ontological base
that can determine statehood; the state is always in an operational field defined in a
dynamic process. This framework is extremely useful in mapping out the factors as they
appear in the story of the ICH. My argument is: without an analytical review of this story,
we cannot capture these two countries in a diachronic fashion.
Table 8.2. Analytical Frame for Japan's Interactions with the ICH
Let us discuss Japan first (table 8.2). I began with 1986, the year of the MOSS
negotiations (Field I-1). At that bilateral meeting (Chapter 4, Part 1), the United States
pressured Japan directly through a political channel, hoping to make the MHW change its
policy on drug regulation (Fields III-1 and 111-2). Although the MHW accepted some
foreign clinical data, it shifted the venue from bilateral to international, that is, from the
MOSS to the ICH (Field 1-2), and brought the subject of racial difference to the table
(Field II). But Japan's approach to racial difference was challenged at the E5 Expert
Working Group (Chapter 4, Part 2) by the mainstream ideology that asserted the primary
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International-Political Field (Field I) International-Nonpolitical Field (Field II)
1. MOSS negotiations 1. E5 EWG primary unity of human beings
2. ICH 2. E5 guidelines
3. Kitasato-Harvard symposium/genomics
National-Political Field (Field III) National-Nonpolitical Field (Field IV)
1. MHLW 1. Japanese minzoku (intrinsic/extrinsic
2. Drug regulations factors)
3. Bridging study policy 2. Uniquely Japanese biological attributes
4. Global drug development
unity of human beings (Field II-1). An attempt was made to force the MHW experts to
correct their "misguided" thinking on the uniqueness of the Japanese race by accepting a
guideline based on the ideology of unity, which was to be added to the local regulations.
This attempt did not succeed; it led only to a compromise guideline (Field II-2) and a
vague concept of bridging (Field III-3) that could be variously interpreted.
On the other hand, while resisting the pressure applied through the E5 guideline
(Chapter 6, Part 1), the MHLW tried to preserve the integrity of the Japanese state by
suggesting its own solution to the debate over racial difference (Chapter 6, Part 2). This
attempt started with a domestic request for applications to develop drugs for international
sale in accordance with MHLW suggestions (Field 111-4). This method, which assumed
the existence of different races in the areas represented at the ICH, was enhanced through
the use of the genomic definition of race. The MHLW promoted this agenda at the
Kitasato-Harvard symposium (Field 11-3), hoping to revise the original guideline.
However, so far this proposed solution has been studied by no more than a handful of
Western experts and many technical problems must be overcome before it can serve as a
workable agenda.
This sketchy review presents a picture of Japanese strategy in the wake of
globalization. The first step in this transformation was a practical shift from the bilateral
to the global. As I have explained in the present chapter, one goal of kokusaika is to
render Japan's political sway comparable with its economic influence and to forge an
inseparable relationship between the Japanese state and its minzoku. Thus, while the
Western experts tried to distinguish race from citizenship by clarifying what the MHLW
meant by race or by citizenship, they failed. For Japan, dealing with the state is the same
as dealing with the minzoku. In other words, Field III and Field IV are in fact a single
block called Japan. This was not merely a strategic resistance to economic competition, I
argue, because even where kokusaika complicates the landscape of Japanese minzoku
(Chapter 8, Part 2), Japan pursues its nationalist project by initiating new syntheses of
biology and imagination, such as genomics and individual medicine. To sum up, Japan's
transformation resembles what Michael Billig (1995: Chapter 4) called the making of
"national identity in the world of nations." Thanks to an awareness of other states, he
argued, this national identity is involved in a dynamic process of categorizing its people
and its state in a world system. In the case of the ICH, the Japanese notion of "Japan
versus all" or "inner versus outer" evolved into complicated categories, or, more
accurately, a taxonomy concerning body and the state in globalization. Even so, the
guidelines set up by the ICH did little to change Japan's national identity, which still
occupies the highest position in this taxonomic system.
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Taiwan is harder to sketch because it is not formally recognized as a state at the
international level (table 8.3). My starting point was the mid-1980s, when drugs were
first listed as a topic for discussion in United States-Taiwan trade negotiations (Chapter 5,
Part 1). This period superficially resembles Japan's bilateral phase. Using this
quasi-formal channel, the United States Trade Representative and the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America pressured the DoH to waive all requirements for
drug approvals (see list of trial requirements, Field 111-2). Even so, unlike Japan, Taiwan
had no way to shift the venue for negotiation since it lacked the ability to create a global
forum. This situation did not change until Taiwan created CDE to deal with the technical
requirements of clinical trials (Field IV-1), resisting American pressure by introducing a
universal standard for the E5 guideline (Field II-i), which it connected to questions about
racial difference (Field IV-2 and IV-3).
Table 8.3 Analytical Frame for Taiwan's Actions Concerning Drugs and the
ICH
On the other hand, while adopting the bridging study evaluation (Field 111-3), the
CDE tried to use it to promote Taiwan's visibility as a state (Chapter 5, Part 2). First, by
minimizing the differences between Taiwanese and other Asian groups (Fields IV-2 and
IV-3), the CDE made its bridging study evaluation (Field III-3) a workable agenda
(Chapter 7, Part 1). Because it held a strategic position in the ICH debate over racial
difference, the CDE further promoted Taiwan by organizing a global forum to address
this matter (Field 11-2). Second, to maintain the voice of the bridging study and compete
with other agendas - such as global drug development - the CDE proposed the
regional integration of regulatory authorities and created a separate forum for promotion
(Chapter 7, Part 2). If these strategies pan out, they will give Taiwan a long-term voice in
more formal platforms on globalization, such as the ICH-Global Cooperation Group
(Field 1-2).
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International-Political Field (Field I) International-Nonpolitical Field (Field II)
1. United States-Taiwan trade 1. E5 guidelines
negotiations 2. APEC network
2. ICH-GCG 3. Regional integration of regulatory
authorities into a statistical symposium
National-Political Field (Field III) National-Nonpolitical Field (Field IV)
1. DoH 1. CDE
2. Listing trial requirement 2. Asian race (intrinsic factors)
3. Bridging study evaluation 3. Taiwanese customs (extrinsic factors)
Taiwan's actions in the wake of globalization present quite a different path from
Japan's. Denied the autonomy enjoyed by Japan, Taiwan thrusts itself into the limelight
through cooperation with other states, such as the United States and Japan. Moreover, the
statehood that the CDE presents is ambiguous. It is at variance with conventional
thinking about ethnic controversies in domestic politics and challenges the truism that
Taiwan should not be treated as a state. That is why I devoted a certain amount of space
to considering ethnic tensions in Taiwan and their relation to democratization. As to
Taiwan's nationalistic project, I have emphasized the role that internationalization plays.
In Chapter 5 I reviewed Taiwan's gradual international isolation since 1972 and in the
present chapter showed how ordinary people's accumulation of foreign experiences
impinged on how they thought of themselves. As Billig points out (1995: 83), nationalism
can arise from an awareness that "if 'our' nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it
must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations." Taiwanese people might not know
how to achieve a "proper" representation of Taiwan, but their willingness to sacrifice
their racial uniqueness to win normal statehood attests to their desires, a longing for the
"normal country" Lee Teng-Hui invokes.
Still, I am not saying that these strategies have won for Taiwan a real statehood,
although an incipient statehood sometimes appears on the horizon. Virtually no
international organizations, governmental or nongovernmental, include the Republic of
China on their rosters. Even when it is allowed to join, its membership is limited and
distorted, as if to say, "This is not a state." Such is the case with the ICH. Even though
Taiwan was invited to the ICH-GCG, this was strictly on the behalf of the APEC and
under the unexceptionable name "Chinese Taipei." As Horng-luen Wang wrote (1999,
6-8), political scientists consider Taiwan a "political oddity" or a "challenging case."
This does not mean that we cannot find a way to describe Taiwan's situation, and my
suggestion is "performative statehood" (Chapter 8, Part 3).
We have seen the different strategies Japan and Taiwan used to pursue their national
goals in the context of globalization. Can the two "abnormal" states cooperate, as
anthropologist Victor Turner might suggest, so that "we have a loving union of the
structurally damned pronouncing judgment on normative structure and providing
alternative models for structure" (1982: 51)? While some politicians have begun to
investigate possibilities, in a political world the chances are slim. Still, in the world of
proprietary drugs such cooperation is more likely. In Chapters 6 and 7 I described the
failure of Japan's efforts to position itself for global drug development and the
fruitfulness of CDE's tactics in promoting discussions of racial differences: both fostered
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an atmosphere where strategic alliances became possible. I have emphasized the effects
of govern-mentality on the world of drugs - perhaps in the near future we will see




Epilogue: Ethnography of the World, Ethnography of the State
Nationalism has been defined, in effect, as the striving to make culture and
polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more
than one roof at that.
Ernest Gellner'
If we follow only one value, [.. .] no options can be chosen other than an
"ultimate solution." [...] In other words, choosing an ultimate solution
implies the confirmation of a particular value and viewpoint.
Murakami Yoichiro2
The shared imagination between anthropologist and informant that creates
space beyond the immediate confines of the local is also what projects the
traditional site-specific mise-en-scene of fieldwork outward toward other sites.
[...] Complicity as a defining element of multi-sited research is both more
generative and more ambiguous morally; it demands a mapping onto and entry
of the ethnographic project into a broader context that is neither so morally
nor so cognitively determined as it appeared in previous critiques of rapport.
George Marcus3
PART I
THE USE OF (THIS) ETHNOGRAPHY
Anthropology as Cultural Critique
Like the present thesis, the quotations above are interdisciplinary: they do not fit
easily into a given field. A renowned philosopher and social scientist, Ernest Gellner
pours his insights into both social anthropology and political science. Murakami Yoichiro
belongs to the first generation of historians of science in postwar Japan; his broad interest
in philosophy enabled him to play a leading role in making Japanese science and
technology studies a productive discipline. George Marcus, along with Michael Fischer,
has obliged anthropologists to reconnect with the intellectual tradition of the social
sciences and the humanities. Fortuitously, the backgrounds of these quite different
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983), p.4 3 .
2 Murakami Yoichiro, Anzengaku [on security] (1998), p.2 3 4 .
3 George Marcus, "The Uses of Complicity," in Ethnography through Thick and Thin (1998), p. 12 3.
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scholars mirror the membership of the ICH. Born to Czech parents and raised in Prague,
Gellner has taught mainly in England. Murakami was educated at the University of Tokyo
and taught there before moving to International Christian University, also in Tokyo.
Educated in New England, Marcus teaches in Texas. These are the scholars who most
influenced the present study.
It was only well after I had begun my fieldwork, when I had the crucial encounters
with Andrew and Mike that I described in Chapter 1, that I began to develop the
problematic into which the names of Gellner, Murakami, and Marcus fit so neatly. While
their specific research programs differed from mine, my systematic observation of race,
globalization, and the state at the ICH would have had very different premises and
conclusions were it not for this trio.
If my project was to succeed as a cultural critique, it needed three things. First, I
needed to shift my research object from a group of individuals to a collective entity, the
state. Second, I would focus on non-Western culture. This would not be a superficial
appreciation, but an examination of how this culture structures its practice in science and
medicine and how these practices "crash" in the era of globalization. Third, this study
would identify itself as an ethnography. Not merely a form or a methodological tool, this
decision would affect the scale of my research and its moral concerns, addressing the
ambiguous relationship between the observer and the observed.
Neither the MHLW's "ridiculous" criteria addressing Japanese race nor Hu's
"maniacal" search for a proper nationality can be considered an exclusively personal
problem or the problem of a special group, such as Asian immigrants. In the Japanese
case, the government believed in a special national value, while in the Taiwanese case Hu
wanted the world to see his homeland as it really was. Issues related to the state
distinguished these two cases from other discussions of cultural conflicts and global
diasporas; they should be viewed as general discussions about how the state is articulated
in a global age. As Gellner points out, the state is an embodiment of nationalism that links
culture and polity, and these "political roofs" cover the modem world. Of a pair of
ethnographic maps, one drawn before and one after the age of nationalism, Gellner
observed: "There is little shading; neat flat surfaces are clearly separated from each other,
[.. .] we see an overwhelming part of political authority has been concentrated in the
hands of one kind of institution, a reasonably large and well-centralized state" (1983:
139-40). His observation on the modern world helps to focus this thesis. As a political
roof that frames people's lives and thinking, the state has appeared as a clear object for
anthropological study.
This thesis is an ethnography of the state. Focusing on the state's behavior in the
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context of globalization, it reveals that the state is neither a casual accumulation of
various apparatuses nor the exquisite plot of controlling mechanisms evoked by so many
social scientists. At the global level, the political roofs of Japan and Taiwan look quite
different than they do in isolation. At the technical or institutional level, the state is
sensitive and responsive to short-term changes in the world. It skillfully keeps a dynamic
balance between domestic tensions and external pressures. The basic problem for Japan
and Taiwan is the same. In the field of health care, the state is responsible for protecting
its people's heath, so providing access to the latest medicines is of great importance.
However, for the sake of public safety necessary measures have to be taken, and these
administrative processes inevitably delay the introduction of potentially lifesaving drugs.
Meanwhile, as a commodity, drugs are hugely lucrative. This induces foreign (drug
producing) states to call for the opening of local markets and the acceleration of the
administrative process for granting approval. Hence the International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use (ICH).
On the other hand, the domestic industry of Japan is quite different from that of
Taiwan. As a more advanced country, Japan encounters friction in its efforts to protect its
domestic industry. In addition, its population is increasingly divided. Taiwan's problem is
a relatively simple one of"accept our standard or no drugs will be imported." Inclined to
petition for more stringent ICH guidelines for drug approval, if only to keep a hand in the
process, Taiwan's experts are aware that if this standard is introduced too soon, it may
curtail domestic industry. As I have shown in the present thesis, most of Japan and
Taiwan's actions can be explained if we consider all of the above factors.
This thesis has taken into account the state's irrational behavior in globalization.
Alongside its quick, predictable reactions, the state has long-term projects and national
agendas that cannot be easily understood in terms of purely Machiavellian calculations.
Others have failed to examine these factors but they are important in understanding the
state's reactions: specifically, they help us avoid two kinds of mistakes. First, while
discussing a technical standard for drug approval, some people, especially medical
experts or officials, tend to consider it a scientific topic and ignore all other factors. They
believe that only by rejecting what they consider nonscientific factors can an agreement
be made. The other kind of mistake, which tends to crop up in regional studies, is made
when a drug is considered purely as a commodity. Assuming an alienated, essentialized
East Asia, scholars take into account cultural factors such as "protectionism" and
"nationalism" but treat them as a stereotypical variable.
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In previous chapters, I have identified individual weaknesses in interpreting the
behavior of Japan and Taiwan; here I want to further, pointing out that these analytical
assumptions are generally inapplicable to a globalizing world. We long ago left behind
those days -- the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - when Asia was totally foreign to
the Western world, and since the expiration of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
people are no longer isolated from science. We live in a world colonized by science and
by Western modernity, the world that, according to Michael Fischer, calls for new tools
and methods. In a discussion of how to teach anthropology to science students, Fischer
points out (2003: 38) that there are "spaces in which disciplinary assumptions are always
subject to question, where tools of analysis from different disciplines are brought together,
sometimes smoothly, more often in a kind of practical creolized urgency to solve
real-world problems."
Through an examination of the debate over racial difference and pharmaceuticals,
this thesis concludes that the key to understanding the questions from Mike and Andrew
in Chapter 1 resides in the distinctive long-term agendas adopted by Taiwan and Japan in
the face of globalization. I acknowledge the cultural aspect of the state but object to
labeling Japan protectionist before a careful consideration of its thinking. Similarly, I
have bracketed certain political questions related to Taiwan, refusing to call it a part of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) or call for its independence. These preliminary
steps are not the ultimate answer to our inquiry but they provide the means to getting
reliable answers. Rather than foregrounding an analytical frame based on out-of-date
assumptions, my interpretive approach sheds us new lights on refreshing our
understanding of the two states. I have relied on several methods. Besides collecting oral
accounts from local informants, I have turned to archival materials as well as local
interpretations. Given that this kind of multidisciplinary methodology is necessary for
studying a civilized, modernized area such as East Asia, and is particularly useful in
dealing with a well-archived international conference at the ICH, I am saddened that
many researchers still rely on only one or two methods commonly used in their
disciplines or academic practices.
In the course of my fieldwork I noticed a serious asymmetry of narrative production
in terms of area and field. Let me explain. Although there is abundant material about
Japan's attitude toward the E5 guideline, virtually no mention of it is made in studies
published in English. In addition, although some scholars who have treated the subject try
to address local voices in their narratives, they tend to inquire about only the immediate
cultural impact of a certain scientific agenda or the cultural assumptions that affect such
an agenda. In other words, they still think science is a timeless artifact and that attempts
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to understand it proceed from outside, not from within. To make up for this, I have
followed Dumit's example (2004) by adding three specific methods to my approach:
ethnohistory or historical ethnography, archaeology of scientific practice, and a
cross-cultural dialogue of knowledge and values.
Among these methods, the last is especially important for two reasons. First, the
ICH provides a universal standard for drug approvals; the standard itself, as Murakami
points out in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, implies a certain set of values
and attitudes. In the case of racial difference, the set of values includes a cultural logic
that assumes the primary unity of human beings and a capitalist logic that smoothes out
all bodily differences in order to maximize the scale of the market. Of course, Japan has
its own values. However, as this thesis has shown, not all values are given a hearing in
the scientific field. Thus, only through cross-cultural dialogue can we discover that which
remains implicit during the process of negotiation before and in the ICH. Second,
scholars tend to apply an Aristotelian dichotomy, seeing the West (the United States in
many cases) as providing the form of a study (this might well mean the analytic
framework) and non-Western areas (in this case, East Asia) as contributing the matter
(issues and materials). Recognizing this situation, I have tried to make a truly
cross-cultural dialogue possible. This means not only letting Asian states speak, but
letting them speak in their way and from their own cultural context.
These concerns made defining the field for this study crucial. Where are the sites
where one can study a global issue like drugs? How does one keep a narrative coherent
while letting each local actor express her or his own opinion, when these may well be
incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense? Even if this can be done, how is a dialogue
among the actors set up? Marcus's idea of multisited ethnography (1998) helped me deal
with these problems. And I decided that to capture a mobile issue like drugs I had to rely
not on several sites but on an international or global site. A site where many states
assemble, the ICH provides a chronological and synchronic reference for meetings and
occasions held in specific places to address specific topics. Further, it is an ad hoc site
formed for the very purpose of creating a universal standard. Unlike other international
institutions, such as the United Nations, if the ICH fails to show progress it will cease to
exist. Therefore, intrinsic tensions push for negotiations.
More importantly for me, as the author of this study and a Taiwan-born researcher,
choosing a global field helps dodge the possible criticism of complicity in multisited
ethnography. Although Marcus lists among the advantages of the multisited approach the
creation of a new kind of complicity between the observer and the observed, in practice
many are quick to ask why certain sites but not others are chosen for observation, why
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certain issues but not others are listed for discussion. In this sense, the ICH was
guaranteed to provide topics that really aroused global attention and reactions that truly
had global impact. Thus, the topics and projects cited here were not selected by the
author's personal preference or by any theoretical inspiration; they appeared as topics
taken up by the ICH. This does not mean that I intended to overlook complicated
relationships in my fieldwork (for example, see the concluding remark of Chapter 5), nor
did I reject all ethical and moral concerns derived from the interactions with informants
by claiming a return to an objective description. Instead, I turned these concerns into
anthropological questions of voice and voicing. The ICH, in this sense, became an index
for assessing a voice, recognizing such agencies as the state's and judging such occasions
for voicing as symposiums and meetings. In other words, beyond analyzing the voices
within the ICH, this thesis examines those voices that originate from outside but have
effects on the discussion within.
Ethnography as a Moral Call in "Third Spaces"
In his article "The Third Spaces of Anthropology," Michael Fischer (2003) clearly
pointed out that the anthropological voice should be considered along with a keen
understanding of the modem world, as well as the role that anthropology can play in it.
The challenge, he explained, to renewing the notions of the ethnographic and
anthropological voice
is not the disappearance of difference, of different cultures, or of ways of
organizing society any more than it is not the disappearance of class, capital,
unethical exchange, power, or gender relations. On the contrary, the challenge is
that the interactions of various kinds of cultures becoming more complex and
differentiated at the same time as new forms of globalization and modernization
are bringing all parts of the earth into greater, uneven, polycentric interaction. (3)
Considering "the aspiration for cross-culturally comparative, socially grounded,
linguistically and culturally attentive perspectives," an anthropological consideration of
the voice "continues to be valuable amid the pressures to simply turn to statistical indices
for all policies and judgments." The challenge for anthropology is "to develop translation
and mediation tools for helping make visible the differences of interests, access, power,
needs, desire, and philosophical perspective" (3).
In keeping with the above argument, I employ anthropology to identify the voice of
the state with a carefully chosen space that is well defined by its boundaries and its
moment. The ICH possesses all of the characteristics Fischer associates with "third
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spaces," that is, zones where "new multicultural ethics are evolving out of demands that
cultures attend to one another, and within technoscientific networks where the demands
of the face of the other, history, and autobiographical figurations counter the reduction of
all to the same" (3).
In Chapter 2 I have presented the world of proprietary drugs as such a
technoscientific world. On the one hand, by providing us with medicines that regulate
various bodily conditions and moods this world impinges profoundly on our everyday
lives. On the other hand, as a highly technical and highly profitable sector, it is opaque to
the public. Before the creation of the ICH that world clearly identified who could produce
and who could afford these products; it also established rules affecting pharmaceutical
innovation and production. Only with the advent of the ICH did the drug world's attempts
to homogenize all bodies and its inner conflicts arising out of different ideas about health
become visible. I have presented the ICH as the place where all of the tensions
surrounding culture, race, and global capitalism imploded. Its birth took place at a critical
moment in what Negri and Hardt call the formation of empire (2000), as a transnational
hierarchy emerged out of capitalist logic.
The voice we are concerned about can be captured in such a space and is revealed in
the interactions among cultures. Cultures on display at the ICH include the ethical culture
related to drug use, the bureaucratic culture related to drug regulation, the expert culture
discussing drugs' connection with race, and even the linguistic culture related to health
and drugs. While the interactions among these distinctive cultures make possible the
presentation of these voices, they also make such presentations almost impossible
because these interactions are so complex. Since, as I have described in Chapter 1, the
ICH has a clear structure and procedures for processing discussions and also has rules
governing the accumulation of archived materials, we can differentiate institutional
voices from individual ones and meaningful voices from background noise.
I situate the voice of the state in two different yet interrelated processes. One relates
to its ontological existence: it traces the production of the state's voice, its circulation in
various dialogic contexts, to the effects it brings to the attention of the ICH. The other
process treats the voice as a representational subject: it traces how a voice can appear in a
text, how this text can be recognized in the circulation of texts, and how this voice as a
representation affects the creation of discourses concerning my topic (i.e., ethnography).
Faced with this division between the two processes (which one might label modernist and
postmodernist), many researchers tend to equate the two or distinguish them according to
hackneyed generalizations - the former empirical and naive, the latter abstract and
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pedantic. For me, the two processes are equally important and separation is necessary.
First, because the ICH is a discursive representation of the world of proprietary drugs that
provides us with a manageable site we can observe more or less in its entirety, a stage
where every action is clear and traceable (though this does not mean that we can ignore
all who fail to speak for themselves at this site). Second, I have relied on Fischer's "voice
one-two-three" frame (2003: Chapter 6) to describe institutional voices. Although Fischer
neither described the standards he used to choose the texts at the center of his study, nor
why the texts represent their authors, this thesis has to address this problem, because the
ICH does not include every statement made at one of its meetings in the official record:
specific regulations determine whose voice merits recording. No matter how many claims
Taiwan's Center for Drug Evaluation (CDE) makes to the ICH, if it cannot make itself an
instrument for voicing (for instance, via Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC),
these statements will fade away without an echo.
The third and the last reason to situate the voice in two distinct processes is the
correspondence between the locus of ethnography and its discursive specificity. As
Fischer puts it (2003), as a discipline anthropology operates in the third spaces, while as a
discourse anthropology is a third space.
If anthropology was in part a creation of the colonial enterprise, its formations
have increasingly been a third space between the desires of empire (of control)
and the defense of the oppressed (of subaltern voices, interests, values, and
perspectives), a third space of helping evolve new multicultural ethics, with
translation and meditation tools for helping make visible the differences of
interests, access, power, needs, desire, and philosophical perspective. (8)
As empires crumbled and colonial states won their independence, anthropology evolved
into a more sophisticated space where "social formations challenged analysts to develop
tools for analysis, not just slot development into categories of the past" (8). For me, the
problem of narrative is that I am both actor and observer, an ethnographer trained in the
West and an informant born in Asia. My ambiguous position prevents me from combining
an ontological existence - for example, a defacto Taiwan - with its textual
representation - a dejure one. It might not be necessary to turn this voice in a
philosophical direction, such as Stephen Tyler's postmodern ethnography or a Derridean
exercise in logocentrism, but we have to pay attention both to the form and to the content
of this ethnography.
Considering first the ontological voice of the Japanese and Taiwanese states, we can
list their components as autobiographical, biographical, and scientific (table 9. 1).
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Produced by the government, the voice of self-portrayal, or voice one, shows a state's
basic attitude toward a topic, such as the acceptance of foreign clinical data. However, as
an agent in the world, this voice has to interact with other state agents, thus creating a
dialogic voice, or voice two. In our case, Japan ceaselessly explains to whoever will listen
that racial difference should be taken into account in drug regulations. Meanwhile,
Taiwan's dialogic voice addresses the pressure from the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) ro waive all local clinical trials. During the
discussions that have ensued, both shored up their agendas by developing different
scientific discourses, which amount to voice three. Using this analytical frame, I showed
that to some extent the ontological voice was a mosaic of the three voices.
Table 9.1 Making the Ontological Voice of the State in Japan and Taiwan
Japan Taiwan
Instrument for MHLW, OPSR DoH, CDE
voicing
Voice of Policies and Policies and
self-portrayal Regulations regulations
(voice one)
Dialogic voice Debates over Debates over
(voice two) racial difference waivers of local trials
Scientific voice Global drug development Bridging study project
(voice three) project and genomics and biostatistics
Table 9.2 The Narrative Technologies of Voicing Used by Japan and Taiwar
Japan Taiwan
Platform for voicing ICH APEC network
Channel of Kitasato-Harvard APEC statistical
voicing symposium symposium
Archive of voicing 1. ICH proceedings 1. Drug Information
2. Kitasato-Harvard Association (DIA)
symposium journals
proceedings 2. Website proceedings
Postproduction Interviews with Interviews with
of voicing ethnographer ethnographer
But the ontological voices are not fully present in the materials people use to
construct their understanding of this issue. Japan's ability to present its cultural concerns
is in doubt because as a public forum the ICH does not treat all parties to a discussion
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equally. When the topic is the uniqueness of the Japanese race, for instance, Japanese
representatives feel that other countries fail to take the topic seriously. Taiwan's problems
are comparatively far more fundamental and severe: it is barred from presenting itself as
a globally recognized polity.
While forming their ontological voices, Japan and Taiwan have created several
ways to deal with their problems of representation. I have listed these narrative
technologies of voicing in table 9.2. As a member of the ICH, Japan's voice is well
documented and archived. Its narrative technologies are applied only when it is
unhappy with the outcome of some negotiation. For example, because its agenda on
global drug development did not get a proper airing at the Expert Working Group
(EWG) during discussions of the E5 guideline, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and
Welfare (MHLW) supported a new "channel" of communication, the Kitasato-Harvard
symposium. and circulated there an English-language outline of its position - this was
its alternative voice.
Taiwan's problem is much more complicated. Both because Taiwan is not an ICH
member state and because it has long been politically isolated from the world as a
sovereign state, Taiwan pursues a dual program of making a voice for Taiwan and making
Taiwan a voice. Unlike Japan, racial difference is not Taiwan's main concern: it is a
strategic point where individual voices converge and form an institutional voice. By
exploiting narrative technologies (organizing series of conferences where it can speak out,
encouraging often-cited journals to run special issues on Taiwanese themes), Taiwan
produces a stronger voice. But how does it maintain such a voice? The answer is
globalization. In its push for a regional bridging study, Taiwan fought for a place on the
global map by situating its voice in broader networks. Of course, in many cases these
narrative technologies are merely part of a political plot, but this does not apply to
Taiwan's actions at the ICH. The ICH is not a conventional international organization and
operates according to its own nonpolitical logic. At this point, Taiwan presents a silent
example of how its existence in text is not an accessory of a factual statehood; by contrast,
at the global level it is this textual existence that gives rise to the epistemological
imagination of itself in the world.
For ethnographers, the most interesting voicing takes place in "postproduction."
Here my Asian identity was both a help and a hindrance as I interviewed representatives
of the MHLW and the CDE. Of course, different societies have different ways to
approach experts and officials, yet everyone I met was excited about my project and their
generous testimony betrayed the hope that I would present my conclusions from their
perspective. Though many of them had published papers on some of the subjects of
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greatest concern to them, these were in Chinese or Japanese: what could be better than
conveying their convictions in a book or a dissertation written in English and bearing the
endorsement of a prestigious institution like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology?
Several times since I interviewed him, Naito Chikayuki of the Organization for
Pharmaceutical Safety and Research (OPSR) has asked about my project, and Chern
Herng-Der of the CDE, one of my local helpers and a key informant for the present thesis,
pushed me to publish the section on Taiwan before submitting my dissertation. "You now
know more than anyone else about how the E5 guideline is applied in Taiwan and Japan,"
he told me, "so you should write it down." They do not expect me to produce a text about
their voices, but they evidently would like it if I did - this is what I call postproduction.
They hope that the stories they tell me about the E5 guidelines will take the form, in my
report, of a coherent voice clearly heard in the ICH.
This sets me an ethical challenge. First of all, should I trust their accounts? I have
described this challenge in Chapter 5: some active Taiwanese informants told me a great
deal about the field and eventually asked me to join their team. When I analyzed their
country's embarrassing isolation and tried to know how these elite medical experts
reacted to this unspoken trauma, they opened up my personal history as a Taiwanese, a
licensed medical graduate, and a researcher of medicine in Taiwan. In Taiwan I enjoyed
extraordinary access to almost everyone I thought could help me but, as I have written
repeatedly, as far as I can tell they did not fabricate any facts and certainly they did not
pressure me to write anything that they knew to be untrue. They showed me around the
discursive fields - the APEC meetings, Drug Information Association (DIA) meetings,
Kitasato-Harvard symposiums, even the ICH-Global Cooperation Group (GCG)
meeting - allowing me to witness their achievements.
The more I learned, the more I understood their distinctive agendas. Of course, this
is a familiar situation for ethnographers and this is where George Marcus encourages
practitioners to adopt a multisited approach. This explains why the present thesis has
become a large volume consisting of nine chapters. I have listened carefully to Japan as
well as to Taiwan, and one of the results is that what one group said has to be confronted
with what the other group said. Furthermore, the moral connotations of this narrative
have been altered - often relaxed - by juxtaposing the two countries in a comparative
framework. This framework is detached from national interests and focuses on the more
strictly academic issue of a new methodology, namely, voice and voicing, in writing
global cultures.
But I have yet to clarify a fundamental question concerning writing: why does the
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author choose to write a certain text? This is, after all, a moral question that no one can
avoid. Like those ethnographers who are willing to spend years living among strangers, I
know that my goal was never the creation of a text isolated from other texts. The birth of
ethnography was accompanied by the appearance of a host of ethical effects and moral
evocations, what Michael Fischer calls (2003: Chapter 2) "emergent forms of life," which
acknowledge an ethnographic datum, a social theoretic heuristic, and a philosophical
stance.
I opened this dissertation by describing my seminal confrontations with an e-mail
message and a Mexican shuttle driver. These fortuitous meetings invited me to assume
the ethical responsibility of understanding and explaining a world that others could not
understand. The state, in this sense, is a subject guiding us along this academic adventure,
and it exercises a writerly agency over its outcome (an ethnographic text). Ernest Gellner
said that nationalism cannot be a natural social unit without its own political shell, the
state (1983: 140). I believe that every state deserves an ethnography.
Of course, such studies are common. The dramatic work of the weak and
disenfranchised to gain a voice of their own should not lead us to the faulty conclusion
that these people were utterly absent from previous discourses; but their depictions were
consistently such as favored the dominant groups. The first step in providing a powerless
group with a voice is to call attention to their unjust treatment. The creation of subaltern
studies was not an academic curiosity: it was a moral effort to rehabilitate a distorted,
ideology-driven understanding of history and nationalism. I would like to mention a
recent example of an "affirmative movement" that played a leading role in connecting the
state to globalization.
When the PRC passed an "anti-secession law" asserting the right to employ all
measures, including "nonpeaceful" actions, to put an end to local (read, "Taiwanese")
calls for self-determination, as many as one million Taiwanese citizens courageously took
to the streets. Encouraged by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and more
than five hundred nongovernmental and civic organizations, the people gathered on
Ketagalan Boulevard in Taipei on March 26, 2005 to express their outrage (fig. 9.1, left).
The implications of the demonstration were clear. Although the people who
marched on March 26 knew that they would not shake the PRC's determination to seize a
territory it never controlled for so much as a single day (keeping in mind that the
anti-secession law belonged to a body of domestic law), they lifted up a collective voice
to decry this threat,4 because otherwise the world would think that Taiwan had meekly
'4 In fact the demonstrators used a local term chianshia, which means something between "to voice"
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bowed its head." More importantly, Taiwanese realized that this bellicose law severely
complicated regional security and the eyes of the world would be trained on them. The
poster illustrated below (fig. 9.1, right), with its emphasis on voicing, makes this
widespread conviction quite visible. Highlighting the objections to the anti-secession law
raised by several world leaders, the poster asks, "Taiwan, what about your voice?" This
approach closely resembles the strategy employed by the CDE in negotiations over E5
policy. As a "nonstate," Taiwan presents its voice by manifesting its desire to join the
global mainstream.
Fig. 9.1. Left, Taiwanese Protesting the PRC's Anti-Secession Law on March
26, 2005; Right, A Poster Announcing the Demonstration: The Large
Characters Read, "Taiwan, What About Your Voice?"
Sources: Taiwan Zibao, March 26 2005 (left); Minzuheping hu Taiwan
dalianmong [alliance on protecting Taiwan by democracy and peace] (right).
Examples like this posed moral challenges for me throughout my fieldwork. While I
feel a strong compulsion to document these states' efforts to present themselves to the
world, their voices will never remain intact once they have interacted with others.
Sometimes - in the case of Taiwan, for instance - even the action of voicing can be a
factor in creating a voice. In the next part of this chapter I will argue that we cannot
achieve an understanding of these two countries without listening to their voices;
however, these voices are neither fixed, self-contained entities, nor are they meaningless,
rhetorical constructions. Weaving between the real and the textual, their long-term goals
for state development can only be seen in the changeable, dynamic process of interacting
and "to argue against."
5 When Taiwanese were polled after the passage of the anti-secession law, more than 50 percent of




with the rest of the world. This is where world ethnography and state ethnography are
produced.
PART II
JUXTAPOSING WORLDVIEWS AND ETHNOGRAPHIES
How the World of Proprietary Drugs Operates
I have tried to draft three ethnographies in the present study: the ethnography of the
world of proprietary drugs and those of Japan and Taiwan, all three in terms of race and
the state. As part of this trinitarian project I have tried to problematize two conventional
thoughts concerning globalization.
The first is the idea that the nation-state, a casualty of globalization, is dying or
dead. This bold declaration appears in the concluding chapter of Eric Hobsbawm's
Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Hobsbawm asserted (1990: 182) that nations and
nationalism were becoming irrelevant to "the new supranational restructuring of the
globe." Indeed, when "race" has been proved a historical myth by science and the state
has given way to global institutions, the notion of the nation-state became an odd
combination of two seemingly irrelevant concepts: nation, which refers to a people
sharing a common culture and heritage, and state, the government of a bounded territory.
Although I will not try to dismantle Hobsbawm's assertion, anthropological attention
should be paid to nation-states in fields related to health and policy: pharmaceuticals
provide a link.
The second thought has to do with our understanding of the world. Since Immanuel
Wallerstein's theory of world systems (1974, 1989), scholars have sought a unified
formula, such as capitalism, to interpret how the world operates. Using a universal rule as
a reference, they distinguish among local populations by their different responses to these
global impacts (Lewellen 2003: Chapter I 11). In Chapter 1 I pointed out the problem with
this approach: a theory-oriented meditation does not satisfy our empirical curiosity about
exactly what is going on in the world and how to make sense of it with a comprehensive
interpretation. As the present investigation draws to a close, I will add another criticism.
While capitalism plays a dominant role in the drug business, profit is not the only logic
that drives it. Regulatory science, as I have shown in the present thesis, has a distinctive
logic that is not necessarily consistent with capitalism. In other words, as Hardt and Negri
pointed out in Empire, globality "should not be understood in terms of cultural, political,
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or economic homogenization. Globalization, like localization, should be understood
instead as a regime of the production of identity and difference, or really homogenization
and heterogenization" (2000: 45; emphasis in original). The nation-state and the local
should not monopolize the attention of ethnographers: the distinctive nature of the
international entities merits separate ethnographies.
As readers may have guessed from its chapter arrangement, this thesis is an
extension of George Marcus and Michael Fischer's notion (1986: Chapter 6) of
"cross-cultural juxtaposition" as part of a cultural critique.6 Based on the critical strategy
of defamiliarization - "doing the unexpected, placing familiar subjects in unfamiliar, or
even shocking, contexts" (137) - this methodology, which stems from a demystification
of Euro-centric ideology, matches ethnography abroad with ethnography at home:
Presumably, members of other societies, increasingly literate, will read ethnographic
accounts that concern them, and will react not only to the manifest descriptions of
their own societies, but also to the premises about our society that are embedded in
the double vision of any ethnographic work. For their part, American readers might
react negatively to the idealized and simplified accounts of societies abroad, and
might require realistic ethnography at home, as well, for anthropological critiques to
be persuasive. (163)
The present study deviates from this model in two ways. Here a non-American has
examined a global moment related to both the United States and Asia. Rather than the
familiar scene of the American ethnographer reflecting on her or his peculiar position as a
writer, I have been quite concerned about making this non-American text acceptable to
my American readers, who might be wary of a foreigner's take on America, before
challenging the presumptions these readers may have about Japan and Taiwan.
And just as no one can speak for the United States, no one speaks for East Asia,
so I have introduced a third state into the narrative. This project thus involves multiple
references to other cultures triangulated with the primary juxtapositions. This is the
"fully developed reciprocity of perspectives, involving two, and even multiple, cultural
reference points in the writing of anthropological texts" that Marcus and Fischer
mention as "a potential" (1986: 163-64). As the story of the debate over racial
difference inside and outside the ICH comes to a close, I want to return to the
worldviews examined in the previous pages one last time.
Americans are quite familiar with the world of proprietary drugs. They know this
6 Chapters 2 and 3 are about the world of proprietary drugs; Chapters 4, 6, and 8 are devoted to Japan;
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world not only because they consume its products (and absorb countless advertisements
about them) every day, but because, as an advanced technology, drugs require
profit-driven calculations that match their ideas about capitalism. The world of
proprietary drugs is a club whose membership is restricted to a handful of countries able
to produce these drugs.
Fig. 9.2. Imposition of the World of Proprietary Drugs on East Asia Through
Standardization
Key to signs: Solid ovals stand for races; solid boxes identify adminstrative
territories, such as regulatory authorities or the pharmaceutical industry,
and broader fields, such as regional markets or a zone of regulation.
Arrows indicate the forces generated by subjects and objects.
As shown in fig. 9.2, this small yet highly influential world is governed by
and Chapters 5, 7, and 8 are devoted to Taiwan.
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regulatory authorities and the drug industry itself. Visible on the surface are tensions
between the regulators and the manufacturers. But they are really the two sides of a single
coin (for more details, see Chapter 2). Unlike conventional accounts hamstrung by the
complicated connections among government, the academy, and industry, I have pointed
out the underlying logic of standardization that constructs the rules of this world.
Regulators can test only the drugs that achieve high standards (mainly efficacy and
quality) and only thanks to these high standards can the industry promise its customers
good health. Altogether this standard is beneficial for both regulators (keeping things
simple) and industry (low competition), and it presents a high barrier to latecomers.
Treating Asia primarily as a new market, drug companies do not differentiate Asian
states from Asian races. If a new market does not demand further trials and is too small to
begin a process of bargaining, drug companies will call for unconditional surrender. But
this could not succeed in Japan, a substantial market. In order to acquire this market, a
common standard had to be negotiated. The ICH is a bold attempt to bring together
regulators and industry representatives, including the MHLW and the Japan
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA), and is the main interface where
global forces interact with East Asia.
Of course, we have witnessed the growing significance of international and
transnational organizations. Like other global institutions, the ICH has its own procedures
for discussion and a decision-making structure that both constrains and facilitates the
activities of each member. In addition, both sides negotiate to come up with a standard. In
my study, racial difference emerged in the ICH as a troublesome variable that
complicated the desire of the global community to make a single world market for
proprietary drugs. As the bold arrows between the upper and lower boxes of the figure
above indicate, the first contact between the world of proprietary drugs and East Asia was
limited to the ICH and to Japan, its sole Asian representative. Until that point, the ICH
was a scientific forum with commercial goals.7 Only when other members asked Japan to
allow extrapolations of clinical data so that they could more easily enter that market did
Japan's insistence on racial difference shake things up.
Moving back and forth between science and politics, the discussion of racial
difference, described in Chapter 4, encountered a fundamental difference over race and
the state. Treating them as utterly distinct concepts, the United States then tried to
7 It is thus an excellent anthropological site for the study of market. As Marcus and Fischer notice
(1986: 93), although market is a global subject that ethnography ought to be able to take on, there are
practical difficulties in constructing a multi-perspective account of a system or a major social drama that is
encompassed by it.
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substitute other Asian races for Japanese in clinical trials. Meanwhile, Europe recognized
the state as an administrative organization integrating current regulations. Faced with
strong resistance from the Japanese side, they shifted their focus from Japan to other
Asian countries. This is how Taiwan won an appearance on the ICH map.
The CDE provided these experts with a model of how Asian race and state can be
dealt with separately. Recognizing the difference between Asians and Caucasians, yet
asserting the possiblilty of adjusting data from one trial group to suit the other, the CDE
showed that a bridging study was not a fantasy. Moreover, it shifted the focus of the
discussion of racial difference from "Japanese versus non-Japanese" to "Asians in the
diversity of races," the approach favored by the West. To magnify this opinion, ICH
experts not only attended activities organized by the CDE, such as the regional APEC
meetings, they invited the latter organization to contribute its ideas to the founding of the
ICH-GCG (hence the regular arrow from East Asia to the global in fig. 9.2). On the other
hand, global industry never stopped pressuring the MHLW to clarify its position on
foreign clinical data, but Japan proved unexpectedly determined. Its position has not been
affected by Taiwan's approach to bridging studies, and thus far Japan has not approved
any revision to the ICH guideline defining race. Despite all of its efforts, the world of
proprietary drugs has failed in its attempts to use the ICH to crack open Japan's markets.
My sources for the preceding summary of conflicting worldviews were mostly
Western businesspeople and experts. Consistently, they viewed Japan as a troublemaker
and Taiwan as an intriguing actor in the drama of harmonization. Many had not noticed
that over two decades of dealing with the local, the forces of globalization had silently
undergone a transformation. Let me summarize three changes described in Chapter 6.
First, forcing Japan to accept foreign clinical data is less important now: the patents on
the drugs that companies were so determined to introduce have expired. Second, some
Japanese drug companies have successfully entered the global market. Third, the
introduction of the ICH guidelines to other Asian countries has paradoxically made
selling drugs to those markets more difficult: places that never had any say over the
actions of huge corporations acting on their soil now have a voice at the ICH and
elsewhere.
Globalization is not a static force; as Hardt and Negri suggested (2000: 45), "The
better framework, then, to designate the distinction between the global and the local
might refer to different networks of flows and obstacles in which the local moment or
perspective gives priority to the reterritorializing barriers or boundaries and the global
moment privileges the mobility of deterritorializing flows." My study of Japan and
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Taiwan is based on this suggestion. Instead of repeating the inaccurate metaphor of an
"objective" boundary between the Western world and East Asia, in the following section
I will show the ways that Japan and Taiwan situate themselves in the world. In spite of
the steady flow of advanced drugs from the developed to the developing, from the West
to the East, from the rich to the poor, the obstacles that the local throws up are not ill
deployed and fragmented. The attempts to "reterritorialize boundaries" are in fact derived
from a systematic perspective driven by concerns with cultural survival in the midst of
globalization.
Race, State, and the Reason for the Nation-State: Two Ethnographies on East Asia
In Chapter 8 I described Japan and Taiwan by tracing the last two decades of their
changing ideas of race and the state, two of the classical elements in the construction of a
nation-state. In this section I will address their "govern-mentality" at a conceptual level,
looking at how they construct ways to situate themselves and the world in a
comprehensive framework.
Let us begin with the worldview of Japan, which is illustrated in fig. 9.3. First of all,
the inner box at the center of this world represents the Japanese state. In Chapter 3 I
explained that, thanks to the nature of Japan's social institutions, pharmaceuticals operate
through the collective trust of professionals (physicians and hospitals), institutions (drug
makers and the JPMA), and ultimately the government (the MHLW and the OPSR).
In short, the Japanese pharmaceutical business is not run by a "high risk, high
profit" discourse. Of course, as in other countries, Japanese makers have to produce
products that are safe and useful and regulators have to protect the people's health. But
the mechanism is unique. Japan's clinical trials, for example, are performed like a ritual
whose credibility depends on various trusted entities (senior professors, teaching
hospitals, reliable manufacturers) rather than on science. Furthermore, safety, rather than
efficacy, is the regulators' first priority when they review a new product. To avoid
harming a single patient in clinical trials, they reject the absolute measure of efficacy.
Such practices are criticized by the West as backward and unscientific, but Japan's
caution goes beyond culturally specific ideas about the body and death, attached as it is to
strong feelings about the social basis for state intervention in public health. As the
ultimate organization and political realization of the Japanese race, the government
maintains its ruling legitimacy by protecting its people from all possible hazards.8 To do
8 As Murakami Yoichiro pointed out (Murakami and Ichinokawa 1999: 87-90), drug regulation could
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this, it shares its drug regulation duties with several different domestic groups, which
form a tight and closed system.
Fig. 9.3. The World of Proprietary Drugs from Japan's Viewpoint
Note: EFPIA: European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations;
FDA: Food and Drug Administration (USA); MOSS: U.S.-Japan
Market-Oriented, Sector-Selected Discussion; PMDEC: Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Devices Evaluation Center.
Key to signs: As in figure 9.2, solid boxes identify adminstrative territories, such
as regulatory authorities or the pharmaceutical industry, broken boxes indicate
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not be handed over to professionals, because this would mean that the government had given up its
responsibility to take care of its people. While Murakami feels that individuals should be responsible for
many matters, drugs are too important to be left to civilians.
unstable entities or relationships, and arrows refer to the forces generated by
subjects and objects.
Trying to look beyond the monolithic explanation called protectionism, we cannot
ignore cultural and historical factors. While in the United States drug regulations became
tough and competitive due to industry disasters, in Japan the direction of reform has been
toward more constrictive and Japanese-centric regulations. These slow down the
reviewing process, incorporating more people in order to avoid risks, and the Japanese
government hesitates to extend to other states the social trust that permits its regulatory
institutions to function.
But even Japan has to concede that it cannot survive in isolation from the rest of the
world. As its economic power grew, Japan had no choice but to interact with other states
in many ways. This was clearly acknowledged, as mentioned in Chapter 4, when Japan
shifted from a bilateral MOSS negotiation with the United States to a multilateral
negotion with the ICH. Political factors, such as the end of Cold War, also help explain
this shift, but here I have emphasized Japan's ambivalent encounter with globalization as
the boundary of the nation smashed into that of the state. While Japan represents itself as
racially homogenous, this reflects neither the facts nor how individuals think about
themselves. Racial homogeneity is purely a vision that contrasts Japan with the rest of the
world.
Surrounding the box that represents Japan in fig. 9.3 is the world, a fictitious
"other" at the center of debates between an agressive pharmacetuical industry and the
Japanese state. Japan finds Western practices inappropriate because of drug makers'
exclusive concern with the efficacy of their products, which are developed under a
cost-efficient logic with virtually no consideration of nonwhites in clinical trials. More
importantly, some fear that the full flowering of globalization will eradicate Japan.
Juliette Chung has pointed out the crucial role eugenics played in shaping Japan's
national ideology and identity (1999: 206-29). In Japan, Chung argued, Lamarckism was
a cultural logic by which the individual body related to a greater national and racial body.
To guarantee the survival of the national body, undesirable traits had to be removed. In
this view, the world resembles an ecosystem: every race and state has its distinct niche.
To avoid being eliminated by other states, Japan had to protect itself against hostile
outsiders. This conception did not change even after Japan encountered globalization at a
scientific, technology-oriented conference such as the ICH. Scholars like Murakami
Yoichiro think that Japan must play a role in shaping the ICH's safety guidelines because
the Japanese care more about health than others do (1998: 148, 153). Similarly, some
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MHLW officials thought that through the ICH Japan could export its excellent products to
more patients abroad. Even so, Japan's behavior in the ICH was more defensive than
aggressive and rarely did it try to impose its standards on other ICH countries. Japan
contended that global harmony had to be achieved without impinging on the uniqueness
of any state or race.
Hence the proposal that representative populations from Japan, Europe, and the
United States all be tracked in clinical trials. At the same time, Japan proposed moving to
the frontier of genomics, where a new definition of race could replace the current global
standards. Preaching the gospel of individualized medicine, it is sure for now that the
integrity of the Japanese state will be preserved. Of course, on the surface Japan has
sound, scientific grounds for this argument, because Japan can provide clinical data as the
representative of the Asian region. However, when Western experts suggested considering
data from other sources, the MHLW rejected the proposal, claiming that only ICH
countries were relevant (see Chapter 6).
This resonates with Okamoto Koji's division of Japanese regional diplomacy into
"Japan and Asia" and "Japan in Asia" (1998). At the ICH, the MHLW never considered
Japan a part of Asia. As fig. 9.3 shows, the ICH is an international entity, but it includes
only three countries and regions. The APEC network, shown as a broken box, is situated
outside this entity. Hayashi Yoshikazu of the MHLW nicely explained this situation
(2003). When talking about the future of the ICH in Asia, he preferred not to emphasize
Japan's peculiar role as the first and only Asian country invited into this global
conference; instead, speaking as an ICH member, he pointed out that the only channel for
other Asian countries to address issues treated at the ICH was the GCG.
Let me sum up the above worldview. As globalization sweeps over East Asia,
defacing all local traits, Japan's mission is to preserve its identity. Ideas about race
provide the motivation for this campaign, and the state pursues the plan of action and
benefits from it. Can this be a positive sign of the recurrence of Japan's nationalism?
Murakami clearly states that a race-sensitive state does not necessarily mean a nationalist
state. The state, he argues (1999: 91), is a collective agency representing various small
communities and societies within its territory. Fundamentally speaking, the "Japanese
race" does not have to have a biological reality in a strict sense; it is a social factor, a
collective belief that binds these communities together. Furthermore, this collective
vision is reinforced during its involvement in globalization.
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Taiwan, as shown at the center of fig. 9.4, falls outside of the world of the ICH. 9
But the primary problem for this country, as I have mentioned, is embedded in the
representational crisis of its nationality, which I have marked in the figure with broken
lines. Although globalization has affected how the Taiwanese people imagine their nation,
its identity at the global level remains unchanged, even after its remarkable economic
growth. The embarrassing rituals Taiwan has to go through to participate in the WHO's
annual World Health Assembly show just how difficult it might be to return to the world
stage.
Unlike studies that address only interactions within the ICH or discussions of
discrete topics, this thesis pays equal attention to how Taiwan presents its existence on
this global stage. In Chapter 5 I provided a comprehensive account on how some
individuals tried to create an institutional voice that would be heard by the entire world.
The first of the factors that contributed to the development of this voice and the
worldview it projects is the human factor, the medical technocrats with a clear memory of
what they think of as the "golden age" of Taiwan's public health, when the country
cooperated closely with international organizations. They are not bureaucrats who follow
commands but nationalists with a larger mission - saving their country from a
humiliating position. Reclaiming the golden past is not pure nostalgia since the
technocrats hope to return some of Taiwan's vanished luster.
The second factor is the organizational restrictions circumscribing Taiwan's contact
with the world. Since 1972 Taiwan's applications for membership have been rejected by
every organization affiliated with the United Nations and other intergovernmental
organizations. For historical reasons it has managed to retain its membership in two
organizations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the regional APEC. Although
there are still controversies about the name used for Taiwan at these organizations, they
are among the few gateways by which it can communicate with the world.'0 As I noted
earlier, the APEC is both a platform where the CDE can make itself heard and a channel
to the ICH."
9 I mentioned in Chapter 3 that Taiwan's vibrant economy allowed it to develop a sizable drug market,
but it produces almost no innovative pharmaceuticals. As a result, industry does not play a part in Taiwan's
relationships with the ICH.
10 Taiwan is formally called "Chinese Taipei" at the APEC and in the World Trade Organization it has
an even weirder name: "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu."
I I It is not necessary to make a list of comparison here between the WTO and the APEC. In short, the
APEC has several advantages the WTO does not have to make Taiwan a global voice. First, it is a network
operated on the basis of open regionalism and concerted unilateralism. Therefore, it is relatively easy to
propose a new project for cooperation. Second, despite it is a regional organization, but because of the
rising importance of East Asia, the APEC includes world powers such as the United States and Japan. Third,
originated from Asian Development Bank, the APEC has Taiwan as one of its founders and a major
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Fig. 9.4. The World of Pharmaceuticals from Taiwan's Viewpoint
l I C TDE,
lhailandi
(:.I)E, Siugapore/ Th;ailandSingaporehailnd
Other Asia-Pacific Region Networks
Note: ASEAN: Association of South-East Asia Nations; EMEA: European
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products; SDA: State Drug
Administration; SFDA: State Food and Drug Administration.
Organizational restrictions have shaped Taiwan's worldview and its voice as much
as have the technocrats who dream of returning Taiwan to its golden age. The existence
of Taiwan's statehood is problematic, so it is identified either through its regulatory
supporter, thus Taiwan has more bargain power than does in the WTO.
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authority, the CDE, or by the formal name it agreed to use at the APEC, "Chinese Taipei."
Taiwan's main stage at the ICH is the Network of Pharmaceutical Regulatory
Science-APEC Joint Research Project on Bridging Study. If we take a look at fig 9.4, we
notice that by putting Taiwan as its operational center, this network was constructed by
members committed to the bridging strategies Taiwan provides. Related to this, the
members of this network are as active as they are able to practice these strategies. Hence
only Japan and Korea are qualified and willing to serve as supporting members, sitting
beside Taiwan. Some ASEAN countries, such as Singapore and Thailand, are barely
visible at the margins of this network.
Here we should notice how Taiwan treats Japan within this network. Interestingly,
Taiwan does not consider Japan as an ICH member. Since the MHLW has no interest in
presenting other Asian countries' interests at the ICH, Taiwan would not expect it to
provide access to the ICH. Also, the MHLW and the CDE have different opinions about
the acceptance of foreign clinical data. Because the CDE follows the E5 guideline strictly,
it believes that it can communicate directly with other ICH members without the
mediation of the MHLW. According to this view, Japan remains significant but less
significant for Taiwan than Korea.
Even so, Taiwan knows perfectly well that if the CDE ever fails to perform
brilliantly, its existence can only be guaranteed by the discursive networks it creates. In
Chapter 5 I showed how the CDE connected directly to the ICH via the APEC by
attending GCG activities. The CDE restlessly made connections with other countries that
might be interested in bridging studies and tried to establish a regulatory platform for the
Asia-Pacific region (see fig. 9.4, lower right) - it even attempted to contact the
mysterious PRC. This is a complicated world consisting of various networks; through
them these medical technocrats successfully gave Taiwan an institutional voice and have
tried their best to maintain its voicing ability. But these connections are fragile: the CDE
could be replaced in the GCG at any time and its plans to "regionalize" bridging studies
may well fail. This world cannot be stabilized unless Taiwan manages to convince the
relevant organizations to make these networks permanent. And this Taiwan cannot do: its
voice is far too weak.
Let me sum up Taiwan's worldview. Taiwan's voice has been created by a group of
medical technocrats. By pursuing excellence in drug regulations, they not only skillfully
resisted the PhRMA's demands that Taiwan's barriers to pharmaceutical imports be
dropped, they crafted a scientific yet strategic bridging study that raised Taiwan's profile
at the ICH. Since the world is an issue-oriented, dynamic nexus, Taiwan has to keep
exploiting global trends to make more connections if it is to survive.
494
Now we have two East Asian worldviews. These are not just two different ways to
conceive of the world, they help us understand the priorities of these two entities that go
beyond mere politics. Furthermore, they indicate distinct social concerns or cultural
values (perspectives) usually ignored by policy analysts. And they prove that the norm
introduced by globalization does not ineluctably erase unique attributes. On the contrary,
Japan's systematic resistance to the attempt to draft a universal human standard and
Taiwan's fierce commitment to making its statehood visible demonstrate the need for an
ethnography. As presented in this thesis, transnational institutions have not led to the
decline of nation-states, but rather reinforce the prerogatives of such states. As long as
these prerogatives are reiterated, it can be expected that the aspiration to achieve full
nationhood will remain. In this sense, the debate over racial difference at the ICH is a
technoscientific outgrowth of Nakasone Yasuhiro and Lee Teng-Hui's hope to that their
countries might become "normal" in the era of globalization.
PART III
PARTIAL PERSPECTIVES AND MULTIPLE READERSHIPS
From Ethnographic Texts to the World of Texts
Finally, I will deal with the issue of the writing of cultures. This part serves as an
explication of the first part of this chapter, where I briefly discussed the notion of voice
and voicing, and of the questions I brought up in Chapter 1 concerning the reasons for
writing the present thesis and the readership I expect.
In order to combine the three ethnographies on which my thesis draws, it is
necessary to return to the analogy of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic universe (fig. 1.2). In this
cosmology, the state is like the lunar sphere in a cosmological model. When the United
States becomes the point of observation for the rest of the world, the state (in this case,
the U.S.) abruptly becomes unidentifiable because its domestic viewpoints more or less
affect the way world thinks and acts. It is an "America-centric" view of world and the
state many hold even when dealing with other states in the world. Only when the point of
observation is moved to another planet (for example, East Asia) do ethnographers realize
that the state is a lens shaping what they see. In the previous section I showed how such a
lens works by tracing how Taiwan and Japan control their domestic territories and how
they define their relationships with other countries. In keeping with the theoretical
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demands of contemporary anthropology, my thesis presents three worlds from different
viewpoints.
Fig. 9.5. Where Does the Truth of the Universe Rest? Left, The Copernican
Universe; Right, Scientific and Cultural Revolutions, Then and Now.
Source: Rice College website devoted to Galileo. http://galileo.rice.edu/
sci/theories/Copemicansystem.html (left). Cartoon by Leven Abrahamian,
in Fischer 2003: 337, Plate 29 (right).
One might ask which of these three is correct? During the scientific revolution the
Copernican model finally prevailed over the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic one, but that kind of
paradigm shift is not a possible outcome of the confrontation among perspectives that
takes place at the ICH. While questioning the American worldview is an important aspect
of my study, any essentialist assertion about the true nature of this worldview is dogmatic
and dangerous. Rather, the scientific revolution should be a zone where scholars of
science and technology studies can explore different ways to appreciate cultural practices,
social mobilization, and epistemological reorganization through and about science (fig.
9.5). Similarly, I have used the debate over racial difference at the ICH as a window into
the world of proprietary drugs. Mine is no Kuhnian thesis on the philosophy of science
and I do not deal much with how paradigms compete each other; instead, it is a historical
and ethnographic narrative investigating the dynamics at the interfaces between East Asia
and the bio-global world. Access to these worldviews is available only through a
sympathetic understanding of Japan's insistence on its racial uniqueness and Taiwan's
struggle to achieve normal statehood.
If I am not about to make a final judgment on this cultural encounter, why compare
these worldviews? In this final section, I will complete my ethnographic theory of voice
and voicing by adding a set of metaphors of vision, emphasizing the spatial aspect of
writerly agency. Vision is more ontological than voicing; it always presents a
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phenomenon that has meaning only for the seer, whereas voicing is more relational. The
three worldviews examined in my study are not incompatible: they can coexist because
they are situated and offer only partial perspectives.
Of course, this is not original. Donna Haraway built her scientific projects on just
this strategic argument (1991, Chapter 9). My take on globalization in East Asia closely
resembles her critical review of feminist science. In a discussion of "situated knowledge,"
Haraway rejected two feminist attempts to essentialize women's experience in science.
This experience was real and objective, she insisted, and the worldview it supported
could not be interpreted as relativistic or totalizing. 12 Explicitly relativistic approaches
fail to explain women's different worldviews among women with different experiences
and cannot generalize this worldview. Totalizing approaches lose their objective ground
while generalizing local experiences and make communication with other worldviews
more difficult. As Haraway said,
Relativism is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity;
both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make
it impossible to see well. Relativism and totalization are both "god-tricks"
promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully, common myths
in rhetorics surrounding Science. But it is precisely in the politics and
epistemology of partial perspectives that the possibility of sustained, rational,
objective enquiry rests. (191)
My efforts to construct and juxtapose three different ethnographies are due in no
small measure to this passage. I neither excoriate the West (the "objectivity" in
Haraway's quotation) nor do I glorify non-Western regions (feminist science Haraway
referred in her study). I neither dismiss universal modernity nor do I propose Asian
alternatives. The moral of this thesis is: preserve the rhetorical symmetry between
different worldviews. Although the worldview of the West is often portrayed as strong
and invincible, it is not a universal truth but a local culture. In accordance with this
narrative scheme, the worldviews of East Asia are somehow generalized (while,
paradoxically, remaining partial) in order to be set into symmetric correspondence with
the Western worldview.
I am not describing a cultural divide between East and West. I am not following the
fashionable line that opposes the global to the local. By demystifying the political and
12 This is an important argument because it is the basis on which Haraway builds her epistemological
agenda for feminist science. As she says, "Only [a] partial perspective promises objective vision" (1991:
190).
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economic concerns raised in the name of science and public health, I have shown the
temporal and cultural specificity of the logic behind the world of proprietary drugs. In the
same manner, by analyzing the tactics and strategies that the MHLW and the CDE used at
different times and in different situations, I describe the systematic, positioned
rationalities of countries long considered socially passive, technically fragmented, and
culturally superstitious. I make no claims for an objectively differentiated "Asian" culture
totally incommensurable with the West. As Haraway writes of feminism, it "resists the
politics of closure, finality, or, to borrow from Althusser, feminist objectivity resists
'simplification in the last instance"' (1991: 196). Whether global or local, here all
worldviews are treated symmetrically - only "god-tricks" are forbidden.
The present thesis presents a world of texts based on no particular viewpoint;
instead, it is a description, a story, told rather plainly. It casts the Asian states as its
writerly agencies, but they function in my thesis merely as actors. The theme of this
thesis is that which Bruno Latour has proposed for the ethnography of science (1993),
namely, the connections and relationships formed by states facing a new situation called
bio-globalization. Of course, this kind of narrative has a strong moral concern about
being seen and understood in a particular way. Addressing the competition bound to arise
among different visions, Haraway wrote, "Struggles over what will count as rational
accounts of the world are struggles over how to see" (1991: 194; emphasis in original).
My narrative includes not only reconstructions of new visions or worldviews; it demands
that various technologies reconstruct the process of a creation that might have been
erased by other visions.
Mostly, I am concerned about how such agencies and worldviews can appear in this
world of text, namely, this thesis. This is where it departs from a purely philosophical
investigation and where the auditory metaphors of voice and voicing are called upon. The
world of text is a presentation of what Mikhail Bakhtin called heteroglossia, the
interweaving of voices that meet to exchange ideas and opinions, which in turn generates
new meanings and signs that are not predictable in their original dialogic contexts. Before
comparing existing worldviews, I investigated how individual voices came into existence.
Since not every state can speak a line or two at the ICH, I differentiated between two sets
of technologies concerning the making of the voice. Moreover, Michael Fischer (2003)
reminded us of the importance of comparing different voices
as a form of critique by juxtaposition between cultural, moral, or social discourses,
where the juxtaposition would recognize that these were socially situated, that
they required further inquiry about their formation, efficacy, and place among
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contesting perspectives. Similarly, Writing Culture was an interdisciplinary effort
to draw attention to the complex rhetorical forms that professionals adopt, both to
encourage inquiry into the formation of expert cultures and to encourage
experimentation with a wider range of disciplinary tools to heighten the
multidimensionality of anthropological inquiry and analysis. (12)
In the present thesis, I have slighted neither traditional fieldwork nor traditional
ethnography more generally. This is definitely not either a playful experiment or an empty,
rhetorical construction. Rather, I champion the use of ethnography by emphasizing its
moral content, just as the pioneers of this discipline did 150 years ago. By giving voices
to the voiceless and juxtaposing them, ethnography can serve as a new form of
metanarrative, like the grand theories of the nineteenth century (Fischer 2003: 40).
From the World of Texts to an Ethnography of Globalization
Because reception is always multiple, because I am presenting different (and
contradictory) anthropological voices, my narrative has been focused on the global
discursive fields surrounding the ICH and the different voices in the debate on racial
difference. The juxtaposition of distinct worldviews involves readers in ethical issues tied
to reading and writing.
Some have suggested to me that the ICH is so idiosyncratic that it cannot possibly
provide the basis for generalization. Certainly, the discussions held at the ICH are highly
technical, but this does not disqualify them from shedding new light on the state and
globalization. Others have said that the ICH is too complicated for the sort of focus
needed in a serious investigation. It is true that, like many global institutions, the ICH
belongs to a particular domain; it is related to the fields of medical policy, public health,
capitalism, globalization and regionalism, bodily politics, and many others. This very
complexity is why I have limited my scope to a highly discrete issue and prepared my
narrative with certain readers in mind.
The value of the present study can be judged only by the people for whom it was
written. I have borne three kinds of readers in mind: cultural anthropologists who want to
understand globalization and new ways to deal with it, regional researchers on East Asia,
and analysts of medical policies. Certainly cultural anthropologists are my principal
audience. Using the debate over racial difference as an example, the present thesis not
only creates new subjects, fields, and technologies for ethnography, it also proves that
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ethnography is still a useful tool for capturing the changing world of science and
technology. As for new subjects, my study shows that the state is an appropriate subject
of ethnographic inquiry. Like other artifacts created by modernity, the state is a regulatory
body, an intermediate matrix between individuals and the world. Although it cannot be
felt by most of its people, who do not visit other states, the state is not transparent: it does
not faithfully deliver to the local at the behest of the world. If it is to interact with others
while maintaining its ruling legitimacy, the state has to create ways to survive, develop
visions, and accomplish goals. In addition, in order to make ethnography feasible at an
international level, I have treated conferences as international fields.
I have also developed several technologies seldom applied together in anthropology.
First of all, in investigating a modem institution such as the scientific conference, the
ethnographer most employ a rather free definition of fieldwork, including interviews,
archival research, and analysis of legal documents and e-mail communications. Second,
to study modern societies, I have relied on documents in local languages to grasp how the
state conceives of itself and the world. Third, to deal with a universal culture such as
science, I have approached it from outside, using social factors to disassemble the logic
of science from within. In other words, a careful reading of scientific materials is
necessary.
I have one more note for cultural anthropologists on how to treat old concepts like
the state and race in their future works. One of the elements crucial to the construction of
nation-states and nationalism, race was perhaps the first to be challenged by and buried
under the waves of globalization. This has been particularly true of East Asian states,
where the "imagined communities" are shored up by many factors other than race. But
when anthropologists hastily shift their subjects from biological race to socially driven
factors such as ethnicity, class, or gender, it is time to remind them that the epistemic
configuration of race, though fictitious, has not been completely usurped by talk of
populations and the genome (Haraway 1997: Chapter 6). These up-to-date subjects are
part of the discussion of Japanese national character, a discussion in which visions of race
thrive. As a social concept, race is fluid and always questionable. It can be an essential
part of Japan's insistence on equal representation in clinical trials; nonetheless, it is easily
dropped when it is time to construct the CDE's policy on bridging studies. And like other
social factors in anthropology, race works as a probe or a lens to excite the observer's
attention.
My second group of readers, specialists in regional studies, may find in my study
some new ideas about what the local means in a global context. This is particularly true
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for Japan and Taiwan, which have been viewed as racist and willful. I want to show that
both dichotomies between the East and the West and between culture and science are no
longer appropriate in the technoscientific world, where science and culture penetrate each
other, as do the global and the local.
Consider, for instance, the Japanese race under globalization. In a famous article by
James Fallows entitled "Containing Japan" (1989), the influence of exposure to freer
societies was pondered:
The millions of Japanese who travel overseas each year, and the hundreds of
thousands posted to foreign countries on long assignments, presumably come
home with a more open, internationalized point of view. Eventually they will
demand a fairer political system and a more consumer-minded economy, and will
open their society in the way it is now most closed: the visceral reaction against
non-Japanese intruders among the "pure race" Japanese. At that point, according
to the optimists, Japanese and Americans (and other foreigners) will work
alongside one another as individuals, aware of their national identities but not
separated by them.
But this argument is a straw man, says Fallows, who insists that Japan is much more
stubborn than people think. I do not know who is right, but the familiar contrast of Japan
and the world deserves careful examinations. Of course, as I described in Chapter 8,
kokusaika has complicated the landscape of the Japanese minzoku over the past two
decades. But this does not mean that Japan cannot build its global nationhood by shifting
to a "consumer-minded economy." The nation-state of Japan should be conceived in its
establishment of locality, yet this locality should always be related to its attempts to
participate in globalization. While Chapter 4 records Japan's participation in the ICH as a
step toward globalization, Chapter 6 sees Japan's move toward a genomic definition of
race as an attempt to impose a new global standard. Cultural resistance is a term for a
bilateral world: we need a new framework, a topology that maps the complicated twists
and folds of the spaces where we live and think.
Similarly, Taiwan's diplomatic problems should be seen in a global context instead
of an international one. The problem here is not whether Taiwan should be a country or
not; at stake is Taiwan's "nationalist reality," something Horng-leun Wang defined as "the
reality that is defined, reified, and reproduced by institutions of nation-states or their
agents" (2002: 141). Again, this locality has to be understood together with the global. In
another paper, Wang (2000) has suggested that Taiwan's nationalistic politics, which are
par excellence of an international nature, are intertwined with its involvement with such
effects of globalization as transnational mobility and cultural experience overseas. The
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distinction between the international and the domestic does not match the phenomenon
examined in the present study. The reality is that with the advent of globalization,
Taiwanese no longer need to go abroad to feel their country as a whole in the world; this
embarrassing, weird identity can be seen and felt even in domestic scenes. The CDE's
performance at the 2003 APEC welcoming banquet is just one example.
The controversy at the 2001 Asian Women's Football Championship, which was
hosted in Taipei, is an example of what Michael Billig (1995: 6) calls "banal
nationalism," namely, "the ideological habits which enable the established nations in the
world to be reproduced." Organized by the Asian Football Confederation, this biannual
championship has been held for over a quarter of a century. The myth that political
differences do not exist in sports permits North Korea, South Korea, the PRC, and Taiwan
to attend. However, in compliance with International Olympic Committee rules, Taiwan's
national colors are replaced by its Olympic flag (fig. 5.3, upper left). While this rule is
always applied in international sporting events, it was galling for Taiwanese athletes and
spectators to be confronted with the flag of the PRC flying on Taiwanese soil and not a
proper Taiwanese flag in sight. It cannot have come as a great surprise when a number of
Taiwanese soccer fans brought Taiwanese flags to the soccer stadium. When police
officers tried to stop the fans from waving the national flag, fights broke out. Later
criticism of Taipei's mayor was met with the official statement that the city government
had only followed international conventions. 3 A globalized Taiwan has prepared for its
people a stage on which the drama of national identity is played out. The sense of
injustice, of being an "international orphan," can be found in every field. As Wang
Horng-leun reminded us (2001: 255), "Inasmuch as the nation-state's institutions imply a
complete social entity, no place can be ruled out as a battlefield when it comes to
nationalist politics."
My analysis of the ICH can show medical policymakers, the third group of readers,
how traditional international organizations, such as the WHO, remain oblivious to trends
in healthcare that involve heavy investments of industry and capitalist logic. To identify
the pressing issues confronting organizations charged with international health, I have
proposed moving away from institutional hierarchies and toward the dynamic relations
among regulators and drug makers. Though communication among anthropologists and
policymakers faltered for a long time, there are excellent works on the vertical structure
'3 In fact, as the National Council on Physical Fitness and Sports explained, no rules prohibit spectators
from waving flags at international sporting events. Presumably the police actions were dictated by political
concerns and pressure from Beijing.
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of health policy practice, such as Judith Justice's analysis (1986) of the aid administered
in Nepal by the WHO. By tracing this institutional structure from the global level to rural
villages, and by investigating the cultural concerns that exist at each level, Justice showed
how anthropologists can help fill in the communication gaps between the levels. The
present thesis is a similar attempt to lay out the structure of health policy in the era of
globalization. I have tried (Kuo 2003, 2005) to heed Justice's suggestion that
anthropologists need to present the information they collect in a form that planners can
use (Justice 1986: 154).
The explosion of online pharmacies and medical tourism (for example, cosmetic
surgery trips to Thailand and Venezuela, organ sales in the PRC and India) represent
major challenges to the state's commitment to protecting its people's health. In this sense,
my study may appeal to those who are interested in learning about race and state in East
Asia. Japan and Taiwan bring their own concerns to ICH meetings, and these are often
unrelated to health per se. But rather than think of these concerns as political, we should
think of them as a hybrid of political and health concerns. Relatively homogenous
nonwhite populations need to be protected against the rampant imposition of medical
standards based on Western ideas. This resistance is cultural, and it has to be done
through the state.
This reminds me of the rather odd conclusion to the ICH-GCG meeting I attended
in July 2003. Rather abruptly, the committee invited Francis P. Grawley, the
representative of Strategic Initiative for Developing Capacity in Ethical Review, to
explain how ethical codes in clinical trials could be standardized. Although his
presentation was interesting, nobody paid any attention - they had other concerns. The
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, as always, did not really care about ethical
issues: they only really care about lowering the cost of these trials. The developing
countries, which cannot afford good clinical trials, saw such matters as utterly irrelevant
to themselves. Some countries that do conduct fine trials remained silent: the struggles
they have undergone because of racial difference have haunted them for over ten years,
and should such a standard come into being they have no idea how population differences
will be handled. After a long and embarrassing silence, the meeting was concluded.
After reviewing how the present thesis can evoke different sets of questions and
issues in different readers, I want to conclude by citing Michael Fischer's portrait of
culture:
Culture is not a variable; culture is relational, it is elsewhere, it is in passage, it is
where meaning is woven and renewed, often through gaps and silences, and
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forces beyond the conscious control of individuals, and yet the space where
individual and institutional social responsibility and ethical struggle take place.
(2003: 7)
I wonder whether this portrait applies to states at the global level, if we swap the words
state for individual and global for society. Globalization does not sweep all things away,
as many have claimed; in the genomic/global world the state and races take on new lives.
I have tried to depict the culture of globalization and how it changes and is changed by
struggles and discussions over the state and race. Nation-states may eventually decline,
but they are thriving today and will thrive tomorrow. Like it or not, people still need a
nationality and the state is an indispensable category in the institutionalized grid of the
world. Gellner was right: in the age of globalization, the state still matters.
As I take my leave, let me borrow Tonio's last line in Pagliacci to announce the end
of this social (melo)drama: La comedia efinita (the story is over).
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Appendix 1: Basic Information on the ICH Conferences
ICH Dates Places Numbers of
conferences participants
ICH I November 6-8, 1991 Brussels, Belgium about 1,200
ICH2 October 27-29, 1993 Orlando, Florida about 1,600
ICH3 November 29-December 1, 1995 Yokohama, Japan about 2,400
ICH4 July 16-18, 1997 Brussels, Belgium about 1,600
ICH5 November 9-11, 2000 San Diego, California 1,309
ICH6 November 12-15, 2003 Osaka, Japan over 1,800
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Appendix 2: ICH guidelines, 1991-2003
Note:
The ICH set a highly technically process for making guidelines; even so, as seen in this
appendix, it has achieved the finalization of fifty-six guidelines, including twenty-three in
the category of quality, fifteen in that of safety, and fourteen in that of efficacy, along with
four multidisciplinary guidelines. Every ICH member has different processes for the
implementation of these guidelines, which, adopted from the ICH website
(http://www.ich.org) in alphabetical order, will be introduced in the following:
EU. The ICH guidelines were submitted to the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal
Products (CPMP) for endorsement once they have reached Step 2 or Step 4 of the ICH
Process. The CPMP decided on the duration for consultation with interested parties
(usually six months). The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
(EMEA) publishes and distributes the Step 2 drafts of guidelines for comments. At Step 4
the drafts are endorsed by the CPMP and a timeframe for implementation is established
(usually six months). The guidelines are subsequently published by the European
Commission in Volume III of the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European
Union.
FDA. When Step 2 or Step 4 drafts have been reached, FDA publishes a notice with the
full text of the guidance in the Federal Register. Notices for the Step 2 drafts of
guidelines include a date for receipt of written comment; the Step 4 drafts of guidelines
are available for use on the date they are published in the Federal Register.
MHLW. When Step 2 or Step 4 drafts have been reached, the ICH texts are translated into
Japanese. Subsequently Pharmaceutical and Medical Safety Bureau (PMSB) Notification
for the promulgation or consultation of guidelines is written in Japanese issued with a
deadline for comments in the case of consultation drafts, or an implementation date for
finalized guidelines. The notifications on guidelines in Japanese and also English
attachments (ICH Texts) are available from PMSB or on the website of the National




Topic Guidelines Date of implementation
number (Step Five)
QIA Stability testing of new drug substances All regions 1994
and products
QIA Stability testing of new drug substances All regions 2001
(R1) and products (first revision)
QIA Stability testing of new drug substances CPMP March 2003
(R2) and products (second revision)
MHLW June 2003
FDA November 2003
QIB Photostability Testing of New Drug CPMP December 1996
Substances and Products MHLW May 1997
FDA May 1997
Q1C Stability Testing for New Dosage Forms CPMP December 1996
MHLW May 1997
FDA May 1997
Q1D Bracketing and Matrixing Designs for CPMP February 2002
Stability Testing of Drug Substances and
Drug Products MHLW July 2002
FDA January 2003
Q1E Evaluation of Stability Data CPMP March 2003
MHLW June 2003
FDA June 2004
Q1F Stability Data Package for Registration CPMP March 2003
Applications in Climatic Zones III and IV MHLW June 2003
FDA November 2003




Q2B Validation of Analytical Procedures: CPMP December 1996
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Methodology MHLW October 1997
FDA May 1997
Q3A Impurities in New Drug Substances All regions 1995
Q3A (R) Impurities in New Drug Substances CPMP February 2002
(Revised) MHLW December 2002
FDA February 2003
Q3B Impurities in New Drug Products All regions 1997
Q3B (R) Impurities in New Drug Products (revised) CPMP March 2003
MHLW June 2003
FDA November 2003
Q3C Impurities: Guideline for Residual CPMP September 1997
Solvents MHLW March 1998
FDA December 1997
Q3C Impurities: Guideline for Residual CPMP September 2002
(M) Solvents (Maintenance) MHLW December 2002
FDA November 2003
Q5A Viral Safety Evaluation of Biotechnology CPMP April 1997
Products Derived from Cell Lines of MHLW February 2000
Human or Animal Origin FDA September 1998
Q5B Quality of Biotechnological Products: CPMP December 19995
Analysis of the Expression Construct in
Cells Used for Production of r-DNA MHLW January 1998
Derived Protein Products FDA February 1996
Q5C Quality of Biotechnological Products: CPMP December 1995
Stability Testing of MHLW January 1998
Biotechnological/Biological Products FDA July 1996
Q5D Derivation and Characterisation of Cell CPMP September 1997
Substrates Used for Production of MHLW July 2000
Biotechnological/Biological Products FDA September 1998
Q5E Comparability of CPMP November 2003
Biotechnological/Biological Products
Subject to Changes in Their MHLW May 2004
Manufacturing Process FDA March 2004
Q6A Specifications : Test Procedures and CPMP November 1999
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Acceptance Criteria for New Drug MHLW May 2001
Substances and New Drug Products: FDA December 2000
Chemical Substances
Q6B Specifications : Test Procedures and CPMP March 1999
Acceptance Criteria for MHLW May 2001
Biotechnological/Biological Products FDA August 1999
Q7A Good Manufacturing Practice Guide for CPMP November 2000
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients MHLW November 2001
FDA September 2001
Safety
Topic Guidelines Date of implementation
number (Step Five)
SIA Guideline on the Need for Carcinogenicity CPMP December 1995
Studies of Pharma- ceuticals MHLW April 1997
FDA March 1996
SI B Testing for Carcinogenicity of CPMP September 1997
Pharmaceuticals MHLW July 1998
FDA February 1998
S 1C Dose Selection for Carcinogenicity All regions 1994-1996
Studies of Pharmaceuticals
SIC (R) Addendum: Addition of a Limit Dose and CPMP September 1997
Related Notes MHLW July 1998
FDA March 1997
S2A Guidance on Specific Aspects of CPMP September 1995
Regulatory Genotoxicity Tests for MHLW July 1996
Pharmaceuticals FDA April 1996
S2B Genotoxicity: A Standard Battery for CPMP September 1997
Genotoxicity Testing for Pharma- MHLW July 1998
ceuticals FDA November 1997
S3A Note for Guidance on Toxicokinetics: The CPMP November 1994
Assessment of Systemic Exposure in MHLW July 1996
Toxicity Studies FDA March 1995
S3B Pharmacokinetics: Guidance for Repeated CPMP November 1994
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Dose Tissue Distribution Studies MHLW July 1996
FDA March 1995
S4 Text on Validation of Analytical All regions 1993
Procedures
S4A Duration of Chronic Toxicity Testing in CPMP November 1998
Animals (Rodent and Non-Rodent MHLW April 1999
Toxicity Testing) FDA June 1999
S5A Detection of Toxicity to Reproduction for CPMP September 1993
Medicinal Products MHLW July 1994
FDA September 1994
S5B (M) Maintenance of the ICH Guideline on CPMP December 1995
Toxicity to Male Fertility: An Addendum MHLW April 1997
to the Guideline on Detection of Toxicity FDA April 1996
to Reproduction for Medicinal Products
S6 Preclinical Safety Evaluation of CPMP September 1997
Biotechnology-Derived Pharmaceuticals MHLW February 2000
FDA November 1997
S7A Safety Pharmacology Studies for Human CPMP November 2000
Pharmaceuticals MHLW June 2001
FDA July 2001
Efficacy
Topic Guidelines Date of implementation
number (Step Five)
El The Extent of Population Exposure to CPMP November 1994
Assess Clinical Safety for Drugs Intended MHLW May 1995
for Long-Term Treatment of FDA March 1995
Non-Life-Threatening Conditions
E2A Clinical Safety Data Management: CPMP November 1994
Definitions and Standards for Expedited MHLW March 1995
Reporting FDA March 1995
E2B (M) Maintenance of the Clinical Safety Data CPMP November 2000
Management including: Data Elements MHLW March 2001
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for Transmission of Individual Case FDA April 2002
Safety Reports (Version 4.4.1)
E2C Clinical Safety Data Management: CPMP December 1996
Periodic Safety Update Reports for MHLW March 1997
Marketed Drugs FDA May 1997
E2C (A) Periodic Safety Update Reports for CPMP March 2003
Marketed Drugs MHLW April 2003
FDA February 2004
E2D Post-Approval Safety Data Management: CPMP November 2003
Definitions and Standards for Expedited MHLW
Reporting FDA
E3 Structure and Content of Clinical Study CPMP December 1995
Reports MHLW May 1996
FDA July 1996
E4 Dose-Response Information to Support CPMP May 1994
Drug Registration MHLW July 1994
FDA November 1994
E5 Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of CPMP March 1998
Foreign Clinical Data MHLW August 1998
FDA June 1998
E5 Ethnic Factors in the Acceptability of CPMP November 2003
(Q&A) Foreign Clinical Data MHLW February 2004
Questions & Answers FDA June 2004
E6 Good Clinical Practice : Consolidated CPMP July 1996
Guideline MHLW March 1997
FDA May 1997
E7 Studies in Support of Special CPMP September 1993
Populations : Geriatrics MHLW December 1993
FDA July 2001
E8 General Considerations for Clinical Trials CPMP September 1997
MHLW April 1998
FDA December 1997




ElO Choice of Control Group and Related CPMP July 2000
Issues in Clinical Trials MHLW February 2001
FDA May 2001
El11 Clinical Investigation of Medicinal CPMP July 2000
Products in the Pediatric Population MHLW December 2000
FDA April 2000
Multidisciplinary guidelines
Topic Guidelines Date of implementation
number (Step Five)
M 1 Medical Terminology All regions 1999
M2/ Electronic Standards for Transmission of All regions February 2001
E2B (M) Regulatory Information (ESTRI)
M2/ Electronic Common Technical Document CPMP November 2003
eCTD MHLW May 2004
FDA
M3 Timing of Pre-clinical Studies in Relation FDA November 1997
to Clinical Trials MHLW November 1998
FDA November 1997
M4 The Common Technical Document CPMP November 2003
MHLW May 2004
FDA
(R): revision; (M): maintenance; (A): Addendum. (Q&A): questions and answers.
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Terms and Names in East Asian Languages
Note:
It is always a problem when people deal with topics outside of the English-speaking
world. Researchers who do not know East Asian languages may prefer translations rather
than romanization of these terms. However, the necessity of accuracy must be stressed
that translations would unacceptably change the meaning of these terms. More
importantly, people who have mastered the languages will want to know precisely what
the author has translated, particularly since the names and terms are often rendered in
English or roman letters in several different ways. For these purposes, in this thesis some
terms and names are retained in romanization to indicate their Asian origins, and tables
are provided to correlate these terms with the local languages from which they are
phonically transcribed.
Like other literature concerning this region, Japanese and Taiwanese personal names are
given in the local manner, surname followed by given name unless quoted or appearing in
the materials written in English. Some readers may also have difficulties in distinguishing
among the numerous names of Asian people that occur in this thesis. Nakamura,
Nagamura, Nakayama, Chang, Chung, Cheng are all distinctive names when articulated
in their languages, but in English they tend to blur. On the other hand, some names that
look distinctive, such as Chern and Cheng or Kuo and Quo, are in fact different spellings
of the same character. It is particularly common in Taiwan where there exist no rigid
regulations imposing a "standard" way of romanization for people's names. I do not
apologize for this, since to tell these names is a starting point to achieve a mutual
understanding on these people and their activities studied. In addition, everyone has the
freedom to choose the way s/he prefers to be called. Thus, in the following correlation
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